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I. INTRODUCTION
With the collapse of Communism and the Cold War geopolitical order,
three interrelated tendencies surfaced; the growing disempowerment of
ideologies based on modem rationality,' the formation of a new transnational
order with an integrated financial system, standards of production and
consumption; and, the relative decline of the centralized nation state, and
modem territorial sovereignty
The escalation of ethnopolitical conflicts is shaped by both indigenous
factors and global constraints.' Levels of communal interaction shape
intercommunal conflicts. For ethnopolitical conflicts, both the international
system and the relations between and within nation states must be considered.4
Within the international system, the flow of capital, ideas, nationalism and the
use of hegemonic power affect the escalation of conflict between and within
states. The vitality of micro-nationalist issues within state structures has
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I. Fred Pearson et al., Overcoming Wilsonianism: American Conflict Resolution and Ethnic
Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING
POINTS IN ETHNOPOLrrITCAL CONFLICTS 23-40 (SeAn Byrne & Cynthia Irvin, eds. 2000).
2. Id.
3. CONFLICT RESOLUTION: DYNAMICS, PROCESS AND STRUCTURE (Ho-Won Jeong, ed. 1999).
4. ANDREA K. GROVE & NEAL A. CARTER, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, NOT ALL BLARNEY IS CAST
IN STONE: INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 725 (1999).
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produced protracted ethnopolitical conflict resulting in micro-macro tensions,
and zero-sum stalemates.
The nation state is losing some of its initial power of a self-evident
collective identity, a common good, and a self-governing legitimacy.5 Social
and class identities are being replaced in some areas with ethnic, religious, and
territorial affiliations.6 These new identities now strive for self-determination,
celebrate ritualistic group meanings and norms, and cause ethnoterritorial
mobilization, ethnopolitical conflicts, state fragmentation, and regionalism
around the world.7
Globalization has worked to reinforce these local particularisms and
allegiances in response to the economic identity constructed by the global
markets transnational hegemonic order. Instead of a straightforward
manifestation of laissez faire capitalism, enshrined in the rule of law and
prosperity under the constructivism of international liberalism or post-modern
condition, the new order disclosed a surprising resemblance to pre-modern
disorder fueled by instability and turmoil, counter mobilization, and ethnic
cleansing for the pursuit of cultural homogeneity and ethnic purity.9 It is a truly
intellectual effort to try to make sense of this "pulp fiction"--a transition
between refugees, Netscape, Gerry Adams, McDonalds, Jihad, Disney,
Domestic Violence, Corporate Downsizing, and Sarajevo.
Since the end of the Cold War, ethnopolitical conflicts have increased in
frequency and intensity.'l However, communal or ethnic conflict is not simply
a post-Cold War phenomenon. During the 1960s, modernization theorists
argued such 'tribal' conflicts were primitive and would eventually erode as
industrialization, communications, technology, and international trade spread."
5. John Agnew, The Geopolitical Context of Contemporary Ethnopolitical Conflict, in
RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS 98 (Sedn Byrne & Cynthia
Irvin, eds., 2000).
6. SOCIAL CONFLICTS AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES (Patrick G. Coy et al., eds. 2000).
7. PEACE IN THE MIDST OF WARS: PREVENTING AND MANAGING INTERNATIONAL ETHNIC
CONFLICTS (David Carment & Patrick James, eds. 1998).
8. Agnew, supra note 5, at 98-125.
9. HUGH MIALL ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT
& TRANSFORMATION OF DEADLY CONFLICTS (Polity Press 2000) (1999).
10. Ted Robert Gurr, The Ethnic Basis of Political Action in the 1980s and 1990s, Sketch: Turks
in Germany: From Guest Workers to Ethnoclass, in PEOPLE V. STATES: MINORITIES AT RISK IN THE NEW
CENTURY 3, 21 (2000).
11. SAMIR AMIN, IMPERIALISM AND UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (Monthly Rev. Press 1977) (1976);
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Dependency and Development in Latin America, 74 NEW LEFT REV. 83 (1972);
Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60 THE AMER. ECONOMIC REV. 231, 231-236 (1970)
available at http://www.jstor.org; ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CRITIQUE AND ANTI-CRMQuE: ESSAYS ON
DEPENDENCE AND REFORMISM (1984).
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The eruption of ethnonationalism in the "developed West" cast doubt on the
prospects for integration and the future of the multi-ethnic state. Britain, the
world's first industrial nation and model of stable democracy, became racked
by ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland and the rise of nationalism in Scotland
and Wales) 2 Prosperous Canada has experienced great difficulties in trying to
accommodate ethnonational sentiment in Quebec. 3
While cooperative relations among groups maintaining disparate linguistic,
religious, and cultural customs do not necessarily constitute the exception to the
rule, relations are often strained during periods of social and economic
disruptions, scarcity, uncertainty, and fear. 4 Unfortunately, the underlying
issues associated with periods of political transition (for example, corruption,
mismanagement, and ineptitude) are often obscured by the nationalistic rhetoric
of opportunists who find it advantageous to play the 'ethnic card' and foster
ethnic strife rather than risk their own political demise. 5
During colonial times, in central Africa, Belgian authorities transformed
neighbors into enemies by issuing Rwandans cards designed to establish their
identity. This campaign institutionalized and helped provide racial rationale for
subsequent Tutsi domination. 6 The rampant economic and political uncertainty
that engulfed Eastern Europe during the latter part of the 1980s drew a number
of unscrupulous politicians out of the woodwork. 17 Responding with repression
to irredentism, the Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria, and the Chausesco regime in
Romania, for example, stepped up their campaign of 'Regeneration' and the
creation of nationally pure states. In Bulgaria the 'Regeneration Process' aimed
to force assimilation under a national civil code, coercing Bulgarian Turks and
Slavic Muslims (pomaks) to adopt Bulgarian names. The policy of
Regeneration was also responsible for closing mosques, forbidding the use of
the Turkish language in public places, and discouraging cultural and religious
practices, and the Islamic consultation creed (sher'a). Very similar in form
were the assimilatory policies adopted by the Romanian government to erase the
Hungarian ethnic identity of the population in Transylvania. In 1989, Zhivkov's
12. MICHAEL HECHTER, INTERNAL COLONIALISM: THE CELTIC FRINGE IN BRITISH NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 1536-1966 (1975).
13. Neal Carter & Sedn Byrne, The Dynamics of Social Cubism: A View From Northern Ireland
and Quebec, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT 41 (Sedn Byrne
& Cynthia L. Irvin eds., 2000).
14. See generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985).
15. See generally PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Tom Woodhouse & Oliver
Ramsbotham eds., 2000).
16. George McCall & Miranda Duncan, South Africa's National Peace Accord and Laue's
Developmental Vision for Community Conflict Intervention, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS
IN ETHNOPOLmCAL CONFLICTS 154-73 (Sein Byrne & Cynthia Irvin, eds. 2000).
17. Pearson et al., supra note 1.
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nationalist campaign led to a mass exodus of Bulgarian Turks and pomaks to
Turkey and had devastating repercussions for the Bulgarian economy that
caused a chain of additional repressive measures by the regime.'8 Such coercive
measures included forced labor and the sending of urbanites to the countryside
to gather the harvest. In the same year, the massacre in Timisvar, Transylvania,
triggered the Rumanian anti-Communist revolution and the fall of Chausesco's
totalitarian regime.
In general, authoritarian states (for example, Franco's Spain, Zhivkov's
Bulgaria, Tito's Yugoslavia, Melosovic's Serbia, and Chausesco's Romania)
failed miserably at suppressing ethnic expression indefinitely. From another
perspective, the vacuum left after the failure of the Communist mobilizational
appeal was seen by both nationalist contra-elite and the travestying former
Communist nomenclature as a potential benefit to be recaptured. As a result of
the political vacuum, all former Communist countries who once adopted federal
territorial organization (USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) collapsed with
the dissipation of centralized planning and a once privileged Communist
nomenclature system. 9
In contrast, the liberal democratic state (Britain, France, Canada, the
United States, and Germany) has tried to make ethnicity irrelevant by urging the
members of ethnic groups to join the "mainstream." But even liberal
democratic states cannot break the chains of their past.20 Long and complex
local histories of strife, grievances, national identity, irredentism, nationalism,
sovereignty, and political violence have helped to shape hostile and extremist
behavior between ethnic groups in states within Africa, South East Asia,
Europe, the Middle East, and North America. 2' Historical biases, oppression
and hatreds, strong group loyalties and core ethnic identities, collective
memories of past glories, traumas and grievances have caused physical and
emotional injury that have brutalized peoples.22 Bloody Sunday, Enniskillen,
Omagh, Hebron, Netzarim, Soweto and the Boipatang Massacres, for example,
have all left indelible marks in the memories, culture and folklore of people in
Northern Ireland, Israel, and South Africa.23 Failures by academics and policy
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. MIALL ET AL., supra note 9.
21. See generally JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT,
DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION (1966).
22. See generally JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY BASED CONFLICTS (1997); VAMIKVOLKAN,
BLOOD LINES, FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO ETHNIC TERRORISM (1997).
23. Sedn Byme, Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa at a Crossroads: Understanding
Intergroup Conflict, Peace-Building, and Conflict Resolution, 28 INT'L J. OF GROUP TENSIONS 231, 231-53
(1999); Sefn Byrne, Power Politics as Usual in Cyprus and Northern Ireland: Divided Islands and the Roles
of External Ethno-Guarantors, 6 NATIONALISM & ETHIC POL'S. 1, 1-23 (2000).
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analysts alike to recognize and to address both the pervasive and ubiquitous
means by which ethnicity influences the political, social, economic, and
territorial dimensions of multi-ethnic states have, undoubtedly, contributed to
the exile, flight, homelessness and deaths of those caught up in the violence that
ethnic conflict so frequently produces.'
Peace is a time-consuming process, and the problems associated with rising
unemployment and poverty, and the distribution of resources among ethnic
groups, can strain political settlements.25 The violence of radical groups outside
of the peace process can exert polarizing pressures on the peacemakers. For
example, the recent activities of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic
Jihad, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip put tremendous pressure on Ehud Barak
to resign as Prime Minister of Israel.
Consequently, the challenge confronting researchers and conflict resolution
practitioners is to try to understand the historical and cultural depth of ethnic
nationalism that has demonstrated tremendous resiliency within "ethnopolitical"
conflicts.26 We need to take into account why structural inequalities, political
dynamics, communal identities, cultural attributes, group loyalties, cognitive
differences and fear of the other often reinforced by the mass media and
education increasingly drive and fuel ethnic conflict if we are to derive and
successfully apply conflict resolution techniques, processes, and models to such
conflicts.27 It may be more appropriate now to try to understand local level
culture because indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution may create new
opportunities for the just settlement of protracted ethnic conflicts. 2 Introducing
new applications of conflict resolution will involve closer contact between
conflict resolution practitioners and a wide variety of grassroots groups and
institutions-trade unions, police, schools, church-linked groups, professional
organizations, and community groups among others.29  Consequently,
practitioners have to be aware of the dynamics of intergroup conflict, assist in
building essential interpersonal skills, and introduce appropriate conflict
24. CONFLICT RESOLUTION: DYNAMICS, PROCESS AND STRUCTURE, supra note 3.
25. See generally JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN
DIVIDED SOCIEnES (1997).
26. See generally DR. LOUISE DIAMOND & AMBASSADOR JOHN MCDONALD, MULTI-TRACK
DIPLOMACY: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PEACE (3d ed. 1996).
27. SeAn Byme & Loraleigh Keashly, Working with Ethno-Political Conflict: A Multi-Modal
Approach, 7 INT'L. PEACEKEEPING 97, 97-120(2000).
28. JoHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS
CULTURES (1995).
29. DIAMOND & McDONALD, supra note 26.
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resolution mechanisms that reduce and dissolve fears and suspicions between
opposing communities.30
II. THE ANALYTICAL POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL CUBISM
As the dynamics of conflict change, so must the dynamics of conflict
intervention techniques.3' If we are to successfully apply conflict analysis and
resolution models to modem conflict, we need to take fully into account why
structural inequalities, political dynamics, communal identities, group loyalties,
cognitive differences and fear of the other increasingly drive and fuel ethnic
conflict.32 Consequently, one of the foremost challenges confronting conflict
resolution researchers and practitioners is to understand the historical and
cultural depth of the ethnic nationalism that has demonstrated tremendous
resiliency within ethnopolitical conflicts.33 Simultaneously, we must accurately
assess the institutions and mechanisms inherent in the construction of social
conflict as well as those designed to help heal and rebuild individuals,
communities and societies after intense conflict.34 For example, while the wars
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Rwanda and South Africa may
be largely over, it is still not clear what kind of institutions and techniques are
necessary to assist these societies in building a positive, just, and lasting peace.
This, among others, is just one of the many challenges with which existing
models of conflict resolution and transformation are presently confronted.
Models of conflict resolution based on Western cultural mores, values and
styles of inclusion, and exclusion do not fully take into account the historical
and cultural depth of the ethnic nationalism that has continued to persist despite
the reconfiguration of the global order. Similarly, these models produce a
superficial analysis of other social conflicts, such as those persisting within
institutions and local communities. The superficial analysis of such conflicts
can propose solutions that are infeasible, often polarizing the key stakeholders
and locking them into protracted conflict.35 In other words, conventional
approaches to managing such complex conflict often fail as a result of poor
analysis of the underlying dynamics that fuel systemic conflicts in the midst of
30. LEDERACI, supra note 28
31. RONALD J. FISHER, INTERACTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PIONEERS, POTENTIAL, AND
PROSPECTS (1997).
32. Byrne & Keashly, supra note 27.
33. DIAMOND & MCDONALD, supra note 26.
34. JANIE LEATHERMAN ET AL., BREAKING CYCLES OF VIOLENCE: CONFLICT PREVENTION IN
INTRASTATE CRISES (1999).
35. HIDDEN CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS: UNCOVERING BEHIND-THE-SCENES DISPUTES (Deborah
M. Kolb & Jean M. Bartunek eds., 1992).
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internal and external rapid change. 6 Hence, Social Cubism can assist a third
party intervenor to effectively analyze the relationships, and processes so
conflicts can be handled effectively and cooperatively, incorporating the elite
and grassroots levels. 7
Conflict theorists and conflict resolution practitioners must understand and
carefully consider the inter-related social forces that conjoin to "produce self-
reinforcing patterns of intergroup behavior."38 Byrne and Carter's (1996), and
Carter and Byrne's (2000) analysis makes skillful use of the cube structure as
a framework to examine six interrelated social forces at work in Northern
Ireland and Quebec. The Social Cube of ethnopolitical conflict escalation
illustrates that six social forces-demographics, economics, history, politics,
psychoculture, and religion-interactively and simultaneously combine to
produce multiple relationships and patterns of inter-group behavior through time
and context.3 9 Social Cubism breaks out of the Menachean dualistic thinking
that informs how the pracademic analyzes and intervenes in social conflicts.
Instead, it draws attention to the complexities as well as the dynamic
interactions between the six social forces that provide the cues for the escalation
and/or deescalation of social conflicts.
Consequently, Social Cubism can be applied to a range of situations to
analyze a social conflict and determine the best way to resolve it. The focus of
this special issue is on understanding how the analytical framework of the
Social Cubism model may be applied to both the macro-micro levels of
intergroup conflict and the conceptualization of other prevalent social conflicts.
Social Cubism provides the conflict theorist and practitioner with a
synergistic methodology to analyze actors and events within time and context
as they unfold and operate on the world (epistom). It produces a holistic
historical and interactive framework to assist in the analysis of relationships that
are transforming over time and space as these relationships reproduce, integrate,
and change to address new contexts. Social Cubism is quantum thinking and
language that clarifies and simplifies the complex reality of conflict.
The name, "Social Cubism," is inspired by the arts-based cubist movement
and the six-sided puzzle-"Rubik's Cube."'  In the arts-based cubist
36. SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO HANDLING CONFLICT AND REACHING AGREEMENTS (1998); BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING
COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY PROBLEMS (1998); WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES
RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFuCT (1988).
37. Sedn Byrne, Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern
Ireland, J. OF PEACE RES. 38(3), at 372-52 (2001).
38. Sefn Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, J. OF PEACE & CONFLICT STUDIES (3)(2), at 53 (1996).
39. Id. at 52-72.
40. Id.; Byrne & Carter, supra note 13.
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movement, painters Georges Braque and Pablo Picasso, attempted to render
three-dimensional subjects on two dimensions, and thus would render multiple
perspectives at once. Rubik's Cube also presents a significant analytical
challenge where the goal of having each side become one can only be achieved
by having a deep understanding and skill regarding the interconnectedness of
the sides. Subsequently, the Social Cubist perspective approaches the
complexities of social conflict by arguing that six interconnected and
interdependent social forces--demographics, economics, history, politics,
religion, and psychocultural factors-work in unison to produce self-reinforcing
patterns of conflict behavior. Thus, it is necessary for us to understand the
several facets of the Social Cube simultaneously.
Rubik's Cube also presented a significant puzzle, as attaining the goal of
getting each side to be one color required an understanding of the
interconnections among the various sides. Social Cubism is thus an approach
that emphasizes the complexities of conflict situations. We argue that the
various facets influence each other, and that concentrating too much on any one
or two sides of the cube may detract from a full understanding of the conflict.
It is better to realize how each factor can influence the other, and to attempt to
manipulate all factors in harmony when intervening in conflicts.
Social Cubism is a Frierean and Gandhian experiment with truth. It assists
the theorist and practitioner in understanding the relationships between knower
and known across time, space, mortality as well as language by analyzing
deeply embedded structural issues and dysfunctional behaviors within plasmic
and compressed social conflicts.4' History is the energy of the cube, which
influences the temperature of events in social conflicts. The cubes, represented
by the six forces of social reality, are not isolated among themselves. Rather,
like the intertwined roots of conflict phenomena, the cubes might be likened to
dynamically spinning cylinders: constantly emerging, merging and reemerging
entities. Thus, conflict interventions, and multiple methodologies, must be
flexible over time.
A multi-dimensional model of constructive conflict resolution and peace
building must consider how the relationships between all of these social forces
operate simultaneously at different levels within the conflict milieu. Moreover,
a flexible and multi-modal systems approach must coordinate the interventions
of a diverse web of individuals, groups INGOs and NGOs with their own
approaches, perspectives and resources.42 Consequently, the contingency
approach to the escalation of ethnopolitical and other social conflicts can
41. This discussion resulted from a number of in-depth conversations between the author and Dr.
Tom Boudreau on the concept of cubism in Spring 2001.
42. Byrne & Keashly, supra note 27.
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provide the cues to sequence and/or coordinate the appropriate conflict
interventions. 3
The dynamic interaction between the six social forces produces over 720
intricate relationships that need to be connected to the third party intervention
contingency model. Thus, combined efforts on a number of fronts would be
required to de-escalate a stage four conflict back down to a manageable
relationship. Third party interventions in this conflict de-escalation process
could be maximized through the coordinated sequencing of the multi-level and
multi-modal contingency model with an inherent early warning system. Such
an approach accepts the subjective and objective mix of the Social Cube that
underlies most social conflicts. 44 The model also recognizes the necessity for
coordinating the unique virtues of a variety of third party interventions and
mechanisms so that they are not competing with, and perhaps, undermining each
other's efforts.
The objective of this special issue is not simply to present descriptive
accounts of conflict analysis and resolution. Nor is our objective to render
judgments of which side(s) may be in the "right." The purpose of the issue is
to identify and illuminate the causes, responses, and the consequences of social
conflict, and its resolution. In doing so, we hope to refine, contribute, and
improve the theoretical, methodological, and practical understanding of social
conflict in general.
The special issue has both conceptual and analytical reasoning, and policy
and practice relevance because it includes selected contemporary interpersonal,
intergroup, institutional, and social conflicts at the international and
comparative levels that have institutional avenues for addressing grievances and
preventing or limiting conflict; many of today's most serious social conflicts are
in settings that lack institutional channels to limit their escalation. These
protracted conflicts have not resulted in mutual accommodation. Given the
perception among the public and policy-makers that social conflicts are reaching
into the public debate this special issue serves as a broad foundation for those
debates as well as furthering conflict resolution and contributing to theory
building.
ImI. SOCIAL CUBISM: THEORY AND APPLICATION
The contributors to this volume offer a rich mix of papers that illustrate the
value of synthesizing different disciplinary approaches to furnish a
comprehensive study of the analysis and resolution of conflict. It is our belief
43. Loraleigh Keashly & Ronald J. Fisher, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions:
Theoretical and Practical Considerations, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 235-63 (Jacob Bercovitch, ed, 1996).
44. Byrne & Carter, supra note 38, at 52-72.
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that this special issue offers useful insights to those pursuing applied work as
well as those interested in social conflict theory. Our approach is explicitly
interdisciplinary. Most importantly, this special issue will be useful to students,
practitioners, and faculty interested in a more holistic picture of the field of
social conflict and its resolution. It will appeal to those pursuing applied work
as well as those interested in social conflict theory. Articles combine critiques
of existing theory with innovative strategies for conflict resolution and
transformation, and an in-depth understanding of the causes of, and strategies
and methods through which social conflict is perpetuated.
The articles discuss aspects of the underlying theoretical and
methodological basis of understanding conflict and their links to different issues
and responses to conflict. Also, the articles analyze selected topics in social
conflicts such as workplace conflict, and police violence as well as
ethnopolitical conflicts. Finally, the articles also examine in-depth some cases
in different contexts to illustrate possible approaches to conflict prevention,
deescalation and settlement. Furthermore, the articles demonstrate that Social
Cubism is both a simplistic yet enigmatic and plasmic concept. Taken
collectively, the articles demonstrate a significant contribution to the study of
conflict analysis and resolution within a Social Cubism metaphor.
These researchers also use the Social Cubism analytical concept to explore
the underlying micro-macro factors that tend to escalate social conflicts. Their
articles demonstrate that these factors solidify competing identities and escalate
tensions within groups, institutions, communities, and organizations. They
explore some of the causes of social conflicts and how global and certain social
forces impact escalation and influence the protracted nature of social conflicts.
In addition to examining the theoretical approaches to understanding some of
the exogenous and endogenous issues that affect social conflicts, one must also
consider other variables in ones analysis. For example, the role of multi-
national corporations, individual and groups goals, interests, and capabilities,
the media, and scarce environmental resources are critical to our understanding
the protracted nature of social conflicts. Any individual or group that enters a
process of escalation will have its own set of interests based upon its desire for
a positive outcome. This larger understanding will allow the student of social
conflicts to appreciate more fully the intricate and intertwining dynamics of
such conflicts.
The first article is contributed by Lana Russ-Trent. Russ-Trent's
Integrative Inductive Social Cubism is a complex and critical analysis of
complex conflictual contexts. Indeed, whether in wars between nations or
disputes within families, social conflict is caused by many factors and forces,
both internal and external, and micro and macro. Furthermore, agency-structure
tensions are endemic in social conflict analyses, as well as in the ultimate and
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wide-ranging decisions made to act, to adjust, or to critically negotiate often
ambiguous and/or contradictory relational contexts, large, and small.
Integrative Inductive Social Cubism (USC) suggests the long-discussed
agency-structure conundrum is an emergent, infinite, and dynamic negotiational
dance. Moreover, USC proposes a dialectical, postmodernist, feminist,
heuristic, phenomenological, and elicitive theoretical analysis, more integrative
than oppositional, requiring inductive and integrative critical thinking. Based
on Byrne's & Carter's (1996) Social Cubism's single Rubik's-Cube 6-facet
model, IISC suggests three Rubric Cubes with eighteen facets: "a cube, within
a cube, within a cube." Therefore, conflict is dialectically analyzed from the
outside in, then the inside out.
In USC, we consider each cube, in terms of each dramaturgical context,
namely Cube I contains the Front Stage Ethos-Structural-Macro cube facets,
Cube II contains Back Stage Ethos-Structure-Agency cube facets, and Cube [U
contains Actor Ethos-Individual Agency cube facets. Indeed, USC is "a
complex set of interactions (intersections) and motivations in infinite and
continual re-adjustment."
The second article features the work of Mike Hare, who argues that the
history of social theory has, in one sense, been a continuing struggle to better
understand the interaction of social forces related to agency and structure at both
the micro and macro levels. Although the classical sociologists offered theories
about these issues at both ends on the spectrum, they also clearly were
concerned with the linkages, which connected them together. In modern times,
theory has seemed to focus more upon opposing paradigms striving for
theoretical purity. However, most recently, there appears to be a renewed
interest in the integrating and synthesizing of theories toward a more holistic
and balanced paradigm to understand conflict at the local, national, and
international levels. This article reviews briefly some of these considerations
and seeks to encourage further interest and development of adequate social
theory models for gaining a more complete understanding of social theory,
especially as it relates to conflict and to its resolution. Specifically, two models
are discussed: the Major Levels of SocialAnalysis model by George Ritzer and
the Social Cubism model by Sean Byrne and Neal Carter.
The third article highlights Bini Litwin's analysis of workplace disputes
within the European Union, with the United States as a case study. Litwin's
article analyses workplace violence, which is viewed as a dynamic process that
occurs along a continuum, arising at various levels from multiple sources. The
analysis begins by defining workplace violence, which for purposes of this
analysis includes direct (physical), structural and cultural violence. Current
rates of occurrence and trends of workplace violence are presented at the
European Union level, and in the United States based on the Northwestern
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National Life Insurance Company (NWNL), Department of Labor 1999
Futurework Report and current related workplace resources.
The origins of workplace violence are identified and defined according to
the Byrne & Carter (1996) social cubism model. The model has been adapted
for purposes of workplace conflict analysis and classifies conflict factors
according to demographic, historical, economic, balance of power, political and
psycho-cultural factors. This multi-factor, multi-level analysis establishes a
framework for conflict strategies to be developed that are specific to the origin
and type of violence manifested within the workplace. It is proposed that both
structural and relationship sources of conflict need to be addressed, from an
individual, organizational and societal level when designing dispute systems.
Finally, strategies are offered for each of the six conflict factors identified, with
interventions classified according to preventive, negotiated Appropriate Dispute
Resolution (ADR) and facilitated ADR approaches. Conclusions and
implications for policies related to management of workforce issues are offered
based on the analysis provided. It is anticipated that this model can be applied
to manage and resolve workplace conflict at all organizational levels locally,
nationally, and internationally.
The fourth article is based on Karen Michelle Scott's speculation that in
recent years, there have been growing concerns in many countries, and
throughout the United States regarding police officers' use of excessive force
during their encounters with minorities. Many of these concerns have arisen out
of a renewed awareness that a society which claims a legacy of justice and
liberty for all, has in effect, maintained a pattern of institutionalized violence
against racial and ethnic minorities-including Native Americans, African
Americans, Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans.
A significant amount of the literature on police-minority group conflict in
the United States focuses on racism as the driving force behind most instances
of police use of excessive force. This is because issues of racial discrimination
and hatred are deeply rooted in much of the inter-group conflict in American
society, and also, because physical distinctions such as race and gender are the
easiest to identify during a conflict between members of different groups.
However, there is a negative consequence associated with limiting the analysis
of the inter-group conflict between police and minority groups to the racial
dynamic. For when this narrowed lens of analysis is used, it yields too little
viable and substantive information in the way of addressing the conflict.
To encourage a more comprehensive analysis, the complexity of factors,
which form to produce protracted inter-group conflict, such as that between the
police and minority groups needs to be analyzed in many areas of the world
including America. The Social Cubism model approaches inter-group conflict
as a complex puzzle of social dynamics, which combine as an integrated unity
to sustain the behaviors of inter-group conflict. Thus, given the complex nature
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of the protracted conflict between the police and members of minority groups
in America, Scott utilizes the Social Cubist framework to broaden the lens
through which we examine this conflict.
In the fifth article, Judith McKay contends that the theory of Social
Cubism,45 a theory originally designed for the analysis of international
ethnoterritorial conflict, may be used in the analysis of micro-conflicts in other
settings, such as American communities. Many American communities are
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. Moreover, in some areas of the United States,
such as South Florida, communities may have much more ethnic diversity than
is found in other parts of the world. This presents a variety of challenges in the
analysis of issues confronting the community.
Unlike other theories, which may look at an issue from only one or two
perspectives, Social Cubism directs the researcher to look at an issue from a
multiplicity of perspectives and to acknowledge that at different times, under
different circumstances, and in different settings, the factors will interrelate in
dynamically different ways. In a community that contains a number of ethnic
groups, Social Cubism has the ability to interact dynamically and consider a
wide spectrum of factors in a multiplicity of changing and evolving
circumstances.
This application of social cubism in a local United States community is
unique and will contribute to the fields of ethnoterritorial conflict resolution and
strategic community planning. The results of such an inquiry will inform the
community and will enable law enforcement, political and civic leaders,
educational and service providers to have input into a strategic community plan.
The inquiry will also enable communities to analyze other conflicts and
problems beyond those related solely to ethnic conflict. Issues such as violence
prevention and intervention within families and neighborhoods and schools
would be appropriate examples of the use of this analytical framework.
Other international theories such as Multi-Modal Intervention Theory
(2000).46 Lederach's Integrated Nested Paradigm, 47 Boulding's shared vision
of peace, 4 and Diamond and McDonald's Multi-Track Diplomacy,49 may then
significantly contribute to the structure of conflict management and resolution
models in United States communities. Thus international peacekeeping theory
may have broader implications than previously envisioned.
45. Id. at 52-71.
46. Byrne & Keashly, supra note 27.
47. LEDERACH, supra note 25.
48. ELISE BOULDING, BUILDING A GLOBAL CIVIC CULTURE: EDUCATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD 95-1 17 (1988).
49. DIAMOND & McDONALD, supra note 26, at 11-25.
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In the sixth article, Karen Jenkins argues that in the post-Cold War setting,
the daunting challenge for conflict resolution scholars and practitioners,
government officials, and non-state actors is to develop multi-modal and
multidimensional mechanisms for dealing with failed states and traumatized
societies. For more than two hundred years, Haiti has suffered from the traumas
of slavery and colonization, a succession of predatory dictatorships, and
economic sanctions and international isolation. This article examines the
effectiveness of Social Cubism as an analytical framework for dealing with the
multifaceted conflict in Haiti.
The Social Cube of conflict has six interrelated facets or forces: history,
religion, demographics, political institutions, economics, and psychocultural
factors. These six social forces, when combined, produce differing patterns of
intergroup behavior or interaction. Although the factors, when combined, may
produce different patterns of importance or urgency, it is important not to allow
one factor to overshadow the others just because it appears more salient at the
time. Social Cubism allows for the identification of various interrelated or
interlocking social factors and their detrimental affects on Haiti. For Haitians
as a society to emerge from its "tent of victimhood," it is important to analyze
the present dilemma using the Social Cubism approach to intergroup conflict to
account for how structural and psychocultural mechanisms interact to
exacerbate or ameliorate political conflict, economic strife and cultural divide
that the country faces.
The seventh article features the work of S.I. Keethaponcalon. In
considering the parallels between conflict management and conflict resolution
in Sri Lanka, this analysis makes skillful use of the Social Cube analytical
process tool to examine the levels of communal interaction that shape
intercommunal conflicts. For ethnopolitical conflicts, both the international
system and the relations between and within nation states must be considered.
Within the international system, the flow of capital, ideas, nationalism and the
use of hegemonic power impact the escalation of conflict between and within
states. The vitality of micro-nationalist issues within state structures has
produced protracted ethnopolitical conflict resulting in zero-sum stalemates.
The eighth article, focusing on ethnic conflict resolution in Northern
Kenya, is written by Joshia Osamba. He argues that since the 1980s, conflicts
and violence involving pastoral communities in the borderlands of northern
Kenya have become endemic. The violence has especially taken the form of
banditry and cattle rustling. The emergence of cattle warlords among the
pastoral groups, and the internationalization and commercialization of cattle
rustling activities tend to exacerbate such violence. Acts of banditry and cattle
rustling have led to loss of human lives, stealing of livestock, displacement of
populations as well as creating an environment of permanent insecurity in the
region. This article analyzes the violence and insecurity in the borderlands of
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northern Kenya using the Social Cubism perspective to demonstrate how issues
in a conflict are often related and interlinked with one another. The article also
examines possible strategies for a third party conflict intervention to control or
de-escalate the violence.
Finally, Neal Carter's (St. Bonaventure University) article argues that
throughout its history, Belgium has been a complex political and social entity.
The King of the Belgians was told in an official report that 'there are no
Belgians,' yet he retained his title. The country has rapidly shifted from unitary
to federal structure, with different rationales and responsibilities for Regions and
Communities. Demographic changes are somewhat difficult to map due to
restrictions on questions that can be asked during the census. The combination
of multiple levels of political institutions, group conflict, economic disparities,
political symbolism, and psychological factors demonstrate the utility of the
Social Cubism approach to the study of relatively peaceful conflict. This article
argues that much of the complexity of Belgium's political institutions is the
result of attempts to mitigate conflict and postpone significant disagreements.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Global, national, and indigenous factors and actors must be considered
when trying to build consensus within a context where individuals, groups and
communities have been locked in strife over a long period of time.5" We need
to consider a number of questions in the design of an intervention contingency
model 5' or a "multi-modal and multi-level" intervention.52 For example, what
is the exact role of external actors in the escalation and de-escalation of social
conflict? Must both the grassroots and elite decision-makers be responsible for
"consensus building" in protracted social conflicts? Who should take the lead
in building-in superordinate incentives for ongoing cooperation in any
accommodation of the parties interests? What roles do conflict resolution
practitioners have in the transformation of relationships in social conflict
scenarios? The "Social Cubism" approach suggests that strategies can be
combined to bring about the refraining of social conflict so that effective
deescalation can take place. For example, the storytelling process can assist the
practitioner to build on indigenous cultural knowledge systems by taping into
cultural stories of doing conflict intervention and transformation.53
50. LEDERACH, supra note 25.
51. Keashly et al., supra note 43.
52. Byrne & Keashly, supra note 27.
53. Jessica Senehi, Constructive Storytelling in Intercommunal Conflicts: Building Community,
Building Peace, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN ETHNOPOLrrICAL CONFLICT 96 (Sedn
Byrne & Cynthia L. Irvin eds., 2000).
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In this introductory article, the social forces and combination of
mechanisms for escalating and deescalating social conflicts were discussed.
Particular attention was given to the role of the "Social Cube" for the analysis
and resolution of conflicts especially in the design of a force field analysis of
social conflicts. These value-laden factors must be incorporated into the
practitioner's conflict resolution processes so that effective deescalation of
protracted social conflicts occurs. Effective intervention by external third
parties necessitates a holistic and interactive approach that transforms
underlying structural inequalities and subjective dynamics that tear individuals,
groups, communities and nations apart.
The primary purpose of the special issue is to explore the theoretical
underpinnings and practical implications of Social Cubism. In this endeavor,
the authors provide rich theoretical material for the practitioner and scholar to
consider when analyzing the social forces that interact to escalate social
conflicts. The student of social conflicts are also provided insightful
observations from the authors personal experiences in the field to more fully
understand the dynamics of successes and failures of conflict intervention in
social conflicts.
The contributors also use the case-study method using the Social Cube
analytical device to provide prescriptive insights to explain social conflict, and,
how it might be resolved. The articles also explored the lessons learned about
the causes of social conflict in ethnic, community, and workplace. Finally, the
articles also draw together Social Cubism with conflict resolution, and
peacemaking. The papers use case studies to explore efforts at resolution in
ethnic, organizational, and community based social conflicts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Studies of ethnoterritorial politics typically either examine political and
economic structures to emphasize the competing interests of groups, or use a
psychoanalytic approach to emphasize psychological and cultural forces.
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Researchers who do address both material and psychological factors often
attempt to weigh their relative importance as causes of conflict.1 We, in
contrast, propose that studies of ethnoterritorial conflict be modeled from the
perspective of social cubism, involving the interaction of material and
psychological mechanisms.2
The term 'social cubism' evokes images useful to describe our
perspective.3  Much like Rubic's Cube, ethnoterritorial politics poses a
multi-faced puzzle. People concentrating on only one aspect, or side of the
puzzle, are unlikely to produce a complete solution or picture of the problem.
Only when one considers the interrelations among the faces of the puzzle can
one progress toward a more holistic solution. A multidimensional perspective
was also advocated by the cubist artists, such as Bracque and Picasso, who
sought to render on two-dimensional canvass the multitude of perspectives
involved in viewing three dimensional objects. Similarly, we isolate key factors
to show how they combine to form complex patterns of ethnic politics.
We use the cube as an analytical framework to examine the Northern
Ireland and Qu6bec conflicts. In this comparison, we do not intend to cover the
whole terrain of each side of the cube but to highlight some of the most salient
issues of these complex conflicts. We rely heavily on other researchers'
conclusions concerning each facet. Our main contribution is in the combination
of the facets and the analysis of how their interaction affects the dynamics of
ethnoterritorial conflict and its regulation. While several researchers have
indicated that the nature of conflicts changes over time, relatively little work has
been done to examine the interaction of various factors in gradually shaping
conflicts.
We see the social cube of conflict as having six interrelated facets or
forces: history, religion, demographics, political institutions and non-
institutional behavior, economics, and psychocultural factors (see Figure 1).
These six facets or social forces combine to produce patterns of intergroup
behavior. For example, histories recounted by competing groups often evoke
1. See, e.g., Wayne G. Reilly, The Management of Political Violence in Quebec and Northern
Ireland: A Comparison, 6 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 44-46 (Spring 1994). see also MARC
HOWARD Ross, THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT: INTERPRETATIONS AND INTERESTS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1993).
2. See SeAn Byrne & Neil Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, 3(2) J. OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, at 52-72 (1996); Neal Carter & SeAn
Byrne, The Dynamics of Social Cubism: A View from Northern Ireland and Quebec, in RECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN ETHNOPOLrTICAL CONFLICTS, 41-46 (SeAn Byrne & Cynthia Irvin, eds.
2000).
3. This metaphor was suggested by Jessica Senehi during a conversation with the authors. See
Jessica Senehi, Language, Culture and Conflict: Storytelling As A Matter of Life and Death, 7(3) MIND AND
HUMAN INTERACTION 150-64 (2000); Carter, supra note 2 at 98-125.
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previous patterns of economic, political, or religious interaction to support
contemporary claims, while symbolism produces affective responses toward
groups and of intergroup interaction.4 As Connor notes, these factors are
typically studied as independent causes of conflict, failing to produce adequate
explanations.' Instead, ethnonationalism should be seen as a psychological
phenomenon emphasizing various intergroup differences to produce a sense of
group cohesion. The interaction among the sides of the cube produces patterns
of intergroup behavior.'
Northern Ireland and Qu6bec, rarely compared directly,7 indicate the
complexity of the relationship between psychological and material factors.
Several factors indicate, at least at first glance, that conflict should proceed in
similar patterns in both cases. Both regions have been members of the British
Empire in which Catholics were a significant part of the population whose
education and economic mobility was limited. In both Ireland and Qu6bec, the
theme of survival echoes in history. Nevertheless, Qu6bec has experienced
relatively minor violence, while terrorist activity has constrained the daily lives
of Northern Irish people. We propose that the interrelation of the six facets can
help explain differing levels of successful peaceful conflict regulation.
When describing the conflicts, we are forced to used labels that simplify
the complex interrelations of the facets. For example, the use of the categories
"Catholic" and "Protestant" in Northern Ireland and "Francophone" and
"Anglophone" are useful as general guidelines for membership. Unfortunately,
they also obscure a number of internal diversity. We would like to stress that
in using these categories we are not stating that language or religion is the cause
or the essence of the conflict. Instead, we are using categories that are used
prominently by the involved parties themselves. Let us now proceed to the
comparison of the six facets of ethnoterritorial conflict. The salient aspects of
each factor are summarized in Figure 3.
4. See generally JOHN AGNEW & STUART CORBRIDGE, MASTERING SPACE: HEGEMONY,
TERRITORY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1994); GIDON GOTTLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE:
A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGNTY (1993) (Council on Foreign
Relations, Washington, D.C.); MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS (Ted
Robert Gurr, ed. 1993); TED ROBERT GURR & BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS
(1994); THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION: CASE STUDIES OF PROTRACTED ETHNIC CONFLICTS
(John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, eds 1993).
5. WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING (1994).
6. Sehn Byrne & Loraleigh Keashly, Working with Ethno-Political Conflict: A Multi-Modal and
Multi-Level Approach to Conflict Intervention, 7(1) INT'L PEACEKEEPING 97-120 (2000).
7. See Byrne & Carter (1996), supra note 2; Carter & Byrne (2000), supra note 2; Reilly, supra
note 1. See also KATHERINE O'SULLIVAN, FIRST WORLD NATIONALISM: CLASS AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND AND QUEBEC (1986).
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Although we are forced to compare the six factors of the conflicts, we
attempt to show that these divisions are to some extent artificial. The crucial
point of our analysis it that social cubism focuses attention on the interplay
among factors. This notion allows us to advance beyond the primordialist and
instrumentalist notions of ethnic conflict by combining the notions of the
psychological importance of social groupings and the political utility of
emphasizing group divisions.8
II. HISTORIcAL FACTORS
History, recounted by those involved in conflicts, sets the context for
current ethnoterritorial politics. Stories of past events, seen from diverse
viewpoints, influence the legitimacy of current institutions, perceptions of
political possibilities and the attributed motivations of various groups.9 This
brief summary of Quebec and Northern Irish history highlights only some of the
historical events frequently evoked by the main parties involved.
Northern Ireland's troubles are often traced through a long history of ethnic
hostility. Norman forays from England into Ireland during the twelfth century
established a military presence to dominate the Gaelic chieftains.'° Feudalism
eliminated the communal practices and Brehon laws of the indigenous people.
Successive insurrections by the Irish nobility were squashed by English arms.
William of Orange's 1690 victory at the battle of the Boyne eliminated the
power of the Irish nobility and established an era of Protestant dominance."'
The 1692 Penal Laws secured a dominant relationship that allowed the
Protestant community to force most Catholics outside the socioeconomic and
political system. 2 Catholics could not be elected to political office, practice
their religion, speak the Gaelic language in public, or bequeath property unless
the heir converted to the Protestant faith. Cultural discrimination against
Catholics continued until Daniel O'Connell successfully mobilized the Irish
peasantry to agitate for political representation in parliament, and helped to win
8. See, e.g., Daniele Conversi, Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as
Boundary Maintenance and Creation, 1(1) NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS 73-85 (Spring 1995); Anthony
D. Smith, Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations, 1 (1) NATIONS
AND NATIONALISM 1-34 (1995).
9. Senehi, supra note 3 at 150-64; Jessica Senehi, Constructive Storytelling in Inter-Communal
Conflicts: Building Community, Building Peace, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN
ENTHOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS 98-125 (Sehn Byrne & Cynthia Irvin eds., 2000).
10. PADRAIG O'MALLEY, THE UNCIVILL WARS: IRELAND TODAY (1983).
11. See generally SEAN BYRNE, GROWING UP IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY: THE INFLUENCE OF CONFLICT
ON BELFAST SCHOOL CHILDREN (1997).
12. J.J. LEE, IRELAND, 1912-1985: POLITICS AND SOCIETY (1985).
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emancipation in 1833 for the Catholic majority on the island of Ireland. 3
Charles Stuart Parnell's Home Rule movement of the late nineteenth century
divided the island between unionists in the northeast industrial heartland of
Ulster and nationalists in the agrarian South of Ireland. 14 Parnell's call of
"Home Rule for Ireland," was interpreted by Ulster Protestants as "Rome Rule"
because the religious cleavage became superimposed on the national question.
In 1912, Protestants of Ulster, fearing the prospect of a Catholic-dominated
Ireland, formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) to resist Home Rule. 5 A
deepening political polarization between both parts of the island was further
exacerbated by the Irish Volunteers' Easter Revolt of 1916, a failed insurrection
to break the British connection. 16 The 1919-21 War of Independence between
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government produced the 1921
partition of Ireland, which altered but did not end the series of hostile relations
in Northern Ireland that intensified during the seventeenth century and still lock
the ethnic communities in sectarian strife.'7
Between the 1920 Government of Ireland Act and direct rule from London
in 1972 a self-governing Northern Ireland was dominated by the old Protestant
Unionist party.' S Attempts by the non-violent Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association (NICRA) in the late 1960s to reform the region failed and spiraled
into chaos when NICRA was replaced by a militant IRA who confronted the
British army on the streets. 9 Since 1972, several attempts to formulate a
devolved constitutional framework for governing Northern Ireland have met
with little success.2" Terrorism propagated by Republicans and Loyalists
intensified polarization between communities, frustrating attempts of elite
13. McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 4; CYNTHIA IRVIN, MILITANT NATIONALISM: BETWEEN
MOVEMENT AND PARTY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BASQUE COUNTRY (1999).
14. HENRY PATTERSON, CLASS CONFLICT AND SECTARIANISM: THE PROTESTANT WORKING CLASS
AND THE BELFAST LABOR MOVEMENT 1868-1920 (1980).
15. PAUL DIXON, NORTHERN IRELAND: POWER, IDEOLOGY AND REALITY (2001).
16. TOM WILSON, ULSTER: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1989).
17. ARTHUR AUGHEY, UNDER SIEGE: ULSTER UNIONISM ANDTHE ANGLO-IRISHAGREEMENT (1989);
NORMAN PORTER, RETHINKING UNIONISM: AN ALTERNATIVE VISION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (1996).
18. See PAUL BEW ET AL., THE STATE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1921-72: POLITICAL FORCES AND
SOCIAL CLASSES (1979); PAUL BEW ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND, 1921-1994: SOCIAL CLASSES AND POLITICAL
FORCES (1995).
19. PAUL AUTHOR, THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY, 1968-73 (1974).
20. See generally McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 4; PAUL BEW & HENRYPATTERSON, THEBRITISH
STATE AND THE ULSTER CRISIS: FROM WILSON TO THATCHER (1985); Paul Bew & Henry Patterson, The New
Stalemate: Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in BEYOND THE RHETORIC: POLITICS, THE ECONOMY,
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 25 (Paul Teague, ed. 1987); PAUL BEW & HENRY PATTERSON,
SCENARIOS FOR PROGRESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1990).
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accommodation.2' Current negotiations between the British and Irish
governments and the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland, aimed at creating
a power-sharing devolved government and cross-border institutions, have
deescalated terrorist activity in the wake of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement
(GFA).22
Canadians recall a less violent past than the Northern Irish, but the
Francophones and Anglophones recount history differently. 23 Francophones
devote more study than Anglophones to the period before the 1867
confederation of Canada. Both linguistic groups celebrate heroes of their
linguistic group and emphasize the importance of cultural survival. The
Francophone Qubcois consider themselves a distinct nation continually
threatened with cultural extermination, while Anglophones struggle to maintain
a Canadian identity in the shadow of the United States.
After the British conquest of New France in 1763, British policy toward
the Francophones alternated between attempts to assimilate them into
Anglophone society and attempts to accommodate differences without
destabilizing their control. The 1837 Papineau Rebellion was premised on
demands for responsible government and the removal of the Chateau Clique, a
group of mostly Anglophone elites governing the colony.24 Lord Durham was
subsequently appointed Governor-General and asked to report on the situation.
He advocated a new system to assimilate the Francophones. This
recommendation produced the United Province of Canada, a legislative union
with two equally represented regions, one predominantly Francophone, one
mostly Anglophone.25
By the 1860s, Anglophones outnumbered Francophones within the United
Province of Canada. Anglophone reformers began to call for representation by
population. A combination of ethnic and ideological divisions produced
political deadlock. The 1867 Confederation of Canada joined New Brunswick
21. See ADRIAN GUELKE, THE AGE OF TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLrTCAL SYSTEM
(1995); Sedn Byrne, Conflict Regulation or Conflict Resolution: Third Part Intervention in the Northern
Ireland Conflict - Prospects for Peace, 7(2) TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1-25 (1995).
22. SeAn Byrne, Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa at a Crossroads: Understanding
Intergroup Conflict, Peace-Building, and Conflict Resolution, 28 INT'L J. OF GROUP TENSIONS 231 (1999);
SeAn Byrne, Power Politics as Usual in Cyprus & Northern Ireland: Divided Islands and the Roles of
External Ethno-Guarantors, 6(1) NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 1-24 (2000); Sedn Byrne,
Consocialtional and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, 38(3) J. PEACE
RESEARCH 327-52 (2001).
23. See generally DAVID V.J. BELL, THE ROOTS OF DISUNITY: A STUDY OF CANADIAN POLITICAL
CULTURE (1992).
24. See LAURIER LAPTERRE, CANADA MY CANADA: WHAT HAPPENED? 86-99 (1992); J. ARTHUR
LOWER, CANADA: AN OUTLINE HISTORY 86-87 (1991).
25. LOWER, supra note 24, at 90-9 1.
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and Nova Scotia with Quebec and Ontario (the latter two having been carved
from the United Province of Canada), establishing the primarily Francophone
province of Qu6bec within a predominantly Anglophone country.26
French-Canadians established two approaches toward cultural survival.
Federalists argued that the best way to protect Francophone society was to
participate actively in Canadian federal affairs, ensuring that Francophones were
involved in political decision-making. This activist approach was attacked by
the Catholic Church and nationalists, who advocated cultural isolation.27 The
struggle between federalists and nationalists has continued to dominate
Francophone Qudbec's political landscape. Anglophone Quebecers, on the
other hand, have generally promoted a strong federal government. Several
events increased the tension between federalists and nationalists. The Radical
Liberal Party during the period of the United Colony of Canada advocated a
republican form of government removed from the Anglophone section, while
the Conservative Liberals favored cooperation with other Canadians. The Riel
Rebellion in the 1880s exacerbated tensions between Francophones and others,
reinforcing nationalist commitment to maintain a strong commitment to Quebec.
The loss of protection for Francophone rights in Manitoba weakened the
position of the federalists. When conscription was instituted to help with the
effort of both World Wars, Francophone nationalists argued that it was wrong
to send their people to fight "Britain's War" although many Francophones had
already volunteered. Recently, failed constitutional negotiations and referenda
on Qu6bec sovereignty have divided Quebecers.
During the 1960s, educational reforms and a decline in the Catholic
Church's political influence reduced schools' parochial nature. During the
so-called 'Quiet Revolution,' a new group of nationalists advocated the creation
of an economically competitive cadre of Francophones, birth rates plummeted,
and Quebec's legislature passed laws promoting the use of French. The goal
was no longer passive resistance for survivance. Instead, Quebicois demanded
the tools and opportunities necessary for ipanouissement (flourishing). Since
then, much debate has focused on the proper relationship between Quebec and
the 'Rest of Canada.' In the recent referendum debate, for example, nationalists
used the Lord Durham Report as evidence of the threat of assimilation, while
federalists cited the benefits of interethnic cooperation.
Several scholars highlight the massive changes in Quebec society brought
about by Pierre Elliott Trudeau during his tenure as Canadian Prime Minister
(1968-1979; 1980-1984)." McRoberts argues that the changes Trudeau
26. See generally P.B. WAiTE, THE CONFEDERATION DEBATES IN THE PROVINCE OF CANADA, 1865
(1963).
27. See generally LAURIER LAPIERRE, GENESIS OF A NATION (1966).
28. See, e.g., ROGER GIBBINS, CONFLICT AND UNITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CANADIAN POLITICAL
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introduced in Canada, especially with respect to bilingualism, multiculturalism,
and constitutionalism have significantly reduced the potential for reconciliation
between Quebec and the rest of Canada.29 Trudeau's historical legacy remains
controversial today. More recent history, especially regarding linguistic politics
and the quest for constitutional recognition as a distinct society, will be
addressed in other sections.
As is clear from this cursory overview of the historical evolution of
ethnoterritorial politics in these two cases, ethnic groups emphasize different
factors as they interpret the past. These differences can increase hostility if their
histories provide sharply different interpretations and characterizations of other
groups.
Il. RELIGIOUS FACTORS
With the post-Cold War expansion of identity research, several researchers
have noted the need to increase our understanding of the psychological
dynamics of identity and transfer our knowledge to the realm of politics.
Brewer warns of the dangers of conceptual stretching of the concept of social
identity. 30 She distinguishes among person-based identity, role-based identity,
group-based identity and collective identity, and she calls for theorization that
recognized the implications of these different bases of identification and yet
could address the interactions among them.' Scholars need to understand more
fully the ways in which people manage multiple bases of identification. Huddy
argues that four key issues that hinder the successful application of
psychological research on social identity theory to political issues are 1) the
range of identity choices people can make, 2) the subjective meanings people
give to identities, 3) the differences in strength or potency identities have, and
4) the stability of several political and social identities. 32 These difficulties
require a great deal of nuance in discussing political identity conflicts, which is
why we advocate examination of the several facets of the social cube.
For example, social and political institutions are linked to religion, which
fosters bipolar societies in both Northern Ireland and Qu6bec. In Northern
Ireland, Protestants and Catholics attend separate schools and churches, rarely
intermarry, and live in separate neighborhoods for physical and psychological
LIFE (1994); LOWER, supra note 24.
29. See generally KENNETH MCROBERTS, MISCONCEIVING CANADA: THE STRUGGLE FOR NATION
UNITY (1997).
30. Mailynn B. Brewer, The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology
22(1) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, at 115-125 (2001).
31. Id.
32. Leonie Huddy, From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity
Theory, 22(1) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, at 127-156 (200 1).
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protection; religion preserves each group's way of life.33 In Canada, religious
affiliation promoted distinct life-styles, as economic differences and parochial
schools reinforced religious and linguistic polarization. We emphasize the
salience of conditional loyalty, discussed below, in promoting intergroup
tensions and polarization, bearing in mind the political salience of religion in
Qu6bec has declined drastically since 1960s while it remains a central concern
in Northern Ireland.
Catholics in Northern Ireland are relatively homogeneous in their religious
beliefs and their identification with the Irish nation.34 This cohesion withstands
enormous differences between the political agendas of the Social Democratic
and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) about issues such as the legitimacy of violence
and the role of consent in disposing of Northern Ireland. For example, Grove
and Carter examine the rhetoric of John Hume and Gerry Adams to show
competing attempt to mobilize the nationalist/Catholic population in Northern
Ireland and to illustrate the interconnections between the context of the conflict
and the rhetoric used.36
Heterogeneity in the religious beliefs of Ulster Protestants does not directly
influence their national identity.37 Religious diversity does, however, create
some conflict between members of the different denominations and between
liberal or moderate and fundamentalist or extremist Protestants. 38  Intra-
Protestant conflict subsides when Protestants evoke a seventeenth century
religious covenant with the monarch to band together in a homogeneous bloc
to resist any perceived threat to their interests, especially Northern Ireland's
membership of the United Kingdom (UK).39
33. See generally JOHN WHYTE, INTERPRETING NORTHERN IRELAND (1990); NORTHERN IRELAND
AND THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION (Dermot Keogh & M.H. Haltzel eds. 1994).
34. See JOHN MCGARY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND: BROKEN IMAGES
(1995); EDWARD MOXON-BROWNE, NATION, CLASS AND CREED IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1983).
35. IAN MCALLISTER, THE NORTHERN IRELAND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY:
POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1977).
36. Andrea Grove and Neal Carter, Not All Blarney is Cast in Stone: International Cultural Conflict
in Northern Ireland, 20(4) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 725-65.
37. See generally JOHN D. CASH, IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY AND CONFLICT: THE STRUCTURATION OF
POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1996); RICHARD ROSE, GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: AN IRISH
PERSPECTIVE (1971).
38. See generally FRANK WRIGHT, NORTHERN IRELAND: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1987).
39. See generally STEVE BRUCE, GOD SAVE ULSTER! THE RELIGION AND POLITICS OF PAISLEYISM
(1986); STEVE BRUCE, THE RED HAND: PROTESTANT PARAMILrrARIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1992); SeID
Byrne & Aimee Delman, Group Identity Formation and Intra-group Conflict, 25(4) THE J. OF INTERGROUP
RELATIONS 35-57.
20021
750 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:741
A key factor in intra-Protestant cooperation is conditional loyalty, an idea
similar to Scottish contractarian notion of covenanting: "If the ruler fails to live
up to his or her obligations, the subjects should not abandon the contract but
rather should refuse compliance with the laws and try to coerce the ruler into
keeping the bargain". 4° Conditional loyalty helps explain "how unionists
avoided the crisis of national identity which nationalists so often predict for
them"." Unionists are loyal to the monarch in her role as head of the
established church as well as head of the British state. Parliament, however,
lacks the religious legitimacy of the Queen. There is no contradiction in
Northern Irish Protestant opposition to the British Parliament since most
Protestants are ultimately loyal not to political institutions but to their
ethnoreligious identity.42 Protestants will remain loyal to Britain only as long
as Britain guarantees them a majority in Northern Ireland.43
Several historical examples illustrate the contractarian nature of Unionist
ideology-the Monarch's protection of the Protestant community's Ulster
identity and political attachments to the United Kingdom. For example, the
Home Rule crises of 1886, 1893, and 1912 saw an upsurge in riots in Belfast,
the creation of an Ulster Protestant army, and the development of the UVF in
which Protestants sought to resist Home Rule by force. In fact, World War I
narrowly averted a civil war in Ireland.44 Protestant opposition to direct rule
from London in 1972, the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, the 1993 Frameworks
Document, and the 1995 Framework for Peace further illustrates the depth of
Protestant fear and betrayal as well as the strategy of intra-Protestant
cooperation to protect their ethnoreligious identity and resist what they perceive
as a forced incorporation into a united Ireland.
Religion has played a different role in Canada. Religious loyalty prior to
the 1960s helped Canada maintain relatively peaceful interethnic group
relations. Colonial patterns in New France failed to produce strong
governmental institutions, leaving the Catholic Church as the most important
communal organization. In 1659, Monseigneur de Laval, bishop of Qu6bec,
established the tradition of ultramontism, the doctrine that the Church is
predominant in all social affairs and is politically superior to the state.45 After
40. DAVID MILLER, QUEEN'S REBELS: ULSTER LOYALISM IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE 5 (1978).
41. John Hunter, An Analysis of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, in POLITICAL COOPERATION IN
DIVIDED SOCIETIES: A SERIES OF PAPERS RELEVANT TO THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 25 (Desmond
Rea, ed. 1983). See also ROSE, supra note 37, at 40-88; WHYTE, supra note 33; BRUCE, supra note 39.
42. ARTHUR AUGHEY & DUNCAN MORROW, NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICS (1996).
43. See Moxon-Browne, supra note 34; ROY WALLIS ET AL., No SURRENDER: PAISLEYISM AND THE
POLITICS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1-35 (1986).
44. McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 4.
45. See supra note 7, at 50.
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the British Conquest of Quebec, the 1774 Qu6bec Act recognized and supported
the dominance of the Catholic Church, which in return advocated acceptance of
British rule. Protestants (primarily Anglophones) were allowed to establish
separate social facilities. Parochial schools reinforced the power of the Church
and allowed each religious group to control the socialization of its own
members. The 1867 British North America Act (now called Constitution Act,
1867) reserved education policy for the provinces. Qu6bec maintains its
parochial school system, although reform is underway to change schoolboards
from being based on religion to being defined according to language.
Relations between religious groups in Qu6bec have not been as strained
historically as in Northern Ireland. Little economic or territorial competition
emerged between religious factions. After the Conquest, English Protestants
tended to cluster in specific regions, especially Montreal and the Eastern
Townships, and were relatively free to join the Canadian ethnic majority and
business elite.46 While the Catholic majority remained mostly in the primary
sector, Anglophone Protestants tended toward entrepreneurial ventures,
providing the capital for industrialization.
The history of ultramontism influenced the ethnonational identity of
French Canadians. As with Ulster Protestants, Canadian loyalty to religion was
stronger than that to parliament or the crown. Religious identity promoted
strong ties among members of a parish. The Church's decline as a powerful
social actor since the Quiet Revolution seems to have changed the focus of
group loyalty. Most social functions historically performed by the Church, such
as education, health, and welfare, now fall under provincial jurisdiction.47 As
the provider of these functions changes, so too does citizen identification with
social institutions. This change in loyalty is illustrated by a change in
self-identification: during the Quiet Revolution, French Canadians inhabiting
Qu6bec began to refer to themselves as Quibicois rather than Canadiens
fran~ais.48 The history of ultramontism, transferred to provincial loyalty,
increases the potential for rejecting the limited monarchy and the federation.
Furthermore, the legacy of the Catholic Church's emphasis on language
increased the salience of cultural differences, which currently dominate
constitutional debate in Canada.
Today, religion has more salience as a social category in Northern Ireland
than in Qu6bec. In Northern Ireland, religious difference tends to create a moral
46. See J. LEwis ROBINSON, CONCEPTS AND THEMES IN THE REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF CANADA
101-117 (Talonbooks revised ed. 1989); SHEILA MCLEOD ARNOPOULOS & DOMINIQUE CLIFf, THE ENGLISH
FACT IN QUEBEC (1980).
47. See LaPierre, supra note 24, at 178-95.
48. Louis Dupont and Dean Louder, Quelles Cultures Reproduire? (paper presented at the 1995
Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Nov. 15-19, 1995).
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rejection of compromise. In Qu6bec, religious differences historically helped
maintain relatively peaceful coexistence, since the Catholic Church advocated
acceptance of Canada in exchange for a level of cultural autonomy at the
provincial level. Ironically, the decline of religion's importance in Qu6bec may
increase the potential for intergroup conflict, as Qugbdcois identification
switched from the church to the province without reducing the importance of
linguistic differences.
IV. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
Demographic factors are crucial aspects of the two conflicts. In Quebec,
Francophones comprise about 85 percent of the population and dominate the
province's political system despite their minority status (about 20 percent of the
population) in Canada as a whole. The low birthrate of Qu6bec Francophones
increases demands for provincial involvement in social, language, and
immigration policy. In Northern Ireland, Catholics (primarily of Gaelic
descent) remain a minority, although their relative size is growing due to birth
rates that exceed those of Protestants. The decline of Protestants' relative
position increases fears of Catholic domination.
Demographic differences in Northern Ireland and Quebec lead to socio-
psychological patterns that can be seen as a conflict over national identity
between "double minorities".49 In Northern Ireland, Catholics and Protestants
see themselves as minorities, but are simultaneously viewed by the other
community as a threatening majority. 0 Double minorities reinforce the need for
security and recognition of each group's territorial claims. Northern Irish
Catholics see themselves as an Irish minority in Northern Ireland and a majority
in an all-Ireland context. Protestants are a majority of the population in
Northern Ireland, but a minority of the over-all population in the UK and in any
future united Ireland. Hence, Northern Ireland Protestants see themselves as a
besieged minority locked into an eternal struggle to defend themselves against
both internal and external forces.
In Northern Ireland, historical references to campaigns of genocide affect
the perceptions and fears each group holds of the "other."'" Protestants in
49. HAROLD JACKSON & ANNE MCHARDY, THE Two IRELANDS: THE PROBLEM OF THE DOUBLE
MINORITY (3d ed. 1984); WHYTE, supra note 33, at 100-02; John Whyte, How is the Boundary Maintained
Between Both Communities in Northern Ireland?, 9(2) ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES, at 219-34 (1986).
50. See Terrie Northrup, Dynamics of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict, in INTRACTABLE
CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 55-82 (Kriesberg et al., eds., 1989).
51. The Gaelic chieftains' 1641 massacre of Ulster Protestants and the seventeenth century
Cromwellian massacre of the Catholic inhabitants of Dundalk and Drogheda illustrate this point. See A.T.Q.
STEWART, THE NARROW GROUND: ASPECTS OF ULSTER 1609-1969 23-34 (1977); ROSE, supra note 37, at
180-204; MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 2-98 (1980); MICHAEL MACDONALD,
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Northern Ireland have developed a pronounced "siege mentality." They
considered the Republic of Ireland as hostile to their interests and identity and
thus deem any move toward rapprochement with Catholics in Northern Ireland
as acceptance of eventual Irish unification.52 Catholics have been alienated by
their treatment within Northern Ireland and look to the government in the
Republic of Ireland to protect their interests. Each group, recalling a history of
community conflict, seeks a majority within political institutions in order to
prevent discrimination or suppression. The double minority in Northern Ireland
thus decreases the potential for the formation of a political "middle ground"
between the communities.
5 3
The double minority in Qu6bec, however, may actually mitigate conflict
due to Canadian federalism. The Anglophone minority in Qu6bec belongs to
the majority Anglophone community in Canada and North America. The
Francophone majority in Qu6bec also developed a "siege mentality," viewing
itself as a minority population engulfed in an Anglophone environment although
it sustains a provincial majority. Qu6bec nationalists traditionally advocated
high birth rates to attain the "revenge of the cradle" and maintain the
Francophone culture.
Qu6bec Francophones claim that legal limitation of the use of English in
education, businesses and advertisements is necessary to counteract the
overwhelming majority of Anglophones in Canada. Furthermore, Qu6b6cois
politicians have used education policies to increase the assimilation of
immigrants into the Francophone, rather than the Anglophone, community.
Anglophone Quebecers are a special minority within the province due partly to
the dominance of English throughout Canada and their well-established
presence in Qu6bec.
Many Anglophone Quebecers think of themselves as a political minority
in Qu6bec, strongly oppose Qu6b6cois nationalist policies, and fear that the
creation of an independent Qu6bec would cut their ties with the rest of Canada.
Others stress the importance of maintaining the special status of English in
Qu6bec, while also celebrating Qu6bec's cultural distinctiveness.
However, today immigration is affecting the relative status of both groups.
The changing demographic pattern, especially in Montreal, affects the relative
political strength of Anglophones and Francophones. As the Francophone
Quebecer population ages, with a low birth rate, the likelihood of Quebec
sovereignty winning a referendum appears to reduce as time goes by. This may
CHILDREN OF WRATH: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1986).
52. See generally JOSEPH RUANE & JENNIFER TODD, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN
IRELAND: POWER, CONFLICT AND EMANCIPATION (1996).
53. See generally MERVYN T. LOVE, PEACE BUILDING THROUGH RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1995).
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well increase the feelings of Quebec Francophones as being a minority and
needing to increase control over cultural politics.
Clearly, this "double minority" has implications for the way these groups
in Northern Ireland and Qu6bec view the world.' In general, Northern Ireland
experiences more problems with terrorism and the salience of symbolism, and
conflicting national identities than Qu6bec because of the insecurity of each
ethnic group. The communities' lack of control over policies, mutual suspicion
of treachery, and use of terrorism and symbolism that promotes a siege
mentality all reduce the potential for Northern Ireland to create a sense of
"shared identity."55 In contrast, Qu6bec benefits from the existence of Canadian
federalism, which reduces both groups to minority status in some areas but
establishes them as a majority in others. This may promote some mutual
recognition. However, continued failure in the negotiation of constitutional
matters is reducing the good will on both sides of the debate. Despite the
potential for accommodation presented by the positive aspects of double
minorities (groups may extend special consideration to minorities within their
territory, if reciprocity can be expected), problems still threaten the equilibrium.
The relative size and rate of demographic change of the groups are significant.
The relative loss of population for Northern Irish Protestants can increase their
insecurities. In Qu6bec, declining birth rates and increased immigration are
forcing Qu6b6cois nationalists to redefine the basis for identification with their
group, and also shape their policies concerning the education of non-Christians
whose native language is neither French nor English.
V. POLrrICAL FACTORS
Peaceful regulation of ethnoterritorial conflict relies heavily on the political
legitimacy of the state, the inclusiveness of political institutions, and the
prevalence of non-institutionalized conflict such as terrorism. These functions
are interrelated, but various combinations are possible. In this section we
address the importance of boundaries and terrorism as political factors. These
factors greatly influence both the legitimacy of the state and the potential for
peaceful regulation of conflicts.
Many ethnoregional movements emphasize the territorial delineation of
political institutions in which they can participate. Qu6bec's provincial
boundaries allow the Quibecois some degree of control over a specific territory
within the larger Canadian context. Northern Ireland, however, has a boundary
that does not meet the demands of either Protestant or Catholic community.56
54. See WHYrE, supra note 33, at 25-43.
55. See generally BYRNE, supra note 11.
56. John McGarry, Political Settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa, 46(5) POLITICAL
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Debate over the boundary in Northern Ireland increases group hostility as the
salience of national identity becomes a tangible threat to the existence of
Northern Ireland's position within the UK.57 When disputes over boundaries
and institutions devolve into terrorist action, the potential for peaceful
regulation is reduced, as the ability of the state to remain inclusive is challenged.
A. Boundaries
The political partition of Northern Ireland from the Irish Free State by the
1920 Government of Ireland Act did not resolve ethnic conflict. The foundation
of the border served only to foster sectarian politics. Moderate Nationalist
members of the SDLP and militant Republican members of Sinn Fein in the
Catholic community continue to agitate for a united Ireland. Moderate Unionist
members of the Official Unionist Party (OUP) and militant Loyalist members
of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) within the Protestant community seek
to maintain "peace through security,, 58 arguing that threats and terrorist attacks
by both the Continuity and Real IRA make special security arrangements
necessary.59
Protestants and Catholics maintain their entrenched positions concerning
the political status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK or a potential United
Ireland. According to international norms, Northern Ireland is not a full
member of the UK to the same degree as Scotland and Wales. 60 Northern
Ireland's constitutional limbo encouraged the political violence of the PIRA
while solidifying the siege mentality of Protestants. Moderate Unionists and
militant Loyalists are determined to protect the British link, thereby
safeguarding Protestant heritage and identity. Moderate Nationalists believe
that the root of the conflict is the British presence in Northern Ireland, and wish
to end partition by peaceful democratic means, contrary to the political violence
of the PIRA.6 ' Political competition over the geopolitical space of Northern
Ireland enhances feelings of fear, suspicions and uncertainty, thereby shaping
STUDIES 1-17; Brendan O'Leary, The Conservative Stewardship of Northern Ireland, 1979-97: Sound-
Bottomed Contradictions or Slow Learning, 45(3) POLITICAL STUDIES 663-76.
57. See generally KEVIN BOYLE & TOM HADDEN, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE CHOICE (1994).
58. See generally MICHAEL FARRELL, ARMINGTHE PROTESTANTS: THE FORMATION OFTHE ULSTER
SPECIAL CONSTABULARY ANDTHE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY 1920-27(1983); EAMONN MCCANN, WAR
AND AN IRISH TOWN (1974).
59. Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, 27(2) SECURITY
DIALOGUE 167-78.
60. See generally ADRIANGUELKE, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE( 1988).
61. See MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969-89
(1991); MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, BRmSH GOVERNMENT AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION:
GOVERNING A DIVIDED COMMUNITY (1994).
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the political agenda for both communities. Nevertheless, all constitutional
parties in Northern Ireland, Nationalist and Unionist, accept the legality of
partition and agree that change will require the consent of the majority within
Northern Ireland.62
The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland ensures
that Protestants and Catholics identify with a different political
entity-Northern Protestants with Britain and Northern Catholics with the
Republic of Ireland. Both communities live under the psychological stress of
a besieged minority depending on the conceptual lens is used to consider the
geopolitical context.63 This in turn allows each community to display fear and
suspicion of the political intentions of the "other side" as the political violence
of the paramilitaries prevents a solid middle ground from emerging. As Whyte
notes, the difficulty of regulating conflict in Northern Ireland stems from the
facts that "minorities are groups which feel threatened; that threatened groups
are liable to be hypersensitive; and that in Northern Ireland both groups display
these characteristics."'
Boundaries have a different significance in Canada. Qu6bec's provincial
boundaries enable the Qubcois to assert a great deal of control over their
cultural affairs. Conflict exists over the extent of power to be held at the
provincial and federal levels of government. These federal boundaries are less
prone to conflict than the more institutionally divisive border in Northern
Ireland. The ambiguous nature of federal boundaries increases the opportunity
for peaceful regulation of conflict.
As leaders debate Quebec sovereignty, however, boundaries gain
significance. The boundary between Qudbec and Newfoundland has never been
formally delineated. Outstanding aboriginal land claims and Anglophone
enclaves would obstruct the simple secession of Qu6bec. Furthermore, some
analysts argue that Qu6bec could only leave with its original boundaries and
would thus be forced to cede all land granted to it by the federal government.65
The past debate surrounding Canadian Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
Stephane Dion's suggesting that parts of Qu6bec's population (especially
Anglophones and Aboriginals) could remain in Canada in the event of a
62. See generally DAVID BLOOMFIELD, PEACEMAKING STRATEGIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
BUILDING COMPLEMENTARITY IN CONFuCT MANAGEMENT THEORY (1996).
63. See Paul Dixon, Consocialtionalism and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: The Glass Half
Full or Half Empty, 3(3) NATIONALSIM & ETHNIC POLITICS 20-37 (1997); Paul Dixon, Paths to Peace in
Northern Ireland (I): Civil Society and Consociational Approaches, 4(2) DEMOCRATIZATION 1-26 (1997); Paul
Dixon, Paths to Peace in Northern Ireland (il): The Peace Processes 1973-74 and 1994-96, 4(3)
DEMOCRATIZATION 1-25 (1997).
64. WHYTE, supra note 33, at 100.
65. See, e.g., DAVID L. VARTY, WHO GETS UNGAVA? (1991).
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Qu6becois declaration of sovereignty' can be traced to a long-standing fear that
Anglophones might be separated from the rest of Canada.67 Once the boundary
is perceived as requiring a strict division of groups, the level of salience and
hostility of territorial disputes increases dramatically.
As a result of the 1995 attempt to declare independence, the Canadian
federal court ruled that Quebec did not have the right to such a declaration, but
that Canada would be obligated to negotiate should a clear majority of
Quebecers respond to a clear question about Quebec sovereignty. This simply
moved the debate to issues of what constitutes a clear majority and a clear
question. Turnover in the federal and provincial political arenas continues. The
Reform Party has been replaced by the Canadian Alliance with leader Stockwell
Day. With the resignation of Lucien Bouchard, Bernard Landry became
Premier of Quebec on 8 March 2001. The sovereignty issue is likely to remain
a subject of debate for some time.
B. Terrorism
Terrorism has been used in both regions to draw attention to conflicts.
Significantly, nationalist terrorism in Qu6bec was aimed primarily at symbols
of colonial or federal domination, whereas Republican violence in Northern
Ireland has targeted civilians in addition to property and symbols of the British
state. Sectarian attacks conducted by both Loyalists and Republicans produced
a state of fear and powerlessness marked by a self-perpetuating pattern of
deterrence and revenge.6"
In Northern Ireland, persistent paramilitary violence in the form of local
punishment beatings and shootings since the 1996 cease-fires indicates that the
future course of the fragile peace process could be marked by a return to
violence. A recent internal feud by the UVF and the UFF matched by
continued paramilitary activities by both the Continuity and Real IRAs suggest
that the current peace process should not be taken for granted.69 In the past,
paramilitary violence from the Republican PIRA to force the British
government out of Northern Ireland, and by the Loyalist UVF to keep Northern
Ireland British has claimed many lives, ensuring an enduring bicommunal
66. See Martin Lubin, Political Issues in Contemporary Quebec: Whither Party Politics in Quebec
since the Referendum? (paper presented at the 1996 Meeting of the New York State Political Science
Association Mar. 29-30, 1996); Anthony Wilson-Smith, Fighting Back, MACLEAN'S, Feb. 5, 1996, at 10-14.
67. See, e.g., George Koch, The Price of Separation, ALBERRTA REPORT, Mar. 17, 1990, at 13;
Ingrid Peritz, Anglo Separatists Surface Again, MONTREAL GAZETTE, April 20, 1991, at B4.
68. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 11-12; ALLEN FELDMAN, FORMATIONS OF VIOLENCE: THE
NARRATIVE OF THE BODY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. (1991).
69. Byrne, supra note 21.
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conflict.7° For example, the Enniskillen Poppy Day massacre of eleven
Protestants in 1987 by the PIRA, the 1992 murders of Catholic and Protestant
patrons in a bar in Greysteel by the UVF, the 1993 PIRA murders of ten
Protestants in Frizzell's fish shop in West Belfast, and the 1998 continuity IRA
bombing of Protestant and Catholic civilians in Omagh, Co. Tyrone reinforced
historical fears of genocide in both communities. Loyalist paramilitary violence
has escalated during periods of crisis when British policy initiatives were
perceived as a threat to abandon Protestants to the Irish nation. Republican
violence, on the other hand, was aimed at forcing a British withdrawal thereby
creating a United Ireland.
Violence has polarized both communities in Northern Ireland, thereby
discrediting moderate alternatives. The PIRA has refused to surrender its arms
in exchange for Sinn Fein participation in the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Moderate Nationalists represented by the SDLP and moderate Unionists
represented by the OUP now fear, in the wake of the current arms
decommissioning impasse, that if concessions are not forthcoming by
Republicans and Loyalists, then advocates of physical force such as the
continuity and Real IRAs as well as the Red Hand Defenders and the Orange
Volunteers can claim to offer the only solution.7 '
The peak of terrorist activity in Qu6bec was in the 1960s, involving groups
like the Front de Libiration du Qubec (FLQ) who drew inspiration from
anti-colonial and civil rights movements, Marxism and the PIRA.72 In the early
1960s, the FLQ conducted a bombing campaign against symbols of colonial or
federal domination. The FLQ seems to have had about thirty active members,
most of whom were arrested in 1963. However, several apparently unconnected
groups identified themselves as FLQ cells. Bombing activities intensified in
1968-9, and in 1970 British Trade Commissioner James Cross and Qu6bec
Labor Minister Pierre Laporte were abducted. These abductions appear to have
been the acts of about ten people, but Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
reacted forcefully, revoking protection of civil liberties, arresting 450 suspects,
destroying presses, and mobilizing 10,000 military and special police forces.73
Popular opinion, mildly in support of the FLQ, dropped dramatically when
70. See generally A CITIZEN'S INQUIRY: THE OPSAHL REPORT ON NORTHERN IRELAND (Andy
Pollak & Torkel Opsahl, eds. 1993).
71. Byrne, Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland,
supra note 2 1.
72. PIERRE VALLItRES, WHITE NIGGERS OF AMERICA: THE PRECOCIOUS AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A
QUEBEC "TERRORIST" (Joan Pinkham, trans., 1971).
73. See SHEILAGH HODGINS MILNER & HENRY MILNER, THE DECOLONIZATION OF QUEBEC: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEFT-WING NATIONALISM 195-223 (1973); JEAN-CLAUDE ROBERT, DU CANADA FRAN(AIS AU
QUIBECLIBRE: HISTOIRED 'UNMOUVEMENTINDtPENDANTISTE[FRENCH CANADA AND FREE QUEBEC:. HISTORY
OF THE INDEPENDENCE MOvEMENT] 283-86 (1975).
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Laporte was executed by his abductors. In Qu6bec, the governmental backlash
provoked by the attacks failed to produce the reaction desired by the terrorists:
instead of criticizing the federal government for invoking the War Measures
Act, citizens blamed the agitators for disrupting a peaceful, if unequal, system.
The failed attempts to amend the 1982 Constitution Act, enacted despite
the Qu6bec government's opposition, combined with the defeated referendum
on Qu6bec sovereignty may reduce the attractiveness of institutional politics for
Qu6bec nationalists. Some businesses who opposed sovereignty during the
referendum have allegedly received letters on FLQ letterhead threatening
retaliation for any further anti-sovereignty actions.74
Terrorism does remain a threat in Quebec. Recent bombings of caf6s with
Anglophone names have been linked to a renewed FLQ. Reaction against not
only the linguistic-cultural-political split in Canada but also against
globalization could prompt Quebec once more to enter into a period of struggle
with terrorism. This possibility will be reduced if institutional politics can
address the issues of concern to those who might turn to violence.
A difference between the two regions thus seems to be that the Qudbcois
have access to institutions which most view to be legitimate, while many
Northern Irish Catholics view political institutions as Protestant tools of
repression. Quebecers are thus able to protest specific issues without seeking
to destroy the entire political system. Institutional politics may further foster
less antagonistic views of the outgroup, while violence will increase the mutual
antagonism of groups. Canada's federalist structure permits more peaceful
conflict regulation.75 Northern Ireland's lack of a strategic middle ground
prevents cross-cutting cleavages, leading to institutional and constitutional
impasse. Political differences in Northern Ireland create tensions and
misperceptions between communities, resulting in a bipolar society.
VI. ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic differences can be found in comparisons of virtually any groups.
They become important in ethnoterritorial conflict to the extent that disparities
can be linked to competition between groups, institutional favoritism,
stereotypes, or other factors that divide the groups. Leaders of ethnoterritorial
movements may exploit disparities in the distribution of economic resources to
mobilize a particular constituency to support for their demands. Awareness of
intergroup discrimination adds economic concerns to the overall categorization
of the Other.
74. Diane Francis, Threatening Letters and an FLQ Logo, MACLEANS'S, April 22, 1996, at 11.
75. See generally MICHAEL BEHEILS, THE MEECH LAKE PRIMER: CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD (1989); MCROBERTS, supra note 29; PATRICK J. MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE: THE
INSIDE STORY (1991).
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Northern Ireland's Protestants have historically had greater access to
political and economic resources than Catholics.76 Catholic areas have higher
unemployment rates than Protestant areas. Recruitment practices, lack of
industrial development, emigration and discrimination increase the economic
gap between Protestants and Catholics, divide the working classes, and reinforce
intergroup discrimination.77 Economic privileges in housing and employment
enjoyed by Protestants reduced the salience of class conflict and may in part
explain continued Protestant support for institutional links with Britain.78
Although both groups have similar distributions of members identifying with
various economic classes, they are likely to see intergroup differences as more
important than intragroup disparity.79
Qu6bec long exhibited economic patterns similar to Northern Ireland.
Protestantism correlated strongly with capitalism; Qu6bec was dominated
economically by the Anglophone minority, as Francophone Catholics tended to
shun capitalist ventures. By the 1960s, studies of economic disparity showed
vast differences in the economic welfare of Qu6bec's two linguistic
communities."0 This inequality helped change nationalist sentiment in Qu6bec
from ultramontane isolationism to secular cosmopolitanism as the Quibecois
began to seek political control of provincial resources. The federal and Qudbec
governments initiated language laws to address new perceptions of economic
discrimination against Francophones. Nevertheless, the two languages remain
asymmetrical, and it is generally more advantageous for Francophones to learn
English than for Anglophones to learn French. Qu6bec politicians defend their
relatively strict language laws on the need to counteract this asymmetry. Since
76. See John Agnew, Beyond Reason: Spatial and Temporal Sources of Ethnic Conflicts, in
INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 44-46 (Louis Kriesberg et al., eds., 1989); FARRELL,
supra note 5 1, at 2-98; WALLIS ET AL., supra note 43, at 1-35; LIAM O'DOWD ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND:
BETWEEN CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL WARS (1980); John Agnew & James G. MacLaughlin, Hegemony and the
Regional Question: The Political Geography of Regional Industrial Policy in Northern Ireland, 76 ANNALS
OF THE ASSOC. OF AMER. GEOGRAPHERS, 247-61 (1986).
77. See PAUL ARTHUR & KEITH JEFFREY, NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE 1968 (1988); R.J. CORMACK
& ROBERT D. OSBORNE, RELIGION, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT: ASPECTS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (1983); Bill Rolston, Alienation or Political Awareness? The Battle for the Hearts and
Minds of Northern Nationalists, in BEYOND THE RHETORIC: POLITICS, THE ECONOMY, AND SOCIAL POLICY
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 58-91 (Paul Teague, ed. 1987).
78. See FRANK GAFFIKIN & MARTIN MORRISSEY, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE THATCHER YEARS
(1990); RONNIE MUNCK, IRELAND: NATION, STATE AND CLASS STRUGGLE (1985); BELINDA PROBERT,
BEYOND ORANGE AND GREEN: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CRISIS (1978).
79. Sedn Byrne & Michael Ayulo, External Economic Aid in Ethno-Political Conflict: A View from
Northern Ireland, 29(4) SECURITY DIALOGUE 219-33 (1998).
80. See, e.g., JOHN PORTER, THE VERTICAL MOSAIC: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CLASS AND POWER
IN CANADA (1965); Jacques Mathieu and Jacques Lacoursi~re, LES MtMOIRES QUtBPCOISES [THE MEMOIRS
OF THOSE FROM QUEBEC] (1991).
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the Quiet Revolution, Francophone Quebecers have greatly improved their
economic status and education levels.
Both Northern Ireland and Quebec have exhibited patterns of nepotism that
increase within-group solidarity. If this pattern is accepted by the groups, as in
traditional Quebec, it will not be harmful to intergroup accommodation.
However, if economic competition dominates or a shift occurs in economic
trends, polarization and hostility may very well increase.
VII. PSYCHOCULTURAL FACTORS
Tensions and emotions have often escalated during social change or
perceived political crises between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland
and between Anglophones and Francophones in Qudbec. During crises, each
group portrays the opposing culture as an outgroup or enemy to rally the
ingroup against potential genocide or subjugation. Cultural symbols and
stereotypes reinforce group identity and solidarity and clearly distinguish the
ingroup from the outgroup.
The importance of symbolism helps explain the nature of the conflicts in
Northern Ireland and Quebec. Symbols create a sense of commonality among
group members and help them categorize their political beliefs. Ethnoterritorial
groups often promote prejudice and stereotyping by invoking group traditions
to symbolize issues (e.g. nationality, religion, and ethnic identity) that have yet
to be resolved."' The Northern Irish conflict appears intractable because
economic issues are complicated by religious and national identity crises
embedded in people's minds from an early age. 2 These psychocultural and
political images are used to categorize people from the other community as an
outgroup.83 Quebec's role in Canada's constitutional debate centers around
Quebec's status as a distinct society or as one of ten equal provinces.' The
nature of debate and form of conflict management in these two regions create
unique political cultures.
81. See, e.g., KEVIN BOYLE & TOM HADDEN, NORTHERN IRELAND: A POSMVE PROPOSAL (1985);
E.E. O'DONNELL, NORTHERN IRISH STEREOTYPES (1978).
82. See ROSE, supra note 37, at 60-127.
83. See, e.g., John E. Greer, Viewing the Other Side in Northern Ireland: Openness and Attitudes
to Religion among Catholic and Protestant Adolescents, 24 J. FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 275-92
(1985); ROSEMARY HARRIS, PREJUDICE AND TOLERANCE IN ULSTER: A STUDY OF NEIGHBOURS AND
STRANGERS IN A BORDER COMMUNITY 178 (1972).
84. See, e.g., RONALD L WATTS & DOUGLAS M. BROWN, OPTIONS FOR A NEW CANADA (1991);
CHARLES TAYLOR, RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES: ESSAYS ON CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM
(1993); MONAHAN, supra note 75.
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In Northern Ireland, myths of siege, victory, massacre and martyrdom
permit two distinct cultural traditions to co-exist uneasily in a sectarian milieu.85
Protestants and Catholics use these historical events to promote group solidarity,
thereby reducing the potential for intergroup cooperation. 86 Northern Irish
Protestants believe that their cultural symbols, flags, and holidays are of
importance to their core values, cultural mores and belief structures. Orange
marches are perceived as a "traditional expression of a legal right" to display
Protestant values and symbols.8 7 Likewise, Northern Irish Catholics wear Easter
lillies to commemorate the Easter Rising of 1916. The existence of these
cultural and religious symbols reinforces ingroup solidarity and outgroup
hostility.8"
A strong link exists between Republican violence, Catholicism, and a
pan-Celtic culture centered around the redemptive nature of a blood sacrifice.
Northern Irish Catholics often invoke the symbolic significance of "martyrs for
the cause," or Christ-like figures, best exemplified by the deaths of Bobby
Sands during the 1981 Hunger Strikes and Patrick Pearse during the 1916
Rising.89
Symbolic rituals tend to further escalate the conflict by fostering the
growth of sectarian belief structures. Extremists depict the conflict as a struggle
between good and evil.' Moderates, however, perceive the conflict in political
and economic, rather than religious, terms.9' As debate turns from economic
and political matters to questions of ethnoreligious identity, polarization
removes the middle ground.92
Lipset claims that Canada is a country of defeated nations, and therefore
its symbolism often reinforces notions of the challenge of survival for distinct
societies in an inhospitable climate, faced with the ever-present threat of
assimilation. 93 Quebec also has some heroes that exemplify the hardships of
Francophone survival. Louis Riel, a Mdtis leader in the West, exemplified the
85. STEWART, supra note 5 1.
86. See MARl FrrTDUFF, BEYOND VIOLENCE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1996).
87. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 43, at 1-20.
88. Byme & Delman, supra note 39; NORTHRUP, supra note 50.
89. See Conor Cruise O'Brien, Ireland: The Mirage of Peace, 33 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 23-33
(Apr. 1986); JOHN M. FEEHAN, BOBBY SANDS AND THE TRAGEDY OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1986).
90. See Jennifer Todd, Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture, 2 IRISH POLITICAL STUD. 1
(1987). See also WHYTE, supra note 33.
91. See Cathal McCall, Postmodern Europe and the Resources of Communal Identities in Northern
Ireland, 33 EURO. J. OF POLIT. RESEARCH 389 (1998).
92. AGNEW, supra note 76, at 41-53.
93. See generally Seymor Martin Upset, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1990).
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difficulties faced by Francophones outside Qu6bec. Riel was hanged as a traitor
for leading a revolt against the revocation of protection for Francophone Mdtis
in Manitoba. Nationalists use his story to exemplify how hostile the rest of
Canada is to Francophone equality. Qu6bec politicians use symbolism
effectively, emphasizing land, language, faith and families. The feast of St.
John the Baptist is held as Quebec's national holiday. To intensify the sense of
Qugbicois nationalism, activists have used slogans such as "Maitres chez-nous"
(Masters in our own house) to represent a desire for self-determination and
economic responsibility. With the increased Francophone attention to national
symbolism, Anglophones responded with Canadian symbols: the Maple Leaf
has been the insignia of Canada only since 1965; "0 Canada" replaced "God
Save the Queen" in 1967.
During the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, both the yes and the no sides
attempted to use symbols to depict their allegiances. While the nationalists
tended to give priority to Qu~bdcois symbols, they chose to use the Canadian
dollar coin in their symbolism, to represent continued economic cooperation
between an independent Quebec and the rest of Canada. Federalists frequently
merged Canadian and Quibicois symbols in an attempt to illustrate the
coexistence and complimentarity of loyalties to both entities.
Symbolism intensifies violence in Northern Ireland, where people can be
terrorized for belonging to one group or another; but it has not led to violent
conflict in Qu6bec. The Northern Irish conflict is marked by intense hostility
and imagery that rejects cooperation with the other community. In Canada,
however, the myth of "two founding races" forging a social compact indicates
the desirability of intercommunity accommodation despite fundamental
differences.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In general, Northern Ireland experiences more problems with terrorism and
conflicting national identities than Quebec due to each ethnic group's insecurity
over the national question. Lack of control over policies, mutual suspicion of
treachery, histories of intercommunity violence, and symbolism that promotes
a siege mentality all reduce the potential for Northern Ireland to create a sense
of shared identity. In contrast, Qu6bec benefits from the existence of
federalism, which reduces both groups to minority status and also promotes
some mutual recognition based on the myth of Canada's creation through a pact
between the two "founding races." However, repeated failure in the negotiation
of constitutional matters is reducing the good will on both sides of the debate.
Despite the potential for accommodation presented by the positive aspects of
double minorities, problems still threaten the equilibrium.
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We have identified a number of significant interrelated factors that are part
of a multi-causal analysis of conflict in Northern Ireland and Qu6bec. These
six facets or social forces of the cube must be examined together if we are to
understand how ethnoterritorial conflicts can be ameliorated or exacerbated.
The six factors produce different patterns, with some factors reinforcing
potential conflict and others mitigating the differences. Unfortunately, the
social cube cannot capture the dynamic nature of politics, and therefore may
seem to give too little weight to recent events in both regions. However, our
analysis indicates the difficulties that must be overcome if a lasting settlement
is to be reached in Northern Ireland as well as those that face Quebecers
attempting to define the political nature of their province. The interlocking
nature of the cube also indicates that addressing only one dimension is unlikely
to provide a settlement, but also that improvements in a single area may
ameliorate others as well.
What stands out in our analysis is the way that material and psychological
dimensions interact to maintain or mitigate intergroup conflict. Entrenched
sectarian attitudes result from political and economic institutions and cultural
stereotypes that reinforce bigotry, suspicion and polarization. A holistic, social
cubism approach to intergroup conflict must account for how structural and
psychocultural mechanisms interact to exacerbate or, indeed, ameliorate
ethnoterritorial conflicts. Future research should address the interrelation of
material and psychological mechanisms that shape ethnoterritorial politics.
2002] Byrne & Carter
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C. Figure 3: Six Social Forces of the Complex Cube
CONFLICT FACTOR NORTHERN IRELAND QUtBEC
ECONOMIC Both groups support nepotism. Anglophones traditionally
Working class divided along dominated the economy.
ethnic lines. Class differences Modernization since 1960s
exist within groups, but are increased Francophone stake in
perceived as less important than business.
inter-group differences.
RELIGIOUS Both groups tend to form Religion was basis for separate
enclaves. Protestant loyalists educational systems. Catholic
follow the doctrine of church was the dominant social
conditional loyalty, institution, but religiosity has
declined since the 1960s.
POLITICAL Terrorism used to address Federal structure allows groups
partition and instill fear within means of effective, legitimate
and between communities to representation. Nationalism
maintain bipolar society. concentrates on role of Quebec
Partition is central to national as defender of the Francophone
identity. Direct rule from UK culture.
instituted in 1972 due to lack of
Catholic representation.
PSYCHO-CULTURAL Traditions, values, holidays and Francophones traditionally used
symbols reinforce ethnic and language, land, race, and
religious identity; the conflict is religion to promote their
emphasized in symbolic identity. In the 1960s,
marches. Gaelic schools have Francophones increasingly used
been active in Catholic nationalist symbolism.
nationalist working class areas, English-Candians responded
thereby reinforcing ethnic with the development of
identity and fear. Cultural Canadian symbolism. Some
events maintain communal blending of Canadian and
divides, thereby hindering Quebec symbols by the
shared identity. federalists.
HISTORICAL Martyrdom and battles are French-English conflict is seen
used to reinforce intergroup as constitutive of Canada.
conflict and promote enclaving. Qudbdcois often refer to the
Reenactments of historical "Conquest" and refer to
events emphasize the salience of Anglophones as "English."
territory and ethnic cohesion. English Canadians tend to use
regional categories.
DEMOGRAPHIC Fear of genocide helps Anglophones are part of the
emphasize ethnoterritorial wider Canadian context.
identity. "Double Minorities" Francophones have developed a
affect perceptions each group siege mentality to sustain a
holds of the other. Positions are regional and linguistic identity.
defended and a small Changes in birthrates and
middle-ground is not in a immigration affect Qu6bec's
position to articulate and cultural policies.
accommodate interests.
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D. Figure 4: Interacci6n de las Seis Fuerzas
CONFLICT FACTOR NORTHERN IRELAND QUIBEC
ECONOMIC Used to support claims of Primarily used to compare Quebec and
discrimination based on other provinces. Has occasionally been
religion. Could potentially used to compare linguistic groups,
mitigate ethnic cleavage especially during the Quiet Revolution.
with internal class
divisions
RELIGIOUS Used as a primary Has lost some salience with
category label, replacing modernization, but helped shape a
ethnicity and language. tradition of acceptance of hierarchy and
Decreases potential for compromise between two main
compromise, as moral linguistic groups, and divergent
symbols are lent to economic patterns. Its salience is now
conflicting parties. less than that of ethnicity and language.
POLITICAL Terrorism reinforces Terrorism was a minor issue, but
religious cleavage, reduces deliberate killing for political ends
salience of economic deemed unacceptable. Current political
factors, and contributes to institutions, through their complexity,
historical backing for reduce the salience of cleavages.
continued conflict. Political institutions have a mixed
Reduction of violence may effect on histories, as nationalists and




PSYCHO-CULTURAL Generally these factors These factors have a mixed effect in
reinforce a bipolar conflict Quebec. Some promote overlapping
by emphasizing the threat loyalties with Qudbec and Canada,
of mutual destruction. while others indicate loyalty is
May change with the mutually exclusive. English Canadian
cease-fire and confidence symbols are largely a reaction to
building measures. Francophone nationalism, and were
slow to distance themselves from
British symbols.
HISTORICAL Histories used to promote Histories mixed between conflict and
a bicommunal view of the compromise. Figures of cooperation
region through the may also be seen as figures of co-
recounting of past conflict optation.
DEMOGRAPHIC Narrowing population gap Decline in Qurbecois birthrates
increases Protestant fears increases Francophone fears of
of assimilation. Proximity assimilation and demand for increased
increases need to maintain control of cultural policies.
boundaries. Francophone dominance in the
_ province mitigates the level of hostility.
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E. Figure 5: Early Warning-Contingency "Social Cube" Escalators!
De-escalators
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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether in wars between nations or disputes within families, conflict is
caused by many factors and forces, both internal and external, micro and macro.
Furthermore, agency/structure tensions are endemic to any conflict analysis in
relation to the decisions to act, to adjust, or to critically negotiate often
ambiguous and /or contradictory relational contexts, large and small.' The
factors discussed in Byrne's and Carter's Social Cubism Model hold one key to
a deeper discussion of the decisionmaking and the dynamic states in which the
six facets of their Rubik's Cube® interact with each other.2 This discussion
suggests an even deeper, inductive and integrative analysis of conflict using two
additional keys or Rubik's Cubes®.
Indeed, while Social Cubism utilizes one Rubik's Cube® with six facets,3
Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism suggests three cubes with eighteen facets:
a cube, within a cube, within a cube. The Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism
model further suggests that the long discussed agency/structure conundrum is
in an emergent, infinite, and dynamic negotiational dance among the cubes and
their facets, contrary to a Cartesian, Manichean and syllogistic oppositional
dilemma. Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism expands both conflict analysis
and its dynamism as being contextually driven. Conflict analysis is thus
dialectically analyzed from the outside in and then inside out, as the facets relate
to one another and are re-synthesized. The Integrative-Inductive Social Cubist
model therefore, proposes dialectical, postmodernist, feminist, heuristic,
phenomenological, and elicitive theoretical analyses-a more integrative than
oppositional one.' Such analyses require both inductive and integrative critical
thinking.
1. See generally VOL. L WILLIAM JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890); GEORGE H. MEAD,
MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (1934); GEORG SIMMEL,
CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS (Kurt H. Wolff, trans. 1955).
2. See Sean Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics
in Northern Ireland and Quebec, J. OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUD. 3(2) 52-71 (Dec. 1996).
3. Id.
4. See generally Herbert Blumer, Society as Symbolic Interaction, in SYMBOLIC INTERACTION,
PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD (Herbert Blumer, ed., 1969) (1962); PAULO FRERE, PEDAGOGY OF THE
OPPRESSED. (2000); HANS-GEORGGADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD( 1993); HANs-GEORGGADAMER, HEGEL'S
DIALECTIC: FIVE HERMENEUTIC STUDIES (1976); JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND
CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION (1996); EEDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY. (W.R. Boyce Gibson, trans., 1931); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR
PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES (1995) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR PEACE]; JOHN
PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1997) [hereinafter
BUILDING PEACE]; GEORGE RnrZER, MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (4th ed. 1996); ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (1972).
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11. THE ORIGINS OF INTEGRATIVE INDUCTIVE SOCIAL CUBISM: SOCIAL
CUBISM BY BYRNE & CARTER (1996)
Byrne and Carter suggest analyzing ethnoterritorial and communal
conflicts by utilizing a Rubik's Cube® to express the complexity and inter-
relatedness of six endemic factors, namely, demographics, economics, religion,
politics, psycho-culture, and history (see Figure 1).' I suggest that each of these
facets is directly related to structural, indeed, macro-societal issues and contexts.
Byrne & Carter further posit that their six-factor categorization obscures internal
diversity and suggest future and deeper research is needed to fully explain the
complexities of conflict in context.' Integrative Inductive Social Cubism
endeavors to continue where Byrne and Carter have left off (see Figure 2).'
I. INTEGRATIVE-INDUCTIVE SOCIAL CUBISM
Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism uses the same general system of
analysis as Byrne and Carter.' However, it suggests inductively delving deeper
into the systems, integrating as it goes along and re-synthesizing by using a
cube, within a cube, within a cube. This emergent triple level of dialectical
analyses relate to complex power relations and profound discontinuities in
existential phenomena,9 both latent and manifest, in the inter, intra, and
intersecting relations, the decision-making negotiations between the facets of
the three cubes. Therefore, subjectivity is an asset rather than a liability: a
decidedly non-positivistic non-objective view. Visualize the three cubes as the
frontstage, backstage, and actor, respectively, the major theatrical theme of
Goffman' s Symbolic Interactionist "dramaturgical analysis."' ° Scenes, settings,
actors and audience are in a continual state of flux, unfolding and adjusting with
each interaction." They are one, yet they act in discontinuity.
The one-cube Social Cubist analysis poses a six-faceted puzzle. The three-
cube Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism (see Figure 2) analysis propose that
we explore the innate, internal tensions and relations that manifest themselves




9. See generally S. HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN
EPISTOMOLOGY (1998).
10. ERVING GOFFMAN, PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY IFE (1959) (hereinafter
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE]; ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974).
11. See also Bell Hooks, Let's Get It On, in PERFORMANCES PRACTICE AS A SITE OF OPPOSITION
210-221 (Catherine Ugwu, ed., 1995); JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX (1994) (discussing
"performative interpretation").
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in different forms, during different time orientations, contexts, and states of
affairs in a triadic and emerging context. We analyze conflict from the macro
structural societal level, penetrating into the micro level where human agency
and decision-making potential is developed, and back out again, re-synthesizing
along the way. Conflict is not solely actor driven, structure driven, or context
driven. It is the sum total of a complex, often strategic, set of interactions and
motivations in infinite motion and continual re-adjustment.12 Moreover,
relational power dynamics 13 are continually mediated and negotiated in terms
of socially constructed roles and rules,14 from the largest constituencies to the
smallest individual existential experiences, 5 backgrounds and "sociations."' 6
Power relations are thus embedded, submerged, indeed folded into each conflict
and its analysis in diverse ways. 7
A. Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism (Russ-Trent 2000)
As discussed, we begin with Byrne's and Carter's premise of six related
facets or forces of the larger exterior Cube I, which constitutes the front stage.'
8
History, religion, demographics, political institutions and institutional behavior,
economics, and psycho-cultural factors are construed as structural and macro in
character. However, embedded inside Cube I, resides Cube 11, the back stage,
the group-based (collective) facets. The category of "group based" infers that
we are simultaneously dealing with the agency of individuals in relation to the
structures in which they act and visa versa, suggesting reciprocity, exchange,
and contextual social "collective" identity (micro and macro). Cube II facets
are: identity groups, collective security and group survival, group tradition,
existential history and experiences, group power relations (intra/inter), psycho-
12. Lana Russ-Trent, Women Going Against the Grain: Female Political Militarism in Northern
Ireland: The Phenomenon of Female Resistance: A Phenomenological Exploration of Women's "'Strategic
Living;" (2001) (unpublished dissertation manuscript, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida). See also PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 10; JAMES, supra note 1; MEAD,
supra note I; SIMMEL, supra note 1.
13. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON
LANGUAGE (1969) [hereinafter THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE]; MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF
THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF HUMAN SCIENCES (1971) [hereinafter THE ORDER OF THINGS].
14. See generally JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER (1994) [hereinafter PARADOXES OF
GENDER]; THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER (Lorber & Farrell, eds., 1991).
15. The "things in themselves." See HUSSERL, supra note 4; IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON, (Norman Kemp Smith, trans 1929).
16. Simmel, supra note 1. See also Hannah Arendt, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958); Hannah
Arendt, ON REVOLUTION (1963); J. Derrida, THE ENDS OF MAN: PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH (1969).
17. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, POWER AND KNOWLEDGE (1980).
18. See Byrne & Cartner, supra note 2.
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"sociations,"' 9 and group self-interest and power maintenance status quo.
Finally, embedded deep within Cube II, (residing in Cube I), exists Cube IlI, the
actor, whose actions are most intimately involved in individual decision-making
ability, cognitive and decision-making development, self-efficacy and self-
determination (phenomenological intentioned individual meaning-making).
Cube III therefore, relates most directly to the agency of the individual and
explores the facets of self-identity, ingroup/outgroup individual membership
identity, psychology and behavior, individual social identification2" individual
psychology, individual existential and developmental history21-"owned"
experiences-and contextual and pragmatic self-interest,2 2 all micro in
character.
It is important to note that these three integrated cubes, this triadic and
pluralistic emergent relationship, act relative to each other, simultaneously, and
in increasing and decreasing degrees. We are proceeding from the macro level
to the micro level and, often, back again, re-synthesizing and adjusting,
affecting each in an immutably dynamic tension thus creating inter-cube, intra-
cube, and inter facet social constructs which must be negotiated and/or
mediated-"shared intertwined dynamics. 2 3
Following Goffman's theatrical metaphor,24 actors collectively make
strategic adjustments during performances, often depending on backstage and
audience responses 25 and both individually and collectively develop the
Simmelian "sociations" necessary to negotiate within a contextual conflictual
environment.26 As Byrne and Carter suggest, interplay among the factors
19. See SIMMEL, supra note 1; GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OFGEORG SIMMEL (Kurt H. Wolff,
trans. 1950). [hereinafter THE SOCIOLOGY OFGEORG SIMMEL].
20. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS: EUROPEAN STUDIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, eds. 1986); Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and Intergroup
Behavior, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. I. (197 1) [hereinafter Social Categorization and
Intergroup Behavior]; HENRI TAiFEL, DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS (1978) [hereinafter DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS].
21. See generally Blumer, supra note 4; HUSSERL, supra note 4; EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF
EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (1970) [hereinafter THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN
SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY]; BARRY SMITH & DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH, THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUSSERL (1995).
22. JAMES, supra note 1; PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 10; ERVING
GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES (1963) [hereinafter BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES]; MEAD, supra note
1; RrrZER, supra note 4, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL, supra note 19; SIMMEL, supra note 1.
23. See generally HAACK, supra note 9.
24. See generally PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 10.
25. JAMES, supra note 1; MEAD, supra note 1;
26. See SIMMEL, supra note 1.
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exists.2 7 We must therefore, visualize Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism's
three Rubik's Cubes® in constant motion, interplaying with each other, the
facets turning as the cubes are relating with, negotiating with, and transforming
one another with each new context.
Because constant motion and interplay exist between the eighteen facets
of the three cubes, and the cubes denote 1) structure, 2) agency/structure, and
3) agency, there are no bifurcated oppositional forces per se, no Manichean-us
versus them--dichotomous or Cartesian dualistic influences. 28 Rather, it is a
"negotiated dance" if you will, as the factors deal with each new context in a
process of fragmentation, de-centering and deconstructing power from
collective subjectivity, including individual and cultural ethical issues,
heterogeneity and identity issues.29 It is meant to be non-iterative. Since multi-
faceted and contextual relationships exist among the facets, a non- oppositional
approach, rather than a bifurcated structure versus agency approach remains
extant, but never static. This is the purpose of utilizing an undulating symbol
for infinity (see Figure 2) in which we place agency and structure as the
signifier of the infinite possibilities and variables that occur in any conflict
context. We place agency and structure in the site of infinity, inferring a never-
ending expandable, retractable, convoluted, and integrative circularity rather
than an oppositional linearity. The infinity symbol is in constant motion as is
its size and potential to undulate and distort with each new context is revealed,
mitigated, negotiated, mediated or exacerbated. Agency and structure are rarely
in the same degree of tension (negotiation) or strength (power). This is a critical
postmodernist, heuristic and phenomenological" thrust of Integrative-Inductive
Social Cubism (I-ISC).31
B. Post-modernism's Influences
Postmodern social theory offers a more integrative, hermeneutic, and
heuristic approach to understanding societal relations, hence social conflict.
Within this theoretical persuasion, stands Integrative Symbolic Interactionism,
a feminist critical approach, both inclusive and relational, rather than
oppositional, dealing with multi-modal and multi-faceted constructs of
27. See Byrne & Carter, supra note 2.
28. See Rend Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking
for Truth in the Sciences, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES (George Heffernan, trans. 1911);
HUSSERL, supra note 4.
29. See generally HAACK, supra note 9.
30. See HUSSERL, supra note 4.
31. See GALTUNG, supra note 4, at 23. DERRIDA, supra note 16; THE ORDER OF THINGS, supra note
13; THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 13; FOUCAULT, supra note 17; THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG
SIMMEL, supra note 19; SIMMEL, supra note 1.
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negotiated conflict behavior and power relations.32 The extrapolation of Mead,33
Blumer, 4 and Ritzer 3 has developed integrative conflict theories which explore
the intricacies of societal relations in more existentially "lived" and "owned"
syntheses and sites. Rather than doctrinaire, they are consilient,36 uniting
knowledge heretofore devalued and often silenced. They focus on "power"
relations and human agency.37 Hooks's "practical performances as [sites] of
opposition" is exemplary.3" Influences include all those who have been
historically marginalized, their voices, their habitus,39 their existential
experiences and motivations, historically de-valued within linear conflict
analyses. However, today we choose to benefit from those marginalized voices
in order to heuristically explore the phenomenological motivational factors
rather than the dichotomized simplistic us versus them linear structural
scenarios.' Therefore, feedback loops are perpetually re-synthesizing
contextual analysis as the I-ISC's cubes undulate like the harmonic or erratic
rhythm of a heart and the expected or unexpected beat of jazz quartet.
IV. CUBE I: THE FRONT STAGE ETHOS: BYRNE'S AND CARTER'S (1996)
SOCIAL CUBISM
As discussed, this six-facet model emerges as a structural, macro one,
primarily dealing with the front stage of human ethos in the form of
institutions/structures, both large and small, including nations and nation-states
in which powerful entities and raw power are dealt with, in context. This
includes 1) politics, political institutions, interest groups, lobbying and
legislative bodies; 2) religion, including ideology and its social, often
authoritarian, and patriarchal institutions; 3) history, including institutional
(national- bureaucratic) linear-based constructions; 4) psycho-culture, including
the tensions and pressures to maintain identity status (power) in the structure -
collective nationalist consciousness (identity), and attendant prescribed rules
(laws); 5) demographics (quantifiable cohorts, trends, societal pressures), and
32. See Foucault, supra note 17; RrrZER, supra note 4.
33. MEAD, supra note 1;
.34. Blumer, supra note 4.
35. RITZER, supra note 4.
36. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998).
37. See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 17; SIMONEDE BEAUVOIR, THESECOND SEX (1952); BELL
HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM THE MARGIN TO THE CENTER (1984) (hereinafter FEMINIST THEORY);
Hooks, supra note 11.
38. FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 37; Hooks, supra note 11.
39. PIERRE BOURDIEu, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (1980).
40. See, e.g., HUSSERL, supra note 4; THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 21; SMITH & SMITH, supra note 21.
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finally; 6) economics (global standing: instrumental power, markets and
indicators, social welfare systems, financial infrastructure(s)).
V. CUBE II: THE BACK STAGE ETHOS: INTEGRATIVE-INDUCTIVE
SOCIAL CUBISM
Cube I explores group (agency/structure) behavior which includes positive
and negative group social identity (ingroup/outgroup behavior), 4' external and
internal kin behavior, individual behavior within the group, agency in relation
to the group structure (groupthink), cognition and conscientization.42 The facets
of Cube 1I include 1) group social identity-belonging to organizations,
collectivities and communities large and small, 2) collective security/ group
survival--both offensive and defensive actions/behaviors, 3) group
tradition-including existential "collective" ethos and history, transgenerational
transmissions of group trauma and traumatic metaphoric memory narratives;
43
4) group power relations, including issues of gender, race, life-style, ideology,
social role constructions, marginalization and dis-empowerment, 5) psycho-
"sociations" referring to the Simmelian "webs" of strategic affiliations, both
latent and manifest" (psycho-social political relations) which are necessary for
cohesive group membership, survival, and harmony- trading justice for
harmony,45 and finally; 6) group self-interest through which the maintenance of
internal solidarity, internal and external influence (power) is assured, including
economic standing, political and group legitimacy, increasing membership and
maintenance is assured. Therefore, Cube I deals with the relational (group)
sites in which agency and structure dialectics (tensions) are the most intimate,
contradictory and ambiguous.
A. Group Process
Tensions and emotions escalate during social change or perceived political
crisis. The tendency is for each group, large or small, to portray the "other"
opposing group as an out-group. This is often accomplished through negative
41. Tajfel & Turner, supra note 20; Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior, supra note 20;
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS, supra note 20; HENRI TAFEL, SOCIAL IDENTITY AND
INTERGROUP PSYCHOLOGY: EUROPEAN STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1982) [hereinafter SOCIAL IDENTITY
AND INTERGROUP PSYCHOLOGY].
42. Critical consciousness and full humanity-autonomy and self-determination. See generally
FRIERE, supra note 4.
43. See generally VAMIK D. VOLKAN, BLOODLINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO ETHNIC TERRORISM
(1997).
44. See SIMMEL, supra note 1.
45. L. Nader, Trading Justice for Harmony, NIDR FORUM, at 12-14 (Winter 1992) (National
Institute for Dispute Resolution).
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behavioral attributions and negative characterizations, facilitated by infused
rhetoric and language.' Such processes rally group solidarity, reinforcing
group differentiation, in-group and out-group opposition creating positive and
negative group identities, which in turn, create marginalization for some. Each
group attempts to maintain a positive group identity by constructing the "other"
as a perceived negative group identity, attributing negative behavior, devalued
cultural capital and causal fault.47 Psuedospeciation is often a result.48
Remember, group process occurs within and between family units,
organizations and nation-states.
B. The Psychodynamic Group Process: Creating Ethnic or Identity Tents
When personal and group identity is threatened-whether perceived or
real-and/or when such tension is exacerbated by the persistence of past
trauma-an imposed duty to avenge by consensus-and/or when personal and
group/national identity are intertwined, collective memory often ensues and
group survival becomes critical. Violence often results. The "group identity"
supercedes the individual identity as they merge into one super-ordinate
identity. Multiple contextual identities, which may mediate the conflict, are
ignored. Dichotomized Manichean distinctions become the perceived reality.
The psychodynamic group process begins to overwhelm the conflict.
Difference and dominance becomes key.
Symbolic referents become indicators and markers of differences.50 Such
referents assist and reinforce the persistence of difference. They exacerbate
group tensions and cause acting-out behaviors. Behavioral projections and
articulations of symbolic battles lost or won, heroes and heroines, war wounds,
trauma and abuse, create and sustain an us versus them context. Oftentimes,
consensually pressured group ground rules are issued for survival, face and
solidarity. Dominance of one group "over" the other is acted out.
46. Taj fel & Turner, supra note 20; Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior, supra note 20;
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS, supra note 20; SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP
PSYCHOLOGY; supra note 41.
47. BOURDIEU, supra note 39; ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL PoLITICS (1976).
48. Pseudospeciation is the exercise of characterizing one group as sub-human, a subspecies, to
one's own group. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter CHILDHOOD
AND SOCIETY]; ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE (1980) [hereinafter IDENTITY AND THE LIFE
CYCLE].
49. Tajfel & Turner, supra note 20; Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior, supra note 20;
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS, supra note 20; SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 41.
50. VOLKAN, supra note 43.
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Negative attributions of the behavior and motivations of the "other" evolve
into Cartesian sites of contamination for "them" and sites of purity for "us."
Such sites create justifications and rationalizations which can then be the bases
for perceived or real irrational actions and violence against the "other." These
sites may cause structural, cultural, and/or physical violence. 5' New frames of
conflict, new contextual metaphors, evolving narratives,52 transformed identities
of victim/hero/heroine/victor, objectification of the other, abstraction and
dehumanization are the dynamics that may follow. Reification of "our" group
culture, language, and practices reigns supreme over "theirs."
The narcissism of the supreme winner or ultimate loser/victim and a reified
sense of community (tribalism) may ensue. It becomes the "the superior virtue
of the oppressed."53 A closely defined sense of who "they" are and who "we"
are results. Stunning examples of such conflictual group dynamics can be found
in Northern Ireland's divided societies, i.e., Catholics versus Protestants,
Republicans versus Loyalists, the perpetual intergroup conflict. Other examples
are South Africa's Apartheid past, Afrikaners versus indigenous peoples. In the
United States as well as pockets throughout the world, The Aryan
Brotherhood's "white power" movement and its discrimination against
homosexuals, Jews, Catholics, and non-whites articulates the dynamics of
dehumanization through group psychodynamics. These dynamics have been
used and continue to be used to justify the slavery of Africans, of women
(Taliban), of the Chinese, of Jews and of the Irish, among others. And finally,
gender discrimination and hegemonic male androcentrism-a male centered
universe-has been extant.54 Add to this, the overarching social affects and
effects of such group behavior and the strategic social constructions based on
these dynamics which ultimately form regenerative and oppressive
environments into perpetuity, until the status quo is broken.
Narrative55 and early childhood socialization generates emergent thematic
phenomenological and psycho-cultural subjective expressions of hatred,
resentment, and alienation. 6 Expressions of hatred and marginalization are
created by the transgenerational transmission of trauma57 instrumentalized
51. GALTUNG, supra note 4.
52. VOLKAN, supra note 43.
53. BERTRAND RUSSEL, UNPOPULAR ESSAYS: 12 ADVENTURES IN ARGUMENT BY THE WINNER OF
THE 1950 NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR LrrERATURE (1967). See also MICHAEL LERNER & CORNEL WEST, JEWS
AND BLACKS: A DIALOGUE ON RACE, RELIGION, AND CULTURE IN AMERICA (1996); STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE
ETHNIC MYTH: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CLASS IN AMERICA (1989).
54. See, e.g., DEBEAUVOIR, supra note 37; THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE; supra note 13.
55. See VOLKAN, supra note 43.
56. CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, supra note 48.
57. See VOLKAN, supra note 43.
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through folklore, and myth (hero/heroine worship) especially found within
closed sectarian systems or bifurcated conflicts."8 Perceptions of history, real
or imagined are mirrored in stories and myths creating tropes from which
children mirror adult behaviors.59 Regenerated oral and written history
establishes a mythologized sense of grandiosity, 6° group purity, solidarity, the
creation of not only physical but psychological boundaries, peace walls,
sectarian enclaves, a sense of siege and separateness. 6' Indeed, the power of
infused rhetoric, which often creates social knowledge is a profound context in
which agency/structure considerations are negotiated.62
The obsession with difference and dominance (superiority and inferiority)
can be traced to the formation of negative and positive group identities which
empower and dis-empower groups and individuals. "Victimhood" or
"Victorhood" becomes a way of life, "chosen trauma" and "time collapse," rule
the decision-making process. 63 Only winners and losers can be actors in such
drama. There is no room for ambiguity.' 4 It becomes an "us versus them"
group drama dynamic. Group memory, residing in the past, defines the future.
Ethnic, group tents and group identities often create "imagined
communities. 65 Such identity tents are imbued with a real sense of collective
and/or metaphoric memory that can be problematic. Retold narratives, differing
perceptions and hermeneutics can lead to exaggeration, factual errors, and
"hidden transcripts" benefiting one side against the other.66 Through
storytelling the group creates a collective history, culture, artifacts, symbols, and
rituals, which prove the group's uniqueness and chosenness. This dynamic
stratifies values: "ours" are more legitimate than "theirs" and legitimates
dominating behaviors.
Ingroup/Outgroup dichotomies reign supreme and are reinforced through
communal consensus (pressure), building behavioral roles and rules for group
58. See, e.g., PREPARING FOR PEACE, supra note 4; BUILDING PEACE, supra note 4; VOLKAN, supra
note 43.
59. JERVIS, supra note 47.
60. See ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD: THE SEARCH FOR THE TRUE SELF 37-57
(Ruth Ward, trans. 1997).
61. See Byrne & Cartner, supra note 2.
62. See, e.g., THE ORDER OF THINGS, supra note 13; FOUCAULT, supra note 17.
63. VOLKAN, supra note 43.
64. See generally SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY (1948).
65. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTION ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM (1991).
66. JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS 145
(1990).
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membership.67 These behavioral roles can oftentimes create oppressive
dynamics and intra-group tensions more devastating than the conflictual
tensions outside the group. Examples of this can be seen in the violence and
killings inside sectarian groups in Northern Ireland (intra-group conflict), the
Real IRA versus the Provisional IRA on the Catholic/Republican/Nationalist
side.6" Conversely, the killings and violence persist between the UDA and the
UDF on the Loyalist/Protestant/Unionist side of the conflict. They police
themselves. Within these sectarian cohorts, there are cases of "punishment
beatings" and "kneecappings" which alert group members to the rules of the
group and the consequences of breaking group rules - losing the public face of
the organization. Therefore, power relations within the group are structurally
constrained and delineated. Indeed, groups can be just as violent to their own
as they are to their adversary.69 Othering does occur within groups, as well.
Difference within the group unhinges the status quo.
C. Othering
Erikson coined the term "pseudospeciation," the tendency to portray one's
own tribe or ethnic group as human while describing other groups as sub-
human, a subspecies.7" This ingroup/outgroup othering can occur in relation to
nation, race, culture, family, gender dynamics, religion, social group, etc.
Othering creates markers and characteristics of distinction and symbolic
referents, i.e., supposed genetic characteristics, gang colors, uniforms, status
symbols, practices, language, clothing, flags, and murals, which project
stereotypes: negative for "them" and positive for "us." Dichotomized thinking,
syllogistic attributions and perceptions attribute all negative behavior to the
other i.e., gay versus straight, Catholic versus Protestant, Republican versus
Democrat, male versus female (biological essentialism), Black versus Hispanic,
Serb versus Croat, etc. The other is innately evil. The group identity and
behavior becomes synonymous with self-identity.
The sense of group identity becomes inextricably linked to one's self-
identity (their core identity) which we will discuss as we move from Cube II to
Cube III. This begs the question, is then our self-identity a singular and static
one? Or is identity negotiable? Often the trauma experienced in Cubes I and
II may have damaged the sense self-efficacy, human dignity and integrity of the
individual, as a member of a group, to a point in which human agency is barely
67. See generally DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS, supra note 20.
68. Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, supra note 48; IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE, supra note
48; ERIK H. ERIKSON, THE LIFE CYCLE COMPLETED (1997) [hereinafter THE LIFE CYCLE COMPLETED].
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existent. Resistance, "going against the grain," is difficult. 71 A threat to the
group is a threat to the individual. We will return to this issue later.
Any threat to the group identity jeopardizes the status quo and threatens
group cohesion. The group becomes hypervigilent, acutely aware of differences
and tends to concentrate on minutia, which Freud called the "narcissism of
minor differences."72  Groupthink takes hold and imposed consensus can
ritualize and mythologize leadership. Charismatic leaders are thus bred.
Charismatic leadership may, in turn, use the vulnerability of its membership,
often in the absence of any sense of individual identity. Ingroup repression,
justifications for violence, irrational actions, primitive behavior and a sense of
shared anxiety may be created in our group and against groups other than our
own. The group members rally for protection under their collective tent, since
their self-identity is lacking.73 Members often revert to symbolism, tropes of
motherland, fatherland, the mother tongue, ethnicity, family and metaphorical
memory, which then can become exploitative, if not checked.
Leaders such as Hitler, Chausescu, Malosovic, Pol Pot, and Idi Amin, leapt
into the breach and exploited their people in such a way. Similarly, leaders of
certain religious/ideological organizations and cults have exploited their
membership. On the other hand, positive (or ambiguous) leadership can also
exploit and propagandize victimization to different degrees. Examples include
Irish Republican Army's political wing of Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams and
Protestant, Reverend Ian Paisley.74 The dynamics will include infused rhetoric,
hidden transcripts, metaphor, unbending group-solidarity and power-over.
Groups often become "trapped" in a time warp. These characterizations depend
on whose side you choose.
As discussed, "time collapse," based on "chosen trauma" through
generational narrative, modeling, rituals, martyr-making, victimhood,
monument and memorial building, public rhetoric, and tradition-making,
continually replay the original trauma. In fact, they often exaggerate and
regenerate it. Anecdotes become myth. Myths become embedded into daily
living and childhood development, which can be devastating.75
Early childhood can become imbued with the sense of "Victimhood" in a
group sense, as well as an individual one. There may be great pressure and duty
to avenge ancestors in order to remain a valued and respected nascent member
of the group. Daily rituals and narratives reinforce this duty. The suspension
of critical faculties in which present becomes linked to the past in an obsessive
71. For further discussion, see Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
72. See SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (1950) [hereinafter TOTEM AND TABOO].
73. See VOLKAN, supra note 43.
74. Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
75. See ScO-r, supra note 66.
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way, often reinforced by symbolism, may cause dysfunctional behavior and
violence.
Cultural symbols, familial/kinship symbols, symbolic rituals, and practices,
including differentiating each group from the other in deferential patterns, is the
general dramaturgy of ingroup/outgroup behavior. Symbolism of material and
non-material significance can create the sense of intra-group commonality.
Conformity can promote prejudice, invoking group traditions embedded in the
minds of group members and manifest ingroup behavior.76 As discussed,
striking examples of this are the Aryan Resistance and Neo-Nazi groups
throughout the globe who display Nazi regalia, uniforms and swastikas, who
march, assemble, and articulate hateful rhetoric long after the Third Reich's
demise of 60 years ago. The hateful message is mourned and perpetuated.
Another example is ethnic cleansing seen around the world. In smaller groups,
perhaps dysfunctional families, the drama may be less identifiable, yet just as
dramatic, traumatic and meaningful for its members.
D. Ritualizing Trauma
Ritualized mourning, identification with the dead, perennial mourners,
preoccupation with emotion, linking objects, places, and persons with the
deceased are a collective response.77 In the United States, for the "baby
boomer" generation, my generation, we need only to revisit the funeral
procession of President John F. Kennedy. I can still hear the footsteps of the
funeral procession, the dreaded drum beat and the clopping hooves of "Black
Jack," the riderless horse, his Masters boots turn backward at his side. Lee
Harvey Oswald was shot in real time while I was watching TV, innocence lost.
How many times have we seen such images, including the deaths of Martin
Luther King, Robert Kennedy, and Gandhi, which have been re-articulated
again and again into the public consciousness, in books and films?
In Northern Ireland, the 1981 hunger strike, "dirty protest" and subsequent
death of Republican political prisoner Bobby Sands, while in Long Kesh prison,
looms large in Republican, Catholic and IRA legend, in Ireland and indeed
around the world for supporters of a "United Ireland." On a research trip of
August 2000 in Belfast, Northern Ireland, I saw Sand's image displayed on
public murals, in pubs and restaurants, community centers and in homes. I was
also privy to the depth of despair, humiliation, mourning, and generational
revenge in the eyes of family members who lost loved ones during the
"troubles." Images of the "fallen" hang proudly in family homes, many lit by
candles like sacrificial alters. The same holds true in Loyalist quarters.
76. See Byrne & Cartner, supra note 2.
77. See VOLKAN, supra note 43.
784
Russ-Trent
So too, during the Vietnam War era, at dinner every evening, news reports
displayed body bags taken from military transports. These were fallen United
States men and women who, some believe, lost their lives in an undeclared war.
I vowed, "never again".. . not for my son. Such visuals will forever remain
with these cohorts. Indeed, Holocaust footage, narratives, books and frozen
traumatic memories are revisited and sometimes relived by its victims in body
memories.78 Family trauma can also be a site of the psychodynamic group
process. Dysfunctional and traumatic family memories and symbols can
include, jewelry, estates, toys, memorabilia, smells and tastes.79 In religious
contexts, the Crucifix, the Star of David, the Bible, the Torah, religious
veils/habits/attire, Passover feasts, etc., imbue a group's sense of belonging, a
shared identity and right to mourn, sometimes obsessively. This
transgenerational transmission of trauma ascribes a higher meaning to the
original trauma and reifies it throughout the generations.8" Oftentimes, survivor
guilt originating from trauma helps the narrative to evolve.81 Other times,
"victimhood" or "survivor guilt" can divide families, groups, communities, and
nations.
The attendant behaviors of group trauma and Complex Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (CPTSD) are internalization/externalization behaviors both
positive and negative, which may include: projection, repetition, compulsion,
grandiosity, psychological dysfunction, hypervigilence, and obsession, to name
a few.8" Group psychodynamics, under the "tent of victimhood" defines
destinies, distorts or re-ignites memories, fuels the fires of ancient hatreds and
group humiliations.83 "Victimhood" becomes a way of life, a habitat creating
negative prospects for future, self, family, group, or, national development and
happiness. This negative habitus creates negative behaviors such as fantasized
low expectations. The reverse can also result, i.e., grandiosity and entitlement.
However, negative habitus usually enables group dynamics such as intense
feelings of hatred, self-loathing, defensive or offensive posture/behavior. Often
these feelings are considered justifications for revenge and the duty to avenge
ancestors, which leads to extermination, ethnic cleansing, purification,
discrimination, abuse, and violence. The circle of trauma then creates another
generation of "chosen people" as well as "chosen trauma" syndrome. Material
representations become important markers and articulators of trauma.
78. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA & RECOVERY (1992).
79. Id.
80. See VOLKAN, supra note 43.
81. See ScOTT, supra note 66.
82. See MILLER, supra note 60. See also HERMAN, supra note 78 (discussing CPTSD).
83. VOLKAN, supra note 43.
84. See BOURDIEU, supra note 39.
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Transitional objects become infused with the memory of ancestor's trauma:
fetishes, symbols, signs, group colors, accoutrements, and attachments to
rituals.85 During slavery, singing and dancing manifested dissidence, resistance,
and existential ethos, albeit latent and strategically hidden from their masters.
Indeed, women have been "living strategically" since the beginning of time.86
In the Catholic religion, children become metaphorical "soldiers of Christ" on
their confirmation. During Easter, the Lilly becomes a sign of resurrection, re-
birth, and life-affirming martyrdom (death brings life). Nazis had their
swastikas and finely appointed uniforms.87 The list is infinite. From Goffman's
dramaturgy,88 to symbolic interactionism89 and the concept of "the generalized
other," to expectations and perceptions, 9' all combine at different points to
articulate a group's ethos. And "nesses" of we-ness are formed.9
"Nesses" get in the way of transformative conflict resolution. We-ness,
Jewish-ness, Black-ness, female-ness, male-ness, white-ness, British-ness, Irish-
ness, become abstractions, and imagined creations of shoulds or oughts-not
what "is., 92 A stone becomes a profound Palestinian symbol of empowerment,
group ethos and group-determination, especially for its generationally
humiliated youth. Chosen glories, past traumas, infused rhetoric, and
metaphoric memories become shared reservoirs of identity and create a sense
of belonging that has the power to exacerbate, mediate or resolve conflict.93
Children observe the adults as they act out this drama. They internalize adult
behaviors.
Children's cognitive development, observing adult behaviors, form
children's self-identities positively, negatively, or ambiguously. A child's
existential experiences inform their development and fashion their core
identity.9' Contextual and multiple identities are thus grounded and evolve into
an idealized sense of self95 as it relates to ingroup positive identity, or in the
85. VOLKAN, supra note 43.
86. Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
87. See DERRIDA, supra note 11; PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 10; Hooks,
supra note 11.
88. See, e.g., PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 10; BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC
PLACES, supra note 22.
89. MEAD, supra note 1.
90. See JERVIS, supra note 47.
91. See VOLKAN, supra note 43.
92. ANDERSON, supra note 65.
93. VOLKAN, supra note 43.
94. CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, supra note 48.
95. See, e.g., CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, supra note 48; IDENTITY ANDTHE LIFE CYCLE, supra note
48; SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM (1939); TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 72.
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alternative, self-hatred and alienation due to trauma96-a negative sense of one's
self, one's social identity,97 cultural capital,9" and life-world." Results may
include dissociative identity disorder (DID), repression, projection, or any of a
number of psychological dysfunctions affecting the next Cube III, the actor.
The "narcissism of minor differences" leads to reductionist decision-making,
psychologized differences, bureaucratized hatred, malignancy, and prejudices,
which eats at the very core of the individual."°
Myth, belief systems, and collective memories are legitimized through
social dominance orientation, in-group favoritism and/or out-group
derogation."1 Such legitimization is experienced by organizations, cultures,
kinship relations, as well as, national relations. This is the reason for
Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism's three cubes and their eighteen facets
continuously interfacing in a negotiated and infinite dance. Transgenerational
transmission of trauma0 2 and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder among other
realities, are salient in both large and small group contexts.'0 3 Traumatic
memories of horrendous events or perceived trauma based upon perceived, yet
"trivial" events, affect group harmony and cohesiveness. Narratives which
articulate and frame trauma are tools which generate painful or joyous
memories, oftentimes establish additional metaphoric memories, create martyrs,
heroes and heroines. Often these narratives are Manichean, therefore,
dichotomous, by design.
"Us versus them" dichotomous creations of conflict lead to the Manichean
struggles to justify right versus wrong, good versus evil-the forces of light
versus the forces of darkness. Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism suggests that
ambiguous shades of gray are ever extant and therefore must be included in the
analyses of all conflict, context by context. Objectifying and rationalizing a
conflict for the sake of clarity, or a positivistic stance, only muddies the water
and poses a subject/object bifurcation, in opposition, that will never solve the
underlying interests, issues and motivations of one and the other."'4 Therefore,
96. See HERMAN, supra note 78.
97. SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 41.
98. See BOURDIEU, supra note 39.
99. THE PHIUSOPHnCAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY: Two LECTURES (1987) [hereinafter THE
PHILiSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY]; J. HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION (1996).
100. See TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 72.
101. Shana Levin & Jim Sedanius, Social Dominance and Social Identity in the United States and
Israel: Ingroup Favoritism or Outgroup Derogation?, in POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1999).
102. See VOLKAN, supra note 43.
103. See HERMAN, supra note 78 (discussing PTSD).
104. See HuSSERL, supra note 4.
20021
788 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:771
Cubes I, II, and m must be seen as relative to each other and dynamic.
Analyses are multi-causal. Their resolution and/or prevention must be
considered multi-dimensional, integrative, relational, therefore, complex.
E. Case Example: Ingroup/Outgroup Dynamics, Nazi Germany, and the
Treaty of Versailles-Dramaturgy, Symbolic Interactionism, and Social
Identity
An example of this multi-dimensional interplay is the case of Nazi
Germany during post-World War I. The Peace Treaty of Versailles stood as a
living document of shame for the German people. It humiliated a nation, and
by extension, each German citizen. This created not only a negative
identification for their own group (and each member of the group) but it
inspired a nation, and a man, Hitler, to recreate a positive in-group identity from
these humiliating circumstances. The German people recreated themselves,
actor by actor, as an in-group, in solidarity, with symbols and rituals which
reinforced this new in-group. This stands as an example of the dialectical
relationship between structure and agency, from nation to group, from group to
individual and back again, which occurs in conflictual contexts. Once we
include Cube 1ll (to come)-the individual development of human agency-we
will see how the three cubes relate specifically in this context. Our exemplar
will be Reichsfuherer Heinrich Himmler. What stands out is the way that
material and psychological [I would add, behavioral-group and actor -driven]
dimensions interact to maintain or mitigate inter-group conflict." 5 Nazi
Germany was created over time by a spiral of national, collective and individual
rationalizations. We will now see how the actor, interfaces, intersects and
integrates into this triadic and infinitely dynamic analysis of Integrative-
Inductive Social Cubism.
VI. CUBE I: THE ACTOR'S ETHOS: INTEGRATIVE-INDUCTIVE
SOCIAL CUBISM
Cube ll determines where the actor places herself or himself in relation to
society, existential predicaments and conflict. This includes mental
products-critical thinking, dialectics, human agency-in relation to the
material world and praxis in it."6 This is determined by the way in which one
identifies and differentiates her/himself during the ongoing interplay of ideas
105. Byrne & Cartner, supra note 2, at 66.
106. See BOURDIEU, supra note 39 (discussing "praxis"); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION. VOL 2. LIFEWORLD SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (1987)
[hereinafter THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION].
and politics. These politics can also include daily strategic living. °7 Self-
esteem, self-efficacy, self-determination, and critical consciousness-Freire's
conscientization and full humanity'°--are socialized concepts which are
integrated, embedded into each individual's conscious intentionality.'" These
include mental schemas, normative prescriptions and shared understanding,
habitus (the interior sense of future prospects), and internalized mental cognitive
structure by which people deal with the social world. This is usually based on
the existential realities, which are produced by, and themselves produce
society."' The history of the individual is played out in real time, affecting his
or her immediate kinship, organization, group membership or nation. Social
theorists have called this individual behavioral construction, "social
performances.'. I call it "strategic living."" 2
Performative interpretations"', and phenomenological intentions" 4 suggest
that how we understand and come to know ourselves, and others, cannot be
separated from how we represent and imagine ourselves-our core individual
self. We must reaffirm individual narratives as an integral component of
memory-work and the need for people to speak affirmatively and critically out
of their own histories, traditions, and existential experiences, to make visible
and to challenge the, often grotesque, inequalities, deferential hegemonic
patterns, and intolerable oppression(s) of the present moment in order to prevent
those future moments. " Moreover, identities are always in transition, mutation,
change, and often become more complicated as a result of chance encounters,
traumatic events, or unexpected existential collisions." 6 Personal biography,
Cube H, can and does turn into social text.
Cube HI includes 1) self-identity, 2) ingroup/outgroup membership in
relation to self, 3) social identity in relation to self, 4) individual psychology or
107. Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
108. See FREIRE, supra note 4.
109. See HUSSERL, supra note 4
110. See, e.g., THETHEORY OFCOMMUNICATiVEACTION, supra note 106; BOURDIEU, supra note 39;
111. See, e.g., PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 10; BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC
PLACES, supra note 22.
112. Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
113. See, e.g., PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY UFE, supra note 10; BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC
PLACES, supra note 22; DERRIDA, supra note 11; Hooks, supra note II.
114. See HUSSERL, supra note 4
115. Henry Giroux, CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AS PERFORMATIVE PRACTICE: MEMORIES OF WHITENESS,
IN SOCIOLOGYOFEDUCATION: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES 147, (Carlos Alberto Torres & Theodore R. Mitchell,
eds., 1999).
116. Id. at 149.
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pathology, 5) individual existential history and experiences," 7 and 6) self-
interest and survival. Each one of these issues of pure individual agency must
be integrated in relation to-not against-society, group, family or nation. This
suggests integration among Cubes I and 11 and is the infinite negotiational dance
introduced at the onset of this analysis.
Hence, Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism makes no hierarchal
distinctions between the eighteen facets of the three cubes when attempting to
understand and analyze conflictual behavioral and social dynamics.
Uniqueness-subjectivity, intra-subjectivity and inter-subjectivity-is the key to
the overall model. Moreover, objectification is seen as a dangerous
exercise-in this instance, the exception is the rule-exceptional individual
agency can and does create change and transformation. We are both objects and
subjects of our own existence."8 In fact, for those who believe that structural
constraints lead to oppression and conflict, and structure can never be
controlled, I suggest that we consider the agency of the oppressed, the
oppressors, and the always extant "middle tier" who play one side against the
other." 9 Group and/or structures exist by the leave of and with the concurrence
of individuals in them, to varying degrees, through complicity and/or collusion.
The agent who voices concerns and resistance, which may lead to the end of the
oppression or violence, cannot be ignored. 20 The absence of such a voice
permits violence either to be fed or to be mediated into cessation. Otherwise,
the concept of transformation is mere fantasy.
Whether the structure can be superseded is often determined by the
individual actors of the structure. Without individuals such as Gandhi, King,
Maude Gonne, Steinem, Eleanor Roosevelt, de Beauvoir, Hovel, Adams,
Paisley, Hitler, along with unknown heroines, heroes, heretics, and hate-
mongers, social change-for the better or worse-would never have occurred.
Critical thinkers, critical sites/spaces and dissonant voices "going against the
grain" can create change.'' The "life world" would be a hopeless and static one
without resistant voices.
117. See, e.g., HUSSERL, supra note 4; THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 21; SMITH & SMITH, supra note 21; John-Paul Sartre, Consciousness and
Society, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN-PAUL SARTRE 255-260, 415-423 (Random House, ed., 1965). See also
Blumer, supra note 4; DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 37, at 78, 129.
118. THE ORDER OFTHINGS, supra note 13.
119. See BUILDING PEACE, supra note 4.
120. Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
121. See, e.g., FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 37; Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
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The "life world" is, however, a social world. 22 There is a social nature to
knowledge. 23  There is a relationship between the phenomenology, the
themes. 24 Patterns, and essence of living, negotiating and adjusting-what
individuals think-which is integrated into the ethnomethodology of what
individuals actually do in their daily living, especially in conflictual contexts.2 5
There is an infinite dialectical relationship between the habitus and the field of
individual experience and social reality.2 6 It begins in childhood.
A. Early Childhood Development of Human Agency
Cognitive development and the capacity for critical thinking is the
overarching context of Cube m: the actor's ethos. It begins in early childhood
development. Piaget's work proffers that intellectual development evolves
through stages and schemas of knowledge. Ongoing development is integrated
and re-synthesized through to a critical thinking stage. These schemas are
programs or strategies that individuals use as they interact with the
environment-what I have coined "strategic living."' 127  With experience,
negotiation, mediation, and critical thinking, decisions are made. Human agency
is developed and social actors act. Actors transform their existential
predicaments (Aretxaga 1997).
Piaget further suggests that the development of the mental schemas or
structures occurs in the same order in all of us and at a relatively predetermined
rate-a rate governed by our physiological maturation. Until requisite
neurological structures are developed, these schemas cannot appear. 21 Indeed,
conceptual intelligence, "symbolic function," imitation, play, intuition,
rationality, transductive, deductive, and inductive activity, concrete operational
thought allowing one to integrate with other actions, relate and re-synthesize,
reflect, display empathy, infer, and negotiate the next "optimal" decision, are
intricacies which can be disrupted by trauma, neglect, abuse, or apathy in early
childhood and adolescence. 29 Furthermore, these functions of cognition, trust,
122. See The Theory of Communicative Action, supra note 110; THE PHILISOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF
MODERNITY, supra note 99.
123. FOUCAULT, supra note 17. See also JAMES, supra note 1; PARADOXES OF GENDER, supra note
14; LORBER, supra note 14; DEBEAUVOIR, supra note 37.
124. See HUSSERL, supra note 4.
125. See HUSSERL, supra note 4; THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 21; SMITH & SMITH, supra note 21; SCHUTZ, supra note 4.
126. See BOURDIEU, supra note 39.
127. Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
128. B. JOYCE & M. WEIL, MODELS OF TEACHING 281-82 (5th ed. 1996).
129. See HERMAN, supra note 78; CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, supra note 48; IDENTITY AND THE LIFE
CYCLE, supra note 48.
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intention, 3 andjudgment are fundamental to intellectual development, complex
levels of thinking and problem solving.'
The social environments in which the above constituent complexities of
intellectual development occur are critical. The reality is that, in many
instances, childhood development is not nurtured. It is often neglected or
traumatized in societies in which ethical considerations, human dignity, equality
and personhood is devalued. Justice is denied, and hope is often based in
becoming your oppressor. The self is therefore, traumatized, including the
cognitive structures from which human agency and decision-making emanates.
Positive or negative group psychodynamic processes are often the triggers
which influence the actor.
B. Case Study: Henreich Himmler, Reichsfuherer, SS: Early Childhood
Influences: Human Agency Develops
[l]n the right hand corner he has put his name followed by his title.
Heinreich Himmler, Reichsfuhrer, SS. Make no mention of the
special treatment of the Jews, he says, use only the words,
Transportation of the Jews Toward the Russian East. A few months
later, this man will deliver a speech to a secret meeting in the district
of Posen. Now you know all about it, [the final solution] and you will
keep quiet, he will tell them. Now we share a secret and we should
take our secret to our graves."'
Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler was profoundly influenced by his father,
Gebhard. His father "loomed large to his son."'33 Father, Gebhard, strictly
followed the child rearing experts of the day. "Crush the will," they wrote.
"Establish dominance. Permit no disobedience. Suppress everything in the
child." Griffin begs, "What could make a person conceive the plan of gassing
millions of human beings to death?"'" Could the answer be childhood
development?
As a man who made history, Heinrich Himmier shaped many
childhoods... And an earlier history, a history of governments, of
wars, of social customs, and ideas of gender, the history of a religion
lending to the idea of original sin, shaped Heinrich Himmler's
130. See HUSSERL, supra note 4.
131. JOYCE & WEIL, supra note 128, at 285.
132. S. GRIFFIN, A CHORUS OF STONES: THE PRIVATE LIFE OF WAR (1992).
133. l at 120.
134. Id.
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childhood as certainly as any philosophy of child raising. One can
take for instance any formative condition of his private life, the fact
that he was a frail child, for example, favored by his mother, who
could not meet masculine standards, and show that this circumstance
derived its real meaning from a larger social system that gave
inordinate significance to masculinity.'3 5
At a certain stage we begin to define ourselves, to choose an image of who
we are. In time we forget our earliest selves and replace that memory with the
image we have constructed at the bidding of others.'36 How can we grasp the
"inner state" of Himmler's being, his phenomenological intentionality-Cube
I? 137 At the train station, young Heinrich hears singing and sees valiant men
in fine uniforms. He wants to be a soldier. More than anything, he wants a
uniform. Heinrich also wants to control. He needs to control, as he was
controlled by his father. The thoroughness of father Gebhard's hold over his
family came alive through his daily procedures: every package, letter or money
order to pass through the door was, by Gebhard's command, to be duly
recorded. And his son followed suit.
Every single piece of paper issued with regard to... [the SS] office
will pass over Heinrich Himmler's desk, and to each page he will add
his own initials. No detail will escape his surmise or fail to be
recorded.'38
Indeed, Himmler felt, what Germany needed was a "man of iron," a man
like his father. The Treaty of Versailles was taken as a humiliation. An
unforgivable weakness, he argued, has been allowed to invade the nation. A
man should be a man and a woman a woman.'39
A real man should love a woman as a child who must be admonished
perhaps even punished, when she is foolish, though she must also be
protected and looked after because she is so weak."4
Further signs of Himmler's developmental dysfunction and the agency
which emanated from it, can be evidenced. Once he is Reichsfuherer, he will
135. Id. at 121.
136. Id. at 122. See also IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE, supra note 48; THE LIFE CYCLE
COMPLETED, supra note 70; JAMES, supra note 1; SIMMEL, supra note 1.
137. See generally HUSSERL, supra note 4
138. Griffin, supra note 132, at 133.
139. See generally Griffin, supra note 132 (featuring excerpts from Himmier's diary).
140. Id. at 134 (quoting from Himmier's diary, 1920-1923).
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set certain standards for superiority that, no matter how heroic his efforts, he
will never be able to meet. A sign of the Ubermensch, he says, is blondness.
But he himself is dark. He says he is careful to weed out any applicant for the
SS who shows traces of a "Mongolian" ancestry. But he himself has the narrow
eyes he takes as a sign of such a descent. "I have refused to accept any man
whose size was below six feet because I know only men of a certain size have
the necessary quality of blood," he declares, standing just five foot seven behind
the podium. 4'
Indeed, his denigrating views on homosexuality are evidenced as he states
"Germany's forebears knew what to do with homosexuals. They drowned them
in bogs." This was not punishment, he argues, but "the extermination of
unnatural existence."'' 42 However, one of his heroes, Henry the Great, was a
homosexual.
43
In the larger sense, Nazi Germany and the relational and intersecting
accounts of WWI and WWII are prime exemplars of how the decision-making
of a few individuals impacted the lives of millions. More interestingly, the
decisions made were, in part or in whole, based upon such personal histories as
that of Himmler. If we were to explore the personal lives of the actors of
WWII, such as Roosevelt, Mussolini, Toynbee, Eden, Churchill, Chamberlain
and Hitler, we would detect critical incidents, existential histories and "lived
experiences" which influenced the decisions they later made on the world
stage.'44 Thus, Cubes 1, 11, 11 interrelate with one another in dynamic integrative
contexts. On President Wilson:
it did not occur to [President Wilson] that questions of property and
peace might be subordinated to those of national pride and
resentment; that the Germans might be driven to restore their honor
and the power needed to recover it, by whatever means necessary." 45
Machiavellian solutions were defensible, therefore Hitler, one individual,
was able to continue his reign of terror, through the individual efforts/actions,
individual rationale, subject/object dichotomization, and intentioned human
agency, by extension, the collective approval of the German citizenry---one
actor at a time. Therefore the preceding case study, exhibits the forces of the
eighteen facets of I-ISC which motivated a nation (Cube I); a group/nation/state,
141. Id. at 141-42.
142. Id. at 142.
143. Id. at 142-43.
144. JERVIS, supra note 47.
145. DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR 376 (1995).
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The Nazi Party (Cube I); and each German citizen/actor (Cube I1), to commit
the atrocities of the Holocaust.
C. Case Study: Gerry Adams, Leader of Sinn Fein
In more recent times, we can learn from the psycho-cultural and psycho-
social development of Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, the political wing of
the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Recent research has established that the
development of one's personality and individual persona influences negotiating
behavior. '46
A behavioral profile was done on Adams through a content analysis of his
spontaneous interviews, proffering a link between individual characteristics and
expected behavior. Some themes and patterns cited were that he would stand
his ground at all costs, believing that his position is the correct one. His
complexity may mediate these dominant traits, making him more receptive to
the views of others. 4 7 Adams also has a high need for affiliation, making him
concerned with how others view him. This, in turn, would lead him to seek
normalized relations with the opposition.'48 In a tense Post-Good Friday (1998)
Peace Agreement environment, Adams continues to engage in the politics of the
process, wanting to be viewed as a man of peace. Despite signing the peace
accord, Adams did not really concede much, and he continues to have an impact
on the future governing arrangements of the region. 1
49
Reading Adam's book Cage 11 provides insight into his intentioned
actions.5 Furthermore, during my August 2000 archival research in Belfast,
Northern Ireland, interviewing male and female Republican (Irish Republican
Army, or IRA) ex-political prisoners and their families, I witnessed attestations
of Adam's personal charisma. Some had spent time with him in Long Kesh
prison. They literally would die for him, men and women alike, as they believe
he would for them. This evinces a strong personal influence, demonstrating the
power of the individual actor in sectarian (group) contexts, whether you agree
with Adam's politics or not. This also attests to the influences, positive or
negative, which charismatic leaders (individual actors) have on the conflict
resolution or exacerbation process.
146. See, e.g., Elena Mastors, Gerry Adams and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: A Research
Note, POL. PSYCHOL., Vol. 21, No. 4, 839-46 (2000); M.G. Hermann & T. Preston, Presidents, Advisors, and
Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements, POL. PSYCHOL., 15, 75-96 (1994).
147. See DONALD A. SYLAN & STEVE CHAN, FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: PERCEPTION,
COGNITION, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1984).
148. M.G. HERMANN, A HANDBOOK FOR ASSESSING PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FOREIGN
POLICY ORIENTATIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERS. (1987) (Ohio State University mimeo).
149. Mastors, supra note 146, at 844.
150. See GERRY ADAMS, CAGE ELEVEN (1984).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Integrative-Inductive Social Cubism (I-ISC) attempts to provide an
integrative and complex analysis of conflict from the micro levels through the
macro levels, intersecting along the way, in a dynamic and nonlinear affect and
effect. I-ISC is in constant re-synthesis. At the Cube I, structural level, the
analytic demands are focused on macro-facets, the Social Cubism Model of
Byrne & Carter.15" ' At the Cube II, structure/agency level, the analytic demands
are focused on the relationships relative to inter group and intra group conflict.
At the Cube I1I, the agency/actor level, conflict analysis concerns are focused
on individual decision-making ability and intentionality, and the development
of individual human agency.
We must be aware of the emerging and interfacing eighteen facets of this
model, Cubes I, II and III, (see Figure 2) in a dynamic negotiation with each
other at different time orientations, different contexts, and different power
relationships/constructs. The three cubes are separate and at the same time, they
are one. The symbolic nature of internalization and integration, the three
Rubik' s Cubes®, and the sign for infinity in designing this inductive model, are
meant to be simply complex and ultimately, purposeful. Conflict is filled with
ambiguity, contradiction, and surprise. Complex critical thinking and processes
are required to manage it, mediate it, negotiate it, or exacerbate it. Conflict can
also be productive. 5 2 We must never lose sight of this. Were it not for conflict,
social justice would be an oxymoron. However, conflict must always be seen
as complex, dynamic, and transformative.
Conflict = attitudes/assumptions + behavior + contradiction/content.153 In
Integrative Inductive Social Cubism, conflict is articulated as a dynamic triadic
construct. As Galtung suggests, we cannot assume that a gender, a generation,
a race, a world, a state, or super-state, has "goals," per se."' 4 These are merely
abstractions. However, certain elites, decision-makers, and charismatic leaders
may have goals, often clearly formulated ones, which are "power over" models.
Being cognizant of the realities of such power brokers, conflict analysis must
be complex rather than dyadic, Manichean, syllogistic, and Cartesian. "Conflict
is about life, pointing straight to contradictions as life-creative and life-
destructive."' 5 5 Therefore, a working theory of conflict will have to be located
15 1. See generally Byrne & Cartner, supra note 2.
152. See, e.g., LOUIS KRIESBERG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT: FROM ESCALATION TO RESOLUTION
(1998). See also GALTUNG, supra note 4; JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT IN NATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES (1997); SIMMEL, supra note 1.
153. GALTUNG, supra note 4, at 72.
154. See GALTUNG, supra note 4.
155. Id. at 71; ROBERT MERTON, Manifest and Latent Functions, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
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and articulated at the phenomenological level, which is the essence of the
Integrative Inductive Social Cubist Approach. Meaning-making is the key to
the eighteen facets as they relate to each other. Moreover, there is a manifest
and latent side to conflict, the manifest side being identified with behavior, and
the latent aspect with attitude and contradiction.'56
In part, this suggests the necessity for cultural workers to develop
collective projects in which traditional bifurcations of margin/center,
unity/difference, local/national, public/private can be reconstituted through
more complex representation of identification, belonging, and community. This
implies a fundamental redefinition of the meaning of sociologist and
theoretician as artist and public intellectual. As public intellectuals, we must
define ourselves not merely as marginal, avant-garde figures, professionals, or
academics acting alone, but as cultural workers whose collective knowledge and
actions presuppose insurgent visions of public life, community, and moral
accountability. What is crucial is a conception of the political that is open yet
committed, respects specificity without erasing global considerations, and
provides new spaces for collaborative work engaged in productive social
change.'57 We must create an "integrative critical language" through values,
ethics, and social responsibility."'58 The time has come for artists, educators,
and other cultural workers to join together to defend and construct those cultural
sites and public spheres that are essential for a viable democracy and an
emancipatory project.' 59
There is no doubt in my mind that this theory can and will be re-
synthesized, deconstructed, and/or expanded in a new and vital way. The
dialectic process must not only continue. It must never end. Just as I have built
on Byrne & Carter,"6 I hope that someone will build further on my construction.
The articulation of an "emancipatory empiricism" is the project that I am
suggesting.' 6'
The most naive fallacy in the field (of peace research) is not only to believe
in global architectonics, that the structure can be constructed and filled with any
kind of actors; equally naive is to believe that structure is independent of
culture. I would add that it is equally naive to ignore individual human agency
STRUCTURE (Free Press 3d ed. 1968) (1949).
156. GALTUNG, supra note 4, at 71.
157. Giroux, supra note 115, at 152.
158. Id. at 152; SUZANNE LACY, MAPPING THE TERRAIN: NEW GENRE PUBLIC ART 20 (Suzanne Lacy,
ed., 1995).
159. See Giroux, supra note 115, at 152; Lacy, supra note 158, at 43.
160. See generally Byrne & Carter, supra note 2.
161. See H.R. ALKER, REDISCOVERIES AND REFORMULATIONS 338 (1996); Ho-WONJEONG, THE NEW
AGENDA FOR PEACE RESEARCH 3-12, 233 (1999).
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and its individual development-as would suggest, "the intersection of the
personal and the systemic."
'162
Indeed, "[The] greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long-term is
always rooted in the local people and their culture ... emerging often from their
own experience of pain.' 63  Finally, Gandhi's words are, in effect, the
phenomenological essence of this transformative conflict resolution project
called Integrative Inductive Social Cubism:
suffering is infinitely more powerful than the law of the jungle for
converting the opponent and opening his ears, which are otherwise
shut, to the voice of reason. Nobody has probably drawn up more
petitions or espoused more forlorn causes than I, and I have come to
this fundamental conclusions that if you want something really
important to be done you must not merely satisfy the reason, you
must move the heart, also.16
162. PREPARING FOR PEACE, supra note 4, at 21.
163. BUILDING PEACE, supra note 4, at 94.
164. MAHATMA GANDHI, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI (1958).
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C. Integrative Inductive Social Cubism at a Glance
Integrative Inductive Social Cubism is based upon the original work of
Byrne and Carter's Social Cubism. 65 Integrative Inductive Social Cubism is
based upon the following assumptions:
1. There is an interconnectedness, or at minimum, an inter-relatedness
among human beings, and between the self, kin, local, national, and
global levels. Therefore, this analysis is based in a relational,
postmodernist and feminist foundation.
2. The unit of analysis in this theory is multiple based and simultaneous,
moving in and out from cube to cube to cube, from the individual to
groups, then societal structures, then in again. Conflictual forces are
in a state of constant motion, pressure and undulation. This includes
the psychological (agency), psycho-social (agency/structure) and
psycho-cultural (structural/political) contexts: the individual's human
agency is in constant tension with the external societal structures
around her and can be both subtle (latent) and profound (manifest). "
3. A continuum of empowerment and dis-empowerment exists, ranging
from authoritarian control (Machiavellianism, nationalism,
dictatorship), colonialism, patriarchy, domination (sometimes by
dysfunctional consensus), oppression, exploitation, structural
violence-cultural, familial, communal, 6 7  innuendo-
ingroup/outgroup stereotyping/discrimination, unkindness, and
individual incongruence in mind/body connections (Gandhi's,
1970/76 satygraha). Psycho-cultural, psycho-social and psycho-
political/cultural factors affect both low and high politics, and
decision-making in collectivities and individuals.
4. Just as we are discovering the wonders of DNA in biology, DNA
based computers and "String Theory' ' in quantum physics,
discovering their complex relational working structures and
constituents, in the hope that the world will be better if it is better
understood, so too, in conflict analysis, we can atomize the analysis
down to its smallest constituents in order to phenomenologically
understand the relational and contextual complexities and
intersections extant in it, micro to macro, at the global (structural) as
well as mid-range (ambiguous agency/structure sites) and individual
(agency) levels
165. See Byrne & Carter, supra note 2.
166. GALTUNG, supra note 4, at 71; MERTON, supra note 155 at 73-138.
167. See GALTUNG, supra note 4.
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I. ABSTRACT
One of the themes in the study of social theory, throughout its history, has
been the examination of the social forces of agency and structure. This has been
true both of the micro and macro levels of social interaction and has also been
discussed in a number of differing applications to social problems in local,
national and international contexts. Although the classical social theorists
offered varying emphasis at both ends of the spectrum, they also seemed clearly
* S. Michael Hare is a Ph.D. student in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern
University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He has served as the Senior Pastor of a number of churches over the
past twenty-two years and has also taught courses in Philosophy, Religion and in the Social Sciences at several
Community Colleges and Universities. He has served as a volunteer mediator for the Better Business Bureau,
the Court System and for several Non-profit Organizations. This chapter was developed from a thought paper
submitted for a class in Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution taught by Dr. Semn Byrne and was
influenced by Byrne & Carter's (1996) "Social Cubism" argument.
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concerned with understanding the linkages that connected them together. More
recently, some theorists have focused more upon the extreme positions of
opposing paradigms in an apparent pursuit of theoretical purity. However, there
now appears to be a renewed interest in integrating and synthesizing social
theories toward a more holistic and balanced paradigm. This article will briefly
review some of these considerations and attempt to encourage further
investigation and development of adequate social theory models, especially as
they relate to conflict and to its resolution in local, national, and international
applications. Specifically, three concepts will be proposed as progressive steps
toward this goal. The first step relates to a theoretical broadening of perspective
in light of C. Wright Mills's concept of Sociological Imagination.' The second
recommended step is inspired by George Ritzer's interest in meta-theories and
examines the integration of ideas from his Major Levels of Social Analysis
model.2 The final suggestion concerns the exploration of new dimensions and
considers the dynamics of the Social Cubism model by Sedn Byrne and Neal
Carter.3
I1. INTRODUCTION
One of the rarest of all commodities in this life seems to be that of finding
adequate balance. Aristotle sought to find a happy median in the Golden Mean.4
Philosophers have long been debating whether each individual person is a free
agent or whether each one is totally and helplessly locked into an endless chain
of deterministic causes and effects. Varying philosophical speculations place
the answers to these questions at both extremes and at several places in
between.5 Biologists design experiments to try and ascertain whether nature or
nurture wields the strongest influences in guiding human behavior and both
possibilities find their ardent supporters.6 Theologians have argued for centuries
about whether the human destiny of every person is divinely and absolutely
fixed prior to one's birth or whether the choices that we exercise in this life
represent genuine acts of freedom. Likewise, whole religious denominations
1. See CHARLES LEMERT, SOCIAL THEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS, 348
(2000).
2. See GEORGE RrrzER, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (4th ed., 1996).
3. See SEAN BYRNE& NEALCARTER, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces Of Ethnoterritorial Politics
In Northern Ireland And Quebec, 3(2) PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, at 52-71 (1996).
4. See 0. JOHNSON, ETHICS: SELECTIONS FROM CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY WRITERS, 67-
77(1989).
5. See R. SOLOMON, INTRODUCING PHILOSOPHY: A TEXT WrrH INTEGRATED READINGS 495-537
(4th ed. 1989).
6. See JOHN J. MACIONIS, SOCIETY: THE BASICS 124-125(4th ed. 1997).
have grown up around exactly how one might think that this question should be
answered.7 It seems that incomplete or partial knowledge can easily lead one
toward the acceptance of an extreme position in any number of areas. For
example, embracing one end or the other of opposite extremes on any
continuum often seems to represent an imbalance in rationale that ultimately
leads to isolation and disunity. Yet, the choice to accept such a position seems
common in almost every discipline. So, in trying to answer the questions of
structure and agency in social theory, whether at the local, national, or
international level, social theorists are following a long line of similar inquiry
in many other disciplines. Social scientists also, as they study the structures and
institutions of any given society, and the individual's actions within them, are
engaged in a very real quest to understand where agency factors leave off and
where structural ones begin.' Often, those of us theorizing about these issues
initially only find partial answers to our questions. Therefore, in general, any
one theory often can only provide a very small part of the explanation to these
rather large and complex questions. The search for balance can usually be
satisfied only through the comparing, contrasting and synthesizing of ideas and
concepts while seeking a well-rounded and integrated whole.9 Nowhere is this
more evident than in the analysis of social conflict and in the search for its
resolution at all levels and across all cultures.' 0
Although the study of conflict, and conflict resolution theory, is of
necessity multidisciplinary in scope", it is also clearly grounded in the social
sciences.' 2 Because of this, and because of the complexity of the subject matter
itself, the connection between social theory and the need for simple and
practical models becomes obvious. 3 Conflict seems to be as complicated as it
is prevalent.' 4 The sources of conflict sometimes seem almost infinite and the
consequences, when they are not adequately managed or resolved, can be
horrific. I" Examples such as the genocide practiced in Bosnia and Rwanda
7. See SPERRY LEWIS CHAFER, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 183-198 (1974).
8. Cf. RrITZER, supra note 2, at 531.
9. Id. at 633.
10. Cf Byrne & Carter, supra note 3.
11. See J. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL, 5-6 (1992).
12. See L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT, 5 (1956).
13. See C. COSTANTINO & C. MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE
TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS xiii (1996).
14. See D. WEEKS, THE EIGHT ESSENTIAL STEPS To CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PRESERVING
RELATIONSHIPS AT WORK, AT HOME, AND IN THE COMMUNITY ix (1994).
15. Cf LEMERT, supra note 1, at 148.
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illustrate just how deep-seated these sources of conflict can be when
experienced in protracted situations in local, national, and international contexts.
Conflict occurs at all levels of social interaction, from the largest of society's
structures to the smallest of human groups. 16 With these things in mind, a better
understanding of micro and macro sociological theory, along with deeper
insights into agency and structure relationships, can offer much toward an
integrative understanding of conflict and toward the development of more
holistic models for finding resolution. 7
As in the case of micro- and macro-sociological theory, questions of
structure and agency are sometimes viewed as polar opposites, and may even
be seen as mutually exclusive concepts. 8 Although there are certain valid
distinctions, that sometimes need to be made, to differentiate macro issues from
structural ones, and micro issues from those of agency 9, their general
similarities are sometimes offered together here for purposes of simplification.
It is my contention that a balanced and holistic theoretical approach requires an
integrated sociological worldview. This perspective needs to be one in which
structure, agency, micro and macro sociological issues can all be considered as
interrelated concepts held together by a natural tension that could best be
conceptualized as an integrated multi-dimensional design. In other words, for
there to be a comprehensive understanding of such events as the recent protests
at the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings, the tensions between
structure and agency must be taken into account. This becomes especially
evident considering the starkly contrasting opinions that exist as to how one
nation's economic policies can empower or disempower individuals and nations
around the world.
Much as Ritzer's diagram of social analysis (see figure 1 below) of the
micro/macro-level issues includes both vertical and horizontal axes, with multi-
directional and multi-level interplay between objective/subjective and
micro/macro continuums, so also structure and agency issues require similar
frameworks for a comprehensive evaluation.2 0 And, just as Byrne and Carter's
social cube model demonstrates the importance of viewing the interconnections,
relationships and the interaction between many social variables (see figure 2
below) 21, so, also, this article will illustrate the complexity, emphasize the
16. See W. WILMOT & J. HOCKER, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT, 33 (1998).
17. Cf COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 13, at 22.
18. See G. MARSHALL, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY, 10-11 (1994).
19. Cf RrrZER, supra note 2, at 522.
20. Id.
21. Cf Byrne & Carter, supra note 3.
necessity and encourage the development of better, more comprehensive
conflict analysis and resolution models. Truly helpful conflict intervention
systems designs require the capacity both to analyze complex social interactions
and to offer clarification to both structural/agency and micro/macro-sociological
influences in social theory (and in conflict resolution theory). But they also
need to provide the simplicity with which to offer real help to the conflict
resolution practitioners who will be seeking to apply them to ordinary cases in
the international, as well as to local and to national settings.
m. BROADENING PERSPECTIVES
Because of the limitations inherent in a person having only incomplete
information and perspective, the hope for progress toward more integrative
designs challenges us to widen our fields of view. The interface between
agency, structure, micro and macro factors in the determination of ultimate
causes of conflict is complicated in part due to the invisible nature of macro-
structural level influences upon individuals and upon groups. For example, the
universal international law principle of human rights is not perceived culturally
in the same light in China as in the democracies of the West. This divergence
of cultural values contributes to conflict escalation between countries at the
international level. In addition, there is further complexity added because of the
multidimensional considerations of each.
For example, Martin Luther King, Jr. demonstrated, in both his writings
and in his life, the society-changing potential of non-violent resistance.22 But
how could one best analyze and explain just how such individual and corporate
actions positively impact a society? On the one hand, each individual act of
resistance could be considered agency at its most basic level. Dr. King
illustrates this beautifully when he quotes Henry David Thoreau on the slavery
issue, "aye, if one honest man, in the state of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold
slaves, were actually to withdraw from the copartnership, and be locked up in
the county jail therefore, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. 23
Indeed, history provides us with a plethora of examples in which the actions of
single individuals have had profound social import. But then, in contrast, Dr.
King also acknowledges the necessity of a larger agency when he states that the
success of nonviolent protest depends upon a "mass movement" to accomplish
its goals.24 He further magnifies the importance of linkage between the two
22. See J. FAHEY & R. ARMSTRONG, A PEACE READER: ESSENTIAL READINGS ON WAR, JUSTICE,
NON-VIOLENCE AND WORLD ORDER, 113-128 (1992).
23. Cf. LEMERT, supra note 1, at 347.
24. Id. at 345.
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when he writes that it is "not a struggle between people at all, but a tension
between justice and injustice. '
Although individual agents take part (and are vital to this movement) a
complete understanding of what is really at work extends to the larger
framework of analyzing structures and value systems of the society as a whole.
Dr. King's philosophy clearly integrates the involvement of individuals with
groups to move the conscience of the larger society and even of the world.
Although it is possible to isolate and to compartmentalize his individual
statements and concepts in ways in which they might be categorized as either
micro or macro in nature, the overview leaves one with a sense of the need to
see the whole as an interconnected range of ideas on a continuum between the
two.
Similarly, the questions of structure and agency are likewise difficult to
separate.26 At what juncture does the agency of the individual end and the
influence of the group become primary? A model with the capacity to
graphically illustrate and bring meaning to these relationships could be most
helpful for building new holistic and balanced perspectives. A relatively recent
example of the interface between agency and structure issues, resulting in
positive conflict management and resolution, is found in the multilevel impact
of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee's (TRC) efforts between 1994-1996
to heal the inter-group conflict between Blacks and Whites in South Africa.
This effort represents a structural intervention within a society with a goal of
transforming relationships between ethnic groups down to the micro level of
individual interaction and cooperation.
There is no doubt that the dynamics of nonviolent actions taken by many
people during the civil rights movement in this country impacted America at
every level. Individuals and families were changed forever.27 So were whole
cities and eventually our entire nation and the world.2' The changes were
imperfect and incomplete. The new conflicts have replaced the old. And the
new questions raised, and not yet answered, remain for further study and
analysis. What really caused the conflicts in the first place? Are the answers
to be found in our history? In our religion? Are they causes that originated in
individuals or in groups? What social structures contributed to and facilitated
these problems? What cultural and psychological factors accelerated the acts
of violence and what factors contributed to inhibiting them? Why did similar
25. Id.
26. Cf. RrrzER, super note 2, at 521.
27. See M. EDELMAN, LATERNS: A MEMOIR OF MENTORS (1999).
28. See e.g. JESSICA SENEHI, VIOLENCE PREVENTION (2000) available at
http.//webct.nova.edu/adrd6l70senehi/syllabus.htm.
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actions not have the same effect in other settings? Why do differing strategies
seem to work more effectively in one culture than in another?
IV. AvoIDING EXTREMES
Avoiding the extremism caused by focusing only upon a narrow field of
partial information is not always a simple matter. In trying to negotiate
paradoxical forces in social relationships, some have tended toward theoretical
polarization through retreating to one end of the continuum or the other. One
clear example can be found in the work of David Riesman as he attempts to
explain why individuals act in society in specific ways. He quotes from Erich
Fromm regarding the connections between social structures and the
development of individual human character. He concludes that the very desires
and motivations of individuals seem to be wholly and absolutely determined at
the macro-structural level by society's indoctrination implemented through the
socialization process. He goes so far as to extend this idea, of social influence
over individuals, to include all "mode[s] of conformity-even be it one of
rebellion."29
If applied uniformly and universally, his inferences would seem to extend
in concept even to the nonviolent resistance movements of leaders like Vaclay
Havel, Nelson Mandela, Corazon Aquino, Shimon Peres, Mohandas Gandhi and
Martin Luther King, Jr. If one accepts this premise, one would seem to be forced
to conclude that even as individuals might choose to rebel, in one form or
another from the dominant culture, the character-shaping influences of that
culture are causing the individual actors to "want to rebel. All individual
human agency seems to have been thereby denied and each individual
consequently reduced to a mere passive receptacle of the larger structural forces.
How is this actually accomplished according to Riesman? His theory
seems to imply an ability of a given society to pre-determine what is necessary
for its own best interests and to bring about the desired results.3 This is
accomplished through the shaping of the character of individuals within it
through the social institutions of family, schools, and government. The
individual person therefore seems passive. He or she seems to merely be a
conduit of these forces and then ultimately to become a vehicle to support and
reproduce them. Other social theorists seem to draw similar conclusions,
accepting macro-sociological determinism, in even more concise terms. Bruce
Mayhew, for example, states, "In structural sociology, the unit of analysis is
always the social network, never the individual."'', The nature of the apartheid
29. Cf. LEMERT, supra note 1, at 322.
30. Id. at 321.
31. Cf. RrTZER, supra note 2, at 494.
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system in South Africa illustrates how the structural violence of the state toward
Blacks, Asians, Coloreds and Whites can be institutionalized within a society
and internalized within individuals. But once again, the question remains,
where does the responsibility for this evil reside? Can it be wholly the result of
structural forces alone.. .or do individuals share in the blame? Mayhew, and
others like him, would seem to conclude ultimately that an individual's choice
cannot be separated from the macro-forces of the society to which one belongs.
On the other side of this issue lies another theoretical pole. Some neo-
Marxian theorists clearly rejected the parallel concept of "mechanical
determinism" which seemed to be implied by writers like Engels in speaking of
"the inevitable decline of capitalism."32 Rather than considering structural
influences as some kind of irresistible force in history, theorists like Georg
Lukacs and Antonio Gramsci proposed "a subjective orientation" to offset "the
early Marxist at the objective, material level.""a The Critical Theory School, as
a whole, further criticized the positivism of sociology for allowing the scientific
method to legitimize the status quo.' If one rejects these principles thoroughly
enough, there can be no chain of cause and effect and thereby no possible
deterministic structural forces, only subjective ones.
Why such extremism? Lewis argues that the resistance to a more integrated
paradigm is not so much theoretical as political because opposition to existing
theory is often the inspiration that many theoretical approaches draw from. In
other words, an integrated theoretical framework threatens their more
independent and extreme approaches.3 5 Perhaps this is indeed correct in some
cases. But another possible, more fundamental, flaw in rationale could come
from the tendency in all of us to want to achieve total comprehension of any
subject matter under consideration. It arises from the basic reductionistic
tendencies that accompany our human condition out of this desire to understand
and explain reality in an absolute fashion in spite of our own limited experience,
knowledge, and perspective. For example, seeking to understand the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in isolation is an exercise in futility. One needs to consider
the wider regional context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Similarly, a study of the
multifaceted cold war politics of the United States-Russia rivalries certainly
serves to illustrate the necessity of understanding and unraveling the complex
and interrelated layers of local, regional and international conflict contexts.
Oversimplification, at best, only postpones the real work of analysis and
achievement of mutual understanding.
32. Id. at 272.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 277.
35. Id. at 228-229.
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With the limitations of our own individual abilities and experiences, we
can suffer from intellectual tendencies toward narrowing the field to a
manageable range, especially in regard to paradoxical problems. Interestingly
enough, ancient wisdom literature addresses these very concerns with amazing
insight. In philosophy, the definition of paradox carries the idea of implicit
contradiction.36 But in Judeao-Christian theology, a paradox is defined as a
condition in which there is only an apparent contradiction.37 In other words,
just because one cannot fully comprehend the breadth, height or depth of an
issue, this does not necessarily require that it is in itself contradictory. Further,
the commendation of one old Hebrew proverb encourages rather that a person
attempt to accept both sides of the paradox even without a total comprehension
of the issue. Specifically in this context, addressing some of the perplexing
questions related to the existence of good and evil, it states: "It is good that you
grasp one thing, and also not let go of the other .... . 3" To paraphrase, it is
acceptable in the quest for greater understanding for a person to allow an
apparent contradiction to stand while one continues to pursue the wisdom and
knowledge necessary to grasp them both at the same time. So, to apply these
insights to social theory, perhaps we should be more willing, than we often are,
to tolerate some cognitive dissonance long enough to continue the search for
balance and completion rather than succumb to the temptation to settle for one
extreme or the other. Opportunities to exercise this kind of open mindedness
toward diverse viewpoints are plentiful in such events as the religious wars of
our own day. Islamic Fundamentalist and Israeli Zionists interests often seem
to be mutually exclusive. The polemical positions that have frequently been
presented to justify ethnic cleansing in such places as the Balkans and Rwanda
illustrate the need for new paradigms of analysis and for a stretching of
perspectives to comprehend rationales. Certainly this is not intended to suggest
that wholesale accommodation of such rationales would necessarily be
appropriate but rather that a movement toward the creation of better frameworks
in which we can analyze, comprehend and adequately address such conflicts
would be more constructive and encourage more collaborative solutions.
V. HARMONIZING CONCEPTS
Writers like C. Wright Mills also seem to offer concepts that could
potentially help bridge the chasm between extremes positions or concepts. His
idea of "sociological imagination" provides a theoretical description of how a
person might perhaps extricate him/herself from the structural stream long
36. Cf. SOLOMAN, supra note 5, at 40.
37. See W. ELWELL, EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY, 826 (1984).
38. See ECCLESIASTES 7:18.
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enough to gain some objectivity and to rise above the invisible forces of cultural
indoctrination and paradox. "It enables him [the possessor] to take into account
how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become falsely
conscious of their social positions" 31 thereby clarifying ones vision and
allowing that person to gain a new outlook unobscured by cultural myopia.
Mills suggested that those that have been successful at doing this have done so
through asking several key and searching questions. His material is quoted here
at length because of its direct importance regarding the need for a complex
model for analyzing conflict and because it will be used later in this article to
illustrate the significant value that Byrne and Carter's model provide to this
discussion:'
First, what is the structure of this particular society as a whole? What are
its essential components, and how are they related to one another? How does it
differ from other varieties of social order? Within it, what is the meaning of any
particular feature for its continuance and for its change?
Second, where does this society stand in human history? What are the
mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for
the development of humanity as a whole? How does any particular feature we
are examining affect, and how is it affected by, the historical period in which it
moves? And this period---what are its essential features? How does it differ
from other periods? What are its characteristic ways of history making?
Third, what varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in
this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they
selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What
kinds of human nature are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in
this society in this period? And what is the meaning for 'human nature' of each
and every feature of the society we are examining?
Notice the way in which Mill's questions lead an observer to analyze
different levels of social interaction and the reciprocal nature of how they
interrelate. Notice also the contextualization of placing the inquiry into its
unique historical and cultural setting and the reflexive and reflective
requirements of providing complete responses. Assuming that we can be
successful enough in doing this to begin the analysis of agency/structure and
micro/macro integration and linkage issues, what types of models permit a
multi-dimensional, multi-layered and multi-faceted approach that would be
comprehensive enough to deal with all of these questions and yet simple enough
to offer practical assistance to conflict interveners? Perhaps a brief consideration
39. Cf LEMERT, supra note 1, at 348.
40. Cf Byrnes & Carter, supra note 3.
41. Cf. LEMERT, supra note 1, at 349.
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of some ideas from the past can help in illustrating what capacities these new
models might require.
VI. LEARNING FROM THE PAST
Looking back to the classical social theories of the past can potentially be
of help to us in at least two regards. First, we can more clearly recognize the
helpful insights gained by these social theorists toward a better understanding
of the linkage between micro/macro and structural/agency concerns. Secondly,
we can also potentially discover those factors that have already been seriously
considered in social theory analysis and, by omission, those that clearly have
not. Although some sociologists and conflict theorist have tended to
characterize the classical social theorists as primarily residing on one side or the
other in this debate, George Ritzer notes that they generally demonstrated a
concern for gaining a better understanding of micro-macro linkages.4 2 The
following sections will attempt to summarize representative portions of some
of their writings to help illustrate this point. In doing so, we can learn how these
social thinkers contributed to the integration of these concepts, on the one hand,
and yet failed to think comprehensively enough on the other. Perhaps by
recognizing some of the shortcomings of their own attempts to account for all
of the relevant social factors, we can avoid making similar mistakes ourselves
and thereby add new perspectives to these past contributions.
A. Karl Marx
We begin with Karl Marx precisely because of the macro-sociological and
conflict emphasis he seemed to place upon a relatively narrow field of causal
factors, specifically economics. His dialectical approach was in many respects
revolutionary in its potential for overcoming some of the barriers and linear
thinking of other theorists. He demonstrated an integration of historical and
subjective factors in his writings that were exceptional. However, in his
divisions of the social classes and in his analysis of social conflict, he seemed
to consider economic factors as almost singularly responsible for all of society's
ills as well as potentially the best arena in which to find solutions. So, in spite
of the opportunities presented by this dialectical approach, Marx nevertheless
seemed to accord to economic factors the lion's share of value as compared to
all other social considerations and categories. Secondly, he seemed to discount
the importance of certain other social forces, for example, religious factors in
escalating conflict. He acknowledged the reality of religious influences in
42. Cf. RrTZER, supra note 2, at 494.
Hare
814 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:803
society but seemed to minimize their significance especially toward finding
positive solutions.
Because of these dynamics, Marx has often been interpreted as an extreme
structuralist.43 These realities illustrate further the need for models that can
offer dialectical and multidimensional theoretical approaches. Although Marx's
argument about class conflict does indicate the importance of economic issues
in escalating international conflicts, there remains a need to allow for a more
balanced value to be assigned to a variety of relevant social factors, and to the
interplay that they have at the multiple levels of society. A modem example of
this complexity can been seen in the critical conflicts between the G-7 Nations
and the group of seventy-seven. Certainly economics is central to the many
tensions existing between the wealthiest of developed and the poorest of
developing nations. But at the same time, complexities of greatly divergent
value systems further compound and complicate finding parity and justice in a
way that can be understood as equally satisfactory to all. Economic
considerations are clearly key to the conflicts but not easily interpreted in the
vacuum of mono-culturalism. Rather, much can be learned through looking at
cultural perspectives through a number of lenses before drawing final
assessments.
B. Emile Durkheim
Emile Durkheim clearly concerned himself with macro-sociological and
structural issues and with the effects that these social forces exerted upon the
individuals in a society. In fact, his criticisms of the sociology of his own day
related to its failure, at several levels, to significantly differentiate itself from
other academic disciplines, especially psychology. This further revealed his
interest in the macro/structural realm and in the keeping of society together
through cultural and legal norms. One of his primary points related to
sociology's apparent inability to identify a domain that it could call its own. In
Sociology and Social Facts he writes, "Sociological method as we practice it
rests wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be studied as things,
that is, as realities external to the individual ... there can be no sociology unless
societies exist, and ... societies cannot exist if there are only individuals."
4
In comparing sociology with psychology in this context, he was clearly
demarcating the subject matter of the former as it specifically related to objects
wholly separate in existence from mere individuals in society and indicating that
psychology should be the social science discipline that claims the individual, in
like manner, as its own. He therefore, in one sense, places sociology squarely
43. Id. at 271.
44. Cf. LEMERT, supra note 1, at 73.
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in the domain of macro/structural theory. Even while doing so, Durkheim is not
theoretically and categorically divorcing micro and macro, structural and agency
concerns from one another. Instead, he goes on to offer significant ideas related
to their linkage. This is demonstrated in his works on anomie and suicide. For
example, in his Anomie and the Modern Division of Labor, he expresses
concern at the macro-level about a diminishing influence of moral restraint and
guidance in modern society. He is dealing with the subjective macro-social and
structural forces in the ongoing development of norms and values in modern
society. And yet, in the very same context, he connects this particular social
phenomenon-the collective conscience-to the agency of the individual person
as having a real effect upon society.45
In spite of the macro realities of both objective and subjective social
structures, at the micro level, individual liberty, evidently according to
Durkheim, wields very real consequences in its linkage to the greater structural
problems of a society. Moreover, Durkheim' s functionalist model later became
the philosophical framework for the 1948 development of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC). This movement, by pooling the coal and steel
industries of Germany and France, proved successful in preventing them from
going to war with one another. Scientific and economic cooperation created
norms of interdependence that have spilled over into the political realm through
the expanded membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). This
integration of forces, at both the macro and micro levels, brought about a
working relationship and peace system that has also resulted in a political and
economic regional superpower, the European Union (EU).
What are the linkages between these varying levels? In Suicide and
Modernity, the very core of Durkheim's thesis relates to identifying the social
factors, beyond the individual, that influence people in society to take their own
lives. In this connection, the correlation of suicide rates to external social
factors necessitates the consideration of macro-structural dynamics in
relationship to this issue. Durkheim does this in part by correlating the various
suicide rates of different nations by occupational categories.' He does it in
principle by connecting determining factors to some force exterior to the
individual.47 Ultimately, the agency for suicide is eminently recognized at the
micro-level of individual choice and behavior as social norms break down and
anomie results in the increase of suicide. Durkheim certainly seems to
acknowledge this when he speaks of man's "free combinations of the will.
4
45. Id. at 70.
46. Id. at81.
47. Id. at 75.
48. Id. at 74.
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Therefore again, both macro/structural and micro/agency forces exist.
How exactly do they interrelate? Durkheim' causes us to ask the right questions,
but fails to integrate them in such a way as to help us understand linkages.
More complex models, with the capacity to help establish these relationships are
needed for further clarification of all of the variables in society and how they
interact with one another at different levels.
C. Max Weber
Max Weber is also known primarily for his grand narratives regarding the
ever-growing bureaucracies of the modem age.49 The very nature of the subject
itself has an intrinsic, collective component that depends upon masses of
individuals for its very existence and function. "Bureaucracy is the means of
carrying 'community action' over into rationally ordered 'societal action"' and
the individual bureaucrat "is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism."5°
Yet, Weber is also apparently keenly aware of the significance of individual
agency, even in the largest bureaucracy. As he discusses leadership and
authority, he addresses both macro-structural and micro-agency types of
legitimate authority in society. The Rational and Traditional forms of
leadership find their power in the structural institutions of rational-legal
authority and sacred societal traditions. However, when he comes to his last
type, Charismatic Authority, he states that its basis resides upon "devotion to the
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual
person . . ."" Thus, his theories reveal a belief that the largest imaginable
bureaucracy can still be affected by the agency of one person but also that the
individual lives in an "iron cage". However, conflicts between bureaucracies
and individuals seem to clearly trouble Weber." Other factors must be
involved. But what are they and how are they interrelated? Weber's theories
seem inadequate to answer many of these questions but, at the same time, serve
to illustrate the lack of critical thinking in our world.
Today, similar tensions would seem to exist with such developments as the
explosion of the Internet and e-commerce. Global communications have been
speeded up, thereby dissolving geographical boundaries into a global village of
sorts. However, rational technology seems to have not only provided
undeniable benefits to humankind but also to have brought about an eradicating
of differences of culture, an inhibiting of critical thinking and an effecting what
49. Id. at 199-124.
50. Id at 109.
51. Id. at 115.
52. Id. at 100-104.
has been called the "the McDonaldization of society" 3 .. . or, to borrow from
Weber's terminology, the creation of a global "iron cage."
VII. SYNTHESIZING IDEAS
The reality of this complex interaction of individuals and groups has
inspired efforts to develop social interaction models that could perhaps shed
new light on just how these differing elements interrelate. What appears to be
lacking, however, are conflict analysis models that provide adequate
frameworks capable of demonstrating holistic and balanced paradigms of social
interaction, especially as related to the complexities of social conflict between
individuals and groups, nationally and in the global arena. One approach has
been developed through the practice of comparing social theories among
themselves in a new field called meta-theoretical analysis.54 This integration of
theories has provided social scientists with new frameworks with which to
discover and consider relationships previously unexplored.
George Ritzer offers a diagram of Major Levels of SocialAnalysis designed
to integrate micro and macro aspects of interaction.55 This two-dimensional
chart shows two axes, one vertical and the other horizontal. The vertical axis
provides a continuum from macroscopic to microscopic. The horizontal axis
offers a similar continuum from objective to subjective. This divides the overall
graph into four quadrants with the following categories: Macro-objective,
macro-subjective, micro-objective and micro-subjective. Arrows pointing both
directions connect each of the quadrants to all of the others indicating
multidirectional linkage interconnecting every part of the diagram into
dialectical relationships. This provides for a range on the horizontal axis "from
material phenomena like individual action and bureaucratic structures to
nonmaterial phenomena like consciousness and norms and values.. . "and on
the vertical axis "from individual thought and action to world-wide systems."56
This model encourages the researcher to consider the larger framework as a
whole rather than any single component in isolation. It further graphically
places each of the four quadrants in equal relationship and implies equity of
significance to each dynamic (see figure 1).
Using Ritzer's diagram to analyze Mohandas Gandhi's nonviolent
disobedience movement could place, for example, Gandhi's own personal
values of justice and injustice in the micro-subjective category. His actual
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 497.
56. Id. at 496-499.
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personal protest activities could be considered in the micro-objective theoretical
quadrant. The larger society's acceptance of some of these values could be
considered a part of the macro-subjective phenomena and any actual resulting
civil rights legislation that was enacted by the British colonial power, in the
macro- objective category. So, in considering individuals and groups, their
beliefs and actions, their impact on cultural values and legislative enactment, we
can move through all four analytical frameworks while maintaining a
continuous and very interconnected theoretical network of interaction. This
model provides a great step toward a more holistic perspective capable of
drawing upon multiple sociological levels of analysis.
VHII. EXPLORING NEW DIMENSIONS
Another model offering potential for an even more comprehensive analysis
is Byrne and Carter's Social Cube,57 which has six facets compared to Ritzer's
four. It provides potentially more dialectical dynamics while maintaining
relative simplicity of design. It is graphically presented as a simple cube with
each of its six sides representing different faces or facets of social reality. It
includes demographics, religion, history, economic factors, political factors and
psycho-cultural factors. Its design is tailored to the consideration of ethno-
territorial politics with a stated goal of providing a more complete view of social
phenomena. "Only when one considers the interrelations among the faces of the
puzzle can one progress toward a more holistic solution."58 A further key to its
usefulness is found in an emphasis, not on rigid categories, but on inter-
relationships. Their focus is intentionally directed away from concentrating
upon any single category exclusively, and toward gaining a greater
understanding of the interplay existing between them.59 The social cube model
is applied to both the Northern Ireland and Quebec conflicts illustrating the
complex set of relationships between Protestants and Catholics in Northern
Ireland, and Anglophones and Franco-phones in Quebec.
IX. BYRNE AND CARTER'S SOCIAL CUBE
Returning again, for illustration, to the general consideration of Mohandas
Gandhi and his involvement in the human rights non-violent protest movement
in India, we can compare its characteristics to the criteria of the social cube.
The dynamics now offered move from the four categories found in Ritzer's two-
dimensional model to the six categories found in Byrne and Carter's three-
57. Cf. Byrne & Carter, supra note 3.
58. Id. at 1.
59. Id. at 2.
dimensional model. But something else also seems to develop. In writing on
ethno-territorial conflicts in Northern Ireland and Quebec, Byrne and Carter
note the tendency of some to focus upon one category or another rather than
considering combinations or even competitions between the various factors.
"People concentrating on only one aspect, or side of the puzzle, are unlikely to
produce a complete solution or picture of the problem."' In using the three-
dimensional model, it becomes much more clear just how dialectical in nature
social conflict theory must be in order to adequately analyze the different levels
and categories of factors discovered, especially in social conflict. For example,
rather than simply attempting to place different levels of social realities in one
or another of the four categories of Ritzer' s model and then trying to visualize
some kind of abstract linkage between them, Byrne and Carter's analysis moves
to a more complex examination of the relationships between differing aspects
of a conflict rather than merely focusing on the position which it holds on the
model.
For example, the social cube model could easily encourage one to consider
not only, in this case, the subjective, micro-level considerations of the personal
beliefs, norms and values of Mohandas Gandhi but also to further analyze them
in the framework of the other facets of the cube as applicable. Ritzer
acknowledges that his model, in general, provides only a "'snapshot' in time.
' 6
'
The three-dimensional social cube seems to do more than that (see Figure
2). While certainly, the model can represent a single moment in time, its very
design and purpose is to encourage a more continuous and dynamic analysis of
events unfolding while also considering the fluctuations and interplay between
those factors. For example, using only three of the six factors (for
simplification) in Byrne and Carter's Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of
Ethnoterritorial Politics in Northern Ireland and Quebec to illustrate the point
a comparative analyses of the historical aspects of both of the conflicts under
consideration can also be correlated to the religious aspects of these conflicts
and further correlated to psycho-cultural factors. In this example these three
factors-history, religion and psycho-cultural considerations-when combined
reveal contrasting results in the two cultures due to the differences created by
their respective combinations (for an extended modification of this model see
also Russ-Trent, in this special issue). The following portions of the paper are
quoted to simply illustrate how these factors are intertwined and actually
fluctuating through time and space to create a dynamic, ongoing, and ever-
changing social environment helpful in the study of the conflicts in both
Northern Ireland and in Quebec:
60. Id. at 1.
61. Cf. RrTZER, supra note 1, at 638.
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"History, recounted by those involved in conflicts, sets the context for
current ethno-territorial politics."62 "Today, religion has more salience as a
social category in Northern Ireland than in Quebec."6 "Tensions and emotions
have often escalated during social change or perceived political crisis between
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland and between Anglephones and
Francophones in Quebec." 6
In these sample observations, the importance of historical context, the
changes in religious factors and the psychological impacts of social tensions are
all noted. The resulting dynamics of the conflicts in these two seemingly
similar cultural confrontations take on notably different characteristics because
of the differences in history and religion in each culture. And although the third
statement seems to indicate that the result of these tensions on psycho-cultural
factors are the same, one has only to look at how these tensions manifest
themselves differently in each ethnic setting to realize that these considerations
are different too. The section on terrorism, under Political Factors, in Byrne and
Carter's article clarifies this point. The differences in the frequency and
intensity of terrorist acts of violence found in both Northern Ireland and
Quebec, for example, find their origins in the interplay between a number of the
factors including differing levels of access to political institutions historically.65
(For additional insights into the analysis of similar cultures in order to discover
subtle variables that can dramatically alter outcomes, see Jay MacLeod's Ain't
No Makin' It).66
Another impressive aspect of the Social Cubism model is found in its
potential to achieve what C. Wright Mill's quotation above stated must happen
in order to objectively study one's own culture through the use of sociological
imagination.67 Notice his emphasis on the study of relationships (see quotation
above). In the first question he offered as a necessary ingredient, in order for
one to gain insights into the structures of a society, the finding of the "essential
components" of those structures and the information required to understand..
. how they are related to one another?" 68 Second, Mills addresses the question
of history and its significance in relationship to both the culture itself and to
62. Cf. Byrne & Carter, supra note 3, at 4.
63. Id. at7.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 10-11.
66. See J. MACLEOD, AIN'T No MAKIN' IT: ASPIRATIONS AND ArAINMENT IN A LOW-INCOME
NEIGHBORHOOD (1995).
67. Cf LEMERT, supra note 1, at 348-352.
68. Id. at 349.
other cultures. Third, Mills includes questions about "human nature" as related
to the culture in much the same way as Byrne and Carter address the "psycho-
cultural factors" in their Social Cubism model. Finally, he references the word
"change" throughout his questions demonstrating the need, in each of the areas
of inquiry, to follow the ever-changing dynamics of the flow of social events in
cultural study.
Using the Social Cubism model to consider again the nonviolent example
of Gandhi would seem to stimulate a whole host of additional questions for
analysis, both at the micro and at the macro levels. What was the history of this
conflict in India? What is the relationship between this conflict and the history
of British colonialism? How does it relate to the histories of other non-violent
protest movements? What are the structures surrounding these events? What are
the religious factors? What are the political factors? What is the relationship of
these factors to the people on the other side of this conflict? What about the
personal histories of the individual leaders on both sides of the protest? How
have the leaders influenced the other protestors and the society and by what
means? How do economic factors relate to the society, the subgroups and the
individuals involved? What is changing and what is not? What connects all of
these events together and in what social patterns?
X. CONCLUSION
Theoretical models help us to organize information and to better relate
concepts and ideas together. Social conflict theories are always finite, and
partial in nature, due to the limitations of the theorist's own abilities,
experiences and perspectives. Social conflict theory models that inspire
integration and synthesis of seemingly opposed viewpoints can trigger insights
into the commonalities and compatibilities between them and help social
scientists to envision new and better models and theories. The models discussed
in this article help us to ask more probing questions into the interrelationships
between the social structures around us and the individuals who create and
comprise them. Through broadening perspectives, synthesizing ideas and
exploring new dimensions, we can build upon the labors of the past and
hopefully discover relationships that can potentially reveal more holistic
solutions to social problems locally, nationally and globally. Social conflict
poses one of the most complex and difficult social problems of all for social
theorists to analyze, understand and resolve. Perhaps some of the insights
gained through the discussion and utilization of these multidimensional models
will result in the development of even more practical tools for the future in the
field of social conflict theory and in their application to social conflict and
conflict resolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Violence is an issue that is often chronicled throughout the world, with
media stories depicting violence in the home, streets, schools and workplace.
Although no sector of society is immune from violence, "stories about
workplace violence have inundated the media ... shock has supplemented
hysteria about crime in the streets."' A report issued in 2000 by the Third
European Survey on Working Conditions notes that over fifteen million people
reported violence, sexual harassment or bullying in the European workplace,
with large numbers of workers complaining of stress and burnout.2 Of the
fifteen million incidents reported, thirteen million were reports of intimidation
and bullying and two million were reports of workers subjected to physical
* Ph.D. Candidate, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The author wishes
to acknowledge the support, creative thinking and editorial assistance of Dr. Sean Byrne, who provided the
impetus and support to develop and complete this article.
1. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, VIOLENCE ON THE JOB: IDENTIFYING RISKS AND
DEVELOPING SOLUTIONS (Gary R. VandenBos & Elizabeth Q. Bulata, eds., 1996).
2. Press Release, Working Conditions in Europe Not Improving, According to Survey, European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Dec. 14, 2000) available at
http://www.eurofound.ie/newsroompress3.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
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violence from people belonging to their workplace.' Data from the 1993
Northwestern National Life Insurance Company (NWNL) 4 notes that violence
and harassment in the United States workplace are also pervasive, with more
than two million Americans victims of physical attack at the workplace, six
million threatened, sixteen million harassed. The issue of workplace violence
is clearly global, "crossing borders, work settings and occupational groups."5
The 1999 United States Department of Labor (DOL) Futurework Report notes
that 50,000 United States workers die every year from occupational diseases.
These numbers are staggering, but relay only part of the problem. Clearly,
direct violence affects worker morale, productivity and ultimately, the
organization's economic resources and profitability. However, indirect
structural violence must also be considered when one looks at the origin of
workplace violence.
The origin of violence can be described along a continuum that often
begins as latent dissatisfaction and escalates to open conflict and ultimately
violence. Violence along a continuum might span "competitive pressures, loss
of personal autonomy, surveillance, cumulative physical and mental reactions,
fatigue and changing workplace demographics."6 These organizational issues
create a cultural milieu that permeates the workplace and in turn, socializes the
workforce into a given paradigm of thinking and behaving that can lead to
escalation within the continuum of violence.
In analyzing the wide range of actions that encompass violence, one can
begin by defining the factors that contribute to violent actions. Byrne and
Carter7 identified six social forces, described as social cubism that interact to
create a climate of violence. Although the Byrne and Carter social cubism
model was applied to ethno-political conflict, the multi-factor, inter-relational
model can also be utilized to develop a conceptual framework to analyze social
forces that create workplace conflict. These social forces that inter-relate in the
workplace can be analyzed from the following six perspectives: demographics,
historical, psycho-cultural, balance of power, political and economic (Fig. 1).
In order to ultimately apply these causative forces to conflict interventions, one
must also consider the micro-macro link across multiple levels of analysis as
3. Harassment & Violence, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, at http://www.eurofound.ie/working/harassment.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
4. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE, FEAR AND VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 6 (1993).
5. Duncan Chappell & Vittorio Di Martino, The Real Image of Violence at work (Asian-Pacific
Newsletter), Jan. 1999, available at http://www.occuphealth.fi/einfo/asian/ap199violenceO4.htm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2002).
6. Mary Carroll, The Violence-Prone Workplace: A New Approach to Dealing with Hostile,
Threatening, and Uncivil Behavior, BOOKLIST, Dec. 15, 1999, at 743.
7. Sedn Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in Northern
Ireland and Quebec, J. Peace & Conflict Studies, 3 (2), at 52 (1996).
used by Byrne and Keashly,8 which in this analysis will consider the individual,
the organization and society at large.
1]. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE DEFINED
There is "no agreement on what constitutes workplace violence."9
Violence within the workplace can be viewed from multiple perspectives, with
the broadest definition including all acts of aggression against an individual
within the workplace environment. This definition would include "any form of
behavior by individuals that is intended to harm current or previous coworkers
or their organization."'" This definition includes all forms of aggression,
including both violent and non-violent acts such as thefts, incivility or spreading
of rumors. Additionally, one might consider violence from the perspective of
acts that are generated directly from within the work environment as well as
those which are incidental to the organization i.e. family disputes that might
occur at the workplace but are not related to the work environment itself.
For the purposes of this analysis, workplace violence will be viewed as a
continuum of behaviors that arise directly out of the work environment. The
multi-factor analysis will be based on Galtung's description of violence as a
conflict triangle that is comprised of direct, structural (indirect) and cultural
violence. According to Galtung, direct violence would include injury inflicted
or directed from one individual towards another, such as physical injury,
sanctions and/or detention." Structural violence is that which comes from the
structure itself and includes those actions that attempt to harm the worker or
organization through non-physical methods, i.e. exploitation, marginalization,
emotional duress/harm. The use of organizational power over its workforce to
elicit worker compliance is commonly manifested through gender inequality
within traditionally patriarchal organizational settings. A third form of violence,
cultural violence, includes "those aspects of culture... that can be utilized to
justify or legitimize direct or structural violence."' 2 According to Galtung,
cultural violence allows acts of violence to be accepted as the norm, which
rationalizes latent or manifest approval of either direct or structural violence.
These forms of violence have differing time relations; "direct violence is an
8. SeAn Byrne & Loraleigh Keashly, Working with Ethno-political Conflict: A Multi-modal
Approach, in INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 97 (Michael Pugh ed., 2000).
9. VIOLENCEON THE JOB, supra note 1, at 1.
10. Id. at2.
1 . JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CoNFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND
CIVILIZATION (1996).
12. Id. at 197.
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event, structural violence is a process with ups and downs and cultural violence
is an invariant, remaining essentially the same for long periods."' 3
Violence in its various forms can be seen as a dynamic process that needs
to be analyzed from various perspectives and levels of analysis. Such multi-
level analysis provides a framework to develop appropriate interventions that
are needed to effectuate a workplace climate of positive peace, defined by
Galtung '" as the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds.
III. VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE-TRENDS AND OCCURRENCE
Violence in the workplace is not a phenomenon unique to any particular
country or culture. Reports of workplace violence and harassment emanate
from all quarters of the globe, with violence becoming an everyday reality for
many workers according to the recent International Labor Organization (ILO)
Safe Work report.'" According to the ILO report, "understanding has grown that
violence at work is not just an episodic, individual problem, but a structural,
strategic issue rooted in wider social economic, organizational and cultural
factors."' 6 Although perceptions and susceptibility to violence may vary greatly
from country to country, it can nevertheless be found in both developing and
industrialized nations.
7
Workplace violence was described in 1984 by then United States Surgeon
General C. Everett Kropp as a public health problem of significant proportion,
which has "indeed assumed the proportion of an epidemic."'" Since then there
has been considerable data generated concerning direct violence in the
workplace, with trends showing increases and decreases over the years.
Although recent trends show a decrease in workplace homicides in the United
States, there is an increase in reporting of intimidation and bullying within the
European community, albeit variations are noted among work sectors and
individual nations. Increases in workplace violence and harassment may also
be a reflection of greater public awareness and concern throughout the world
about the real and potential hazards of workplace violence. Whether real or a
13. id at 199.
14. Id.
15. See Vittorio Di Martino, Violence at the Workplace: the Global Challenge (International Labour
Organization), Nov. 2000, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safework/violenceviolwk/violwk.htm.
16. Id. at8.
17. Harassment & Violence (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living Working
Conditions), at http://www.eurofound.ie./working/harassment.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
18. MrFllE D. SOUTHERLAND ET AL., WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: A CONTINUUM FROM THREAT TO
DEATH 1(1997).
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factor of increased reporting, this heightened awareness has increased efforts to
identify the origins and possible strategies to address organizational conflict.
According to the ILO SafeWork report, there are a number of examples that
illustrate the "scope, dimensions and types of violence associated with
workplaces in many parts of the world" "9 including:
In South Africa, some surveys report that as many as four out of five
workers have experienced hostile behavior at the workplace.
In the United Kingdom, a 1994/95 survey found that over 11,000
retail staff had been the victims of physical violence and over 350,000
had been subject to threats and verbal abuse.
In France, over 2,000 attacks were reported on the personnel of the
Paris transport system in 1998.
In Japan, a bullying hotline received more than 1,700 requests for
consultation during two short periods in June and October, 1996.
In Germany, a 1991 survey found that 93% of women questioned had
been sexually harassed at the workplace. 2°
A recent United States Department of Justice report notes that;
"approximately one thousand employees are murdered (in the United States)
yearly while performing their work duties.. .there are two million incidences of
workplace violence reported, including one million simple assaults and 400,000
aggravated assaults.. .the vast majority go unreported."'" The numbers are
clearly staggering and call out for a response.
A conspiracy of silence surrounds workplace violence, with workers often
denying the risks and accepting the violence as part of the job.22 A study by the
Society for Human Resources Management found that "48 percent of employees
surveyed experienced a violent incident in the workplace.. .including verbal
threats (39 percent), pushing and shoving (22 percent) and fist fights (14
percent)., 23 Women appear particularly vulnerable to workplace violence, with
women thirty-nine percent more likely than men to be the victims of workplace
homicide.2 4  The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS),25 which first
19. See Di Martino, supra note 15.
20. See Pascal Paoli, Safework, Violence at Work in the European Recent Finds, at
http://www.ilo.org/publiclenglish/protection/safework/violence/eusurvey/eusurvey.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2002).
21. William Atkinson, The Everyday Face of Workplace Violence, 2/1/00 RISK MGMT. 12 (2000).
22. See Frema Engle, Violence, Crime and Trauma at Work: An Overlooked Problem, EAP DIGEST,
July/Aug. 1987.
23. Atkinson, supra note 21.
24. SOUTHERLAND, supra note 18.
25. See Safework, Introduction to Violence at Work, at http:llwww.ilo.org/public/english/
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reported victimization at the workplace in 1996, notes that women across all
continents report a higher incidence of assault directed against them in
comparison to those reported by men, with women in the United States
reporting a higher incidence of harassment then men by twenty-three percent to
sixteen percent.26 With an estimated 16 million instances of harassment just in
the United States workplace,27 the depth and breadth of the situation is evident.
One must wonder whether the vast majority of violence that goes unreported is
a consequence of latent structural violence, which suppresses victims who fear
loss of their jobs if sexual harassment is reported.
The impact of workplace incidents beyond direct physical harm cannot be
ignored. The effect on worker health, manifested through stress-related
complaints and the costs associated with absenteeism must also be considered.
The Third European Survey on Working Conditions reported in 200028 that
forty percent of European workers exposed to physical violence experienced
stress, forty-seven percent exposed to bullying experienced stress and forty-six
percent exposed to sexual harassment experienced stress. Additionally, thirty-
five percent of workers exposed to physical violence, bullying and sexual
harassment reported absenteeism of thirty-five percent, thirty-four percent and
thirty-one percent respectively during the prior twelve months period.29 The
costs of such incidents have been estimated through various studies among
countries throughout the world, with wage-loss claims from acts of violence by
hospital workers in Canada increased by eighty-eight percent since 1985 and
direct costs of psychological violence in one German company estimated at
$112,00 (US) and indirect costs of $56,000.30
Indeed, the problem may be greatest in newly developing nations, where
reporting of workplace conditions are first beginning to emerge and the voice
of the emerging working class has not been consistently heard. According to
He Qinglian, author of The Pitfalls of China's Development, the working class
of China have been marginalized and "for now, inequality is growing fast, and
in the years ahead, as China further opens its markets under World Trade
Organization rules, labor strife-and questions from abroad about fair labor
practices-are likely to increase."31
protection/safework/violence/intro.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
26. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE, supra note 4, at 12.
27. Atkinson, supra note 21.
28. See Paoli, supra note 20.
29. Id.
30. See Di Martino, supra note 15.
31. Erik Eckholm, Workers' Rights Suffering as China Goes Capitalist, NY TIMES, Aug. 24, 2001,
available at http://www.freeserbia.net/articlesI2001/workers2.htm.
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The United States marketplace is no stranger to the costs of workplace
violence. The NWNL report notes that United States victims of violence or
harassment "experienced twice the rate of stress-related conditions, including
depression, anger, insomnia, headaches and ulcers.. .and were twenty times
mere likely to say their productivity was reduced. 3 2 It has been estimated that
United States workplace violence has resulted in $55 million in lost wages
annually, not including days covered by sick and annual leave."33 The costs
related to lost productivity, liability settlements and security costs are not as
readily quantifiable, but nonetheless, need to be considered a result of
workplace violence.
Data related to the incidence of structural violence in the workplace is
primarily qualitative in nature, particularly from the perspective of workplace
equality issues, unfair or unsafe employment practices, exploitation and/or
cultural organizational behaviors, many of which are based in gender and
minority issues. Although some gains in workplace equality have been realized
for women and minorities as the wage gap has narrowed, there is considerable
evidence that discrimination persists. A comprehensive global analysis of
occupational segregation by sex notes that occupational segregation is extensive"
throughout the world, with male-dominated occupations surpassing female
dominated occupations. This is particularly troublesome, as female occupations
tend be lower paying, have lower status and fewer opportunities for
advancement. Based on the survey, it has been concluded that the current labor
market situation is not ideal for women.' According to the DOL Futurework
report, 5 United States women and minorities continue to earn less than their
white male counterparts. The DOL report also notes earnings of African-
American and Hispanic women are sixty-five and fifty-five percent,
respectively. White women earn about seventy-five percent for every dollar
earned by white men.
Although some wage inequities can be explained by differences in
education, experience or skills, the differences "appear to be largely the product
of stubborn discrimination."' The changing labor force, comprised of more
minorities and women, has changed workplace dynamics and created conflict,
as psycho-cultural needs of workers have changed and power balances have
32. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE, supra note 4.
33. VIOLENCE ON THE JOB, supra note 1, at 14.
34. Jennifer Tikka, Women and Jobs, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Oct. 1998, at 38 (reviewing RICHARD
ANKER, GENDER AND JOBS: SEX SEGREGATION OF OCCUPATIONS IN THE WORLD).
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FUTUREWORK, CH. 5--WORKPLACE CONDITIONS, available at
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shifted. How an organization responds to the individual and collective needs
of its workforce can be considered a precursor to the development of conflict
within the organizational environment. It is this organizational behavior
(culture) displayed over time that will ultimately determine the level of cultural
violence within the organization. In order to link the micro and macro factors
that create direct, structural and cultural violence, it is necessary to explore the
origin and nature of conflict producing forces and to examine their inter-
relations across multiple levels of analysis more specifically.
Although the following analysis is primarily directed towards a case story
based on data compiled within the United States, the application of the analysis
transcends the geographic boundaries of the United States, with application of
the analysis global in nature as reflected by the universality of the origins of
workplace violence.
IV. DEMOGRAPHIC FORCES
Organizational populations tend to be a microcosm of society, often
reflecting the mix of racial, ethnic, gender and cultural diversity evident within
the society at large. Population trends, particularly in the United States,
estimate increased diversity within the workforce compatible with an
increasingly diverse population. Although this assumption is somewhat
industry specific, with education, skills and experience often creating job
opportunities within specific work environments, one cannot deny that the
global workforce is changing. Organizations that are essentially a reflection of
their societal environment must respond to those changes. "One of the more
crucial aspects of any organization regardless of size or design is the
interconnectedness of all its parts ... it's human parts."37
In order to understand the dynamics of organizational behavior, both
functional and dysfunctional, one must begin by looking at the composition of
an organization's workforce. According to the 1999 DOL report,3" recent
United States workforce trends reflect the following:
3 out of 4 women with children and 6 out of 10 women are now
in the workforce.
The proportion of single-parent families has more than doubled
over the last 30 years, up from 11% in 1970 to 27% of family
households with children today.
In 1996, 20% of the population provided informal care to a
relative or friend age 50 or over. This is expected to rise as baby
boomers reach age 65.
37. CONFLICr AND DivERsrrY 140 (Claire Damken Brown et al., eds., 1997).
38. Id.
Immigration trends project 2 out of 3 of the projected 820,000
immigrants entering the United States annually will enter the
workforce upon their arrival.
By 2006, nearly half of all United States workers will be
employed in industries that produce or intensely use information
technology, products, and services.
Whites will have a declining share of the total population and
minorities are projected to rise from one in every four Americans to
almost one in every two. By 2010, Hispanics will be the largest
minority group.
There will be an increased incidence for "homework," creating
the potential for abuse of normal working hours, duties and benefits.
Baby boomers currently make up 47% of the work force, which
will increase the 55+ age group in the workforce over the next 20
years.
1 in 5 Americans work 49 hours/week (or more) and of
workers report more on-the-job stress than a generation ago.
The DOL report 9 demonstrates a national population that will be
increasingly diverse with a concomitant need to provide equal educational and
job training opportunities for women and minorities as they gain a
corresponding increased presence in the workforce. Data from the DOL report
notes that educational attainment varies across racial and ethnic lines, with high
school completion rates lower for foreign born as compared to native born
Americans (65% to 84%). To meet the demands of an increasingly less
industrial and more service, technologically oriented economy, these new
workers will need equal access and opportunities for training and education.
Provisions for child and elder care will also be needed to meet family care
needs related to the increasing numbers of women in the workforce. Given the
changing face of American workers, organizations need to reconcile the
increasing diversity and associated needs of its workforce with job expectations.
Increased demands on workers to respond to home/family and work obligations
create the potential for increased stress and dissatisfaction. The impact of an
increasing number of women in the workforce is not unique to the United States
According to a British study, "working mothers were the most dissatisfied
group of people in society, thanks to the pressure of running a modem family."'
According to a National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health study
in the United States, "job stress can be defined as the harmful physical and
39. Id.
40. Finola Lynch, Can Mothers really have a career? If you think things have improvedfor working
mothers, think again. As Finola Lynch discovers, many employers still believe women should choose between
work or children, THE GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, Jan. 24, 2000 (Manchester, U.K.)
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emotional responses that occur when the requirements of the job do not match
the capabilities, resources, or needs of the worker. Job stress can lead to poor
health and even injury."4 ' There is considerable documentation on the linkage
between perceived job stress and counterproductive behavior and worker
dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction has ultimately has been linked to job
performance and thus to the macro effect on organizational outcomes and
relationships.42
Conflict also arises from demographic differences related to social, ethnic
and cultural identities with customs, values, language and beliefs creating us and
them in-groups and out-groups, described by Simme43 as a source of conflict.
"Demands from minority action groups, government mandates, and immigration
(both legal and illegal) mean that those available and trained for employment
come from a myriad of linguistic and cultural backgrounds."" These
differences have the potential to create socio-cultural communication barriers,45
which can "adversely affect the quality and quantity of worker output."
V. BALANCE OF POWER FORCES: GENDER AND MINORITIES
The issue of power, both real and perceived, must also be given
consideration when looking at potential conflict i.e. the individual's socio-
cultural identity influences how they will interpret, conceive and utilize power
in relation to the organization and society at large.47 For minorities and workers
in newly emerging economies where the "supply of labor vastly exceeds the
demand," the workplace often mirrors societal perspectives and stereotypes,
which places limits and encourages feelings of low self-esteem, powerlessness,
and alienation. As the individual is excluded and kept outside the established
power structure, the opportunity for others to exploit, exclude, and suppress
their inclusion is re-enforced. Bennett proposes that the perceived
powerlessness and lack of control over one's environment acts as an agent of
direct violence that is manifested as employee deviance and results in "attempts
to regain control (corrective function) and in hostile aggression (retributive
41. See Janice Marra, Profile: Profiling Employees andAssessing the Potential for Violence, PUBLIC
MGMT., Feb. 1, 2000. at 25.
42. ROBERT A. GIACALONE & JERALD GREENBERG, ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS
(1997).
43. Georg Simmel, The Stranger, in SOCIAL THEORY 184 (Charles Lemert, ed., 2d ed. 1999).
44. CONFLICT AND DIVERSITY, supra note 37, at 139.
45. See RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES: COMMUNICATION OBSTACLES IN
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY (1991).
46. CONFLICT AND DIVERSITY, supra note 37.
47. COHEN, supra note 45.
48. See Chappell & Di Martino, supra note 5.
function). 49 Volkan notes that the perception of power imbalances increases
the likelihood of primitive ways of behaving, which promotes organizational
conflict.50
Behaviors that result in workplace deviance including behaviors such as
lateness, tardiness, incivility and undermining of the company, as well as more
physically harmful acts, is a costly and pervasive problem.5' Considerable
attention, particularly in the United Kingdom, has been given to the issue of
workplace bullying, which has been defined by the Manufacturing, Science and
Finance Union as "persistent, offensive, abusive, intimidating, malicious or
insulting behavior, abuse of power ... which make the recipient feel upset,
threatened, humiliated, or vulnerable (and) ... which may cause them to suffer
stress."52 A 1994 study conducted by the Staffordshire University Business
School noted that 1 in 2 UK employees had been bullied at work during their
working life, which causes distress to the individual as well as to the
organization.53 Secondary related stress related disorders have been linked to
heart disease, alcoholism, as well as mental and emotional disturbances, with
twenty-five percent of accidents at work in the UK involving workers under the
influence of alcohol. Although workplace bullying may take many forms such
as sexual harassment, bullying in the workplace remains a clear example of the
abuse of power stemming from an imbalance of power between two
individuals.- 4
Demographic changes emphasize the need to address workplace inequality
specifically in relation to the changing face of the worker, which reflects a
growth particularly in the number of women, minorities and persons over 55 in
the United States workforce.55 As the workforce continues to mirror the general
population, and women and minorities increase their visibility, issues of gender
and racial conflicts can be expected to escalate. In their effort to seek
recognition, women have become both agents and recipients of hostile and
dysfunctional behavior. The advent of the men's movement has reflected a need
49. Rebecca J. Bennett, Perceived Powerlessness as a Cause of Employee Deviance, in
DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS: VIOLENT AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 221 (Ricky W. Griffin
et al. eds., 1998).
50. See VAMIK VOLKAN, BLOOD LINES, FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO ETHNIC TERRORISM (1997).
51. BENNETT, supra note 49.




55. See FITUREWORK, supra note 35.
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by men to deal with perceived changes in a patriarchal society in response to the
increased visibility of women and minorities throughout society.5 6
As the number of women in the workplace increase, the potential for
gender related conflict also increases. Reports of sexual incidents in the
workplace by women span all continents; noted as 5.4% in Western Europe,
7.5% in the New World, 5.2% in Latin America, and 3.7% in Africa.57 A report
on the increased vulnerability of women in the United States workforce
conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management, notes that forty-
five percent of workplace victims were women in 1999 compared to forty-one
percent in 1996.58 Race and ethnicity increase an individual's vulnerability to
harassment, with minority women perhaps most vulnerable. The impact of
cultural perceptions and willingness to report assault and/or harassment may be
reflected by the low reporting of such incidents by Asian workers with four
percent of men and one percent of women reporting assaults, and only 1.3% of
Asian women reporting sexual incidents.59 Clearly, the effect of real or
perceived changes in power and control resulting from changing workplace
demographics can be a source of conflict as the dynamics of the established
system is challenged.
The incidence of job segregation according to gender reflects continuing
patriarchal limitations established by societal beliefs and stereotypes.
Occupational segregation by sex on a global basis is extensive according
Richard Anker, who notes gains in the world as a whole have not been observed
in East Asian, most Middle Eastern and North African countries, and some
transition economy countries.'n According to a British study, equal pay and
opportunity has primarily been realized by an elite of well-educated women,
with those in low wage occupations, having had little impact from gender wage
equality initiatives.6" Similarly United States women may have increased their
visibility and numbers in the workplace, albeit they have not increased their
equality.62 Regardless of gains made in their workplace presence, women
continue to be described in terms of what they wear, rather than what they
56. MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POLITICS OF MASCULNrImEs: MEN IN MOVEMENTS (1998).
57. See Safework, supra note 25.
58. Alisa Tang, The Workplace Can Be Threatening, Especially for Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1999.
59. See Chappell & Di Martino, supra note 5.
60. Tikka, supra note 35.
61. Alexander Kronemer, Narrowing the Wage Gap, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Nov. 1, 1999, at 79
(reviewing HEATHER Jostu & PIERELLA PACI, UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN AND MEN: EVIDENCE FROM THE
BRmsH BIRTH COHORT STUDIES (1998)).
62. See FUTUREWORK, supra note 35.
accomplish.63 The influence of societal and organizational patriarchal beliefs
are inherent in oppressed group inequality on a global basis and thus need to be
factored into the demographic forces that create conflict in the workplace
through job segregation, lack of inclusion and opportunity offered based on the
individual's demographic classification rather than abilities.
An additional balance of power factor arises from relationship issues
inherent in the integration of cultures, languages and religious beliefs that are
associated with current and projected growth of immigrants (and minorities) in
global workforces. As economies becomes more inter-related on a global
perspective, integration of workforces that may be increasingly more culturally
diverse, with differing beliefs concerning group affiliation, respect for authority,
norms and customs as well as varying levels of communication skills will
continue to challenge work environments. The challenge presented is to create
an environment sensitive to these changing dynamics and avoid the potential for
conflict to arise from distrust and ignorance of others and their respective
cultures.
Class differentiation within a hierarchical organizational structure may
create animosity, distrust and an adversarial environment. The ability of the
organization to address and recognize the inherent self-worth of the individual
and provide opportunities for inclusion in organizational practices has the
potential to either mitigate or escalate conflict. Through commitment to a
participative, transformational organizational structure, the differences that exist
within the organizational community can be utilized to solidify and develop
group consensus as opposed to creating group disharmony and alienation.
VI. HISTORICAL FORCES
The historical forces that contribute to organizational conflict need to be
analyzed from both the individual and organizational perspective with past
experiences creating a climate within which the individual and organization
form a relationship and develop a mutual identity. The individual thus brings
their individual history to the organization, which is a product of the biological,
cultural and societal self.' In turn, individual behaviors become a function of
unique individual perspectives that are influenced by the organization's
perspectives. The melding of the individual and organizational identity forms
the organization's culture which has been defined as "time-tested, adaptive,
consciously and unconsciously shared knowledge and values that direct
normally developed from the top down, the organization's informal culture is
63. Jill Elikann Barad, Beleaguered Mattel CEO Resigns as Profit Sinks, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2000
at B-6.
64. See generally E. Goffman, On Face-Work, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL AND
CLASSIC READINGS (C. Lemert, ed., 1999).
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often a product of practices and beliefs that have developed as norms over time.
The organization perception, thinking, and feeling."65  Although an
organization's formal structure is thus develops a unique history, upon which
a corporate culture forms with an established set of organizational behaviors,
including norms, values and beliefs.'
A values-based paradigm has been proposed which suggests that the
structure, norms and culture of an organization will affect the ethical behavior
within that organization. The values established by the organizational
leadership will influence behavior throughout the organization i.e. adherence to
a truthful approach.67 One might also propose that an organization's lack of
values or adherence to accepted societal norms, i.e. unethical/unsafe practices,
would influence the behaviors of its workers towards each other as well as
towards the organization in general. The relationship between the various
organizational constituencies is thus influenced by the disparity or commonality
of the culture within that organization as well as by the individual and societal
beliefs that the individual brings to that organization.6" Organizational identity
thus serves as a framework within which the workforce is expected to function,
with the organizational structure placing limits upon the worker through
bureaucratic processes that create a rational legal authority over the worker's
domain and daily functions.69 Robinson and Kraatz note "organizational culture
can often serve the same function as formal structure by generating informal
pressures for compliance with organizational norms . . . or informally
sanctioning deviance."7 The formal structure of an organization i.e. how they
handle grievances, dysfunctional behavior, and incivility, will accordingly
influence the level of conflict and violence within that organization.
"Employees who said their employers have grievance, harassment and security
programs reported lower rates of workplace violence ... (as well as) lower
levels of dissatisfaction with their jobs and lower levels of stress-related
illnesses.' Company practices regarding the use of mediation, employee
advisory groups, ombudsmen or similar avenues to redress dissatisfaction or
65. SETH ALLCORN, ANGER IN THE WORKPLACE: UNDERSTANDINGTHECAUSES OF AGGRESSION AND
VIOLENCE 102 (1994).
66. Max Weber, The Bureaucratic Machine (1909-1920), in SOCIALTHEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL
AND CLASSIC READINGS (C. Lemert, ed., 1999).
67. GIACALONE & GREENBERG, supra note 42.
68. See WILLIAM L URY ET AL., GETIING DISPUTES RESOLVED, DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT COSTS
OF CONFLICT (1988).
69. WEBER, supra note 66.
70. Sandra L Robinson & Matthew S. Kraatz, Constructing the Reality of Normative Behavior: The
Use of Neutralization Strategies by Organizational Deviants, in DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR IN
ORGANIZATIONS: VIOLENT AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 204 (Ricky W. Griffin et al. eds., 1998).
71. NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE, supra note 4.
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disputes, can be instrumental in preventing small grievances from escalating
into larger conflict or violence.72
The historical relationship an organization has with its external
environment is often indicative of that shared with its internal constituency.
The policies and practices exhibited internally as well as externally serve as a
reflection of the organization's beliefs and established culture i.e. social justice
and ecological sensitivity. The organization, as well as the individual worker,
thus has the potential to accept or reject societal mores and norms as they inter-
relate within their own organizational community as well as with the external
community. By establishing and maintaining ethical, trustworthy and
considerate policies and practices, the organization provides a model by which
the individual is encouraged or discouraged from supporting a civil and
cooperative work environment. The organization thus has the capacity to serve
as a role model for how its internal constituency is expected to behave, with
dysfunctional behavior often a reflection of destructive behaviors exhibited by
those in power and/or authority.
The historical relationship and cultural beliefs of an organization often
mirrors that of society in general, creating an atmosphere within which cultural
violence arises. In so doing, the organization condones behavior and/or
organizational beliefs that can potentially contribute to structural and/or direct
violence. For those organizations that choose, either through ignorance or
denial, to ignore the needs of its workforce, the potential exists for disparities
and structural inequalities to create organizational conflict. These practices in
turn create an environment ripe for both direct and structural violence as
workers are denied recognition of their individual worth and unique abilities.
The style and structure of management, common beliefs, myths and rituals
as well as organizational commitment to truth, honesty and respect for others
creates an environment that encourages or negates conflict. How clear the
beliefs are and how strongly they are shared will influence the harmony and
stability of the organization.7 3 Based on work done by Secord and Backman
(1964) and Sherif (1969), Robinson and Kraatz propose that in ambiguous
environments individuals are less likely to rely on objective standards. As a
result, individuals will accept "actions and cues from others ... with deviant
actors more likely to employ defiant strategies. 74  Non-specific
"unacknowledged, undiscussable, but nonetheless powerfully aggressive
negative organizational influences lead to employee alienation."" It is clear the
72. See generally CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICr
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE To CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996).
73. Robinson & Kraatz, supra note 70.
74. Id. at 74 at 213.
75. ALLCORN, supra note 65.
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individual and the organization cannot ignore the historical past of either, which
is ultimately influenced by societal culture as well.
VII. ECONOMIC FORCES
The economic reality of living in a competitive, global economy requires
that organizations maintain their financial viability, often relying on worker
productivity to maintain a competitive advantage. Regardless of the specific
organizational product, ultimately all organizations are held accountable for
their efficiency and effectiveness. How an organization obtains and maintains
that efficiency and effectiveness is based on acquisition and distribution of its
resources. The policies and practices by which economic goals are
accomplished can have a profound effect on those affected by acquisition and
distribution of resources, namely the workforce. Although the quantitative and
qualitative financial impact of violence and conflict on organizations has been
previously noted, further exploration of the relationship between the individual,
organization and society is warranted in order to establish a broader perspective
of how economic forces give rise to workplace conflict.
Direct economic costs related to structural and direct workplace conflict
have been documented in numerous studies that quantify decreased
productivity, prevention and intervention strategies, litigation, lost wages, health
and injury benefits. The DOL report links economic costs of conflict to the
health and injury of United States workers i.e. 1 in 5 Americans work 49 hours
or more a week with resultant sleep deprivation linked to lost productivity,
absenteeism, illness and injury, costs of which range up to $18 billion annually.
The DOL reports goes on to report that 50,000 United States workers die every
year from occupational diseases, thirty-eight percent of nurses endure back
injuries during their career and healthcare workers suffer 600,000 needle-stick
injuries each year, with concomitant debilitating or fatal results for these
workers. Coal miners with black lung disease cost the United States economy
$1 billion annually. Lost workdays cost United States employers $15-20 billion
each year in workers' compensation costs.76 The National Safe Workplace
Institute has estimated annual costs to United States organizations as high as
$42 billion for workplace violence. Buss, (1993) and Camara and Schneider,
(1994) note a $40 to $120 billion cost for theft and embezzlement and Murphy,
(1993) has estimated the costs of a range of delinquent organizational behavior
at $6 to $200 billion." The costs in other countries are comparatively as
staggering as those in the United States, with the costs of alcohol and drink
related diseases estimated to cost the United Kingdom economy approximately
76. See FUTUREWORK, supra note 35.
77. Robinson & Kraatz, supra note 70.
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1.7 billion pounds and 8 million lost works days. A United Kingdom study
noted that 1 in 8 (around 3 million) had been bullied at work in the prior five
years, leading to stress related disorders with the concomitant costs associated
with such disorders. One-third to one-half of all stress related illness is directly
attributable to bullying at the workplace, which in turn has been linked to the
incidence of heart disease, alcoholism, mental breakdowns, job dissatisfaction,
accidents, family problems and certain forms of cancer.78
The increased reliance on technology to improve efficiency and
productivity has also been linked to increased work related stress levels due to
loss of privacy and increased isolation from telecommuting that creates potential
exploitation and abuse as well as demands for increased productivity.79 The
influence of technology on worker stress levels is not specific to the United
States. The International Labor Organization reports that "Automation,
subcontracting, teleworking, networking and the 'new' self employment are
leading to an increase around the world in the number of people working
alone, ' creating similar potential for worker exploitation and isolation as that
identified in the United States by the DOL report.
Although indirect costs associated with worker dissatisfaction, hostility,
stress, illness and anger as well as workplace inequality, injustices, illegal
practices are less well quantified, qualitative, experiential research has
substantiated the economic impact of employee and organizational
dysfunctional behaviors. Kacmar and Carlson have noted the relationship
between behaviors perceived as dysfunctional (structural violence on the
worker) and the outcomes of that behavior on the worker (actor) and the
organization. Political behaviors related to inefficient use of resources i.e.
hiring, firing, assignments, demotions, and raises were linked to poor morale as
well as negative external perceptions of the organizations studied, with
inefficiency and low morale responsible for 90% the reported dysfunctional
organizational outcomes.8'
How resources are acquired and distributed by an organization needs to be
examined closely as a factor in organizational conflict. Organizations are
increasingly looking at mergers and acquisitions as a method to increase
available resources and ensure financial stability. Although often a benefit to
the long-term viability of an organization, the emotional toil taken on all
participants, represents "a significant and potentially emotional and stressful life
78. Ellis, supra note 52.
79. See FUTUREWORK, supra note 35.
80. Chappell & Di Martino, supra note 5, at 4.
81. K. Michele Kacmar & Dawn S. Carlson, A Qualitative Analysis of the Dysfunctional Aspects
of Political Behavior in Organizations, in DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS: NON-VIOLENT
DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR 195 (Ricky W. Griffin et al. eds., 1998).
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event." 2 The emotional effect is often portrayed through anger, hostility, and
alienation that result in poor morale, dissatisfaction, and decreased productivity.
The impact to both the individual and the organization is inextricably linked,
with potential for structural inequalities leading to direct violence undermining
the economic benefits achieved through merger and acquisition. Issues related
to merging of corporate and global cultures, loss of jobs, change of status and
work group relationships serve as a source of employee anger and potential
violence. The drive for economic advantage also leads to downsizing and
worker assimilation of job functions. The association between downsizing and
medically certified sick leave has been shown to be significant in a study
conducted on workers in Finland, with major downsizing associated with high
levels of perceived job insecurity, increased psychological and physical
demands of work, decreases in aspects of control over work, and impaired
relationships with colleagues. a3 How an organization and individual responds
to these issues is often a reflection of core beliefs and systems, as well as
external pressures exerted through third parties i.e. unions, governmental
regulations.
There is considerable documentation on the linkage between perceived job
stress and counterproductive behavior and worker dissatisfaction.' 4
Dissatisfaction has ultimately been linked by Gruenberg to job performance85
and thus to the macro effect on organizational outcomes and relationships.
Indeed, working conditions in Europe are not improving and many workers in
Europe are working under difficult circumstances, perhaps a reflection of
increased global demands for productivity and competition that reflects the
intensification of work that has occurred over the past ten years.86
How resources are distributed also influences workplace conflict.
Structural violence demonstrated through the inequitable distribution of
resources, wages, benefits and opportunities can create a frustrated, hostile,
aggressive workforce that display anti-social (dysfunctional) behaviors and
latent sabotage of the organization. As workers perceive themselves as victims
of the system, with a concurrent loss of power and identity, they may become
82. SUE CARTWRIGHT & CARY L. COOPER, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: THE HUMAN FACTOR 35
(1992).
83. Jussi Vahtera et al., Effect of Downsizing on Health of Employees: What are the Moderators?,
in AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, WORK STRESS AND HEALTH 99 ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY-ABSTRACTS (2001), at http://www. apa.org/pi/wpo/niosh/abstractl2.html.
84. GIACALONE & GREENBERG, supra note 42.
85. Julia Morrison Chambers, The Job Satisfaction of Managerial and Executive Women: Revisiting
the Assumptions, J. EDUC. FOR BUS., Nov. 1, 1999, at 69.
86. Working Conditions in Europe Not Improving, supra note 2.
increasingly hostile and alienated.87 Such behaviors may be demonstrated
through theft, property damage, and whistle blowing that are triggered by
management practices88 and which ultimately will impact the economic
resources of the organization. According to Volkan, when an individual is
confronted with an inability to withstand conflict, they will experience a sense
of hopelessness, fear, and humiliation.89 The net effect to the organization is
one of disharmony, decreased productivity, and ultimately loss of competitive
advantage in the marketplace.
An organization's commitment to the self worth and value of its workers
and how it distributes its economic resources has the potential to create conflict
through practices related to wage and benefits, hiring and firing, counseling,
promotions, and communication practices. As workers vie for limited resources
and their own piece of the pie, competition and power imbalances develop and
allegiances shift from the group to the individual. Personnel policies are a
reflection of how the organization perceives the value of its workforce and as
such, can create a dehumanizing, inequitable environment, ripe for employee
dissatisfaction and conflict. This conflict can be either manifest or latent,
occurring as intra-group or inter-group conflict, as well as between management
and workers. Although these conflictual behaviors may be a manifestation of
societal behaviors, as well as individual cognitive processes, one cannot ignore
the linkage between organizational practices and individual actions and
behaviors.
The influence of third party players who have an economic stake in the
individual and/or the organization also has the potential to contribute to the
conflict experienced within the organization. Union intervention in
management/worker conflict can serve to blur the issues and fuel the conflict
rather than serve to mediate for a peaceful resolution of issues. Governmental
intervention through regulatory bodies may also contribute to creation of an
"us" versus "them" orientation within an organization through practices such as
a Medicare whistle blower policy in the United States that encourages the
workforce to identify organizational misdeeds. For those who seek to create
change or address perceived wrongs, the whistle blower who is willing to speak
out and break the code of silence is often viewed as disloyal and ostracized from
the group. Factions for and against a cause create an environment of hostility
and strife. Although established as a protective mechanism, such regulatory
interventions often serve as a conduit for conflict and increased organizational
dysfunction.
87. PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF HOPE: RELIVING PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Robert R. Barr
trans.) (1999).
88. GIACALONE & GREENBERG, supra note 42.
89. VOLKAN, supra note 50.
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VIII. PSYCHO-CULTURAL FORCES
There is myriad of issues encompassed within the context of psycho-
cultural forces exerted within an organization. These issues include those that
are generated by the social, behavioral, and psychologically constructed milieu
within which an individual relates at the inter-group and intra-group
organizational level.9 How the individual responds to a situation within the
context of their particular environment is often a factor of the psycho-cultural
forces that determine behavior and impact relationships.91 Although psycho-
cultural factors are often responded to from the individual perspective, the
linkage to the organization's historical culture must be considered as a sum of
its parts. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the psycho-cultural forces
will be viewed primarily at the level of the individual and their relationship to
the group. Individual psycho-cultural factors, such as gender, race, ethnicity,
cooperation, control, stereotypes, and group processes influence the individual
perceptions of reality, which in turn establish the basis for human behavior.
The social construct theory proposes that an individual will respond to a
given situation and make decisions about their actions based upon influences
exerted by their social environment. Lederach, building on work done by
Schulz and Blumer, notes that "social conflict emerges and develops on the
basis of the meaning and interpretation people attach to actions and
events.. .conflict is connected to meaning, meaning to knowledge, and
knowledge is rooted in cultural., 92 Examples of low-conflict communities
demonstrate "distinctive psycho-cultural [factors that] produce shared
interpretations of the world and facilitate the management of differences without
resort to violence."93 Who we are is a reflection of our societal experiences, the
norms and expectations of society and how we have been conditioned to
respond. Our prior experiences influence our present actions, which are
similarly influenced by the societal group whom we relate to on an
organizational level.
In looking at behavior, one must also consider the unconscious influence
of human emotions that arise from the Id, Ego and Superego, over which,
according to Freud, man has little control. Freud's theory of psychical
90. See generally IRVING L JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOES (1982).
91. See generally ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
(1976).
92. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE, CONFLICTTRANSFORMATION ACROSSCULTURES
8(1995).
93. MARC HOWARD Ross, THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT, INTERPRETATIONS AND INTERESTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 35-36 (1993).
apparatus describes coping behaviors such as hostility, aggression, withdrawal,
and despondency, which are often utilized to deal with internal and external
turmoil.94 Although "large social forces such as sexism, racism, heterosexism,
and class inequality shape our biographies, (but) it is as individuals that we
experience and make sense of our lives."95 Ultimately, each individual develops
relationship(s) from their unique perspective, with commonality of past history
and grouping along racial, ethnic, gender, sexuality, age influencing a group's
solidarity. Thus, the individual and their social environment are inextricably
linked, with individual behaviors shaped by societal expectations and
classifications as well as by unconscious forces.
An organization's ability to compete in the marketplace, whether on a local
or global level, is often a reflection of the organizational commitment and sense
of common purpose. Durkheim describes the loss of equilibrium (anomie) that
occurs when groups' established beliefs and values are challenged.96 Conflict
ensues and group solidarity and identity is jeopardized. Recent theorists, such
as Vanik Volkan,9 7 propose that group cohesion and stability is bound to a
common culture, with group identity based on a shared vision. Volkan has
proposed that groups will regress when under stress and fall back on primitive
ways of behaving, particularly when a power imbalance is perceived to exist.
Given that the organization is a microcosm of society, these societal forces
impact group consensus or disharmony within the organization. In-group and
out-group designations create power imbalances and competition, which if left
unchecked, can lead to escalation of conflict and undermining of organizational
goals i.e. structural violence directed towards the organization. Real or
imagined perceptions of inequality increase divisions and limit the ability of
groups to work in a cooperative, team environment.
Perceptions of powerlessness among oppressed groups may be encouraged
by organizational policies and practices that disproportionately affect minorities,
the aged and women i.e. unequal pay, opportunities, sexual harassment. Such
perceptions of powerlessness often create divisions among work groups with a
"worker's perceived lack of control over his/her environment ...proposed as a
cause of workplace deviance."9" Locus of control (LOC), a person's beliefs
about control over life events, has been shown to have a direct relationship to
94. Sigmund Freund, The Psychical Apparatus and the Theory of Instincts (1900-1939), in SOCIAL
THEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS (C. Lemert ed., 1999).
95. Judith Lorber, "Night to His day:" The Social Construction of Gender, in FEMINIST FRONTIERS
IV 33(L. Richardson et al. eds., 1997).
96. Emile Durkheim, Anomie and the Modern Division of Labor, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE
MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS (C. Lemert ed., 1999).
97. VOLKAN, supra note 50.
98. BENNETT, supra note 49.
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worker satisfaction and prediction of behavior in organizational settings.99
People with an internal LOC feel they are responsible for what happens to them,
whereas those with external LOC feel that they have no control over what
happens. LOC has been reported to be one of three psychological indicators
that are most likely to show the potential for angry and/or violent behavior on
thejob. An individual's lack of control over their circumstances can create high
levels of stress, and ultimately lead to irrational or violent action against
themselves or others. Job stress and negative affinity (attitude) are identified as
the 2 other indicators of dysfunctional behavior on the job. Indeed, "criminal
and violent offenders have a much lower need for affiliation than non-offenders
(who) don't necessarily view interactions with others as positive experience...
and are less likely to care that their actions may hurt other people. ' '""e Thus, for
those within the organization that are alienated and hostile to group processes,
the potential for dysfunctional and/or violent behavior may be exacerbated by
the perception of diminished LOC and/or job stress.
Substance abuse as well as prior aggressive behavior can be considered
psycho-cultural factors that have been linked to workplace violence.' °' Such
workplace behaviors are often manifestations of aggressive behavior exerted
outside the work environment, i.e. family violence. Bennett and Lehman 10 2
report a linkage between drug and alcohol usage on the job and low affinity for
group cohesion, higher levels of antagonism and violence in the workplace.
"Substance abuse has been linked to poor relationships with supervisors and
coworkers ... that can lead to workplace Violence and to unsafe acts that may
endanger coworkers."'0 3
IX. POLITICAL FORCES
As we move into the twenty-first century, pressure on organizations to
remain competitive in an increasingly high tech, global environment continues
to escalate. Ultimately, organizations must rely on the nature of the
relationships that exist among its various stakeholders, including Board
members, workers, customers, regulatory agencies, and the public, to meet
99. Markku Riipinen, Extrinsic Occupational Needs and the Relationship Between Need for
Achievement and Locus of Control, 128 (5) J. OF PSYCH. 577 (1994).
100. Janice Marra, Profile: Profiling Employees and Assessing the Potential for Violence, PUBLIC
MGMT., FEB. 1, 2000, AT 25.
101. VIOLENCE ON THE JOB, supra note 1.
102. Joel B. Bennett & Wayne E. K. Lehman, Alcohol, Antagonism, and Witnessing Violence in the
Workplace: Drinking Climates and Social Alienation-Integration, in AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION, VIOLENCE ON THE JOB: IDENTIFYING RISKS AND DEVELOPING SOLUTIONS (Gary R. VandenBos
& Elizabeth Q. Bulatao eds., 1996).
103. FUTUREWORK, supra note 35.
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desired organizational outcomes and maintain economic viability. The nature
of these relationships requires that alliances and group processes be established
and nurtured, which in turn dictates how successful the organization will be in
meeting the needs of its various stakeholders. The actions taken by the
organization's stakeholders to meet these demands can be considered political
in nature, referring to those behaviors that might be considered shrewd or
prudent.
Organizations rely on political processes to achieve their goals, which can
be either functional or dysfunctional. Functional, organizational politics are
those that support the organization in reaching its goals, serving the
organization, not the individual making the decision. Dysfunctional
organizational politics are those that are self-serving and non-sanctioned by the
organization. The use of power and/or control over another to accomplish one's
own goals at the expense of the other(s) is considered to be a negative use of
political behavior."
The interaction of the various actors and how groups are formed within the
workplace environment sets the stage for political behaviors evident within the
organization. Often these interactions will be determined by the power and
actions of established in-groups and out-groups. The group process ultimately
differentiates those with power from those that are less powerful to effect
change within the organization, with the ultimate power of the organization
more often resting with a defined and select group. How those in power utilize
their power and exert political influence will set the agenda for the organization
through the actions and behaviors exhibited by the politically powerful. These
actions ultimately create or at the least, influence the culture, vision and mission
of the organization. The potential for dysfunction arises through alliances and
political behaviors exhibited by those who have the power to formulate and
enforce policy that may be perceived as unfair or unjust by those less powerful.
Unfair and often duplicitous actions by the politically powerful can lead to an
environment of distrust, confusion and/or open rebellion among the workforce
i.e. strikes, turnover, low morale, hostility.
The pressure to achieve organizational goals may lead to a culture that is
steeped in a winner take all warrior mentality, forcing competitive win-loose
strategies that promote winning at all costs. 5 Competition is a learned
phenomenon and cooperation is at least as integral to human nature as is
competition. Competition in its raw state often requires one to loose in order for
the other to win."° Such competition may be a sign of emerging conflict,
particularly "when generated by uncontrolled, aggressive competition between
104. Kacmar & Carlson, supra note 81.
105. CONSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 72, at 7.
106. See ALFIE KOHN, No CONTEST: THE CASE AGAINST COMPETITmON (1986).
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or among work units or colleagues."' 7 The political culture of such warrior
organizations "is [often] mirrored as well in the methods employed to control
and fight the threat of conflict."' 08 Such an environment promotes dissension
throughout the organization, leading to conflict between and among
management and its workforce. Ultimately, the agenda is controlled by those
in power, with power derived by the one who is less dependent on the other."°
Simmel has argued that group cohesion arises from both harmony and
disharmony within a group, with conflict seen as having a duality of purpose
and unity achieved when both harmony and disharmony exist. Nevertheless,
power imbalances and individual political agendas that interfere with group
cohesion ultimately disrupt the stability of the organization. As individuals
loose their sense of cohesion, they are more apt to have their reason clouded
with emotion, which makes them more prone to irrational acts based on that
emotion."' Kacmar and Carlson have studied the relationship between political
behaviors and organizational outcomes, looking at behaviors such as favoritism,
nepotism, gender discrimination, use of power and self-serving behavior. The
political behaviors identified in the Kacmar and Carlson study demonstrated a
forty percent dissatisfaction rate and thirty-one percent turnover rate among
those surveyed with organizational outcomes affected through dissatisfaction,
turnover, distrust, and low productivity. According to Kacmar and Carlson,
these behaviors all directly impact the bottom line of an organization, which is
further compounded if unfair treatment is documented and legal action taken."'
The responsiveness of the organization to its external environment
similarly has the potential to increase conflict between the organization and its
external stakeholders i.e. regulatory agencies and consumers. When an
organization's financial goals are placed above that of its environment and/or
its workforce, short-term gains may be realized at the expense of achieving
long-term strategies. The emphasis on individual self-preservation encourages
destructive competitiveness in place of more productive collaboration over the
long term.
There is a clear need for organizational behavior that applies fair and
equitable political processes and proposes. As Alexis Herman, former United
States Secretary of Labor, notes:
In this new economy, we have to think of family-friendly policies in
a new way. Not as fringe benefits. Not as perks. But for what they
107. CONSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 72, at 6.
108. Id. at 7.
109. See URY ET AL., supra note 68.
110. Simmel, supra note 43.
111. Kacmar & Carlson, supra note 8 1.
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really are-good ideas that are good for workers and good for business.
Make no mistake. Companies succeed in the global marketplace
when workers succeed around the kitchen table."12
X. CONCLUSIONS, SYNTHESIS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The global workplace has become an increasingly complex entity,
reflecting not only an organization's systems and beliefs, but also those of its
workforce and society in general. As a microcosm of society, organizations are
exposed to a myriad of forces, which influence its relationships both internally
and externally. These forces, which have the potential to create a climate of
conflict and subsequently violent behaviors, have been identified as
demographic, historical, balance of power, economic, political, and psycho-
cultural. Each of these forces inter-relate on a systemic organizational level as
well as at the level of the individual worker who is similarly a product of and
an agent of the forces identified. Ultimately, as part of the society at large, both
the individual and organization are part of the larger societal system that in turn,
impacts the organizational environment.
Given the dynamic nature of the inter-relationships established within an
organizational environment and the multiple factors that challenge that
environment, one must acknowledge and understand how these factors can
create the potential for destructive conflict. It is through awareness and
acceptance of these factors that the organization can begin to identify and
develop strategies to respond to conflict in a positive, non-adversarial manner.
A multi-modal, multi-level level approach must be applied to the design of
dispute systems that are required for the organization, the worker and society to
respond productively to the myriad of conflicts presented.
The approach to designing appropriate dispute systems is predicated on a
careful analysis of the organization, identifying both structural and relationship
sources of conflict and what factors, if any, are impacting the organization's
ability to achieve its stated goals. Sandole recommends a three-pillar approach
be used to comprehensively map conflict. In so doing, one can identify whether
the conflict is latent or manifest and identify the parties, issues and objectives
used to achieve goals as well as the environmental orientation to the conflict.
Identifying the actors in the conflict, including both internal and external
stakeholders, allows one to determine the forces that are influencing the
dynamics of relationships and the source(s) of conflict. Mapping the conflict
also allows one to define the level of the conflict, whether individual,
organizational and societal in nature and whether conflict is steeped in the
112. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FUTUREWORK, CH. 8-FRAMING THE DEBATE, available at
http://www.dol.gov/asp/futurework/report/chapter8/main.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
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organizational structure or within interpersonal relationships. The overlap
between structural and nonstructural issues must be noted, particularly those
related to relationship, beliefs, values, and control over resources. The non-
structural issues are often manifested within the framework of the organization's
culture and balance of power, requiring the system designer to identify which
forces are the source of conflict." 3 The complexity of identifying sources of
conflict can be seen in such structural issues as ambiguous lines of authority,
which may paradoxically be the source, as well as the result, of relationship
issues based on hierarchical power imbalances. Once issues have been
identified, it is equally important to address all levels of the organization when
designing systems. Lederach (1998) proposes that organizational goals and
change can best be accomplished by involving actors at all levels, including
upper, middle and lower tiers.
The range of potential strategies can be viewed along a continuum, which
include preventive, facilitated, fact-finding, advisory and/or imposed methods.
Prevention strategies can be applied to conflict such as that steeped in gender
and minority issues. Such strategies should be geared towards developing a
collaborative, transformative environment built on human resource policies that
emphasize processes such as team building and cross cultural training.
Employee development can be addressed through workshops that deal with
interpersonal relations, assertiveness training, guest relations, stress
management, communication skills, anger management, and violence
prevention programs, which support the development of positive behaviors and
action among those experiencing inequities and loss of voice. Such prevention
strategies are useful in increasing the ability of stakeholders to gain control and
influence the source(s) of conflict on an internal basis, as individual workers
gain skills that enable them to impact on negative forces exerted. These
strategies are geared towards building team processes and empowering those
who are disenfranchised by power imbalances." 4 Zero tolerance for violent and
aggressive acts and early warning programs that identify potential violent
behavior can be implemented to mediate dysfunctional behavior. Such
programs should be a reflection of organizational beliefs and culture and be
clearly communicated to all within the organization. Policies enforcing
acceptable behavior should be initiated across all levels of the organizations,
including upper management and should stipulate the consequences of non-
compliant actions.1 5 Employee assistance programs should be available to
assist in handling problems requiring counseling, substance abuse and or family
113. Dennis J.D. Sandole, A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three
Pillar Approach, 5 (2) PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES 1, 1-30 (1998).
114. See CONSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 72.
115. Atkinson, supra note 23.
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conflict. VanDer Wall has suggested a seven stop preventive approach to
dealing with workplace conflict including; obtaining support from the top,
performing a workplace violence audit, developing policies and procedures,
conducting training in policies and procedures, arranging for easy access to
employee assistance programs, including mental health professionals, and
having clear, commonsense policies and procedures for terminations and
layoffs."16
Not all forces exerted on an organization can be resolved through
preventive strategies. Interventions such as mediation, negotiation, and
ombudsperson programs provide opportunities to address many of the conflict
that may be embedded deep within societal forces exerted on the organization.
The strategies developed by the organization to deal with these forces must be
reflective of the sources of conflict identified at all levels through thorough
assessment and analysis. These strategies must also be compatible with the
organization's resources and philosophy. Designing a comprehensive dispute
system that includes both structural and relationship issues will allow
application of appropriate strategies to fit the individual needs of the
organization.
Considering the complexity of forces that create conflict within an
organization, a multi-tier, multi-modal approach is needed to identify sources
of conflict and develop appropriate interventions to promote a state of harmony
within the organization (Figure 2). Such an approach can create a synergistic
organism, capable of responding dynamically to conflict as "a necessary part of
life, (creating interventions which) need not be waged destructively,"'" 7 In so
doing, an organization has the opportunity and ability to be a positive agent of
change, one that can create a transformative environment of positive peace,
capable of meeting individual, organizational and societal needs." 8
116. Stacy VanDer Wall, Preventing Workplace Violence: A Guide for Employers and Practitioners,
HR MAGAZINE, FEB. 1, 2000, AT 152.
117. LOUIS KRIEsBURG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS, FROM ESCALATION TO RESOLUTION 1 (1988).
118. See generally EUSE BOULDING, BUILDING A GLOBAL CIVIL CULTURE, EDUCATION FOR AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD (1990).
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XI. APPENDIXES
A. Figure 1: Origins of Violence in the Workplace
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Continued on next page
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B. Figure 2: Strategies for Violence in the Workplace
INTERVENTIONS
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FACTOR _ ADR
DEMO- Partnering; team Union negotiations; Ombudsperson;
GRAPHIC building; training human resource brainstorming;
communication; processes; hiring mediation by 3rd
guest relations; practices; wage & hour party; strategic
affirmative action; policies/practices; planning; consensus
anger & stress organ. policies & building; employee
mgment; procedures; family advisory groups;
assertiveness leave policies grievance procedures
training; cross
cultural training
HISTORICAL Training and Practices related to Worker inclusion in
development in org. cultural/family needs of org. mission &
culture & practices & workforce; fair & practices; grievance
job requirements; equitable work procedure, compliance
org. commitment to practices; strategic processes
environmental/social planning inclusion of




ECONOMIC Fair & equitable Union negotiated and/or Governing body,
distribution of employee work groups community,
resources; clearly input into fair and accountability of
stated fiscal equitable HR practices organization to
practices; & benefits, outcome internal & external
quantitative & measurements; task consumers, reg's,
qualitative force input into laws; ombudsperson
productivity organizational programs; 3rd party
measurements; fair financial, productivity mediation for
retention & goals, strategic disputes; mediated
recruitment practices; planning; consumer cultural merging with
tech training, input into established acquisitions/mergers







BALANCE OF Fair & equitable Violence prevention Mediated review of
POWER human resources programs; peer review; org. practices,
policies & practices; negotiated process for processes; grievance
employee develop- review of grievances & procedures; support of
ment & training disputed job whistle blower
programs; team performance appraisals policies;
building/ commun- ombudsperson;




Continued on next page
Litwin
INTERVENTIONS
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I. ABSTRACT
In recent years, there has been a steady stream of growing concern in
nations throughout the world about police officers' use of excessive, brutal, and
sometimes deadly force where circumstances do not warrant such actions. In
the United States, many such concerns have arisen out of an emerging
awareness of a pattern of excessive police violence targeted at members of racial
and ethnic minority groups, including Native Americans, African Americans,
Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans.
A significant amount of the literature on the police-minority group conflict
in the United States focuses on racism as the driving force behind most
instances of police use of excessive force. However, there is a negative
consequence associated with limiting the analysis of the inter-group conflict
between police and minority groups to the racial dynamic. When this narrowed
lens of analysis is used, it yields too little viable and substantive information to
support an adequate understanding of the conflict and its resolution. Further,
it does not adequately address the proliferation of international accounts of
police violence against citizenry in those nations where racism is a lesser
dynamic and where the police and citizens often share one racial heritage, e.g.,
Jamaica, Mexico City, and Brazil.
To encourage a more comprehensive analysis of the many factors that
produce protracted inter-group conflict at the international level, Byrne and
Carter propose a theoretical framework labeled "social cubism." The social
cubism perspective approaches inter-group conflict as a complex puzzle of
social dynamics that combine as an integrated unit to sustain the conflict
behaviors. This paper utilizes the social cubist paradigm to broaden the analysis
* K. Michelle Scott is a doctoral student in the School of Social and Systemic Studies at Nova
Southeastern University and an instructor at Clark Atlanta University. She has a B.A. in Communication Arts
and an M.A. in Speech Communication. This paper is dedicated to all whose lives have been extinguished and
whose spirits have been rendered to the lowest depths-you are not forgotten.
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of the complex and protracted conflict between law enforcement officials and
minority groups in America. Ultimately, it should become apparent how this
analytical paradigm may be aptly applied to any protracted inter-group conflict
involving state-sponsored violence, regardless of where it resides.
Whether in Mexico City, Sao Paolo, Los Angeles, or Jamaica, it has
become apparent that police throughout the world are seeking new ways to
legitimize their power and influence by carrying out arbitrary acts of violence
similar to vigilantism or "popular justice."' In many cases, police violence is
inflicted upon an implicitly designated citizenry, often distinguishable by its
poverty, class, skin color, religious affiliations, and/or political beliefs. Through
what are often unspoken historical, institutional, and cultural arrangements, such
state-sanctioned violence has been likened to barbarism and terrorism where
global accounts of human rights abuses share one dynamic: there is a
protracted, violent, and sometimes deadly inter-group conflict between the
police and the citizenry they have been designated to protect.
During the past few years, mounting reports by international watch groups
and news services have painted a horrid picture of police abuses on nearly every
national front. Their reports include the following accounts:
" On July 25, 2001, Kenyan police surrounded a bus and ordered
seven passengers who were suspected robbers to lie on the
ground. Each of the seven was then shot in the back by the
police.2
* In January 2001, Tanzanian police officials used gas and
ammunition to break up a political demonstration and kill at
least thirty-seven people. This incident came on the heals of
compelling reports of police beatings and rapes of citizens on
the island of Pemba.3
* In April 1999, BBC broadcasts filmed South African security
forces that used lethal force against individuals who had
surrendered. The police inflicted beatings, cigarette bums,
electric shocks, and suffocation upon the suspects and restricted
their access to medical attention.4
I. Paul Chevigny, Law and Order? Policing in Mexico City and Kingston, Jamaica, NACLA REP.
ON THE AM., 24, 24-30 (1996).
2. Amnesty International, Kenya: Police Execute Seven People in Cold Blood (2001), at
http://web.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/0 ... 19B!.
3. Amnesty International, Zanzibar Dar es Salaam: Amnesty International Calls On The
Authorities To Respect the Freedom Of Assembly, (2001) at
http:Hweb.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/0...95B!.
4. Amnesty International, South Africa: Torture and Misuse Of Lethal Force By Security Forces
Must End, at http://web.amnesty.org1802568F7005C4453/0... C07! (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
" In March 1997, Australian police were filmed brutally punching
and kicking Aborigines while other police officials were
holding them down.'
" In June 1995, violence erupted when Mexican police were
arrested in connection with killing seventeen people who were
on their way to a political protest.6
* "Between 1983 and 1993, the police killed an average of 182
persons each year in Jamaica; in fact, the police killed many
more people than they wounded.",
7
The list of police indiscretions goes on. The British police were recently
charged with racial abuse and frame ups against its Black citizens; the National
Police of Israel has repeatedly come under attack for its use of excessive
physical force;9 members of the Guatemalan police force were charged with
torturing and killing five children in a case brought before the Inter-American
Human Rights, ° and the Brazilian police have a lengthy association with
proliferating accounts involving the infliction of deadly violence upon Afro-
Brazilians." Consequently, one of the most frequently reported types of human
rights violations occurring throughout the world involves those abuses exacted
by police officers.
The widespread reports of state-sponsored atrocities compel our analysis
of the motivations for such acts. Certainly they suggest an unrelenting,
complex, and endemic conflict dynamic between the institution of policing and
select groups of people. Accordingly, it behooves us, in the consideration of the
police-minority group conflict in America, to examine the magnitude of social
forces that serve to fuel and maintain such conflicts to the degree that they are
manifest throughout the world. Thus, the beauty of the social cubist framework
rests in its allowances for the close examination of these forces.
As Max Weber said in 1918, "Specifically, at this present time, the right
to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the
extent to which the state permits it."
5. Amnesty International, Australia: Police Use Excessive Force Against Aborigines No Isolated
Incident, at http://web.amnesty.org802568F7005C445310...DE9! (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
6. Kevin A. O'Brien, National notations: Mexico, 24 PEACEKEEPING & INT'L REL 1i, 11-17
(1995).
7. Chevigny, supra note 1, at 27.
8. Darcus Howe, How the British Police Became Brutes, 130 NEW STATESMAN 22 (1996).
9. Sergio Herzog, Is There a Distinct Profile of Police Offcers Accused of Violence? The Israeli
Case, 28 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 457, 457-71 (2000).
10. Ann Birch, Guatemala on Trial For Torture, Assassination Of Children, 32 NACLA REP. ON
THE AM. 4 (1999).
1I. Michael J. Mitchell & Charles H. Wood, Ironies Of Citizenship: Skin Color, Police Brutality
and the Challenge to Democracy in Brazil, 77 SOC. FORCES 1001, 1001-20 (1999).
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In November 1998, six Kansas City police officers fatally shot
Timothy L. Wilson, a thirteen-year old African American male
who was driving a borrowed pick-up truck.
" In April 1999, a Hartford police officer fatally shot Aquan
Salmon in the back. Aquan was an unarmed fourteen-year-old
African American youth suspected in an attempted street
robbery.
" In June 1999, LaTanya Haggerty, a nineteen-year-old African
American woman, was fatally shot by Chicago police officers
following a traffic stop. The officers reported that they mistook
her cell phone for a handgun. 12
In recent years, there has been a steady stream of growing concern in
nations throughout the world about police officers' use of excessive, brutal, and
sometimes deadly force where circumstances do not warrant such actions. In
the United States, many such concerns have arisen out of an emerging
awareness of a pattern of excessive police violence targeted at members of racial
and ethnic minority groups - including Native Americans, African Americans,
Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans.
For many Americans, it is an embarrassing and indeed frightening concept
that within its borders, people of color are routinely subjected to a form of
legitimized oppression inflicted by some police officers. In a land which has
long boasted of a "moral conscious" thought to elevate American society above
the fray of nations where human rights seem forever at a premium, we have
come to realize that American society is not entirely unlike others where state-
sanctioned repression of selected citizens exists. For indeed, it is from the state
that excessive and brutal police violence against minorities receives its stimulus.
Like Myrdal's concept of the "Negro problem,"' 3 unwarranted police
violence targeted at racial and ethnic minorities in America causes a moral
uneasiness that represents one of many paradoxes in our "democratic" system.
In one of its most recent reports of police brutality in America, entitled United
States of America: Race, Rights and Police Brutality, Amnesty International
noted that:
[t]here continue to be frequent disturbing reports of unjustified police
shootings, with officers firing on unarmed suspects fleeing non-
12. Amnesty International, United States of America: Race, Rights and Police Brutality, at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1999/AMR/25114799.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
13. Gunnar Myrdal, The Negro Problem As A Moral Issue, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE
MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS 245, 245-47 (Charles Lemert ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999)
(1944).
violent crime scenes, during traffic stops, at the end of pursuits or in
other questionable circumstances. In some cases suspects have been
hit with multiple police gunfire. In most of the cases, the victims
were African American or other minorities, and some were children. 4
Several months preceding the release of this report, United States Attorney
General Janet Reno spoke at a National Press Club Luncheon about police
brutality targeted at minorities in America. She said that
[t]he issue is national in scope and reaches people all across this
country. For too many people, especially in minority communities,
the trust that is so essential to effective policing does not exist
because residents believe that police have used excessive force, that
law enforcement is too aggressive, that law enforcement is biased,
disrespectful, and unfair. 5
Skolnick and Fyfe Observe that, "every social order is at some level
maintained by the threat of punishment.. .but somewhere deep in the American
experience is the idea that the legal order and its system of punishment are
inadequate to cope with the problem, whether defined as crime, as immigrants
or as minority groups."' 16 In fact,
evidence of discriminatory treatment and bias in police contacts with
members of the Black, Latino, and Asian communities is widely
documented by NGOs, commissions of inquiry, in court cases and
lawsuits.. .such treatment is contrary not only to the United States
Constitution, but also the United States obligations under interna-
tional law to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination.17
As a result, the discrepancy between the human rights protections
explicated in the laws of the United States and the human rights abuses
committed by some police officers fuels the growing hostility between
minorities and the police. Indeed, "police brutality, particularly against
minorities, is one of the most serious, enduring and divisive human rights
violations in the United States."' 8
14. Amnesty International, supra note 12, at 6.
15. Id. at 2.
16. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE ExcEssIVE USE OF
FORCE (1994).
17. Amnesty International, supra note 12, at 6.
18. Jim Lobe, Police Brutality Found To Be Institutionalized, at
http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/jul98/21-21..070.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
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In America, as in most other nation-states throughout the world, the police
and the military are the only groups entrusted with the authority and capacity
to use violence for the protection or destruction of life. But unlike the military,
"the police are not sequestered on bases - they are spread throughout the
community."' 9  Equipped with uniforms, badges, weapons, ammunition,
chemical sprays, teargas, dogs, restraint holds, electro-shock weapons, and
clubs, some police officers patrol the streets not only "to protect and serve," but
often times to inflict tyranny and repression.
Not surprisingly, the great majority of police-citizen encounters where the
police officer is in an official capacity are rarely free from the nuance of
conflict. From the very start, two sources of conflict are inherent in each of
these encounters. The first involves the circumstance that brought the two
together, and the second involves the significant power disparities between the
officer and the citizen. Add to this existing micro-conflict an encounter that
brings together the police officer and the problem (the minority citizen) in a
social milieu where stereotypes, negative perceptions, distrust, and fear interact
in the midst of structural oppression, and it becomes apparent why hostilities
between members of the police force and minority groups continue to exist.
Still, this does not answer succinctly the question: What leads to the police
abuse of power, particularly against minority citizens, and particularly in
America, where the virtues of equality and liberty are promulgated in nearly
every national symbol?
H1. THE SOCIAL CUBIST FRAMEWoRK
A significant amount of the consideration given to the police-minority
group conflict in the United States focuses on the surface issue of racism as the
driving force behind most instances of police use of excessive force. In fact, the
American Civil Liberties Union recently observed that, "police abuse, especially
against people of color, is as deeply entrenched as ever, and seems impervious
to reform., 20 However, "while race is a key factor in police brutality, it is not
the sole problem. Police use of excessive force and questionable shootings are
reported with alarming regularity in a variety of situations, sometimes cutting
across racial lines.'
Certainly, "there is a racial divide between Anglo and African Americans
in the United States-a divide so pronounced that even the apparently strong
culture of policing does not transcend it."' 22 However, there is a negative
19. George Kelling, Broken Windows and Police Discretion, THE NAT'L INST. OF JUST., at 5 (1999).
20. American Civil Liberties Union, Action: The Antidote To Despair (2000), at
http://www.aclu.org/issues/criminalstpolice.htmL
21. Amnesty International, supra note 12, at 6.
22. David Weisburd et al.,Police Attitudes Toward Abuse OfAuthority: Findings From A National
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consequence associated with limiting the analysis of the inter-group conflict
between police and minority groups to the racial dynamic. For when this
narrowed lens of analysis is used, it yields too little viable and substantive
information to support an adequate understanding of the phenomenon. This is
not intended to suggest that racism is not a major factor in the police-minority
group conflict; but instead, it suggests that a narrowed focus on racism in the
analysis of much of this conflict threatens to obscure from our awareness the
complex ways in which other social forces combine to manifest the conflict.
To exemplify the idea that racism, in and of itself, is merely a tool-and
not necessarily a cause of oppression. Steinberg aptly highlights this quote from
the character Tshembe in Lorraine Hansberry's play Les Blancs.
"Race-racism-is a device. No more. No Less. It explains nothing at all ...
I said racism is a device that, of itself, explains nothing. It is simply a means.
An invention to justify the rule of some men over others. 23 Subsequently,
"what often appears to be an eruption of 'traditional hatreds' [such as that
associated with race] on closer examination turns out to involve political and
economic issues that are real and immediate."'24 For this reason, we cannot
afford, in the examination of inter-group conflict, to ignore ways in which a
variety of social issues combine to influence the conflict. When inter-group
conflict is the outgrowth of numerous systemic practices reflected in societal
inequalities, proposed resolutions to the conflict must involve an adequate
consideration of those practices.
Furthermore, a concentration on racism does not take into account the role
of minority groups as participants (passive and/or active) in the inter-group
conflict. After all, the accumulated anger, cynicism, rage, and alienation felt by
minority groups in response to perceived biases in police conduct "give rise to
witnesses who fail to cooperate with the police, citizens who view prosecutors
as the enemy, lawyers who disdain the rules they have sworn to uphold, and
jurors who yearn to 'get even' with a system that has in their eyes, consistently
mistreated them... ,,25 Thus, the conflict is intensified by the sentiments and
hostilities of members representing both groups.
Finally, a concentration on racial and ethnic differences as the impetus for
police brutality does not adequately account for those occurrences of police
abuse where the officer and citizen share the same racial and ethnic heritage.
For although the great majority of reports of excessive police violence in
Study, THE NAT'L INST. OF JUST., at 6 (2000).
23. STEVEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CLASS IN AMERICA, (1989)
(quoting LORRAINE HANSBERRY, LES BLANCS (Robert Nemiroff ed., New American Library 1973) (1972)).
24. Id. at 170.
25. Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Sept. 9, 1999) at
http://www.tnr.com/archive/0999/091399/coverstory091300.html.
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America have been associated with encounters between white officers and
citizens who are members of minority groups, there have been instances where
minorities have felt equally fearful of abuse during encounters with police
officers who are also members of minority groups. In many of these instances,
abuse has come in the form of an officer's support of the "code of silence" by
"thinking blue" and looking the other way when their peers carry out abuses.
Subsequently, long-held fears about police brutality have resulted in a
generalized anxiety where minorities have become concerned about abuse from
any police officer, regardless of the officer's race.
Evidence of this dynamic was presented to the New Jersey Black Law
Students' Association when Delacy Davis, an African American and ten-year
veteran of the New Jersey police force, reported a letter that he had received
from a fellow African American officer in response to his [Delacy's] activism
on behalf of minority citizens. According to Delacy, the letter was "filled with
obscenities urging him to 'think blue'."26 During his presentation to the law
students, Davis, who founded Black Cops Against Police Brutality, acknowl-
edged that there are some minority officers who will not look out for minority
21citizens.
To encourage a more comprehensive analysis of the many institutional
factors that form to produce protracted inter-group conflict, Byrne and Carter
propose a theoretical framework labeled "social cubism., 2' And although the
social cubist framework does not presume to cover the entire spectrum of
factors related to the manifestation of an inter-group conflict, it effectively
"highlight[s] some of the most salient issues of these complex conflicts., 29
The social cubism model approaches inter-group conflict as a complex
puzzle of social dynamics that combine as an integrated unity to sustain the
behaviors of inter-group conflict. The six dynamics (or pieces of the puzzle)
are:
a) historical; b) religious; c) demographic; d) political; e)
economic; and f) psychocultural factors. Where the social cube
of conflict is applied, each dynamic is dissected and analyzed
to produce a holistic picture of the conflict. Once such a picture
exists, it becomes easier to perceive of the complexity of the
conflict, and quite possibly, less difficult to address its resolu-
tion. Thus, given the complex nature of the protracted conflict
26. Jennifer Johnson, New Jersey Police Officer Speaks About Police Brutality, Violence, THE
CAVALIER DAILY, Mar. 8, 1995.
27. Id.
28. Sean Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces Of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, 3 J. OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES 29, 52-71 (1996).
29. Id. at 52.
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conflict between the police and members of minority groups in
America, the social cubist paradigm will be used to broaden our
analysis of this conflict.30
" In July 1998, an unarmed Mexican national, Pedro Oregon, was
fatally shot six times in the back, twice in the head and once in
his hand, by six Houston police officers who entered his home
during a drug raid.
• In October 1998, Donta Dawson, a nineteen-year-old, unarmed
African American youth was fatally shot by a Philadelphia
police officer who approached the youth as he sat in a stationary
car with the engine running.
" In May 1999, New York City police shot and critically injured
Dante Johnson, an unarmed sixteen-year-old black male, after
the youth ran away from the three officers who stopped to
question him.3
Since the first night watch patrol was established in Boston in 1631,32
hundreds of books, studies, articles, scholars, and practitioners have addressed
the historical relationship between American police and its citizenry.
Historically, the police in America have represented a hierarchy (although in
and of themselves, they are not the hierarchy), established and supported by
public opinion for the social restraint of power and the maintenance of societal
discipline and order. However, such restraint and discipline have the potential
for abuse 33 since they are designed to control access to social and economic
power by maintaining the status quo of class distinctions.'
The history of the police-minority group conflict in America clearly
reflects the class divisions promulgated by in-group/out-group idealism and
theories of social dominance. Lobe observes that when the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders studied the race riots of the 1960s, it found that
police had come to symbolize "white power, white racism and white
repression," (symbols of the privileged status group's domination) to many of
the nation's minorities. 35 But minority group distrust and disdain for the police
in America is not rooted in the 1960s, nor is police distrust and disdain for
America's minorities. The hostilities between these groups began more than
two centuries before in the legacies of colonialism, vigilantism, and slavery.
30. Id.
31. Amnesty International, supra note 12.
32. BRYAN VILA & CYNTHIA MORRIS, THE ROLE OF POLICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1999).
33. Emile Durkheim, Suicide and Modernity, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL AND
CLASSIC READINGS 74, 74-82 (Charles Lemert ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999) (1897).
34. Kelling, supra note 19.
35. Lobe, supra note 18.
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"In America, police targeting of black people for excessive and dispropor-
tionate search and seizure is a practice older than the Republic itself. 36 In fact,
one could say that the history of policing in America was founded on the
policing of racial and ethnic minorities. Skolnick and Fyfe observe, "American
Indians were unquestionably the first 'alien' group to feel the combined assault
of private and officially sanctioned violence. Regarded as threatening and
exterminable, the native population of what was to become the United States
was subjected to massive and sustained violence by private groups and
government soldiers."37
In 1704, following the formal designation of police forces, the slave patrols
were formed as one of the first official police duties in America. These patrols
were a precursor to modem police forces."a Slave patrols authorized police to
arbitrarily search slave quarters, randomly detain Blacks on the streets, and
"enter the house of any Black person who kept his lights on after nine p.m. and
fine, flog, and extort him."39 Maclin observes that some of the slave patrol
practices are not entirely unlike today's police practice of racial profiling.'
During the early 1900s, police were frequent participants and/or approving
observers in the Southern lynchings of Blacks.4' Later, in the 1960s, Americans
throughout the country were witnesses, (with the help of television), to the
brutality and violence inflicted upon Blacks during the civil rights movement.
Not surprisingly, "the commissions investigating the riots and civil disorders of
the 1960s found that police routinely used excessive force, especially against
Blacks. 42 The commissions' findings however, were not news to the nation's
Black citizens who already knew that they were more likely than Whites to feel
the wrath of law enforcement.
A 1965 Gallup poll revealed that thirty-five percent of the African
American men surveyed believed that police brutality occurred in their
communities, while only seven percent of white men believed that there was
police brutality in their communities.43 Just two years later in 1967, a Detroit-
based study conducted by the Urban League revealed that eighty-two percent
of the residents believed that there was some form of police brutality in their
communities." Some twenty-four years after the Detroit study, a 1991 poll
36. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L REv. 333, 333 (1998).
37. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 16, at 26.
38. VILA & MORRIS, supra note 32.
39. Maclin, supra note 36, at 34.
40. Id.
41. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 16.
42. Id.
43. American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 20.
44. Id.
conducted by the Los Angeles Times revealed that thirty-three percent of
Latinos and forty-four percent of African Americans considered the brutality
rendered against Rodney King by Los Angeles police to be very common police
conduct, while only nineteen percent of Anglos considered the behavior to be
very common.45 These findings reiterate long-held minority beliefs that account
for much of the group's angst and rage related to police bias and brutality.
Media images have routinely reinforced these beliefs. In fact, images of police-
led attacks on non-violent protesters continue to be replayed in the minds of
many Americans. Add to these images pictures of Miami's 1980 Liberty City
riot which followed the acquittal of police in the fatal beating of African
American insurance executive Arthur McDuffie, and the 1992 Los Angeles riots
which followed the acquittal of police charged with the brutal beating of
motorist Rodney King, and it is easy to understand how minority group
"mistrust and hostility predictably follow upon abuse and repression."
46
Contributing to the historical rift between minority groups and the police
are deeply embedded stereotypes held by members of both groups and
maintained through transgenerational discourse. For example, a police training
guide distributed during the 1940s by the State of California's Department of
Justice noted the following:
[p]olice officers will notice certain distinctive behavior traits of
Negroes as a group, and of other minority groups ... Members of
minority groups are more than usually sensitive and defensive...
they become apprehensive and continually fearful of insult or
discrimination... Negroes and Mexican-American youth, as groups,
seem more inclined to react aggressively to discrimination.. .The
Southern Negro is compelled to be subservient to the white man in all
ways. In trying to cast off this life-long habit of subservience, he is
often likely to be rude and arrogant, or at least ill-mannered.47
Thirty-three years later, Bayley and Mendelsohn's study48 of the Denver
police force supported police stereotypes of the belligerent minority. Their
study revealed that although police "understand that minorities have not
received a fair deal in American society.. .they [the police] are nonetheless
45. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 16.
46. Id.
47. Davis McEntire & Robert B. Powers, A Guide To Race Relations For Police Officers, in THE
URBAN POLICEMAN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 74, 74-82 (John R. Snibbe & Homa
Snibbe, eds., 1973).
48. DAVID BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORrTES AND THE POLICE: CONFRONTATION IN
AMERICA (1969).
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offended by the militancy and assertiveness of them [minorities]." '' Bayley and
Mendelsohn observed,
[t]here can be little doubt that policemen are sensitized to minority
people... [the police] believe that the involvement of minorities with
crime is greater than for other ethnic groups; that minorities involve
policemen in mediating very ambiguous and very emotional situa-
tions, and not infrequently involving crimes against persons; that
hostility toward policemen is greater among minority people,
particularly in the form of resisting arrest, and that physical attacks on
officers are more common in these areas than elsewhere ....
This suggests that some police may enter an encounter with a minority with
an expectation of confrontation. Stereotypes supporting these notions have
changed little over the years.
Like the historical discourse among police about minorities, minority group
members have also maintained a historical discourse about the police. Through
the years, such discourse has served to transmit truths, myths, and stereotypes
of the "other," thereby exacerbating the conflict between the two groups. For
example, over fifty years ago McEntire and Powers quoted a representative of
Richmond's Attorney General's office who observed, "the average Negro
believes that if he gets arrested he will immediately get his head beaten in with
a club. Far too many Negroes believe that they will get the worst of it every
time they get arrested."'5 Subsequently, each new story of police abuse
reinforces "the belief by minorities that they are targets of abuse-a belief that
historically has sparked major outbursts of violence against the police."5
Minority group beliefs about being the targets of police violence have been
documented throughout much of American history. In fact, their complaints of
abuse have been far out of proportion to their representation in the population.
Certainly, findings on patterns of police brutality suggest that minority group
concerns are warranted. Over thirty years ago Bayley and Mendelsohn reported
that, :physical abuse [at the hands of police] is more commonly experienced by
minorities,"' and still today, there is "evidence that racial and ethnic minorities
[are] disproportionately the victims of police misconduct, including false arrest
and harassment as well as verbal and physical abuse."55 However, only a small
49. Id. at 150.
50. Id. at 97.
51. McEntire & Powers, supra note 47, at 322.
52. Lobe, supra note 18, at 2.
53. Id.
54. BAYLEY & MENDELSOHN, supra note 48, at 127.
55. Amnesty International, supra note 12, at 3.
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number of white officers recently surveyed believe that minority citizens are
treated worse than white citizens."
Discrepancies in group perceptions are reinforced and legitimized based
on historical recounts by opposing groups.57 Consequently, the reality of each
individual experience will be subjective, to a degree, based on the preconceived
notions of the collective's perceptual constancy. Ultimately, this means that
each group will hold on to its stories and perceptions, for it is through these
recounts that each reinforces the legitimacy of its position. The consequence is
that the two groups have become further and further polarized.
In December 1998, Tyisha Miller, a nineteen year-old African
American woman, was shot twelve times by four white
Riverside (California) police officers after they found her
unconscious in her locked car with a gun on her lap.
" In June 1999, New Jersey police officers fired twenty-seven
shots into a vehicle driven by Stanton Crew, an unarmed
African American male, as he tried to maneuver around two
police cars that had blocked his vehicle in following a police
chase. Crew was killed by the gunfire.
" In August 1999, a California SWAT team in the midst of a drug
raid burst into the home of a Mexican immigrant family and
fatally shot, Mario Paz, an unarmed elderly man, in the back."
Schribner and Fusarelli note that the degree to which religion impacts
society and shapes political culture is unclear and open to dispute. 9 This
dispute is complicated based on the elusive concept of religion and the difficulty
in determining its precise impact on public policy. Social and political
institutions link to religion to foster bipolar societies and preserve a way of
life.6
In the nineteenth century, Durkheim proposed that the passions of the
individual need to be regulated by an external force.6' Otherwise, the insatiable
and unlimited desires of the individual would lead to social disruption. For
much of the history of mankind, both religion and the state have served as
regulating forces of human behavior. Subsequently, God's law and man's law
work concurrently to maintain societal discipline and order. Both church and
56. Weisburd et al, supra note 22.
57. Byrne & Carter, supra note 29.
58. Amnesty International, supra note 12, at 3.
59. Jay D. Schribner & Lance D. Fusarelli, Rethinking the Nexus Between Religion and Political
Culture: Implications For Educational Policy, 28 EDUC. & URn. Soc'Y 279, 279 (1996).
60. Byrne & Carter, supra note 29.
61. Durkheim, supra note 33.
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state have a low tolerance for deviance. Furthermore, they have traditionally
competed or worked in collusion for access to power, privilege and persons.
Each institution is intent on producing the ideal society based on the mainte-
nance of the established social order.
Principles manifesting authoritarian values are also inherent in religious
and state ideals of preeminence, supremacy, and rule. Consequently, religious
ideology fortifies many of the repressive sanctions evident in society. In fact,
it is based on religious doctrine and myths that much of society first conceded
to the concept of hierarchical relationships involving subordinate and super-
ordinate beings. In this regard, religious principles of obedience, especially as
they may be applied to the subordinated in society, are linked to the social and
political institution of law and order. Tenets of superior and subordinate beings
are apparent in law enforcement's disparate treatment of citizens. For example,
Chevigny observes that
[a]ll police brutality, including beatings such as the famous clubbing
of Rodney King in Los Angeles, shares [a] relation [to] subordina-
tion; it is apparent in the police practice of forcing the person to lie on
the ground.. .The use of deadly force, except when the officer acts in
defense of himself or another, is a limiting case, like torture - the
officer makes nothing out of the victim he kills. He tells society
through the shooting that the victim's life is worth less than the
assertion of authority and control.62
Although social scientists may not always agree on the value of religion,
most agree that religious institutions serve to benefit "individuals, society as a
whole, or some social group within a society."63 Gamarra proposes, "religion
is linked to power as a disciplinary order and system of ethics.. .it is internalized
by people [and] institutionalized in the minds of individuals."
This concept is consistent with the ideology of the police state that exists
in American society. After all, our leaders know that "if the state is to exist, the
dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be,"65 -a concept
consistent with religious ideology.
62. PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 12 (1995).
63. JAMES PEOPLES & GARRICK BAILEY, HUMANITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 223 (2000).
64. Jefrey Gamarra, Conflict, Post-Conflict and Religion: Andean Responses To New Religious
Movements, J. OF S. AFR. STUD. 271, 272 (2000).
65. Max Weber, What is Politics?, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSICAL
READINGS 110, 110-15 (Charles Lemert, ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999) (1918).
In December 1998, Franklyn Reid, an unarmed Jamaican
immigrant wanted for parole violation, was chased and fatally
shot in the back of the neck at close range by a Connecticut
police officer. Reid was on his knees when he was shot.
In April 1999, New York police officers shot Gidone Bush, a
mentally ill homeless man, twelve times as he wielded a
hammer at them.
In May 1999, Margaret Mitchell, a fifty-four-year-old homeless
woman pushing a shopping cart, was fatally shot by Los
Angeles police officers when the officers thought that she was
trying to attack them with a screwdriver.'
As noted earlier, there are valid arguments to counterclaims that racism is
the sole factor in America's protracted police-minority group conflict. The
social cubist argument, for one, might propose that the racism manifest in this
conflict (and others) is a symptom of deeper, more endemic conflicts. Still,
there is no denying that the persistence of racist ideology in America is salient
to the protracted nature of the police-minority group conflict.
An examination of the racial and socioeconomic demographics associated
with reports of police violence clearly demonstrates the role of these variables
in police subjugation and mistreatment of minorities. One could argue that
police bias based on the racial and socioeconomic dynamics of America's
citizens is written between the lines of American history for the purpose of
maintaining a caste system. This line of thinking is consistent with conflict
theory, which according to Cureton, "implies that discriminatory application of
the law against subordinates reflects rulers' perception of threat (posed by
subordinates) to their power, resources and interests. 67
An analysis of the historical treatment of racial and ethnic minorities in the
United States could not withstand the scrutiny of conflict theory, which
presumes that maintaining the disparate distribution of power is at the root of
much "racial" conflict. For even after the African Americans had been
officially released from the bonds of slavery and the Native Americans had been
apportioned land for reservations, enormous distortions based on theories of
racial superiority were used to justify the discriminatory treatment of racial
minorities and to maintain their subordination in the caste system.68 Like the
African and Native Americans, other racial groups too have long suffered based
on the American caste system. For example, Skolnick and Fyfe observe that
during the nineteenth century, state-sanctioned laws in the Western United
66. Amnesty International, supra note 12.
67. Steven Cureton, Justifiable Arrests or Discretionary Justice: Predictors of Racial Arrest
Differentials, 30 J. OF BLACK STUD. 703, 704 (2000).
68. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 16.
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States were used to fuel vigilante group terrorization of Mexican and Chinese
persons.69 The authors conclude that, "the pursuit of 'law and order' in the West
prompted - as it sometimes does today-a special effort against minority groups
considered dangerous to constituted arrangements, moral values and racial
dominance."7 Thus, conflict theory holds that "because law enforcement
officers are an extension of rulers' power, the job of the police is to suppress or
contain the perceived threat that subordinates represent."' 71 Beyond theory, this
is the lived experience of minorities in America.
It should be noted at this point that concerns about police use of excessive
force are rooted less in the force deemed necessary to fulfill an officer's job
duties and more in the degree of bias to which such force is applied. For
certainly, "as long as some members of society do not comply with law and
resist the police, force will remain an inevitable part of policing, '72 about this
there is little disagreement. However, "research showing that Black to White
arrest [or imprisonment, abuse, and fatality] differentials are associated with
group characteristics such as race, age, low socioeconomic status, large
percentages of concentrated Blacks, and unemployment can be considered
evidence of discretionary discriminatory practices. 73 In fact, there is significant
evidence of such disparities in treatment. Statistics reported by the Institute on
Race and Poverty 74 clearly reveals a racial bias in the application of law
enforcement policies. According to the Institute's findings:
0 In Minnesota, a black man is twenty-seven times more likely
than a white man to be in prison;
0 Although African American drivers account for sixteen and
nine-tenths percent of the drivers on 1-95 in the state of Mary-
land, they account for nearly seventy-three percent of those
stopped and searched by Maryland police, and
* Although African Americans constitute only thirteen percent of
the country's drug users, they represent thirty-seven percent of
those arrested, fifty-five percent of those convicted and seventy-
four percent of those in prison for drug related offenses.
These are just a few examples of the disparities in law enforcement's
treatment of minorities in the United States. Establishing statistical trends to
69. Id.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Cureton, supra note 67, at 704.
72. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 16, at 37.
73. Cureton, supra note 67, at 704.
74. Institute on Race and Poverty, Racial Profiling Data Collection Status Report (2000), at
http:/wwwI .umn.edu/irp/ARB%20.html.
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reflect a pattern of disparate treatment is a daunting task however, since not
every instance of perceived maltreatment is reported. "There is evidence to
suggest that Blacks are being discriminated against by police who are using
their personal discretion rather than responding to actual criminal
conduct ....
Probably no recently acknowledged police practice demonstrates the role
of racial demographics in this inter-group conflict more so than that of the long-
standing practice of racial profiling whereby "police-initiated action relies upon
the race, ethnicity or national origin of an individual rather than the behavior of
that individual. 76 And although numerous analysts have concluded that racial
profiling is a by-product of the nation's 1980s-initiated war on drugs, there is
historical evidence that minorities in America were held in suspicion, (and thus
"profiled"), long, long before the nation even acknowledged that there was a
drug problem. As American history demonstrates, racial and ethnic
demographics alone have traditionally been enough to suspect, arrest, and
convict people of color.
In further consideration of how demographic forces affect this protracted
inter-group conflict, one must take into account the role of America's changing
demographic structure. Using data gathered from the 1999 United States
Population Data Sheet, Pollard concludes that, racial and ethnic minorities now
account for one-fourth of the United States population. By 2015, projections
indicate that minorities will make up one-third of all Americans." These
numbers reflect a dramatic increase in the nation's minority population.
However, this information concludes more than an increase in the number of
minorities. It also proposes an increase in the dominant class' perception of
threat from these growing minorities. Consequently, social sanctions-such as
those associated with the law-will be applied more harshly upon those posing
the threat. With increases in the number of minorities in the United States, it
will not be surprising to find parallel increases in the number of cases of
reported minority abuse at the hands of the police - the most apparent institution
of social control.
Looking through the lens of demographics to examine the police-minority
group conflict, it would be helpful to confirm the percentage of minorities on
the nation's community-based police force relative to the representation of
racial and ethnic groups in these communities. For instance, to what degree is
minority representation in the police ranks proportionate to minority
representation in American society? Certainly, an examination of this number
75. Cureton, supra note 67, at 705.
76. Institute on Race and Poverty, supra note 74, at I.
77. Kelvin M. Pollard & William P. O'Hare, America's Racial and Ethnic Minorities, 54
POPULATION BULL. 1, 7 (1999).
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would be critical to advancing or retarding the notion of conflict theory as
explained by Cureton, a and analyzing its relevance to the police-minority group
conflict.
Drawing on data procured by the United States Department of Justice,
Lott7 conducted an extensive study of the racial and gender composition of
police department demographics in 189 cities. He concluded that although "city
police departments vary greatly in their racial and gender makeup, and there
have been large increases in the proportion of [B]lack and women officers...
most departments have no [BIlacks, Hispanics, or Asians .... ,0
There is little doubt that a proportionately equivalent representation of
minorities in policing, to that in American society, could have a critical impact
on the degree of police violence directed to minorities. Lott observes,
[t]he potential law enforcement advantages from multiracial or female
officers seem obvious. Minority police officers may be more
effective in minority areas simply because residents could be more
forthcoming about information that will lead to arrests and convic-
tions... Trust is also important for other reasons, as reports of riots
erupting after white police officers have shot a black man may
attest.8
Statistics available from the 1999 United States Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract indicate that in 1998, Black officers accounted for over nineteen
percent of the nation's public service police and detectives while Hispanic
officers accounted for almost nine percent.82 However, these statistics can be
misleading in any effort discern the representation of minorities on the police
forces of individual cities. It could be for example, that a larger number of
minority officers are employed in only a few cities and states while a relative
dearth of minority officers are employed in the great majority of cities and
states. A prime example of how the percentage of minority officers could
influence the police-minority group conflict is the state of New Jersey, which
has recently received a host of negative publicity related to its disparate racial
profiling and abusive police practices targeted towards minority drivers. Zolper
reports that in 1998, only fourteen percent of New Jersey police officers were
minorities, as compared with a statewide minority population of twenty-six
78. Cureton, supra note 67.
79. John Lott, Jr., Does A Helping Hand Put Others At Risk? Affirmative Action, Police
Departments and Crime, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 239, 239-77 (2000).
80. Id. at 241.
81. Id. at 239.
82. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, EMPLOYED CIVILIANS BY OCCUPATION, SEX, RACE AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN (1999).
percent.8 3 This type of vast discrepancy encourages an in-group/out-group
mentality based solely on race.
In June 1998, Antoine Reid, an unarmed "squeegee man" was
shot in the chest by an off-duty New York City police officer
when Reid insisted on washing the windshield of the officer's
car.
* In January 1999, Luis Enrique Hernandez died after he was
hog-tied by three officers of the Fort Worth Police Department.
" In May 1999, Lewis Rivera, a homeless man, was arrested by
police officers who sprayed him with pepper spray, kicked him,
bound his hands and feet, and drug him to a police car. Less
than an hour after the assault he was found dead in a holding
cell."
Closely aligned with demographic factors is the influence of economics
upon this inter-group conflict, which is fueled by perceptions of institutional
favoritism and disparities in the distribution of economic resources. Economic
disparities inherent in the American caste system reproduce the dominant and
subordinate class structure. Since the role of law enforcement is constructed to
maintain a deliberate social order, the police are viewed by subordinated classes
as enforcers of class designations.
Where a caste system exists, the quality of a person's existence is based on
his position in the production cycle of society. This will determine his political
power.8 5 Consequently, where minorities are relegated by institutionalized
discrimination to the lower production scales of society, the value placed on the
condition of their existence is subordinate to that placed on the existence of
members of the dominant class. This produces a cycle of oppression which
manifests itself as the justifiable ill treatment of those perceived to be less
productive and subsequently, less valuable to society. The alienation
experienced by the subordinated class and the superiority felt by the dominant
class ignites inter-group conflict and polarizes group positions. This
polarization correlates strongly to the police-minority group conflict.
Where subordinated classes are concerned, Travis observes that "racial,
ethnic, and socioeconomic groups differ substantially in their beliefs about the
legitimacy of law; a higher proportions of blacks (twenty-nine percent) and
83. T. Zolper, 5,000 Applying For State Police, TRENTON BUREAU, at
httpI/www.bergen.com/news/policeO7l99912077.htmL. (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
84. Amnesty International, supra note 12.
85. Karl Marx, The Two Factors Of a Commodity: Use-Value and Value, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE
MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS, 51, 51-59 (Charles Lemert, ed., Westview, Press 2d ed. 1999)
(1867).
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Latinos (thirty-one percent) than whites (nineteen percent) view legal norms as
not binding. ' 86 Furthermore, Travis notes that, "residents whose SES (socio-
economic status) is low are twice as likely as those whose SES is high to report
high levels of 'legal cynicism'."'87 This suggests that the cynicism felt by
America's economically subordinated minorities about the role of law
enforcement is largely a by-product of their resentment of widespread social
disparities. Lipschutz notes:
It is not about the size of one's piece of the pie...it is about who is
entitled, under the terms of the [social] contract, to participate in the
division of the pie. And it is not primarily about ethnic minorities
demanding enhanced rights or returns; it is mostly about elements of
the white majority fearful of losing in what they see increasingly as
a zero-sum game.'
Based on Lipschutz's comments, when the privileged status group
perceives its economic and social prospects under challenge by the subordinated
group, an inter-group conflict will arise.89 The inter-group conflict between
police and minorities, is a microcosmic representation of a more widespread,
systemic conflict in American society.
The manifestation of this conflict is also apparent in the pattern of police
presence in communities. Cureton observes that, "there is evidence that police
operations and services are concentrated in certain criminogenic, low-income,
mostly non-White areas... [and], police concentration in [these] low-income,
socially disorganized areas may increase the probability of arrests for residents
in those areas." 9 Consequently, the increased concentration of police in lower
SES areas will increase the likelihood that discretionary violence will be
inflicted upon minority residents.
Of course, one of the primary arguments for a greater police presence in
lower income neighborhoods involves reports of higher criminal behavior in
these areas. In fact, Rand notes that, "persons from households with lower
incomes [are] more vulnerable to violent crime than those from higher income
households." 9' However, that there is a higher incidence of violent crime in
86. JEREMY TRAVIS, Attitudes Toward Crime, Police and the Law: Individual and Neighborhood
Differences, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. (1999), at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfileslfsOOO240.tx.
87. ld. at3.
88. Ronnie Lipschutz, From "Culture Wars"' To Shooting Wars: Culture Conflict in the United
States, at http://escholarship.cdlib.org/ias/crawford/crawford Il.html. (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
89. Id.
90. Cureton, supra note 67, at 704.
91. Michael Rand, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 1994, UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (1997).
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low-income neighborhoods, and thus, an explicit demand for increased police
presence in these communities, could also be presumed to reflect the economic
disparities of American society. Merton hypothesized that "aberrant behavior
may be regarded sociologically as a symptom of dissociation between culturally
prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these
aspirations."92
The following question, poignantly posed by Merton, prompts one to
consider more strongly the influence that a disparate economic structure has on
criminal behavior. Merton asks, "What, in short, are the consequences for the
behavior of people variously situated in a social structure of a culture in which
the emphasis on dominant success-goals has become increasingly separated
from an equivalent emphasis on institutionalized procedures for seeking these
goals?"93
Merton's views are not offered as excuses for criminal behavior, but
instead, as a possible theory for the causes of such behavior when it is so
obviously associated with the economic disparities among groups. In effect, his
conclusions are not dissimilar to earlier studies of impoverished immigrant
populations conducted by Thomas and Znaniecki, who found that the criminal
behavior of "peasants" may be "the tragic solution of some difficult social
situation involving powerful individual tendencies."" Consequently, there may
be an inherent pressure towards deviation among those in the lower economic
strata.95
" In 1997, Frankie Ann Perkins, an African American woman,
died after police choked her and kneed her in the chest.
" In September 1997, Jeremiah Mearday, an eighteen year-old
African American male, suffered a broken jaw after being hit in
the face with a flashlight wielded by a Chicago police officer.
" In 1994, Shirley Alejos, a Hispanic woman, was handcuffed and
beaten by Chicago police to the degree that her face was
unrecognizable in photos taken afterwards.
" In June 1999, Gregory Riley died after being placed in a
chokehold by Chicago police officers.'
92. Robert K. Merton, Social StructureAndAnomie, in SOCIALTHEORY: THEMULTICULTURALAND
CLASSIC READINGS, 229, 229-41 (Charles Lemert, ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999) (1938).
93. Id. at 235.
94. W. Thomas & F. Znaniecki, Disorganization and the Polish Immigrant, in SOCIAL THEORY:
THE MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS, 248, 248-53 (Charles Lemert, ed., Westview Press 2d ed.
1999) (1918).
95. Merton, supra note 92.
96. Amnesty International, Summary of Amnesty International's Concerns on Police Abuse in
Chicago (1999), at http:llwww.amnesiy.orglailib/aipub/1999/AMR/25116899.htm.
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Amnesty International reports a pattern of police abuse perpetrated by
members of the nation's police forces. For example, in their October 1999
report that focused on the city of Chicago, Amnesty officials revealed the
findings of a study of the twenty-year period between 1972 and 1992.97
According to this study, Chicago police officers routinely engaged in the
systematic torture of suspects during interrogations. The study revealed that
officers mentally and physically abused suspects by involving them in torturous
games, such as Russian Roulette, suffocating, choking, punching, and shocking
(electrical) them. Amnesty reports that, "most of the victims were African
American or other minorities and the officers involved were white." 98
It is interesting that instances of "police brutality often give us the
impression that the police are 'out of control,' that they are not obeying the
bureaucratic-legal norms of the state..."99 when in fact they may very well be
obeying state norms. Certainly, the repeated allegations of police brutality and
the millions of dollars spent each year by law enforcement to settle claims and
award damages for undue harm inflicted by officers suggests the
institutionalization of norms related to excessive force.
Chevigny observes that "the police are the chief players in a political
drama that is always a tense one for us in liberal democracies: the balance
between violence and order."' ° He adds, f
[n]evertheless, we recognize that violence is used directly to control
people and impose order.. .defiance of the police.. .is tantamount to
defiance of order. But the level of violence the police will use varies
all the way from merely arresting a defiant person to shooting him or
to torturing [him]... 1"l
There is no doubt that the policing of America represents a political
institution. In fact, "the term 'police' was originally synonymous with all
internal governance of the state, including keeping order."' 2 However, the
authority to maintain state sanctioned social order is rarely applied to all citizens
on an equal basis, since "... it is rare and risky for the police to try to
subordinate those who are not subordinate, [or] to use degrading violence
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1.
99. Chevigny, supra note 62, at 28.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id. at 10.
against people who are middle or upper class or who are not from a minority. 103
Consequently, policing is an institution whose operations are legitimized by the
government to the degree that it fulfills its authority to regulate behavior and
maintain social control of the lower classes. "The policeman is, by the nature
of his calling, a defender of the status quo.""' Therefore, it is by design that the
authority given to police officers to enforce the law immediately distinguishes
them from the "ordinary" citizens who are obligated to obey the law. This
empowerment leads to distinct and separate group identities between those who
enforce the law and those who must obey the law. The question then becomes,
to what degree does the power bestowed upon those to enforce the law develop
in them the elitist attitudes of the dominant class?
One elitist attitude of police was most apparent among those officers in
New York City's infamous Street Crimes Unit (SCU) who were associated with
the fatal shooting of African immigrant Amadou Diallo in 1999. In this case,
the SCU' s motto, "We Own the Night," may not only have given "the police the
mind-set of a soldier, who doesn't spend much time thinking about the rights of
his enemy,"' ' but also suggests their superior mindset. This motto reflects a
police culture clearly alienated from democratic values" 6 and an institution
where tolerance for abuse is reinforced by an association with the values of the
dominant class.
Chevigny observes that, "controlling the level of violence is the essential
problem of human rights in ordinary police work."" This becomes an
increasingly complex challenge when presented with the charge given to law
enforcement officers by the American political institution. On one hand,
"citizens, politicians and vested interest groups have always pressured police to
"do what has to be done"'08 to enforce order, while on the other hand American
society boasts of being a nation where human rights are paramount.
Consequently, the boundaries between authority and restraint could be
perceived as relatively ambiguous, except to those who intentionally assert their
authority with bias and malice.
In March 1991, motorist Rodney King was brutally beaten,
receiving more than fifty-six blows at the hands of Los Angeles
police officers, for failing to stop during a police pursuit..
103. Id. at 12.
104. BAYLEY & MENDELSOHN, supra note 48, at 28.
105. Anonymous, United States: The Thin Blue Line, THE ECONOMIST, May 6, 2000, available at
http://proquest.umi.com/pdqwebTS-973030.
106. KELUNG, supra note 19.
107. CHEVIGNY, supra note 62, at 11.
108. KELLING, supra note 19, at 11.
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" In August 1997, Abmer Louima, a Haitian immigrant, was
beaten and sodomized with a broomstick following his arrest by
New York City police officers.
" In February 1999, an unarmed African immigrant, Amadou
Diallo, was fatally shot by New York City police officers who
fired forty-one shots and pierced his body with nineteen bullets
after they mistook his wallet for a gun.°9 110
Probably more so than any other recent reports, the high-profile cases of
Rodney King, an African American motorist, Abner Louima, a Haitian-
immigrant, and Amadou Diallo, an African immigrant, most succinctly
characterize the overwhelming concerns about police brutality and excessive
force targeted at minorities in America. In each case, these incidents pitted the
police force against the minority population, clearly reflecting the depths of
group distinctions. Skolnick and Fyfe observe that as a group, "...police often
identify themselves as a moral force, protecting innocent and productive
members of the public against those who would brutalize and victimize ordinary
decent citizens."''  Certainly, there are thousands of morally conscious police
officers that put themselves in harms way each day to protect others. In the
wake of the King, Louima, and Diallo tragedies, minorities across America
came one step closer to identifying as the victims of a "moral force" gone awry.
Boudreau observes that, "in this age of ambiguity, individuals and groups
often look for a reassuring refuge in a unique and historical group identity.""' 2
Thus, collective group identities are created based on the shared historical
experiences of groups. These separate identities reinforce perceptions of in-
group aid out-group boundaries whereby hostilities provide groups with
reciprocal positions to preserve intra-group cohesion." 3 In this case, the police
force and the minority community find a sense of identity, strength, and solace
within their group membership, while subconsciously using such memberships
to radically distinguish themselves from the other. The psychocultural factors
inherent in the police-minority group conflict are most apparent in each group's
expressed distinctions from the other.
Where there is no equality in group status, such distinctions amplify the
degree to which the disenfranchised and marginalized group members are
109. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 16.
110. Shaila K. Dewan, City and Louima Lawyers Continue Settlement Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2000, at B3.
111. SKOLNICK&FYFE, supra note 16, at 92.
112. Tom Boudreau, intergroup Conflict Reduction Through Identity Affirmation: Overcoming the
Image of the Ethnic or Enemy 'Other.' (1999) (unpublished) (on file with author).
113. Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, in ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL
NORMS 70, 70-96. (University of Chicago Press, 1971) (1955).
excluded from attaining access to society's power and privilege. Since the
police are empowered to an immense degree, and minority groups remain
effectively un-empowered, police have historically represented the interests of
"privileged status groups" while minority groups have historically represented
society's problem. Consequently, as one group vies to control the other and the
other struggles to resist being controlled, a clash emerges between the
empowered and the un-empowered, the oppressor and the oppressed, the
dominator and the dominated.
Whether through the projection of one's power over the other (as in the
case of the police) or the acknowledgement of one's victimized existence (as in
the case of the minority community), the polarization between the groups
becomes more prominent each time a controversy involving brutality or
excessive force on the part of police erupts. The polarization manifests itself in
the form of cultural symbols and norms. For example, police concepts of "a
code of silence," "thinking blue," the "blue curtain," and the "blue wall,"
represent a shared belief system designed to reinforce group ties. Skolnick and
Fyfe observe that, "the fundamental culture of policing is everywhere similar,
which is understandable since everywhere the same features of the police
role--danger, authority, and the mandate to use coercive force-are everywhere
present. This combination generates and supports norms of internal solidarity,
or brotherhood.""..
Similarly, the minority group concept of a shared victimization draws
members closer together. In fact, it is this idea of a shared victimization that
permits us to make this analysis of the police-minority group conflict whereby
the minority group is singular. Otherwise, the distinctions between minority
groups are so prominent that any attempt to group them together would be
marred.
Some social scientists have theorized that the police are an example of a
minority group. For example, McEntire and Powers note that since "a minority
group is any group toward which others have prejudices,"' the police could be
considered a minority group based on the prejudices associated with the
occupation. Also, Bayley and Mendelsohn conclude that "there are several
minority groups in America, and one of them is the police.""' 6 These
conclusions, however, are lacking since they ignore that the primary distinctions
between minorities and other groups in America are the tradition of domination
shared by members of the majority group and the tradition of victimization
shared by members of minority groups. As a group, minorities in America
represent members of a traditionally victimized collective-that is, people of
114. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 16, at 92.
115. McENTIRE & POWERS, supra note 47, at 316.
116. BAYLEY & MENDELSOHN, supra note 48, at 55.
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color who constitute "the powerless segments... the working and/or lower
classes, the poverty stricken, the semiskilled and/or unskilled, and the under and
uneducated.""' 7 This characteristic of victimization is a crucial concept
associated with the psychocultural issues at the heart of the conflict. And like
the police concept of thinking blue, the minority group sense of victimization
cannot be ignored, minimized, or shared with the enemy other.
"Relations of conflict do not by themselves produce a social structure, but
only in cooperation with unifying forces.""' 8 In 1936, Karl Mannheim wrote,
"the principle thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of
thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins
are obscured."' '" Consequently, this analysis of the inter-group conflict between
America's police and minority communities has attempted to broaden the lens
through which the police-minority group conflict is perceived so as to reduce
such obscurity.
A society that sanctions the domination of one man over another is the
same society that sanctions the unequal allocation of power, the unequal
distribution of wealth, and the unequal confirmation of human rights. Finally,
this is the same society through which there exists a collective and hegemonic
social contract within which its citizens agree to be dominated and controlled,
for they are convinced of the necessity for social restraint. In this case, the
socially-sanctioned state exercises a system of oppression where human activity
is never truly free, but only thought to be so. This is a particularly salient
concept for the minority in America.
This paper has utilized the social cubist paradigm to broaden our analysis
and understanding of the complex and protracted conflict between the institution
of law enforcement and minority groups in America. It should also be clear
from this analysis that the inter-group conflict between police and citizenry
throughout the world, regardless of the nation, can never be reduced to one or
two social dynamics. The application of the social cubist paradigm in this
regard should support efforts to understand the structural nature of police
violence and hopefully, produce a series of peace-making designs to re-structure
the paradoxical role of police in a world where their presence is often met with
a sense of need and a sense of fear.
117. Cureton, supra note 67, at 705.
118. Simmelsupra note 113, at77.
119. Karl Mannheim, The Sociology of Knowledge and Ideology, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE
MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS, 217, 217-21, (Charles Lemert ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999)
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I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of Social Cubism,' a theory originally designed for the analysis
of international ethnoterritorial conflict, may be used in the analysis of micro-
conflicts in other settings, such as American communities. Many American
communities are multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. Moreover, in some areas of
the United States, such as South Florida, communities may have much more
ethnic diversity than is found in other parts of the world. This presents a variety
of challenges in the analysis of issues confronting the community.
Unlike other theories that may look at an issue from only one or two
perspectives, social cubism directs the researcher to look at an issue from a
multiplicity of perspectives and to acknowledge that at different times, under
different circumstances and in different settings, the factors will interrelate in
dynamically different ways. In a community which contains a number of ethnic
groups, Social Cubism has the ability to interact dynamically and consider a
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Conflict Resolution and Community Studies, Department of
Conflict Analysis & Resolution, Nova Southeastern University.
1. Sefn Byrne & Neil Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, Vol 3 No.2. J. OF PEACE & CONFLICT STUD. 52-71 (1996).
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wide spectrum of factors in a multiplicity of changing and evolving
circumstances.
This application of social cubism in a local United States community-is
unique and will contribute to the fields of ethnoterritorial conflict resolution and
strategic community planning. The results of such an inquiry will inform the
community, and will enable law enforcement, political and civic leaders,
educational, and service providers to have input into a strategic community
plan. It will also enable communities to analyze other conflicts and problems
beyond those related solely to ethnic conflict. Issues such as violence
prevention, intervention within families, neighborhoods, and schools would be
appropriate examples of the use of this analytical framework.
Other international theories such as Multi-Modal Intervention Theory,2
Lederach's Integrated Nested Paradigm,3 Boulding's shared vision of peace,4
and Diamond and McDonald's Multi-Track Diplomacy,' may then significantly
contribute to the structure of conflict management and resolution models in
United States communities. Thus, international peace keeping theory may have
broader implications than previously envisioned.
HI. THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CUBISM
Many nations struggle with ongoing difficulties ranging from internal strife
to war, whose origins can be traced to ethnic conflict.' The internal strife may
be minimal, felt on an almost unperceivable level. Other internal strife may
surface, but will be addressed, thus remaining on a dispute level, never rising
to a conflict. "Most possible conflicts do not become manifest, and of those that
do, most are managed using means regarded by the participants as legitimate."7
This may be due to a number of factors, including alternative means of coping
2. SeAn Byrne & Loraleigh Keashley, Working with Ethno-Political Conflict: A Multi-Modal
Approach, in PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).
3. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES
(1997).
4. EuSE BOULDING, BUILDING A GLOBAL CIVIC CULTURE: EDUCATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD, 95-117 (1988).
5. LOUISE DIAMOND & JOHN MCDONALD, MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
PEACE 11-25 (1996),
6. Examples have included: Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burma, Burundi, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Latvai, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Moldova, Niger, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, the Phillippines, Romania,
Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan and Turkey. See MICHAEL E. BROWN, ETHNIC
CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 3 (1993).
7. LOUIS KRIESBERG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS: FROM ESCALATION TO RESOLUTION 52-53
(1998).
such as acquiescence, emigration, minor resistance, or a fatalistic sense that
there is nothing to do.8
Despite the sense that the vast majority of disputes do not manifest into
conflict, a number do break out around the world. Due to the number of such
conflicts, their tendency to be protracted, the particular fervor with which some
of them are fought, the impact on the participants, and the impact on others in
the global community, theories have been developed to examine, analyze,
manage, or resolve international ethnic conflicts.
One such theory is Social Cubism, designed as an analytical framework for
the study of international ethnoterritorial conflict.9 While this theory was
designed to be used in the analysis of international conflict, upon closer
scrutiny, its application can be seen as vital to the understanding of micro-
conflicts, including those within communities, organizations, and even families
in the United States. When one considers the number of ethnic groups that
comprise many American communities, this notion becomes both intriguing, as
well as logical. Many American communities are comprised of a number of
ethnic groups. This presents issues of culture and how different groups see,
react to, and resolve conflict. Additionally, some of these groups may have
come from regions where ethnoterritorial conflict has played a significant part
in their socialization. Thus, even when emigrating to the United States, some
of these perceptions of opposing groups may emigrate also and result in the
continuation of ethnic conflict in American communities. Some of these
communities may have been previously unfamiliar with these conflicts and
therefore lack an understanding of their origins.
Designed for the study of ethnoterritorial conflict, Social Cubism proposes
a model for analysis of conflict that emphasizes the interaction of various
factors, rather than merely the study of one or several factors. Literally using
the image of Rubic's Cube, the theory recognizes a "social cube of conflict as
having six interrelated facets or forces: history, religion, demographics,
political institutions, non-institutional behavior, economics, and psychocultural
factors."°
By assigning one of these factors to each side of the cube, and seeing that
the cube is dynamic, constantly in motion as the factors interact, one can easily
picture the sides of the cube interacting at various times with different and
changing forces. Like the Rubic's Cube, each side is not only in contact and
relationship with four other contiguous sides simultaneously, but rather, parts
of each side may move, and serve as catalysts for other factors and sub-factors
or facets. Thus, like the puzzle of the Rubic's Cube, the social cube may appear
8. Byrne & Keashley, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 52.
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to be configured in a variety of ways depending on the interplay of each
situation, circumstance, location, participant, and conflict."
Social cubism is seen by this researcher as dynamic. As such, it is a living,
breathing framework that is constantly in interaction and motion. This is a
strength of Social Cubism. One may take new information and add it to the
appropriate facet, thus expanding the analytical framework and making it more
current. Thus, even when outside agents or forces are in play on a contextual
field, the framework, which is designed to be dynamic, can accommodate this
new activity. This flexibility became even more apparent as the researcher
considered a number of other theoretical bases.
Moreover, this researcher believes the cube may be used in analyzing
sublevel and subgroup conflict, because it is reproductive. By that, the cube
may be used to analyze the conflict within specific segments of a community or
even with individuals. For example, as a subject for further study, it is
hypothesized that a family forms a new cube, utilizing the cube of each side of
the family and cube of the community. New data not only informs and alters
the cube, it can reproduce the cube so that when a new family is formed, the
framework (cube) each brings forms a new family cube. It also then impacts the
cube from each home of origin. Therefore, one may use the social cube as a
tool of analysis for conflict within a particular family. That concept is
suggested as a subject for future study, and this researcher intends to pursue that
topic upon the completion of this study.
In viewing its strengths, the comprehensiveness and adaptability of the
theory has become apparent. The following theories serve as examples of ways
to see the dynamic ability of the cube. For instance, some of the major
criticisms of structural functionalism include its failure to deal with change,
conflict, 2 and history". Social cubism, designed as an analytical framework for
ethnoterritorial conflict deals with all three aspects: 1) the dynamic aspect
permits new information to be added, thus addressing the change factor; 2) it is
a framework for conflict, which is the basis for what it may be used to analyze;
and 3) history is included as one of the six factors.
Conflict theory, as advanced by Dahrendorf, 4 addresses large social
structures and issues such as latent and manifest interests. However, like
structural functionalism, it does not view the individual, but rather takes a more
II. Byrne & Carter, supra note 1.
12. GEORGE RrrZER, SocIoLoGIcALTHEORY 250-51 (5th ed. 2000) (citing Jonathan Turner and A.Z.
Maryanski).
13. Id. at 250.
14. Id. at 259-263 (citing Ralf DahrendorO.
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macroscopic view.' 5 Social cubism, this researcher hypothesizes, permits a
cube to be used for an individual.
Interestingly, conflict theory as advanced by Collins, does include the
microscopic, and it is Collins' contention that conflict theory more broadly
views society, its stratifications, and conflicts, within groups and
organizations.' 6  This integrated aspect can contribute to social cubism.
However, social cubism takes conflict theory and gives it the analytical
framework and structure that was missing. From a pragmatic perspective, the
cube enables one to create a blueprint for conflict analysis that conflict theory
suggests, but does not provide.
Neo-Marxism, seen as the theoretical answer to the deficiencies of
Marxism, and modem critical theory, both fail to view conflict from the
comprehensive, more holistic factors of the cube. ' Even systems theory, touted
as one of the most significant theories today, deals primarily with the conflict
between systems, and does not necessarily consider the vast interplay within the
systems and all the contributing factions.' 8 Social cubism, which can address
systems, is not limited to artificially designed systems, nor does it preclude the
issue of conflict within a system or subsystem. This enables it to be used for the
analysis of intrasystem conflict, which would be particularly useful within
communities and organizations.
Im. APPLYING SOCIAL CUBISM IN THE ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY ISSUES
Since it has been proposed that the theory of Social Cubism may be applied
in the analysis of conflicts found in United States communities, it would prove
useful to briefly explore how such a framework would prove useful. One
problem communities grapple with is the issue of violence. Violence can be
broken down into many layers and levels, can originate from several sources,
and can become manifest in a variety of contexts: family, neighborhood,
workplace, and from beyond the local setting in regional, national and
international. If a community wished to address the issue of violence, Social
Cubism could be used as the analytical framework and the researcher could
apply it using various sources and contexts.
For the purposes of this brief illustration, the social issue of violence will
be used, and the micro-context of family violence home will be the unit of
analysis. The first side of the social cube to be identified is history.
15. Id at 259-260.
16. Id. at 264-268 (citing Ralf Dahrendorf).
17. RrTZER, supra note 12, at 284-287.
18. Id. at 317-336.
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A. First Side: Historical Background
If a community wished to analyze the social issue of violence, an
understanding and consideration of history would prove useful. What does
history tell about family violence and how it has been experienced?
The question is often raised as to whether family violence is a product of
our modern society. Increased violence reported in the media and by the media
can lead one to the supposition that family violence is the product of movies,
television, episodic copycat events, and other contemporary occurrences. 9
However, despite well-publicized recent trends in family violence, this violence
is neither new, nor solely a product of, our modem society.
Viewed historically, violence within the family against women can be
traced back through the ages and codified in both secular laws and religious
writings.2 "''he premise of the relation inherited from past centuries was
unequal power, without any question. Men were supposed to make the rules...
and to rule as father of the family at home."'"
The doctrine of family privacy, another creation of English common law,
established that the home was subject to privacy and was not to be interfered-
with by the government.22 This and the doctrine of coverture were imported by
early colonists and became part of American legal tradition and public policy.23
The 1800s saw both the legal recognition of the male prerogative in the
early years, and the beginnings of limitations in abuse by the 1870s. However,
by the end of the 1800s, the issue of family violence was again underground.
Some theorize that economic conditions, followed by World War I, prompted
Americans to turn their attentions elsewhere.24
Thus, authorities were conditioned to turn a blind eye to domestic violence
as well as child abuse. It also explains the anathema felt by law enforcement
officials whenever they had to respond to complaints of "domestic
disturbances," and the delay in enacting laws that protected women and
children.
Hence, the history behind gender and family violence is one supportive of
men being in charge of women, with women and children having lesser status,
19. DEBORAH PROTHROW-STITH, DEADLY CONSEQUENCES: How VIOLENCE IS DESTROYING OUR
TEENAGE POPULATION AND A PLAN TO BEGIN SOLVING THE PROBLEM 29-47 (1991).
20. Jerry Von Talge. Victimization dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family
Violence Directed Toward Women and The Impact on Child Wimesses 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111- 172 (2000).
21. MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS. 5 (1993).
22. SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL
INEQUALITY 63 (1993).
23. Id.
24. Kathleen O'Connell Corcoran and James C. Melamed, From Coercion to Empowerment:
Spousal Abuse and Mediation. Vol. 7 No. I MEDIATION QUARTERLY, 303, 304 (1989).
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be it in the home or beyond the walls of the home.2" The history factor in the
social cube can be seen as a dynamic element, touching upon all the other
factors that influence the way society has grown accustomed to viewing,
reacting, and responding to violence within the home. This pervasive,
enveloping notion of women being seen as less than men has shaped how the
community thinks, plans, and acts.26
B. Second Side: Religion
Religious writings underscored the concept of male domination and
supplied a rational basis and justification for the patriarchal system:
The Old & New Testaments of the Bible see "man" as the direct
creation of God, made in God's own image, whereas "woman," was
created as an after thought, to "assist" man and created from his body.
Even in the New Testament, the maleness of Jesus has been
interpreted by many Biblical scholars and theologians to support male
authority over women.27
This divine revelation served to explain why women were not on man's
level, and to discourage followers from tampering with God's plan for
humanity. This belief was supported in the mythology of various cultures,
including Greek mythology and philosophy.28 Like the Old Testament, Greek
mythology depicts woman has being created after man and as the source of
death, illness, and chaos in the world.29
The United States was a nation founded primarily on the principles of
English common law, and English common law was very much influenced by
Judeo-Christian concepts. Accordingly, it becomes clear that religion has had
an influence on the belief that women and children should come under the
control and rule of men. Likewise a number of current religious practices and
beliefs support the notion that men should be in control of the home."0
25. JUDITH LORBER. & SusAN A. FARRELL, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER (199 1).
26. Von Talge, supra note 20.
27. LPSrrz BEM, supra note 22, at 46-47.
28. Id. at 49-56.
29. See id. at 46-56, the discussion of the Old Testament's depiction of Adam and Eve, with Eve
eating the apple as the cause of human beings being expelled from the Garden of Eden. This is paralleled with
the Greek tale of Pandora, the first woman, who opened the box that released death, illness and other woes
upon the world. In both, women are viewed as the source of evil and suffering, thus explaining why they need
to be controlled by men.
30. Id.
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Therefore, when one views the social cube of gender and family violence,
the religion factor lends support and justification to the notion of male
supremacy and God's divine plan for the genders. Since religion touches upon
the very essence of one's value system, it makes it even more difficult to
address, confront, and change.
C. Third Side: Psychocultural
Culture plays a significant role in forming the lens through which
individuals and groups perceive the world.3 Culture is central to how
individuals and families psychologically and emotionally organize their life
experiences. It influences how they seek assistance, how they define the
problem, what they understand as the causes of family difficulties, and their
overall subjective experience of conflict and violence.32 "Conflict is universal
yet distinct in every culture; it is common to all persons yet experiences
uniquely by every individual."33
Likewise, the way each culture views women, children, and the family unit
will impact how they perceive conflict within the home, who they believe is
responsible for that conflict, how the conflict may be resolved, and how
appropriate it is to seek or accept help from beyond the family unit or group.
Culture will influence what is seen as "normal," versus what level of conflict,
or even violence, within the home is seen as extraordinary.' "A normal
pathway for de-escalating a conflict in one society-fleeing the scene of an
accident-constitutes a serious offense in another. Human boundaries are
cultural creations-social boundaries, legal boundaries, and emotional
boundaries are all drawn according to each culture's values, myths, and
preferences. '35  According to Lederach, "a person's common sense and
accumulated experience and knowledge are the primary basis of how they
create, understand, and respond to conflict. 3
6
Many communities in the United States have residents from various
cultural backgrounds. Thus, an examination of the cultures represented in a
community would contribute significantly to an understanding of an issue such
as family violence. Not all residents will perceive it the same way, experience
31. DAVIDW. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICTMEDIATION ACROSSCULTURES: PATHWAYS AND PATTERNS
21-23 (1992).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 18.
34. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS
CULTURES. (1995).
35. AUGSBURGER, supra note 31, at 23.
36. LEDERACH, supra note 34, at 9.
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it the same way or wish intervention in the same way. Accordingly, any
interventions should be designed with cultural considerations.
As an example, Broward County in Southeastern Florida presents a variety
of socioeconomic, cultural and other demographic circumstances that can
contribute to family violence. The county attracts newcomers and transients
from throughout the United States and the world. This can add stress and
pressure, especially to young families raising children without the emotional
support of their extended families, and sometimes without even the benefit of
their cultural norms. In addition, some cultures may view conflict and violence
within the family not only as a private matter, but as acceptable behavior.37
Moreover, South Florida presents many other factors usually attending
situations of family violence, including: few outlets beyond their immediate
families for people who are venting and coping with their rage; a multi-cultural
community in which some members neither understand nor appreciate the issues
and needs of neighboring cultural and ethnic groups; and low income and
poverty. These are factors that Social Cubism would consider in its dynamic
framework.
D. Fourth Side: Political Institutions and Non-Institutional Behavior
Domestic violence legislation being introduced, debated, and codified into
law in the United States was a reflection of the shift in public policy that had
spanned the centuries. Carl J. Friedrich, defines policy as "a proposed course
of action of a person, group, or government within a given environment
providing obstacles and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utilize
and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realize an objective or purpose."38
Anderson asserts that policy must entail purposeful behavior in addressing an
issue or problem, and he establishes six criteria in consideration of the
implication of public policy.39
First, the policy be deliberate and purposeful, not something that was done
randomly or by chance. Second, the actions are taken over time by government
officials. Third, public policies emerge as a response to calls for action or
inaction regarding specific issues made by individual citizens, public officials,
legislators, groups, etc., upon government officials and government agencies.
Fourth, policy deals with action, with what the government actually does, and
not with mere intent. Fifth, public policy must be specific action, positive or
negative, versus non-action, because a matter has not become a public issue.
37. AUGSBURGER, supra note 31, at 130-142.
38. JAMEs E. ANDERSON, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 9 (1997).
39. Id. at 10-12.
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Sixth, in its positive form, public policy is authoritative, based on law and
carrying with it legitimacy, recognition, and enforcement capabilities.4 °
In essence, public policy reflects intentional action undertaken by the
government, generally in response to issues raised by one or more groups, such
as citizen action, special interest, etc. It is subject to change as the perception
of the issue changes. Public opinion, therefore, may become public policy,
which in turn effects our laws and judicial processes.4 This supports Sharp's
contention that political power flows from the interaction between all or some
of the following sources: 1) authority; 2) human resources; 3) skills and
knowledge; 4) intangible factors; 5) material resources; and 6) sanctions.42
The current woman's movement, which began in the 1960s, also
challenged the old paradigm.13 Realizing the power of the vote, women's
groups were formed to exercise their right to vote by beginning concerted
efforts to elect women or men who were supportive of women's issues and
concerns. Consequently, the perception of elected officials began to change in
response to the power of these voting blocks.' Contemporaneously,
universities began to offer courses and eventually majors in women's studies.
This impacted the new generation of women who entered adulthood with vastly
different expectations than those of their mothers, grandmothers, or indeed any
previous generation in American history. It also impacted the new generation
of men whose own self-perceptions and expectations began to shift.
45
As a response, domestic violence legislation came into the forefront in
many states in the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s. This codified the
recognition that violence within the home would not be condoned and
constituted illegal behavior. Subsequently, most states expanded their domestic
violence laws to include violence of an emotional and psychological nature.
46
How our government and other institutions perceive family violence is a
significant consideration in the analysis of violence. In light of legislative and
judicial action, a number of non-political institutions, such as non-profit
organizations, began to devote themselves to addressing this issue and new
agencies, and centers were initiated specifically in this area.47
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 10-12.
42. GENE SHARP, THE POLITICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION: PART ONE POWER AND STRUGGLE 11-12
(1973).
43. HARRINGTON, supra note 21, at 3-12.
44. Id
45. LUPSITZ BEM, supra note 22, at 39-42.
46. Von Talge, supra note 20, at 111-130.
47. SHARON HERZBERGER, VIOLENCE WITHIN THE FAMILY, 188-208 (1996).
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E. Fifth Side: Demographics
The United States is experiencing an epidemic of family violence (the
terms family violence and domestic violence are used interchangeably herein)
in communities and neighborhoods in every region of our country. According
to Herzberger, even the current statistics do not accurately reflect the rate of this
occurrence and "they dramatically underestimate the true incidence of
maltreatment." '4 8
Violence in the home has caused thousands of women and children to flee
their homes in fear for their safety, and indeed for their very lives. This flight
results in displacement and significantly contributes to homelessness. 9
The effect of family violence on society appears in incidents of workplace
violence. Abusive parties sometimes come to the workplace to harass and
threaten victims either in person, through telephone calls, faxes or the interet.
These women may lose their jobs or believe that resigning is the only way to cut
off another point of contact with the abuser. Likely, they will have to apply for
unemployment benefits or public assistance.5"
Family violence encompasses not only the traditional notion of domestic
violence between spouses or partners, but also abuse by any family member
against another, such as abuse of parents by their children, or brothers and
sisters against each other. While the trends in family violence point to increases
in spousal/partner abuse, the most startling statistics relate to abuse by
juveniles. 5' By impacting the succeeding generations, violence can literally be
bred within the home. 2
Demographically, by understanding the composition of a community, one
can see the number of new families, various age groups, cultures and therefore
should be able to better analyze problems and design interventions.
F. Sixth Side: Economics
"Throughout the history of western culture, three beliefs about women and
men have prevailed: that they have fundamentally different psychological and
sexual natures, that men are inherently the dominant or superior sex, and both
male-female differences and male dominance are natural."53 As such, their
beliefs become adaptable as the norm not only by men, but also, at least
externally, by women.
48. Id. at 5.
49. JERRY LEE BRINEGAR, BREAKING FREE FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1-11 (1992).
50. R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES, 233-243 (1979).
51. HERZBERGER, supra note 47, at 5-17.
52. Id.
53. LIPSITZ BEM, supra note 22, at I.
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Due to the aforementioned limitations on women, women were in a
different category than men economically. This is an important consideration
in the analysis of family violence, the disproportionate earnings of women in
many cases, and as such, the relationship to both power within the relationship,
as well as access to alternatives in addressing family violence.54 If women do
not have such access, they do not have the economic power, despite appearing
to have wealth. But how can women produce, control, and have access to
surplus resources when society's rules, created by and for men, perpetuate a de
facto discrimination against women.
55
How society values work and one's contribution goes to the heart of the
gender issue. "Gender divisions within the work force have played an important
role in perpetuating women's low pay."56 If women are kept in low paying jobs,
then their production, control, and access to surplus resources is limited or even
impossible.
Bern, using the term "androcentrism" to note the tendency to see the male
experience as the normative, points out that employers have the tendency to set
standards for men and women based on the male experience that while one is
working each day, the home and children are being taken care of by someone
else, usually a wife.57 When she is also employed, she is more often still
primarily responsible for child care, care of the home, cooking, etc. Even when
outside help such as babysitters, housekeepers, and so on have been hired, the
woman remains responsible for the schedules, hiring, supervising help, and
making arrangements when "her" help does not work out or is occasionally
unavailable. Moreover, in many households, even when both partners have
outside employment, women do, and are expected to do, a disproportionate
share of household chores. 8
Of significance are two areas: the first is for the individual family, the
second for the community. For the family, an analysis of economics helps with
an understanding of what resources are available for assistance in dealing with
violence. Such assistance may include resources for therapy, attorneys, and
housing expenses for a displaced family member.
54. See Judith Buber Agassi, Theories of Gender Inequality: Lessons from the Israeli Kibbitz, in
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER, supra note 25, at 313-334 (Judith Lorber & Susan A. Farrell eds.,
1991).
55. Id. at 316-317.
56. See Johanna Brenner, Feminization of Poverty and Comparable Worth: Radical Versus Liberal
Approaches, in The Social Construction of Gender, supra note 25, at 205 (Judith Lorber & A. Farrel eds.,
1991).
57. LIPsrrz BEM, supra note 22, at 62-65.
58. Id.
In the second area, knowing the economics of a community will assist in
the analysis of what resources the community has available for its residents, and
which residents may need additional resources.
IV. USING INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING THEORY IN THE DESIGN OF
COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS
In addition, in examining international peace building principles, Lederach,
indicates that "change will require a rebalancing of power in the relationship by
which all those involved recognize one another in new ways. Such recognition
will increase the voice and participation of the less powerful in addressing their
basic needs and will legitimate their concerns."59 He further indicates that
weaker parties, when their own self awareness increases, as well as their
understanding of relationships and context, will usually demand change.
60
Curle contends that the movement toward peace can be understood through
the emerging roles in a typical progression of conflict and that progression goes
through four stages: 1) a latent or hidden stage in which conscientization is
needed; 2) confrontation, in which the conflict is no longer hidden; 3)
negotiation, which may occur when levels of awareness of interdependence
have taken place between the parties; and 4) a restructuring, in which successful
negotiation and mediation have resulted in a relationship restructuring. Curle
refers to this final stage as "increased justice.'
Lederach points out that movement along this matrix may at times be
stalled or may jump forward or backward. Likewise, not all conflict may be
resolved in such a way that sustainable peace may be easily achieved.62
However, as Curle points out in his matrix, latent conflict cannot be resolved
until there is acknowledgment of the conflict's existence.63
In viewing aspects of international peace building and peacekeeping,
Lederach uses a pyramid as a means to describe the types of actors and the
approaches that may be seen. Level One is top leadership, such as military,
political leaders and elites; their approaches tend toward processes led by highly
visible, single mediators and involve cease fires and high level negotiations.
Level Two represents leaders who are known in particular sectors, such as
intellectuals, ethnic and religious leaders, NGOs, and middle tier elites. Their
approaches tend toward insider-partial teams, peace commissions, workshops
and training. Level Three contains local leaders, grassroots leadership,
59. LEDERACH, supra note 3, at 65.
60. Id. at 64.
61. LEDERACH, supra note 3, at 64-66 (citing Curie).
62. Id. at 66.
63. Id. at 64-66.
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community developers and heads of indigenous NGOs. Their approaches tend
toward postwar trauma reduction, grassroots and local training, prejudice
reduction, and psychosocial efforts.'
Lederach suggests that each of these levels has a significant role to play in
the peace effort and that the higher the level, the greater access one has to
information, and the greater impact one's decisions will have on the whole,
while on the lower the level of leadership, the greater experience one will have
with victimized people and the results of the large scale decisions, but the less
the ability will be to see the broader picture.65 Using this pyramid in community
safety and violence intervention, one can see that the communication between
the levels is essential in establishing policies and practices in family violence
mediation intervention whereby the local experts and leaders have greater
opportunities to pass on their expertise, and where middle and upper level
leaders and policy makers can consider carefully this information. Victim
safety may be increased when additional safeguards are put into place on the
local level, but to do this, support and backing in terms of financial programs,
laws, and policies must come from above.
V. COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS & INTERVENTIONS
Byrne and Keashley suggest that in international situations there is an art
to being able to specifically identify problems, and that this could result in a
blueprint of problems that points toward possible solutions. 66 This concept
could assist in problem identification in the area of violence prevention and
intervention projects, and could enable evaluation of pitfalls and problems.
Lederach's "nested paradigm" in international peace building, for example,
points to four stages, depicted as circles, which may be useful for viewing
conflicts in terms of time frames and planning for peace. 67 His approach is
holistic, and views the peace building process in stages from ending the
violence through the establishment of a long term vision, spanning a period of
twenty or more years.68
The first circle is the actual "crisis intervention," which requires immediate
action, short-term action which, on the international level, often means
emergency aid and relief, and in cases of violence, cessation of those hostilities
and cease fires. This usually take place over a two- to six-month period of time
64. Id. at 74-80.
65. Id
66. Byrne & Keashly, supra note 2.
67. LDERACH, supra note 3, at 63-80.
68. Id.
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and focuses on immediate solutions.69 When dealing with family violence, the
first circle represents instead law enforcement's response to the immediate crisis
of violence. That response would be immediate, though it may also happen
repeatedly over a period of time.
The second circle, that of "preparation and training," has become
increasingly more popular in conflict resolution. This involves skills training
and preparatory activities so that future conflict may be better addressed. It
usually occurs over a one- to two-year time span and is seen as short range
planning.7 ° In a community, police officers could be trained so they would
better understand conflict resolution and periodic meetings provide a context to
discuss the role of conflict resolution and mediation in family and community
peacekeeping and peace building.
Such meetings are also helpful in bringing information into the design of
future trainings. The elicitive training model encourages the use of input from
participants in the goals, objectives, and design of training.7 Conversations
with law enforcement officers prior to designing training for them can result in
training that was more relevant and could be described by participants as more
useful.
The third circle, "design of social change," links crisis experience with the
need for better prospective planning, and involves a time frame of five-ten
years. This is seen as "decade thinking," and is the time period during which
many dispute systems designs are conceived.72
This is at the core of this study, the need for a viable and meaningful
community partnership based on strategic community planning for peace.
Rather than merely responding to episodic family violence outbreaks in
individual homes, or neighborhoods and having officers watch escalation trends
without a community program in place, this circle promotes long range planning
and design.
Lastly, the fourth circle, that of "desired future," is for long term vision,
taking place over twenty or more years. During this time, generations are being
considered in terms of conflict and violence prevention and harmony.73 During
this period, envisioning Boulding's shared future of peace is generated. 74 It is
hoped that once a viable community peace building partnership can be
established, a long term vision would be the natural outcome. This is the
ultimate goal, the desired future.
69. Id. at 76-80.
70. Id.
71. LEDERACH, supra note 34, at 55-6Z.
72. LEDERACH, supra note 3, at 63-80.
73. Id.
74. BOULDING, supra note 4.
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This framework allows communities to begin to strategically plan and not
wait for problems to escalate. This will enable them to identify anticipated
problems and emerging issues, and begin the process of planning and
appropriating needed resources. Consequently, early warning systems designers
should develop liaisons with other organizations so that early warning systems
may be improved, and umbrella groups may be formed.
This concept could be of use in planning strategically for long range
solutions to family violence, which has demonstrated to have far-reaching
community implications. As previously established, family violence and its
effects are felt far beyond the walls of the home. Thus, communities that wish
to address this issue can learn much from the application of international peace
building concepts and early warning systems.
Three ideas come to mind in using the concepts of international peace
building in a model for family violence planning and strategy. First, reluctance
against early action and intervention may be overcome. This paradigm shift
would require placing a higher priority on educational and systemic changes
that would result in recognizing violence and its potential in at-risk families, as
well as in all families. At risk families include those with low income, and
those experiencing life-crisis situations such as divorce, relocation, etc.
By looking beyond the myths of violence, early warning systems can be
modified so that: 1) potential victims and their families can be referred to
appropriate agencies for assistance; 2) families being helped by agencies for
other matters can be more closely monitored for abuse; and 3) intervention
decisions can be made, based on the level of violence, culture, and other
contextual considerations, for situations in which abuse has been identified.
This would also be of assistance in setting guidelines for the use of mediation
and other types of intervention.
Second, Lederach found that the planning and strategizing assisted in
establishing long term changes,75 and Byrne and Keashley indicated that liaison
with other groups was an effective means for addressing change.76 Studies and
practice suggest that the most successful strategy for promoting change is not
one strategy at all, but rather involves a combination of strategies that best fit
the individuals and groups.77 This would be supported by international peace
building theory, including Diamond and McDonald's multi-tiered diplomacy.
78
Thus, if a community is to address the issues of family violence with an eye
toward sustainable change, it must deal with a number of strategies and have
supportive services for follow-up treatment.
75. LEDERACH, supra note 3.
76. Byrne & Keashly, supra note 2.
77. DIAMOND & MCDONALD, supra note 5.
78. Id.
Third, Byrne recommends the inclusion in the peace process of all relevant
stakeholders so the promotion of understanding, tolerance, and dialogue may
result in a true opportunity for third party facilitators to aid parties in providing
for their superordinate goals and perceiving the identity of their real needs.79
When family violence is viewed more fully through Social Cubism and
through international peace building theory, it becomes clear that most services
currently available in the community are found in the first circle, that of crisis
intervention, with a few found in the second. Victims are usually encouraged
either to leave, to have the perpetrator removed, or to tolerate the situation.
Often this encouragement to tolerate violence within the home is born of
cultural, psycho-cultural, and religious norms and values. And even when a
victim leaves, or has the abuser removed by judicial mandate, local experts will
attest to the high rates of reconciliations in which, without ongoing service
options, little transformation will occur, and thus there will be limited
sustainability for that change. Without sustainable change, patterns of violence
are more likely to eventually resume, continue and even escalate.
The need for a community response and for viable community partnerships
has also been seen as vital in modern law enforcement. This is congruent with
international peace building theory, which encourages collaboration between
various stakeholders on different levels or tiers.
In light of the aforementioned, it becomes clear that concepts typically
related to ethnopolitical conflict and international peace building may be of use
in examining how and in what way a community analyzes and responds to
social issues, such as violence.
79. Sean Byrne, Conflict Regulation or Conflict Resolution: Third Party Intervention in the
Northern Ireland Conflict. Prospects for Peace, Vol. 7 No. 2 J. OF. TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 1-24 (1995).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the twentieth century has seen an increase in societies
devastated and traumatized by mass violence. Traumatized societies develop
when severe inter-ethnic conflicts cause drastic shared losses, humiliation by the
enemy, and helplessness that prevents positive adaptation to the situation.' We
see examples of this resulting from the genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia, the
brutal militarism in Haiti, and the ongoing clashes between Palestinians and
Israelis in the Middle East. While many of these societies no longer appear
traumatized on the surface, these events may still affect societal processes.2
For more than 200 years, Haiti has suffered such traumas. Slavery and
colonization, a succession of predatory dictatorships, and economic sanctions
and international isolation continue to plague Haiti. In this post-Cold War
setting, the daunting challenge for conflict resolution scholars and practitioners,
government officials, and non-state actors is to develop multi-modal and
multidimensional mechanisms for dealing with failed states and traumatized
societies. This chapter will examine the effectiveness of social cubism as an
analytical framework for dealing with the multifaceted conflict in Haiti.
According to Byrne and Carter, studies of ethno-territorial politics typically
examine political and economic structures, to emphasize the competing interests
* Ph.D. Candidate, Nova Southeastern University.
1. VAMIK VOLKAN, BLOOD LINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO ETHNIC TERRORISM 43 (1998).
2. Id.
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of groups, or use a psychoanalytic approach to emphasize psychological and
cultural forces.' Byrne and Carter advocate the perspective of "social cubism,"
emphasizing the interaction of both the material and psychological mechanisms.
The social cube of conflict has six interrelated facets or forces: history; religion;
demographics; political institutions; economics; and psychocultural factors.4
Social cubism evokes images of the Rubic's Cube, which, if one twists or
turns the cube in any direction, that move will alter the interaction of various
elements of the game. These six social forces, when combined, produce
differing patterns of intergroup behavior or interaction. No one force can be
isolated to explain its relation to the other forces, nor can one stand alone as a
single cause of a conflict. For example, one dilemma for international policy
makers is that they do not have a scientific methodology for assessing the
cultural, political, and social meanings of trauma in the lives of civilian
populations and how these traumatic experiences alter the everyday lives of the
affected individuals. Little empirical research is conducted for assessing
outcomes, and humanitarian goals are often subordinated to political agendas.
Although the magnitude of such problems are becoming clearer, methods of
prevention and reconstruction of damaged societies have remained elusive.
Consequently, the enormous burden of human suffering and loss of social and
economic productivity remains hidden behind a veil of neglect, ignorance, and
denial.5
Social cubism offers an analytic framework for assessing the cultural,
political, and social meanings of trauma. I will use the six forces to examine the
state of Haiti today. Can this perspective shed new light on efforts to rebuild a
traumatized society in ways that promote economic development, civil society
reconstruction, justice, democracy, and human rights, and prevent a relapse into
new rounds of crisis and chaos? My contention is that neglecting the interaction
between these six forces, as well as the collective psychology of people
displaced from their homes and their country, along with the economic and
political reconstruction of the community, cannot support a lasting resolution.
Resolution of the ongoing political conflict in Haiti requires not only political
settlement, but also a wider healing of the traumatized society. Transformation
of this material and psychological anomaly requires short-term and long-term
efforts by many actors.
3. Setn Byrne & Neal Carter, A Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, 3 J. PEACE & CONFuCT STUDIES 52, 52-66 (1996).
4. Id.
5. Richard Mollica, Trauma and Reconstruction in Kobe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Columbia, 16
Harvard School of Public Health 1, 1-4, available at http:/Avww.cgp.orgcgplinklvoll6articesvoll6 html (last
visited Jan. 19 2002).
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Haiti is a country of extreme political polarization, class divisions, a
fractured national identity, and stark socioeconomic contrasts.6 Elites who
artificially perpetuate the extremes of the nation's colonial traditions have
proven unwilling to relinquish their status and wealth (and therefore power) in
post-independence Haiti. These divisions have exacerbated cultural rifts
manifested in language, religious practices, and attitudes toward skin color,
which can only impede the transition to democracy that the Haitian government
is now trying to effect.
7
Haiti has endured many horrendous events in its brief history. Perhaps the
perpetuation of these traumas down throughout its history, without the benefit
of healing as a nation, inhibits Haiti's development today. Volkan describes the
transgenerational transmission of trauma as
when an older person [or group] unconsciously externalizes his
traumatized self onto a developing child's [or group's identity]
personality. A child then becomes a reservoir for the unwanted,
troublesome parts of an older generation. Because the elders have
influences on a child [or community], the child absorbs their wishes
and expectations and is driven to act on them. It becomes the child's
task to mourn, to reverse the humiliation and feelings of helplessness
pertaining to the trauma of his forebears.'
Volkan uses the term "chosen trauma" to describe the collective memory
of a calamity that once befell a group's ancestors. It is, of course, more than a
simple recollection; it is a shared mental representation of the event, which
includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and
defenses against unacceptable thought.9 He maintains that the word "chosen"
fittingly reflects a large group unconsciously defining its identity by the
transgenerational transmission of injured selves infused with the memory of the
ancestors' trauma. I contend that Haiti as a country suffers from a
transgenerational transmission of trauma. I will use social cubism to analyze the
various social forces that interlock to produce the crisis in Haiti today.
6. Jennifer L. McCoy, ROBERT ROTBERG, HAM, RENEWED: POLITICAL & ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
1-26 (Robert . Rothberg ed., Brookings Institution Press, 1997) (1997).
7. IRWIN P. STOTSKY, SILENCING THEGUNS IN HAITI: THE PROMISEOFDELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY
17(1997).
8. VOLKAN, supra note 1, at 43.
9. Id. at 48.
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II. HAITI: AN OVERVIEW OF A TURBULENT HISTORY
Perhaps the single most important element to understand about
contemporary Haiti is that it remains the only nation in history to
have been founded by slaves who overthrew their masters ... This
unique aspect of Haitian history is both an asset and a liability.
Chetan Kumar
Haiti was the first country in the Caribbean to win its independence, when
the French were expelled in 1804, and only the second republic of the
hemisphere after the United States. Haiti, earlier known as Saint-Domingue,
shares roughly a third of the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican
Republic.'0 Modern Haitian history began in 1492, when Christopher Columbus
landed on Haiti near Cape Haitien on the north coast of Hispaniola. " The island
became an important colony and the seat of Spanish government in the New
World until Spain lost interest in Haiti because its obsession with gold had
exhausted that natural resource on the island.
Within fifty years of enslaving the island's inhabitants, half a million
Arawak.Indians had been exterminated in the Spanish gold mines. 2 The
genocide of the native Indians did not go unnoticed in Spain, however. The
missionary Bartolome de las Casas campaigned against Indian slavery,
achieving its abolition in 1542. Yet not only was the measure too late to prevent
the extinction of the Arawaks, but it also brought about the beginning of African
slavery in the New World.' 3 By 1517, Charles V authorized the export of
15,000 African slaves to San Domingo, and thus priest and King launched on
the world the American slave trade and slavery.
14
After nearly one hundred years of Spanish, British, and French fighting
over the island, Spain ceded Saint Dominique, now Haiti, to the French in 1695
by the Treaty of Ryswick.'5 By 1789 the French West Indian colony of San
Domingo supplied two-thirds of the overseas trade of France and was the
greatest individual market for the European slave trade. Slavery was an integral
part of the economic life of the age in the greatest colony in the world, the pride
10. DAVID MALONE, DECISION-MAKING IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: THE CASE OF HAITI 1990-
1997 40 (1998).
11. Leslie A. Benton, & Glenn T. Wae. Haiti: A Case Study of the International Response and
the Efficacy of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Crisis, at
httpl/www.law.emory.edu/EILR/volumes/spg98/benton.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
12. JAMES FERGUSON, PAPA DOC, BABY DOC: HAITI AND THE DUVALIERS 1 (1987).
13. Id. at 2.
14. C. L. R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE AND THE SAN DOMINGO




of France and the envy of every other imperialist nation. The economic
structure rested wholly on the labor of half a million slaves. 6 San Domingo was
also noted for being the world's most repressive colony engendering a caste
system of French domination and set the stage for the social discord and
political exploitation that remains today. 7
Social discord between whites and black widened when the French slave
owners and their black female slaves produced a new class, the mulattos, also
known as gens de couleur or affranchis. This new class's social status rested
between those of whites and blacks. The plantation owners usually educated
their progeny and often signed over land titles to them, so in spite of
institutional discrimination against them, many mulattos became wealthy
landowners, establishing themselves as a viable class." Cruel and abusive racial
discrimination, however, was the hallmark of French colonization in this
three-tiered society of whites, mulattos, and blacks.
The modem nation of Haiti is the product of a revolution against slavery
and colonialism beginning in 1791. In the fifty years or so leading to the 1791
slave revolution in Haiti, black slaves began to react to the brutal treatment of
their masters. The continuing racial strife, bolstered by the inspiration of the
French revolution, contributed to the outbreak of a revolution. During this
period of civil war, Toussaint L'Ouverture emerged as the dominant black
leader 9 of the first large-scale successful slavery revolt in the Americas.
L' Ouverture eventually gained command of the entire island. In 1802, however,
Napoleonic forces sent to depose L'Ouverture took him to France, where he
later died in prison. Nevertheless, Napoleon and his troops, having been
exhausted and defeated in Europe, finally conceded to the Haitian rebellion. 0
Haiti proclaimed independence on January 1, 1804. It emerged as a nation
under the successive leadership of two figures, Toussaint L'Ouverture and Jean-
Jacques Dessalines. After two centuries of Spanish and French colonial rule,
and in the wake of the French revolution and a new government based on the
"Rights of Man," Haiti's slave population began to struggle for political rights
equal to those possessed by the island's white and mulatto elites. 2' The world's
first free black republic was therefore characterized by racial hatred and
corruption. The slave revolution virtually eliminated the white population and
16. JAMES, supra note 14, at 6.
17. Benton & Ware, supra note 11.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2.
21. CHETAN KUMAR, BUILDING PEACE IN HAITI (1998).
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degenerated into a ten-year entanglement of atrocities known as the "War of the
Castes."22
After Dessalines's rule, the desperate competition between blacks and
mulattos manifested itself in the eventual division of Haiti; a northern kingdom
under black Henry Christopher (King Henry I of Haiti), who ruled harshly from
a Cape Haitian palace, and a southern republic under mulatto Alexandra
Petion's laissez-faire rule at Port-au-Prince.23 After Petion died in 1818, the
republican senate selected the commander of the Presidential Guard, General
Jean-Pierre Boyer, as the new president for life. President Boyer then invaded
San Domingo following its declaration of independence from Spain, with the
entire island controlled by Haiti until 1844.
Upon King Henry's death in 1820, Boyer was able to consolidate Haiti and
establish a government remarkable only for its relative stability over a
twenty-five year rule. After decades of Haiti's isolation from the international
community, France agreed to recognize Haitian independence in exchange for
a financial indemnity of 150 million francs. Most nations, including the United
States, shunned Haiti for almost forty years, fearful that its example could stir
unrest there and in other slaveholding countries. Over the next few decades
Haiti was forced to take out loans of seventy million francs to repay the
indemnity in hopes of gaining international recognition. Under Boyer, the
economy stagnated and the division between blacks and mulattos widened.
Boyer's rule gave way to a succession of twenty-two heads of state between
1843 and 1915, when the United States invaded Haiti.24
Since its first independence, Haiti's form of government has been,
practically speaking, a dictatorship. The main method of changing dictators has
been by coup, abetted by execution or exile. In 1915, United States Marines
invaded Haiti with an average force of 2000 to control the country. Although
legalistic reasons were given, the practical reasons were to protect United States
business interests and to keep Germany away (World War I had started and the
waters between Haiti and Cuba are the main ocean passage from the east to the
Panama Canal).
After twenty years of occupation, political stability, and some
improvements to Haiti's infrastructure, the United States withdrew. The United
States occupation had few lasting effects other than to reinforce racism between
the blacks and mulattos because the Marines granted mulattoes political power
over black Haitians.25 In the absence of established political or social
institutions, the military remained the only cohesive institution in the country,
22. STOTSKY, supra note 7, at 18.
23. Benton & Ware, supra note 11, at 2.
24. MALONE, supra note 10.
25. Id.
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and the tool by which future governments would rule. Many Haitians refer to
the United States' withdrawal as Haiti's second independence.26
After several attempts in the late 1950s to move toward democratic
governance ultimately failed, military-controlled elections lead to victory for Dr.
Frangois Duvalier. The accession of the noiriste Duvalier, "Papa Doc" broke
with the tradition of the mulatto elite ruling the country but did nothing to
improve services that the state offered its citizens. In 1964, Papa Doc declared
himself President-for-Life and formed the infamous paramilitary force, the
Tontons Macoutes. Duvalier's regime was marked with terror and corruption,
as tens of thousands of Haitians were killed or exiled. The Duvalier reign of
terror finally fell apart twenty-nine years later, in February 1986, when his son,
Jean-Claude, was escorted into exile by the United States.27
In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic
priest, won sixty-seven percent of the vote in a presidential election that
international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office in
February 1991, but was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army and
was forced to leave the country in September of the same year. It is estimated
that between 300 and 500 Haitians were killed in the days following the
September coup, and 3000 in the following three years. The coup created a
large-scale exodus from the country; in fact, the United States Coast Guard
rescued a total of 41,342 Haitians from 1991 to 1992, more than the combined
number of rescued refugees from the previous ten years.28
The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the
military and the de facto government sanctioned repression, assassination,
torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community's
condemnation. An American military intervention that restored Aristide to his
office in 1994 demonstrated once more that violence remained the decisive
element in Haitian politics; it represented the only viable means of ending
redictatorialization.29 The intervention, however, has had contradictory
consequences. While it resuscitated the difficult process of democratization and
facilitated the relative emasculation of the repressive organs of the state, it also
protected the old balance of class power and set out constraining parameters for
economic transformation. The result was a change of regime rather than the
26. ROBERT DEBS HEINL, JR. & NANCY GORDON HEINL, WRIrEN IN BLOOD: THE STORY OF THE
HAMAN PEOPLE, 1492-1995 489 (1996).
27. FERGUSON, supra note 12, at 119.
28. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Background Notes: Haiti, March 1998, at
http://www.state.gov/www/background-noteshaiti-O398-.bgn.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
29. Robert Fatton, Jr., The Rise, Fall and Resurrection of President Aristide, in HAITI RENEWED:
POLrrICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1, 136 (Robert I. Rothberg ed., 1997).
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creation of a new state.3" In the November 1995 elections, Ren6 Preval,
formerly a minister in Aristide's administration, was elected in the second free
election in Haiti's history. Conditions in the country, however, remained
volatile over the next five years.
Aristide won his bid for re-election in November of 2000 with an
overwhelming ninety-two percent of the vote (although it is estimated that only
ten percent of the population participated in the election). The elections,
however, were plagued with controversy. Many of the major opposition parties
and six unknown candidates (too scared to participate) boycotted the election.3
Opponents accused Aristide of rigging the elections, inciting violence,
intimidating opponents, and even using bombings against political rivals. The
international community has yet to recognize the elections as legitimate. The
air of conflict contrasted with the public euphoria that accompanied the former
priest's election victory in 1990, when he became Haiti's first freely elected
president.
Haiti's past and present exemplifies a society traumatized by violence,
poverty, and a predatory state apparatus. If the country is to heal from its past,
it must dismantle the remnants of the predatory regime, replacing it with a
humane, democratic government that can respond to the needs of the nation.
Next, the interlocking relationship between history, demographics and the
political structure will be considered to better understand Haiti's psychocultural
trauma.
m. DEMOGRAPHICS: THE LAY OF THE LAND
Haiti's only ties with its hemisphere are latitude and longitude. Think
rather of Haiti as a fragment of black Africa, a fragment dislodged
from the mother continent that drifted across the Atlantic and
grounded in the Antilles.
Heinl & Heinl
Approximately 700 miles southeast of Florida, Haiti shares a Caribbean
island with the Dominican Republic. Haiti is located between the islands of
Cuba, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico. The geographic proximity raises questions of
national security in the region, with Haiti as a democratic buffer, leaving Cuba
the only country in the hemisphere still under a dictatorship. The proximity of
Haiti to the United States has led to a large American expatriate community of
30. Fatton, supra note 29.
31. David Gonzalez, Final Haitian Vote Tally Shows Aristide Winning 91.69%, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2000, at A15.
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Haitian citizens and an influx of Haitians seeking political and economic
asylum.32
Demographic factors continue to be a wedge between the Haitian people
reminiscent of post-colonial Haiti. About ninety percent of all Haitians (noirs)
are ebony black. The remaining ten percent have varying traces of Caucasian
blood and are known as jaunes or muldtres. This racial division, Haitians call
it exactly that and speak of "the two races," is the most important fact of life in
Haiti. It dominates the country's whole existence. It is also, in the words of one
of Haiti's ablest thinkers, Alcius Charmant, "the supreme evil of our Republic,
the virus that ravages it, and the road to its ruin."33 Indeed, it is based upon
opposing ideologies concerning the form of government best suited to the
country.'
Two-thirds of Haiti's 7.5 million citizens live below the national poverty
level with an average annual income of less than $250, while a small group of
military and civilian elites continues to oppress the population. a Human
security in Haiti is dangerously weak, not only from a political standpoint, but
also more importantly from a health standpoint. The United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) reports that life expectancy at birth is only fifty-
six years, compared with seventy-six in Costa Rica and the United States.36
Haiti has an overwhelmingly rural population with only thirty percent living in
urban areas.
The physical infrastructure of the cities has also decayed due to financial
constraints, which intensified from 1991 to 1994, swollen populations, and
environmental degradation. The Inter-American Development Bank reports that
less than forty percent of the water needs of the capital are being met and that
erratic gathering and disposal of solid waste in Port-au-Prince and Cape Haitien
contribute to deplorable sanitation conditions. Soil erosion and poor watershed
management damage roads and infrastructure in urban and rural Haiti.37
Haiti has the highest rate of illiteracy in the Western hemisphere and one
of the highest in the world. Roughly sixty-five percent of all Haitians are
illiterate. The other thirty-five percent, among whom a superbly educated elite
boasts degrees from the world's greatest universities, can read and write. 8
It is an old saying that Haiti is eighty percent Catholic and 100 percent
Voodoo (also written Vodun or Vodoun). This may not be the literal truth, but
32. McCoy, supra note 6, at 21; HEINL & HEINL, supra note 26.
33. HEINL & HEINL, supra note 26, at 5.
34. STOTZKY, supra note 7, at 22.
35. KUMAR, supra note 21; McCoy, supra note 6, at 2.
36. McCoy, supra note 6, at 2.
37. Id.
38. HEINL & HEINL, supra note 26, at 5.
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it is doubtful whether more than fifteen percent of Haiti, including a small but
vigorous Protestant community, practices Christianity exclusively. As Judaism
had in Israel and Shinto in Japan, Vodun helped define the Haitian nationality
and ethos even though Roman Catholicism, in its French variant, remained the
official religion until 1987. 39
IV. THE PREDATORY STATE: POLMCAL STRUCTURES IN HAITI
The Haitian state has traditionally functioned as a parasitic
force, siphoning off economic resources from the peasantry through
draconian taxes and other means, and enforcing its will through a
multiplicity of controls, including the threat and the use of force.
Donald Schultz
During Haiti's history of governance by forty-two emperors, kings,
presidents, and other heads of state, all but three ended their term in office in a
bloody coup d'6tat, violent death, or exile.' In Haiti a deeply embedded culture
of predation has fostered autocracy and corruption, extreme social injustice, and
economic stagnation. "It is in this sense that one speaks of the state versus
society, with the military operating as both a repressive arm of the government
and as a semiautonomous actor with interest of its own."'" As North and
Rotberg describe it, "the predatory state extracts income from constituents in the
interest of one group or class without regard to the impact on the wealth of the
society as a whole. Throughout the history of independent Haiti, the presidency
served as a source of private income for the rulers." ' 2 Characterized by few
productive expenditures or none, the state became, as Mats Lundahl comments:
at once too small and too big: too small in the sense that it has failed
to create a policy environment conducive to productivity and growth;
too large if one takes into account the number of public sector
employees who have been taken into the service of kleptocrats to
assist in the creation of private ruler income or have served solely as
39. Patrick Bellegard-Smith, Resisting Freedom: Cultural Factors in Democracy; the Case of Haiti,
in HAM RENEWED: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1, 28 (Robert 1. Rothberg ed., Brookings
Institution Press 1997) (1997).
40. ELIZABETH D. GIBBONS, SANCTIONS IN HAITI: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY UNDER
ASSAULT 177 THE WASH. PAPERS 1, 2 (1998).
41. Donald E. Schultz, Political Culture, Political Change, and the Etiology of Violence, in HAM
RENEWED: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1, 93 (Robert I. Rothberg ed., 1997).
42. McCoy, supra note 6, at 9.
recipients of public funds without performing duties other than
backing the ruler politically.4"
In this sense, Duvalierism was not an aberration but rather the culmination
of a particular set of historical experiences, including those provided by
traditional African culture, slavery, a bloody war of liberation, the reimposition
of elite dominance and mass submission, chronic cycles of tyranny and chaos,
and the effects of a prolonged United States occupation. The result has been the
development of an elaborate syndrome of destructive and self-destructive
political behavior marked by authoritarianism, paternalism, personalism,
patronage, nepotism, demagogy, corruption, cynicism, opportunism, racism,
incompetence, parasitism, rigidity, intolerance, rivalry, distrust, insecurity,
vengeance, intrigue, superstition, volatility, violence, paranoia, xenophobia,
exploitation, class hatred, institutional illegitimacy, mass apathy, aversion, and
submission."
The democratization of Haiti has been a slow and arduous process. The
decline in the predatory state began with the 1986 fall of the Jean-Claude "Baby
Doc" Duvalier dictatorship. Five different subsequent governments preceded
the internationally observed elections of December 1990, in which Aristide,
candidate of the Front National pour la Convergence Democratique (FNCD)
captured sixty-seven percent of the popular vote. The transition from
authoritarianism to populism was a function of the ascendancy of civil society.
The 1991 coup that followed suggests, however, that the old balance of class
power, as well as the vital repressive organs of the Duvalierist state, survived
the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier and instigated the redictatorialization of
Haitian society.45
The coup represented yet another setback for the aspiration of ordinary
Haitians due to an American economic embargo instituted to oust the ruling
military regime. "The motivations for this intervention were ostensibly the
restoration of democracy and human rights, but there may have been an
underlying motive in that the stabilization of Haiti was the only politically
acceptable way to avoid a politically unacceptable influx of Haitian refugees
into the United States."46
Either the return of a populist leader like Aristide or the stabilization
of military rule, was acceptable to the American government,
provided the refugee problem was 'handled,' even if handling meant
43. Id.
44. Schultz, supra note 41, at 95.
45. GIBBONS, supra note 40, at 1.
46. RIcHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRMQUE 58-9 (1999).
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forcible repatriation, brutal means to discourage the outflow, and
resettlement in already overburdened countries in Central America
and the Caribbean.47
At the heart of the current Haitian national crisis is an incendiary conflict
between leadership groups inside and outside the government over the direction
of national politics generally, and economic reform specifically. Politically,
Haiti's leadership is torn between supporters of President Aristide and his
"Fanmi Lavalas" and supporters of the Lavalas Political Organization
(Organisation Politique Lavalas, OPL) led by Gerard Pierre Charles. Both
political parties grew out of the broad populist Lavalas movement originally led
by Aristide. OPL is now opposed to the Aristide's perceived influence over
Haitian politics and vaguely accuses him of having anti-democratic tendencies.
The first step toward democracy must be to dismantle the old state controls and
the public and private monopolies that formed the basis of the predatory state.4"
As long as these mechanisms are in place, regional security in the Caribbean
and the placement of refugees will remain a central issue.
Behind the values, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior that foster political
violence and a predatory state in Haiti are stark economic needs and
relationships. While the military-institutional bases of violence have been
destroyed, the economic substructure remains largely intact. The critical issues
here, both for democracy and political stability, are poverty, inequality,
economic growth, and class conflict.49
V. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: WILL IT EVER ADD UP?
Haiti's economic structure may be locked into a low-level
equilibrium that offers no easy way out ... even well-intended
governments with a purged, honest, bureaucracy have a Herculean
task in this respect.
Mats Lundahl
Haiti has long held the dubious distinction of being the Western
Hemisphere's poorest nation. In an economy with only a 9/10 percent per
capita annual growth between 1965 and 1980, -2 2/5 percent rate between 1980
and 1992,50 a thirty percent drop in GDP during the 1991 to 1994 military
47. FALK, supra note 41, at 59.
48. McCoy, supra note 6, at 5.
49. Schultz, supra note 41, at 101.
50. McCoy, supra note 6, at 6.
period, and a 2 2/5 percent rate for 1999,51 and the need for massive economic
reconstruction is starkly clear. About eighty percent of the population lives in
abject poverty. Nearly seventy percent of all Haitians depend on agriculture,
which consists mainly of small-scale subsistence farming and employs about
two-thirds of the economically active work force.5
2
Haiti has yet to recover from the United States economic embargo
launched in 1993 to force out the government of Raoul Cedras. The embargo
devastated the nation's miserable economic base. During the three-year military
rule, conditions in all areas of Haitian life noticeably worsened. Infectious
diseases such as cholera and tuberculosis were rampant, with only forty percent
of the population having access to modern medicine. Free schools were
available to only ten percent of Haitian children. Deforestation and over-
farming severely eroded the land, and the country of 7.5 million had one of the
highest population densities in the world. The economy shrank more than two
percent annually during the 1980s, then plummeted thirty percent during
military rule. Streets were pocked with craters, most prisons had no water or
electricity, and some judges were without pencils or paper.53 "The military
government was incompetent, corrupt, and violent with 3000-4000 deaths
attributed to state violence during that period. When Operation Restore
Democracy was initiated in the autumn of 1994, Haiti was an economic
wasteland."'
The embargo was a double-edged sword:
While the United Nation-sponsored action undoubtedly applied
pressure on the military junta running the country, the poorest
Haitians suffered its worst effects. Moreover, the negative
consequences of the embargo created a great many new challenges
for those seeking to help Haiti recover. United States assembly
companies that had been in Haiti, and then moved out at the request
of the United States government wanted recompense. Haitian
infrastructure deteriorated badly during the embargo and would cost
much more to repair. In short, the embargo, arguably useful in the
short-term to defeat the military regime, devastated Haiti
economically, making the longer-term United States objective of
restored growth much more complicated."
51. United States Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook (2000), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicationslfactbook.
52. Id.
53. DAVID J. ROTHKOPF, THE PRICE OF PEACE: EMERGENCY ECONOMIC INTERVENTION AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 15-6 (1998).
54. Id. at 16.
55. Id. at 16-17.
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External aid is essential to Haiti's future economic development.
Comparisons of social and economic indicators show that Haiti has been falling
behind other low-income developing countries (particularly in the hemisphere)
since the 1980s. Haiti's economic stagnation is the result of earlier
inappropriate economic policies, political instability, a shortage of good arable
land, environmental deterioration, continued use of traditional technologies,
undercapitalization, migration of large portions of the skilled population, and
a weak national savings rate.56 Domestic and foreign private investment has
been slow to return to Haiti due to concerns about political conditions and
economic reform, even though international financial institutions and donor
agencies have committed substantial sums to assist Haiti in restoring and
expanding its physical infrastructure. High domestic interest rates and poorly
developed internal capital markets are other factors restraining economic
performance.57 Today, the military institution is gone but the oligarchy remains.
Prospects for economic development and a substantive improvement in living
conditions are problematic. The redistribution of economic power in favor of
the poor majority does not seem likely. Although Mintz has argued that hardly
any beneficial long-term political change can be accomplished without such a
redistribution, this is an explosive issue.5" More than any other single factor, the
threat of class warfare led to the coup that overthrew Aristide in September
1991. A resurrection of that specter would have repolarized Haiti, risked more
violence, and frightened away investors. Economic reconstruction is critical to
the continued expansion of democracy in Haiti. In addition to the economic and
political difficulties, however, a more difficult obstacle to democracy in Haiti
may be psychological and cultural influences. The tradition of a predatory,
oppressive state has left Haitians deeply distrustful of government and of
foreigners.
VI. PSYCHOCULTURAL FACTORS: CREATING A COHESIVE COMMUNITY
We're All in the Same Boat, and This Boat Isn't Going to Florida.
Jennifer McCoy
The history of Haiti is one of sharply opposed interests, starkly competing
visions of state and nation, and a rigid class structure. If "the Haitian mind" or
attitude is meant to signify the political, economic, and social positions of the
majority, Haitians have been of one attitude only twice in their history. Their
56. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 28.
57. Id.
58. Schultz, supra note 41, at 102.
first coming together as a people was in the period 1791-1804, when they
bravely united against slavery and French colonialism. The second was in 1990,
when a majority of at least sixty-seven percent elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide
to the presidency in the country's first democratic and free elections. Events
since that election, however, reflect the deep divisions that developed in this
society between these two defining moments."
While pride in their historic accomplishment allows Haitians to think of
themselves as one nation despite the yawning social gulf that divides the top
from the bottom, this same pride also creates an inward focus that prevents
many Haitians from learning from others.' All Haitians sincerely consider
themselves members of the African race and claim bonds of brotherhood with
black Africans. Nevertheless, educated Haitians have always shared the
Europeans' paternalistic disparagement of things African.6 The fundamental
issue is how to create a sense among Haitians that they are all in the "same
boat," and that if one group or class goes overboard, the whole boat will sink.
The problem is that Haitian elites honestly believe, and have believed
for a century and a half, that they can survive without the poor, rural
majority of Haiti. Class structure, not merely income, and historical
tides, not simply the immediate past, are at the root of Haiti's modem
crisis. Indeed, a positive resolution of this crisis is impossible unless
these cultural and historical issues are understood and confronted.6"
The solution, Trouillot contended, involves a social contract between the
state and society, which lays out the obligations of each to the other. For Haiti,
as for most countries, the state preceded the nation at independence. But, unlike
other emerging democracies, the Haitian state did not achieve a social contract
that could produce a sense of national identity. Instead, in nineteenth century
Haiti, elites reacted to the rise of the peasantry not with a package of social
benefits that would have led the majority to believe that they were actually in
the same boat as the elites, but with a form of social apartheid. Elites have
believed that they could survive even if the majority did not. Thus, a sense of
sameness across class lines, a sense of nationhood, was never achieved in
Haiti.63
This cultural division among Haitians has created an internalized violence
in relation to the ethnic diversity of the population. Variation in skin color is
59. McCoy, supra note 6, at 10.
60. See KUMAR, supra note 21.
61. STOTZKY, supra note 7, at 23.
62. Id. at 18.
63. McCoy, supra note 6, at 4.
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perhaps the most "real" of the agents of cultural strife. There exists in Haiti a
historical tension between the older "mulatto" elites and the "black" middle
class. This is a complex issue, however, no aspect of Haitian history is more
confusing than the physical appearance of its people. Haiti is said to be divided
by color, but that is a gross simplification. It is closer to the truth to say that
consciousness of color varies between social classes and also within each class,
and that for many people light skin is symbolically important. But this
statement merely skims the surface. "The skin color of people must be seen as
part of a perceptual whole that includes hair type, nose type, lip type, eye color,
ear size and other features, such as amount of body and facial hair, and body
type."' As important as color is to Haitians, however, it is not clear that this
determined the identification that emerged of a ruling class, so much as did
education, military records, and personal connections. Thus, while color is a
significant cultural issue, it was not, at the birth of the nation, nor today, so
neatly a defining marker that social groups can safely be described in color
terms.
Similarly, variation in the use of language is one manifestation of cultural
division. All Haitians speak Haitian Creole to one degree or another. Eight to
ten percent of the population (the elites) speaks French well enough to claim
fluency, however, only a tiny minority within the elites is truly bilingual in both
French and Creole. More important than bilingualism is the messages given to
elite children that it is unacceptable for members of their class to speak Creole.65
Until Aristide's reinstatement to office, French was the official language in
schools and in the court systems. In this way, language is an effective social
barrier that denies majority participation in certain state institutions, thus ninety
percent of Haitians are excluded from power. Furthermore, there are subtle
nuances of meaning within Haitian Creole that illustrate cultural prejudices and
cynicism. For example, the word leta in Creole means both "the state" and
"bully." The urban people, in turn, refer to the rural peasants a mounn andewb,
which means "outsiders."'
Language manifests itself in the cultural divide as a tool of domination.
Whether one imagines hegemony to be relatively open or relatively closed, the
essence of the concept is not manipulation but legitimation. The ideas, values,
and experiences of dominant groups are validated in public discourse; those of
subordinate groups are not, though they may continue to thrive beyond the
boundaries of received opinion.67
64. STOTZKY, supra note 7, at 21-22.
65. HEINL & HEINL, supra note 26, at 5; STOTzKY, supra note 7, at 21.
66. STOTSKY, supra note 7, at 21.
67. T.J. JACKSON L.EARS, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, 90 AM.
HIST. REv. 567, 567-93 (1985).
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The very things that brought Haitians together are the very things that keep
them apart. Language and religion helped the Haitian peasants to face the
power deficit between master and slave, oppressor and oppressed, and a
dominant Europe and a subaltern Africa. In both Haitian language and Haitian
religion, one finds the necessary compromises and subterfuges that the weak use
to survive.
VII. RELIGION IN HAM: VOODOO OR CATHOLICISM-
MUST THERE BE A CHOICE?
It is often said that Vodun kept Haiti backward. Probably the reverse
is true: Vodun flourished because the rulers of Haiti denied their
multitudinous citizenry a chance to transform a socially and
economically stagnant rural life.
Robert Rotberg
Voodoo is deeply rooted in the Haitian culture; it is an amalgam of the
animist cults of West Africa infused with Catholic ritual. Voodoo plays a
central role in the life and history of Haiti, to disregard it is to foreclose serious
understanding of these people. Haitian Voodoo is the dominant system of
belief, therefore, an important national characteristic. The struggle between
Voodoo and the leading Christian faiths of Haiti (Roman Catholicism and, more
lately, Protestantism introduced by American missionaries) has been a constant
element in Haiti's social evolution.6"
Religious convictions and their representations divide Haitians culturally.
The elites proclaim their adherence to Christianity. Publicly, the elites associate
folk religion with evil, and successive Haitian governments have persecuted
many individuals who openly practice Vodun. Yet there is widespread evidence
that many of the elites themselves consistently practice aspects of it behind
closed doors. They thus claim for themselves a sense of cultural superiority
based on adherence to Christianity and rejection of Vodun (they have even
accepted the encouragement and support of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the
persecution of Vodun believers), while continuing to practice Vodun
themselves.6 9
A large number of the peasants, too, claim to be Roman Catholic
Christians. Indeed, they practice it and follow the annual cycle of Roman
Catholic events, but they also refer to themselves as "servants of the gods,"
members of the major Haitian folk religion Vodoun, Vodun or Voodoo (these
68. HEINL & HEINL, supra note 26, at 5.
69. STOTZKY, supra note 7, at 22.
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terms will be used interchangeably). In Vodun, Catholicism is joined with
Haitianized African religions to form an integrated system of beliefs and rituals.
As one peasant put it, "one has to be a Catholic to serve the loa (Vodun
spirits)." 70
Vodun is as much political as it is religious. President Aristide was
conscious of both the symbol and reality of Voodoo when he took the oath of
office in Creole, and received the presidential sash from a mambo (female
priestess) in February 1991, with symbolic forms of greeting that resonated
deeply within the population. His deliberate use of Creole indicated a break and
discontinuity in cultural patterns that was strangely symbolic of the synthesis in
Vodun, and dealt blows to both the elite language (French) and elite religion
(Catholicism).7
Vodun has an exploitative side, however. Duvalier extended his control
over the Haitian population through the use of Voodoo and the Houngans (male
priests). Houngans had traditionally played an important role in the local
community and had in the past often, but unsystematically, been exploited for
political purposes by the Haitian governments, especially when elections had
been imminent, while after elections Voodoo was often outlawed.72
Duvalier made use of his knowledge of Voodoo and its influence over the
masses to establish a more solid and enduring relationship with its leaders.
Rotberg argues that because Voodoo presents a form of government in the rural
areas since the country does not, Voodoo will only be replaced by development;
Vodun is resilient. Without Duvalier, as without Soulouque, its links to the state
will fade away. Its small, secure, parochial base of power will remain until that
distant day when modernization, if it ever comes to innermost Haiti, erodes the
very foundations of a protective security-giving cognitive universe.73
Vodun became so closely associated with the Duvalier regime that once
Duvalier fled, many houngans and mambos were killed in the ensuing popular
uprising.74
VIII. CONCLUSION
Healing the trauma that Haitians have experienced over the last 200 years
is a herculean task. More importantly, the task is to understand that both the
material (economic and political) and psychological (psychocultural)
70. Fatton, supra note 29, at 138.
71. Bellegard-Smith, supra note 39, at 29.
72. MATS LUNDAHL, POLICS OR MARKETS?: ESSAYS ON HAITIAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT 278
(1992).
73. Robert I. Rotberg, Vodun and the Politics of Haiti, in THE AFRICAN DIASPORA 365 (Martin L
Kilson & Robert I. Rothberg eds., 1976).
74. Fatton, supra note 29, at 139.
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dimensions interact to maintain or mitigate conflict in a society. Social cubism
allows for the identification of various interrelated or interlocking social factors
and their detrimental affects on Haiti. These factors must be examined in light
of one another to initiate understanding of the conflict. Although the factors,
when combined, may produce different patterns of importance or urgency, it is
important not to allow one factor to overshadow the others just because it
appears more salient at the time. According to Byrne and Carter, the
interlocking nature of the cube also indicates that addressing only one
dimension is unlikely to provide a settlement, and yet improvements in a single
facet may ameliorate others as well.75
If historical circumstances do not allow a new generation to reverse
traditions of powerlessness. The mental representation of the shared calamity
still bonds members of the group together. But instead of raising the group's
self-esteem, the mental image of the events link people through a continuing
sense of powerlessness, as though members of the group existed under the large
tent of victimhood.76 For Haitians as a society to emerge from this "tent of
victimhood," it is important to analyze the present dilemma using the social
cubism approach to intergroup conflict to account for how structural and
psychocultural mechanisms interact to exacerbate or ameliorate political
conflict, economic strife, and cultural divide that the country faces.
75. Byrnes & Carter, supra note 3, at 66.
76. VOLKAN, supra note 1, at 76.
2002]
SOCIAL CUBISM: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT
THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA
S. L Keethaponcalan*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 921
II. SOCIAL CUBISM .................................... 923
III. GEO-DEMOGRAPHY ................................... 924
IV . HISTORY .......................................... 926
V. ECONOMICS ....................................... 931
VI. POLITICS .......................................... 934
VII. CIVILIZATION ...................................... 937
Vill. PSYCHOLOGY ...................................... 938
IX. CONCLUSION ....................................... 939
I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict between the ethnic Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka is
one of the prominent ethnic problems in the world today. Sri Lanka is an island
nation located in the Indian Ocean south of the Indian subcontinent. Its
population of approximately eighteen million is comprised of of three major
social groups. According to the 1981 census, which was the last proper
headcount undertaken, Sinhalese constitute 74.6 percent, and Tamils form 18.1
percent, of the total population.' A vast majority of the Sinhalese are religiously
Buddhists. On the other hand, the Tamils are mostly Hindus. Muslims, who
constitute 7.4 percent of the total population, includee both Tamil-speaking and
Sinhala-speaking Muslims.' However, as a religious minority the Muslims in
Sri Lanka have developed a distinct identity different from that of the Sinhalese
and the Tamils.3 Apart from these major social groups, there are small numbers
* Ph.D., Department of Political Science, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
1. For detailed description of demographic information, see SUNIL BASTIAN, DEVOLUTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA (1994).
2. Most members of the Muslim population, the third largest social group in the country, speak
Tamil but do not consider themselves as part of the Tamil community. Complexity of the Muslim status in
the country lies in the fact that it neither belongs to Sinhalese nor Tamil ethnic groups with large number of
especially urban Muslims embracing Sinhalese as their language and medium of education. Since, however,
the Muslims in Sri Lanka have developed a distinct Muslim identity based on religion, they are considered
as a separate social group. Theoretically, the Muslims remain neutral in the conflict. In practice however, their
position always tilts toward the government of Sri Lanka.
3. See generally, S. I. Keethaponcalan, Understanding the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Conflict
Resolution Perspective, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK
(2000).
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of indigenous people and Burgers. Christianity is professed by Sinhalese,
Tamils, and Burgers, and it is the religion of approximately 8 percent.
The two major ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamil, are in conflict
over territorial claims. The Tamils are in a war against the state of Sri Lanka for
a separate state in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island that they
claim is their "traditional homeland."4 Although the confrontation between
these groups could be traced to a historical and pre-colonial era, the post-
independence period witnessed intense conflict and a war. The Sinhalese and
the Tamils are two different ethnic groups with distinct characteristics.
Linguistically, the Sinhalese speak Sinhala, which is described as an Indo-Aryan
language. Tamil, which is spoken by ethnic Tamils, is Dravidian. The Tamils
live mostly in the Northern and Eastern parts of the island while Sinhalese are
concentrated in all other provinces, although the ethnic war has severely altered
the demographic patterns in the recent past.
Sri Lanka was ruled by three western colonial powers (Portuguese, Dutch,
and British) for almost four centuries. At the end of the British rule there
emerged a Christianized, educated, and English-speaking elite comprised of
members of both ethnic groups. This group represented not only cordial ethnic
relations but also a successful forum for constitutional reform for the then-
Ceylon.5 Differences began to emerge in the early 1920s and culminated in the
mid-1980s with violent expression and the struggle for a separate state for the
minority Tamils.6
The Tamil separatist movement resulted from a demand for greater Tamil
autonomy in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Tamil
dissatisfaction with the national politics of Sri Lanka, then called Ceylon, was
expressed even before the island nation was granted independence in 1948. The
cry for greater autonomy that provided the foundation for the separatist
movement gained force with the emergence of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam,
considered by many to be the founding father of Tamil nationalism.
7
Chelvanayagam's movement for regional autonomy was fundamentally a
nonviolent struggle very much modeled on the Gandhian way of satyagraha.
The nonviolent struggle, which lasted for about thirty years, not only failed to
produce any substantial results in favor of the Tamil but in later years forced the
4. For further details, see TULF, Tamil United Liberation Front Towards Devolution of Power in
Sri Lanka - Main Documents, August 1983 to October 1987 (1988) (Tamil United Liberation Front, Madras).
5. J.A. Wilson, S.J.V.CHELVANAYAKAM AND THE CRISIS OF SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM,
1947 - 1977: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 107 (1994).
6. Id.
7. See generally, J.A. Wilson, SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (2000).
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radical elements among the Tamils into the forefront of the national struggle!8
This state of affairs was in a sense caused by the belief of the Sri Lankan State,
as well as in later years the belief of Tamil militants, that excessive violence
resolved conflicts.
The vicious cycle of violence was perpetuated by the actions and reactions
of the parties involved in the conflict, and the conflict turned into an intense
war. The war, which has claimed tens of thousands of lives in both sides of the
spectrum, is fought by the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamils Eelam-the major fighting force among the Tamils. Because both
parties lack the power to impose a military solution on the other and lack
confidence on peaceful means to achieve their goals, the war has continued for
about eighteen years without any signs of peaceful solutions.9
Because the predicament in Sri Lanka, apart from its internal implications,
is highly dangerous regionally as well as internationally, a substantial academic
attention is paid to analyzing the causes, consequences, and ways to deal with
the conflict. These studies, however, either embrace a historical descriptive
method or take one factor as the basic cause of the conflict and focus on that
particular element. For example, economic factors are most often analyzed as
the major cause of the conflict.'0 This study, however, argues that psychology
of the people is the fundamental factor for this conflict, and that all other factors
influence the shape of that psychology.
H1. SOCIAL CUBISM
Social Cubism provides a comprehensive tool to look at ethnic conflicts
and understand the multiple forces behind them. Therefore, it is a useful
framework for conflict analysis." Moreover, Byrne and Carter consider "the
social cube of conflict as having six interrelated facets or forces: history,
religion, demographics, political institution and non-institutional behavior,
economics, and psychocultural. These six facets or social forces combine to
produce patterns of inter-group behavior."' 2 This article, therefore, analyzes the
Sri Lankan conflict using the social cube as the framework. This chapter,
however, does not embrace all the six forces as provided by the original cubism
framework, because the Sri Lankan conflict requires a slightly modified
framework for a better understanding of the conflict.
8. Id.
9. Keethaponcalan, supra note 3.
10. Perera, J., Sri Lanka: History of Ethnic Relations, Formation of the Tamil National Identiry and
the Demand for a Separate State, in SCANDINAVIAN J. OF DEV. ALTERNATIVES 9(2/3), at 67-84.
11. Sean Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, in PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES 3(2), 52-71.
12. Id. at 4.
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One facet of the original cubism framework is demography. In Sri Lanka,
although demography plays a prominent role in the origin of the conflict, it is
very closely involved with geographic factors inside as well as outside of the
island. Therefore, it is imperative to give equal weight to the geographical
factors as well. However, because demographic and geographic factors are not
two independent variables but are very much intertwined, I replace demography
in the original cubism model with "geo-demography." This enables the
researcher to consider geographic and demographic factors equally.
The term "politics" or "political" is not only much-debated in scholarly
literature but still remains vague as a concept. Byrne and Carter in 1996,
although they did not define the "political facet" of the cube, discuss boundaries
and terrorism as political factors. 3 In this article, I take as political factors (1)
(political) institutions and (2) constitutions. The original cubism framework is
insufficient for the Sri Lankan conflict, as it does not provide space for
discussion of the ethnic factors that form one of the fundamental facets in this
conflict. Byrne & Carter apply Social Cubism to the Northern Ireland and
Quebec conflicts that are primarily religion-based conflicts. 4 Therefore, it is
understandable that they used religion as a facet in their analysis. While the Sri
Lankan conflict is primarily ethnic, it has a religious angle to it. In order to
accommodate these different facets, I consider psychology separately from
culture, and I expand civilization to include ethnic, racial, religious and cultural
factors.
In essence, my cubism model includes the following six facets: (1) Geo-
demography (geography and demography), (2) History, (3) Economics, (4)
Politics (constitutions and institutions) (5) Civilization (ethnic, racial, religious
and cultural), and (6) Psychology.
11I. GEO-DEMOGRAPHY
I have argued elsewhere that the principal cause of conflict between the
Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka is the "fear of extinction," intertwined
with suspicion, and superior and inferior complexities. These factors will be
analyzed in detail under the sub-title "psychology." However, the psychological
factors have been deeply influenced by other facets of Social Cubism. In that
sense, the geography and demography of the country have played a crucial role
in escalating the conflict between the protagonists.
As far as the demographic distribution of the country is concerned, the
Sinhalese and the Tamils are the two major social groups. However, there are




Kandyan Sinhalese and (2) Low Country Sinhalese, depending on the
geographical location of the people. Divisions between these groups were
obvious and clear in the pre-independence period. However, after the
independence these differences have largely disappeared.15 The Tamils, on the
other hand, are divided into two social groups: 1) the "Ceylon Tamils" (or now
the "Sri Lankan Tamils") who consider themselves the original inhabitants of
Northern and eastern regions; and 2) the so-called "Up-country Tamils" (or
"Tamils of recent origin") who were brought to the country by the British
colonial administration to work in the tea plantations. Up-country Tamils are
concentrated mainly in central Sri Lanka and urban areas such as Colombo, the
capitol city. In spite of the commonalties between the Sri Lankan Tamils and
the Up-country Tamils, they are officially considered two different groups. The
Up-country Tamil do not have a direct role in the conflict. Therefore, when
referring to "Tamil" in this article, I mean the Sri Lankan Tamils.
When Sri Lanka was granted independence by the British in 1948, the
Tamils enjoyed absolute majority in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the
country, which constitute nine provinces in total. 6 The Tamils not only
considered the Northern and Eastern provinces as their homeland but also had
pushed for greater regional autonomy for Tamil majority areas even before
independence-they were suspicious about the intentions of Sinhala leaders on
the eve of independence. One of the circumstances that created much reaction
from the Tamil people was, as they preferred to call it, the "state sponsored
settlement" of Sinhala people by successive governments in the Tamil areas.
The Tamils believed that the settlements were aimed at reducing the Tamil
majority in these two provinces that were considered as fundamental for their
survival as an ethnic group. Consequences of the settlement schemes, the
Tamils feared, will lead to the weakening of their position politically as well as
threaten their existence in the long term.
The Sinhalese, on the other hand, strongly disputed this claim and argued
that it was necessary to establish settlements in order to accommodate the
growing population in the south. The basis of the Sinhalese people's argument
is that it is unfair for a group that represents only twelve percent of the
population to claim nearly one third of the total landscape of the country.
Whatever the arguments by the competing groups, the net effect of the "state
sponsored settlement" in the Northern and Eastern provinces is that it effectively
reduced the Tamil dominance in the eastern province. Also, it broke the
contiguity of Tamil majority areas and thus seriously challenged the homeland
15. This is not to suggest that these differences have disappeared completely. At a micro-level, one
can still notice that people consciously refer to the cast differences within the Sinhalese society.
16. The Tamils currently have their demographic strength in the Eastern province.
2002]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:921
concept and strengthened the threat perception that the Tamils had about their
Sinhalese counterparts.
Threat perception does not only exist among the Tamils. Sinhalese also
possessed a fear of Tamil dominance. The Sinhalese are, in a sense, a majority
with a minority complex. Although the Sinhalese are the majority community
within the state of Sri Lanka, regionally they become a minority to the Tamils:
the Southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu constitutes approximately fifty-five
million Tarnils. 7 Only a narrow water called Palk Strait divides Tamil Nadu
and the northernmost point of Sri Lanka. The Tamils enjoy cultural, linguistic,
as well as religious commonalties with their counterparts in Tamil Nadu.
Interestingly, Tamil Nadu was the first state ever to openly demand separation
from the Republic of India in the early 1960s. Although the separatist
movement disappeared in the late 1960s, Tamil nationalism remained stronger.
Some even suggested that the Tamil Nadu leaders' desire for separation did not
totally fade away.
Relations between the Tamils in Sri Lanka and India were so strong that
the Tamil militant movement in its early days enjoyed tremendous support from
the people of Tamil Nadu. After the ethnic riots of 198318 in Sri Lanka, in
which the Tamils were brutalized, the political leaders in Tamil Nadu competed
among themselves to support the Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka. The killing of
the former Prime Minister of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, for which the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was blamed, to a great extent eliminated this
support base. However, the collaboration between Tamils in India and Sri
Lanka brought about a suspicion in the Sinhala psyche: they conceived the
collaboration as a conspiracy to form a greater Tamil Eelam, centered around
the separate state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese basically
apprehended the creation of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka as a launching pad for
the creation of a greater Tamil state. In the Sinhalese mind, the greater Tamil
state is a direct threat to the Sinhala state and race. The Sinhalese continue to
resist any suggestion for devolution of power-the focal point of any attempt
at conflict resolution- claiming that any devolved power would eventually lead
to the creation of separate Tamil Eelam and greater Tamil state.
IV. HISTORY
History is one of the most debated factors in this conflict. It has been
interpreted by the conflicting parties according to their positions and, to a
greater extent, exploited to strengthen those positions. Analyzing the Tamil
17. See generally T.E. ANANDARAJAH, CENTER FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES. No. 18,
THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL SYSTEM AND DEVOLUTION OF LAW AND ORDER (1994).
18. See generally JANI DE SILVA, CENTRIPETAL PRESSURES AND REGIME CHANGES IN THE POST-
COLONIAL SRI LANKA IN BASTIAN (1994).
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exploitation of history to justify their demands, Rajanayagam points out that
"the more relations between the two groups deteriorated the more history
became a weapon in the battle to justify Tamil demand for autonomy and, in
principle, independence."' 9 According to Nissan & Stirrat:
Both present the past in terms of the interaction of two opposed
entities, Sinhala and Tamils, who have always been as separate as
they are today. Second, they consist of arguments over events which
allegedly occurred between the fourth century B.C and the tenth
century A.C.D. Third, they present the two communities as
historically and continuously opposed through warfare, joining an
ancient past to the present with no regard for the hiatus of centuries.
Fourth, the histories are both concerned with a "national people's
claim to its own territory. Finally each side presents the other as little
more than barbarians. Both sides in the present political context back
up their respective claims through selective and competitive use of
archaeological evidence." 20
Both parties claim that they are the original people of the island, and the
others are invaders. Although, there is no evidence to prove who the original
inhabitants are or who the first settlers are, one obvious fact that emerged from
the existing theories is that both ethnic groups arrived on the island, probably
from the Indian subcontinent, and settled in different parts. It seems there is no
dispute over the concept that both ethnic groups settled on the island from India.
However, some scholars believe that both groups arrived on the island
approximately the same time. Regardless of the validity, these claims are
providing moral foundations for the nationalist sentiments of both groups, and
there are vicious debates about the rightful ownership of the land in printed
literature as well as in public fora.
In 1815, Sri Lanka was brought under one administration only by the
British. Prior to the arrival of western colonial powers, the island was under the
control of several regional monarchs. For example, when the Portuguese
arrived in 1505, the island constituted three kingdoms: two ruled by Sinhala
kings and one by a Tamil king. The existence of a Tamil kingdom of Jaffna in
the written history of the island provided the basic nucleus for the Tamil
nationalism and still serves as the foundation for demand for the separate state
of Tamil Eelam. On the other hand, the Sinhalese believe that there existed a
19. Dagmar Hellman-Rajanayagam, The Politics of Tamil Past, in SRI LANKA: HISTORY AND THE
ROOTS OF CONFLICT 116 (Jonathan Spencer eds.,1990).
20. Elizabeth Nissan, & R.L. Stirrat, The Generation of Communal Identities, in Sri Lanka: History
and the Roots of Conflict 21 (Jonathan Spencer eds., 1990).
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pre-historic Sinhala kingdom in Sri Lanka that dominated the whole island.
This is also used to justify the Sinhala right to political control.
In addition to its contribution o the nationalist sentiments on both sides,
history also functioned as a source of fear psychology and victimization in the
minds of both ethnic communities. For example, the history of the island
suggests that the Southern Indian rulers from the Indian subcontinent, believed
to be Tamil kings, invaded the island a number of times. There is evidence that
the Chola kingdom was expanded to include parts of the island centuries ago.2
These arguments were used to depict the Tamils as invaders and to claim that
the Sinhalese were victims of alien Tamil invasion. In the same vein, Tamils
contend that the Sinhalese attempted to ethnically eliminate the Tamils from the
island, even from the ancient time. For example, charging the Sinhala history
as Genocidal, Vanniasingham-an ethnic Tamil-writes in his preface as
follows:
according to Sinhalese chronicles, King Dutta Gemunu waged a Holy
War against the Tamils, with a contingent of five hundred bhikkus
actually accompanying the Army in its campaign. He killed the
thirty-two Tamil sub-kings who acknowledged the suzerainty of King
Ellalan, and ultimately Ellalan also, and established himself at
Anuradhapura. However, in his last days he did not have any peace
of mind: he was worried that his killing millions of Tamils would
debar him from entering Heaven. Ultimately he was consoled by the
Buddhist hierarchy that the Tamils whom he had caused to be killed
had not embraced Buddhism and as such were equivalent only to
beasts; killing them was no sin and thus he would not be debarred
from entering Heaven. Obviously, the "millions of Tamils" does not
refer to soldiers in the battlefield but to innocent civilians. Thus the
Sinhalese records admit a genocidal attack on the Tamils in the
second century before Christ carried on in the name of Lord
Buddha.22
The post-independent history of the country also has the same impact in the
Tamil perception. Some of the laws and public policies formulated by the
Sinhala dominated governments immediately after the independence, making
the Tamils believe that the Sinhalese seek to reduce Tamils to second class
citizens and eventually terminate their existence. For example, one of the first
acts undertaken by the first post-independence government, headed by the late
D. S. Senanayake, was to disenfranchise the "Tamils of recent Indian origin,"
21. R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, The People of Lion: The Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and
Historiography, in SRI LANKA: HISTORY AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT 45-86 (Jonathan Spencer, ed. 1990).
22. S. Vanniasinghamn, SRI LANKA: THE CONFLICT WITHIN ix (1988).
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who are also called Estate Tamils. Although there are social differences
between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian Tamils, they share a similar
culture, same language and religion.
The Indian Tamils were brought to the Island by the British to labor in the
tea industry, mainly in the central region of the country.23 Presence of Indian
Tamils-who formed nearly seven percent of the total population-later posed
a threat to the Sinhalese people as well as the ruling United National Party
(UNP) Government. While the local Sinhalese people felt that the Indian
Tamils were taking over their land, the ruling UNP, which is capitalist in core,
considered them politically unfavorable because the Indian Tamils tended to
vote with the leftist parties.24 Therefore, the government intended to kill two
birds with one stone and introduced the Citizenship Acts of 1948-49, which
essentially made the Indian Tamils a stateless people.25
The effect of this act on ethnic relations was that the Ceylon Tamils
conceived this action as a step towards Sinhala dominance against all minorities,
especially against the Ceylon Tamils. Although the predominant Tamil party
at that time, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) headed by late G.G.
Ponnambalam, failed to oppose the Citizenship Act, Ponnambalam's deputy
Chelvanayagam did.26 Chelvanayagam split from the ACTC and formed a new
political party called the Federal Party (FP), which soon became the spearhead
of Tamil nationalism and its demand for regional autonomy. When the Federal
Party was warning the Tamil people of the move towards Sinhala domination
by successive governments, the Sinhala Only Act was introduced strengthening
the argument that the Tamils were made second-class citizens in their own
land.
2 7
The 1956 Sinhala Only Act was a direct result of the election pledge made
by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) that was formed by S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike, who defected from the UNP in the early 1950s. During the 1956
election for the national parliament, Bandaranaike promised the Sinhala people
that if he were given a chance to form the government he would make Sinhala
the only official language of the country. He kept his promise after a
resounding victory in the election.28 The Sinhala Only Act required the public
employees to qualify in the Sinhala language if they wanted to continue in their
23. Perera, supra note 10.
24. Id.
25. Kumar Rupesinghe, Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace
Keeping Force, in 25 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 4, 337-350 (1988).
26. Id.
27. See generally K. LOGANATHAN, SRI LANKA: LOST OPPORTUNITIES, PAST ATTEMPTS AT
RESOLVING ETHNIC CONFLICT (1996).
28. Rajanayagam, D.H., Sri Lanka-A Current Perspective, in ASIAN AFFAIRS 314-329 (1991).
2002]
930 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:921
positions. This Act, though, affected all non-Sinhala speaking (minority)
groups, and it had serious repercussion for Tamils, who dominated the public
sector employment.
In addition to ensuring the "rightful position" of the Sinhala people in the
national life, the Act was intended to reduce the Tamil dominance in the public
sector employment. It effectively fulfilled that expectation. "With the
implementation of Sinhala as the language of government," Mitra and Lewis
claim, "the specter of Tamils being denied jobs in the government service and
of Tamils losing their cultural heritage to the Sinhalese began to spread
throughout the Tamil Community."29 The Tamils felt that by enacting the
Sinhala Only Act, the government successfully pushed the Tamil language to
an inferior position in terms of its relevance to national affairs.30
The Tamil writers, most often than not, cite state-sponsored colonization
schemes as one of the major milestones in the inimical relationship between
these two communities. The Tamil community looked at the colonization
schemes as a conspiracy to divide their paramount position in the Northern and
Eastern provinces. Colonization of Sinhalese peasantry in the North-central and
Eastern provinces was launched almost immediately after independence, with
the Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake leading the campaign. It was argued that
the colonization was imperative for the agricultural development of the country
as well as for accommodating the fast-growing population in the south by
successive governments. 3' However, one major but hidden aim was to reduce
the demographic dominance of the Tamil-speaking people in the Northern and
Eastern provinces. Referring to the impact of colonization schemes, the most
senior leaders of TULF (Mr. S. Sivasithamparam and Mr. A. Amirthalingam)
claimed that "serious inroads have been made into these homelands by policy
of planned colonization with Sinhalese carried out by successive Sinhala
governments since independence. 32 The contiguous nature of these provinces
supported the Tamil claim that these provinces were their homeland and formed
the foundation of the proposed Tamil region.
By indulging in massive colonization schemes of Sinhala people in a
region called Manallaaru or Welioya, the governments were successful in
breaking this contiguous nature. Manallaaru or Welioya is still considered to
be a highly strategic move by the government in its war against the LTTE.
Nevertheless, the colonization programs strengthened the Tamil perception of
29. See generally SUBRATA K. MrrRA & R. ALLISON LEWIS, SUB-NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH
ASIA 44 (1996).
30. De Silva, supra note 18.
31. Mitra & Lewis, supra note 29.
32. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was the prominent democratic party representing
the Tamils in the parliament in the 1960s and 1970s. See, TULF, supra note 4, at 19.
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a "Sinhala conspiracy" to ethnically cleanse Sri Lanka, to make the Tamil
people extinct, and to occupy the Tamil homeland.
Therefore, the history of this island has not only been used by parties to the
conflict according to their interpretations, and to a greater extent to strengthen
their positions, but it has also helped to reinforce their fears about the other
ethnic group. Fear in turn forced the parties to take extreme measures in order
to ensure their safety and, in a sense, their survival. The Tamil decision to lead
a violent campaign against the State of Sri Lanka and many State policies
against the minorities can be explained in terms of fear psychology.
V. ECONOMICS
Economics play a significant role in many modem ethnic and other deep-
rooted conflicts.33 The Sri Lankan conflict is no exception, as economic factors
contributed vastly for the origin and development of the conflict as well as the
escalation of violence. The economic facet of the conflict can be traced to the
colonial period, especially to the British rule. When the British attempted to fill
their administration in Sri Lanka with local white workers, who were
considerably cheaper compared to their white counterparts on the island, the
Tamils-particularly Jaffna Tamils-were in a favorable position to occupy
public sector employment.' This was because of the educational advantages
the Tamils had over their Sinhala counterparts. The Jaffna Tamils benefited
immensely from American missionary activities centered on Jaffna during the
colonial period.35 At the initial stage, Sinhalese were not enthusiastic about
English education, partly for religious reasons. Therefore, over the course of
time, the Sinhalese were not able to compete with the Tamils for public sector
employment. Commentators point out that at the time of independence the civil
service had a disproportionate number of Tamils in it, especially at its higher
ranks. Tamils comprised about 30 percent of the upper levels of the civil
service while comprising only 22.7 percent of the population in the 1946 census.
The Sinhalese comprised 69.4 percent of the population and 57.6 percent of the
upper levels of the civil service.36
The Sinhalese, however, conceived this state of affairs as the British
favoring the minority over the majority. This was understood in terms of the
British policy of "divide and rule" and Tamil collaboration with colonialists.
Naturally this perception fueled Sinhala animosity against the Tamils.
33. SEAN BYRNE & CYNTHIA L. IRVIN, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN
ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS 107 (2000).
34. See generally, BUDDHADASA HEWAVITHARANA, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE
DEVOLUTION PACKAGE AND AN EVALUATION OF DECENTRALIZATION (1997).
35. See generally, DAVID LrTLE, SRI LANKA: THE INVENTION OF ENMITY (1994).
36. MITRA & LEWIS, supra note 29, at 148.
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However, the Tamils continued to dominate public sector employment even
after independence. According to Rajanayagam, the Tamils had found their
living mainly in government service and the professions, and education was said
to be Jaffna's major "industry." The soil there is ard and can be made fertile
only with a lot of hard work. Even then it does not support the population, and
as a result the youth are dependent on civil service jobs and the professions for
a living. Under British rule, this had indeed led to a certain over-representation
of Tamils in these sectors, particularly because the Sinhalese resisted the
mission-based education more than the Tamils and were involved in trade and
commerce to a greater extent.37
Nevertheless, the Sinhalese conceived the Tamil dominance of public
sector employment as a "historic injustice" committed against their race by the
colonial masters with the assistance of the Tamil minorities.38 With
independence literally transferring state power from the British to the Sinhalese
political leaders, the Sinhalese were in a comfortable position to compensate
themselves for past "injustice. Measures were introduced to ensure the
interests of the Sinhalese community both within the legislative framework of
the state and under the guise of public policy.
Unfortunately, these measures were proved to be detrimental to the
aspirations of the minority communities. The language policies were of the
utmost of importance in this regard. The 1956 Sinhala Only Act was, among
other things, a major blow for the economic survival of the Jaffna Tamils
because it required public sector employees to qualify in Sinhala language
within a stipulated period. Tens of thousands of Tamils lost their employment
as a result. Sinhala was further upgraded to be the language of the courts soon
after.'
What the Sri Lankan government called "standardization" was introduced
in 1972 as an education policy to help Sinhala students obtain the bulk of the
admissions to the universities. Essentially, standardization "meant that students
from the Tamil stream had to have disproportionately higher entrance exam
marks than those from the Sinhalese stream to get a place in the university. This
was openly designed to reduce the allegedly over-representation of Tamils in the
universities."'" In addition, Rajanayagam points out that it was the
standardization policy that "hit the (Tamil) youth hardest, and it can be said that
37. Rajanayagam, supra note 28, at 316.
38. Hewavitharana, supra note 34.
39. Keethaponcalan, supra note 3.
40. De Silva, supra note 18.
41. Rajanayagam, supra note 18, at 316.
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it triggered the subsequent violent conflict, because it virtually foreclosed their
future. 4
2
The policy of "nationalization," which was characterized as
"Sinhalesization" by the Tamils, also had the same effect on the economic
survival of the Tamil population. The S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's government
introduced the nationalization process, and large number of institutions,
including commercial establishments and educational organizations, were
brought under the patronage of the government. According to Rupesinghe,
[w]ith the electoral victory of the SLFP in 1956, the pursuit of
Sinhalese hegemony was provided with political power. This was
used to introduce legislation against colonial economic interests, and
to create the conditions for the Sinhalesization of the state. These
policies are reflected particularly in language policy through the
Sinhala Only Act, but also in other spheres such as education,
employment, and land colonization."3
These policies put the Tamils in a strongly disadvantaged position in
competitions for employment in those institutions. Not only the business and
educational establishments but also the state organs were radically
"Sinhalesized" during Bandaranaike era and after. For example, the state's
armed forces were filled with members of the Sinhala community. "From 1970
there was virtually no Tamil recruitment into the armed forces." Even today,
these institutions remain very much Sinhala establishments.45
The resulting lack of economic opportunities not only frustrated the Tamil
community, particularly the youth, but also forced them to think about
alternatives that would ensure their power and development. At that point of
time a separate state seemed a viable alternative. The Tamils also realized,
probably from past experience, that only a violent campaign could help create
such a state. The decision to take up arms was made at the height of the
frustration among Tamil youth. Frustration leads to aggression.' This was
proved to be true in the Sri Lankan Tamil case.
42. Id.
43. Rupesinghe, supra note 25, at 343.
44. Id.
45. James Manor & Gerald Segal, Causes of Conflict: Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean Strategy, in XXV
AsIAN SURVEY 7, 1165-1185 (1985).
46. See generally TED ROBERT GURR, WHY' MEN REBEL (1971).
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VI. POLrncs
The political facet of Social Cubism includes constitutional as well as
institutional factors, including party politics, in contributing to the evolution of
ethnic conflicts. In Sri Lanka all these factors were involved in the increasing
dissatisfaction of the Tamils towards the Sri Lankan State and the enmity
between the two conflicting groups.
The 1946 Soulbury Constitution provided the foundation for the
independence of the country in 1948. Although local concerns were taken into
consideration, the Soulbury constitution was essentially designed by the British
and was in effect until 1972. 47 In 1972 the new First Republican Constitution
replaced this constitution. The Soulbury constitution provided some
constitutional safeguards for the minorities because the Tamil had already began
to raise their voices against Sinhala dominance in the body politics of the
country. For example, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), the chief
political party representing the Tamil people, put forward a proposal popularly
known as "50:50." This proposal advocated a constitutional arrangement that
would ensure that fifty percent of the parliamentary seats to go to all the
minorities.48 First, it did not conform to liberal democratic principles. On the
other hand, the majority Sinhalese immediately rejected it. Therefore, this
proposal enjoyed no major support at that time.
However, as mentioned elsewhere, the Soulbury constitution provided
number of safeguards to the minorities against majority dominance. For
example, Article 29 "specifically denied authority to the Parliament to make
laws discriminatory against or in favor of any particular community. The Privy
Council observed that this was an entrenched clause in that it was not within the
power of the Parliament to amend or repeal the said clause. '49 Meanwhile, a
Second Chamber (Senate) was also created in the parliament in order to, among
other objectives, accommodate minority opinions.50  Also the constitution
ensured that the state would remain secular because it is a multi-religious
community. Effectiveness of these arrangements was a subject of discussion,
because the principles were violated on several instances. For example, the
1956 Sinhala Only Act was passed in the parliament in spite of the fact that the
constitution did not allow any legislation that favored only one racial or
religious community (Article 29).i
47. See generally SUMANTRA BOSE, STATES, NATIONS, SOVEREIGNITY: SRI LANKA, INDIA AND THE
TAMIL EELAM MOVEMENT (1994).
48. See generally Perera, supra note 10.
49. Vanniasingham, supra note 22.
50. CONSTITrLONAL STRUCTURE AND DEVOLUTION OF POWER (Victor Gunewardena & D.
Wesumperuma, eds. 1987).
51. BOSE, supra note 47.
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The First Republican Constitution of 1972 did not include Article 29, and
it also abolished the second chamber in the parliament. This constitution made
the country a unitary state.52 Buddhism was constitutionally given the foremost
place, and the First Republican Constitution placed the responsibility on the
state "to protect and foster Buddhism."53 Sinhala was retained as the only
official language of the state. These features of the new constitution reinforced
the Tamil view that they were made second-class citizens within the country.
The 1978 constitution did not make any major changes to these controversial
features except for language policy. Tamil was recognized as one of the
national languages in this constitution.' Referring to the arrangement on
Buddhism, Warnapala claims that "Chapter 11, which deals with Buddhism, is
more or less the same as in the 1972 Constitution except that the word
'Sasana'-the Buddhist dispensation - is included. The use of this traditional
(Sinhala) description makes the chapter on Buddhism more effective."55
An important characteristic of these republican constitutions is that they
centralized the state's power to a greater extent both administratively as well as
politically. Manor and Segal point out that "although Sri Lanka had an open,
representative political system based on universal suffrage as far back as 1931,
power was still grossly over-centralized. No representative institutions existed
at any intermediate level between parliament in Colombo and the local level."5
Such a political environment left the Tamils with no power over either
national affairs or their regional issues, because policymaking was and has been
controlled from Colombo. Following the nonviolent struggle waged by the
Federal Party led by S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, two pacts were signed.57 The first
was made between Prime Minister Bandaranayake and Chelvanayagam in 1957,
and the second between Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake and
Chelvanayagam in 1965. The Banda-Chelva pact, as it is called, provided for
devolution of power on the basis of Regional Councils. The Dudley-Chelva
pact also agreed that the District Councils would be the principle unites for
devolution. Unfortunately both these agreements were unilaterally scrapped by
the respective governments, forcing the Tamils to lose any faith they had in
reaching agreements with Sri Lanka's governments.58
52. W. A. Wiswa Wamapala, Sri Lanka's New Constitution, in XX ASIAN SURVEY 9, 914-930
(1980).
53. Perera, supra note 10.
54. Warnapala, supra note 52.
55. Id. at 917.
56. Manor & Segal, supra note 45.
57. Willson, supra note 7.
58. Loganathan, supra note 27.
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The nature of party politics in the country also helped escalate the tension
between these communities. Two major parties, namely the United National
Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), represent the majority
of Sinhala people. Both parties can be labeled as "Sinhala parties" in spite of
the meager support they enjoy among the Tamil and Muslim populations,
because their support base is predominately Sinhala. 59 The Sri Lankan Tamils
were represented first by the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) and then by
Federal Party (FP). The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was formed in
the early 1970s as a combined force of Tamil people and enjoyed overwhelming
support of the Tamils in Northern and Eastern provinces.6 ° While Muslim
people tend to vote with the so-called national parties (the UNP and the SLFP),
the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) has represented them since the mid-
1980s. The Indian Tamils predominantly supported the Ceylon Workers
Congress (CWC), and its support base has been confined to tea estates in central
Sri Lanka as well as areas where people of Indian origin live densely. As one
can conceive, party politics in Sri Lanka has been sharply divided along ethnic
as well as religious loyalties.6
This trend undoubtedly encouraged the political parties and their
candidates to extensively employ ethnic and religious slogans in order to win
the numbers game, which is an essential part of liberal democracy. Most often,
ethnic and religious slogans turned against the "other" communities, and the
"others" were depicted as foes. In fact, the political parties were competing to
offer the strongest possible measure against the other communities if they were
elected to power. The 1956 Sinhala Only Act, for example, was originally an
election promise made by the SLFP.62 When the UNP also endorsed the one
language policy, the SLFP leader promised the Sinhala people "Sinhala only
within twenty-four hours" because (according to Vanniasingham)
"Bandaranaike found that 'Sinhala only within twenty-four hours' would be the
sure-fire-vote catcher.,
63
Tamil parties, too, comprehensively manipulated racial slogans against
Sinhala people and the state, particularly in Tamil majority areas. Thus, the
resolution for a separate state of Tamil Eelam came into force as an election
promise. Siriweera points out that "according to the TULF's election manifesto
59. See generally G.R. TRESSIE LEITAN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION THROUGH DECENTRALIZATION
AND DEVOLUTION OF POWER: THE SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE (1990).
60. W.I. Siriweera, Recent Developments in Sinhala - Tamil Relations, in ASIAN SURVEY 9, 903-913
(1980).
61. Leitan, supra note 59.
62. See generally S.S. MISRA, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND SECURITY CRISIS IN SRI LANKA (1995). See
also Rupesinghe, supra note 25.
63. Vanniasingham, supra note 22, at 13.
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[of 1976] the question to be resolved was whether the Tamils wanted their
freedom or continued servitude to the Sinhala-dominated government."' This
sort of shortsighted "vision" of political parties in this country helped only to
increase the vacuum between the conflicting communities.
VII. CIVILZATION
At least in their minds, the Sinhalese and the Tamils are two different
groups of people originating from different civilizations. The conventional
wisdom is that the Sinhalese are descendants of a north Indian Aryan race and
the Tamils are Dravidians, whose geographical base is in South India. It is
imperative to note that there exists an interesting academic discourse which
advances a number of theories regarding the origin and inter-relations of these
groups. For example, some scholars suggest that the Sinhalese and the Tamils
are descendants of same racial stock, probably Dravidian, and others maintain
that the Sinhalese are in fact descendants of aboriginal people called Veddas
who still live in small numbers in the remote mountain areas of Sri Lanka. Yet,
these academic debates in reality do not make any substantial changes in the
perceptions one group holds about the other, which are fundamentally negative.
Moreover, there are obvious differences between these groups. The
Sinhalese speak Sinhala and most of them are Buddhist. The Tamils, on the
other hand, speak Tamil and are predominantly Hindus. There is a Christian
community that includes both Sinhalese as well as Tamil. The common factor
of Christianity failed to make any impact in bridging the gap between the
ethnically different antagonists, because the Sinhala Christians and the Tamil
Christians feel emotional proximity to Buddhism and Hinduism, respectively.
This emotional attachment is based on their ethnic loyalties as well as on
cultural appreciation of those religions. This trend has even influenced some
Tamil Christians and Sinhala Christians to declare that they are culturally
Hindus and Buddhists, respectively.
Nevertheless, the religious aspect of the conflict is somewhat complicated.
It is safe to assume that this conflict is essentially an ethnic one rather than
religious, even though the groups entangled are religiously different. To a
certain extent, religious factors are involved. The Tamil language and Hinduism
are not intertwined to the same degree as Sinhala language and Buddhism. For
the Sinhalese community, their language and religion are one and the same. In
other words, one cannot survive without the other. Rupesinghe points out that
"the Buddhist revival was associated with the conception of the Sinhalese as an
'Aryan' race, and that Buddhism and Sinhalese were synonymous with each
64. Siriweera, supra note 60, at 903.
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other."65 Sinhala Buddhism is the foundation of Sinhalese survival and well-
being, and it is an integral part of Sinhalese identity. The Sinhalese believe that
Buddha himself chose the island of Sri Lanka as a place where his teaching
would flourish.66 Therefore, it is the inviolable duty of the Sinhalese people to
protect Buddhism in the land. Moreover, the Sinhalese also argue that the
"Sinhala Buddhism" could be protected only in a unitary Sri Lanka. This
argument is based on the presumption that any form of devolution of power will
eventually lead to the separation of the country and cause the destruction of
Sinhala Buddhism.
67
Tamil nationalism, on the other hand, does not represent a strong
association with Hinduism. That may be one reason for the overwhelming
support the separatist war extracts from Christian's particularly Catholic masses
in the war zone. The Tamil Catholic Church is highly critical of the Sri Lankan
government for the manner in which the Tamil people were and are treated in
the Northern and Eastern provinces. For their part, the Sinhala hard-liners in the
south accuse the Tamil Catholic Church of assisting the LTTE.
VIII. PSYCHOLOGY
In the final analysis, what is important is the psychology of the people who
are involved in a highly intense violent ethnic conflict. The "fear of extinction"
plays a major role in pushing the people to extreme violence in many modem
ethnic conflicts. Reiterer believes that this "fear of extinction" is fueled often
by memories of century-old massacres and other horrible events in the history
of mutual relations.68 Groups have a "chosen trauma" that assists in the
mobilization of their constituents. 69 This is true for the Sri Lankan situation as
well.
There is a fear of total extinction in both Tamil and Sinhalese psyches,
which is rightly called "crisis of confidence" by students of Sri Lankan
politics.7" Both groups lost faith that they can peacefully coexist within one
system or even side by side. This fear is the fundamental reason for the
Sinhalese desire to maintain tight control over the Tamil people and their affairs.
65. Rupesinghe, supra note 25, at 342.
66. J. BROW, NATIONALIST RHETORIC AND LOCAL PRACTICE: THE FATE OF THE VILLAGE
COMMUNITY IN KUKULEWA, IN SPENCER 128 (1990).
67. Hewavitharana, supra note 34.
68. See generally Albert F. Reiterer, Reducing Ethnic Conflicts: Contemporary Approaches to
Conflict Resolution in Western Europe, in ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND CIVIL SOCIETIES: PROPOSALS FOR A NEW
ERA IN EASTERN EUROPE (1997).
69. See generally VAMIK VOLKAN, BLOODLINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO ETHNIC TERRORISM
(1997).
70. Gunewardena & Wesumperuma, supra note 50.
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Any effort to devolve powers to regional units or share power with their Tamil
counterparts is resisted on the premise that such a situation will lead to the
creation of separate Tamil Eelam and eventually cause the destruction of
Sinhala Buddhist race. The belief that there is a Tamil conspiracy to establish
a greater Tamil Eelam remains very strong in the Sinhala psyche.7'
On the other hand, the Tamils believe that Sinhalese have reduced the
Tamils to a second-class citizenry, primarily by using political power and
imposing hegemonic policies over Tamil affairs. Examples of such tendencies
are often cited from the distorted versions of Tamil history and culture in school
textbooks to what is termed the "military occupation" of Sinhala armed forces
in the North and East. Legislation and public policies affecting Tamil are seen
as tools to reduce their presence in mainstream politics. The Tamil are
convinced that all these oppressive policies will eventually lead to the extinction
of their identity and people as an ethnic group. For them the only way to avoid
such a predicament is to have the right to self-determination, or at least total
control over their own affairs. Several options, including the creation of a
separate state and the introduction of a federal structure, have been put forward
on this supposition.
Therefore, the final positions of these groups are naturally diametrically
opposed to each other. Fundamentally, the Sinhalese want to maintain the
existing unitary status of the state, which ensures the central government's
control of power over all units and levels. The Tamils want to create a unit that
would ensure their survival and well being, be it within a separate state or a
federal structure. This is where both the groups are stuck and are unable to
move towards a peaceful solution. The nineteen-year-long war has proved that
each parties lacks the power to impose a military solution on the other.72
Therefore, an end to the war must be achieved through political dialogue.
However the ground situation in the country does not provide any cause for
hope, at least in the sort term. It seems that a change toward a peaceful
resolution to the conflict is not possible without a strikingly major change in the
political milieu of the conflict setting.
IX. CONCLUSION
As in many other ethnic conflicts, the Sri Lankan conflict too evolved out
of soft political demands into an all-out war. The civil war has so far claimed
more than sixty thousand lives, in addition to causing damage to tremendous
number of economic resources. Social and political institutions were not
immune from the destruction, either. A negotiated political settlement is of
71. Id.
72. Keethaponcalan, supra note 3.
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utmost importance to insure a peaceful resolution with justice to all groups
involved. A just solution cannot be achieved without a proper understanding
of the multiple dynamics. of the conflict. Sri Lankan conflict, although
essentially an ethnic one, it is multi-dimensional.
We have already discussed in great detail the various factors involved in
the conflict and their impacts on the other factors. We have examined, for
example, how the historical factors have influenced the psychology of the
parties, and how the psychology had an impact on the policymaking in terms of
economics, politics, and the decision to use violence in order to achieve goals.
The Social Cubism theory of conflict allows us to examine varied facets of a
conflict by providing a multi-dimensional framework. In this sense, it is a
useful framework for conflict analysis and can be applied to any deep-rooted
ethnic conflicts.
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I. ABSTRACT
Since the 1980s, conflicts and violence involving pastoral communities in
the borderlands of northern Kenya have become endemic. The violence has
especially taken the form of banditry and cattle rustling. The emergence of
cattle warlords among the pastoral groups has contributed to the
internationalization and commercialization of cattle rustling activities. Acts of
banditry and cattle rustling have led to loss of human lives, stealing of livestock,
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military history, governance, constitutionalism, International Humanitarian Law, and conflict resolution. In
his research he has especially focused on trade unionism, ethnic conflict, governance, and African indigenous
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candidate in conflict resolution and a Junior Fulbright Scholar in the Department of Conflict Resolution and
Analysis at Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, USA.
An earlier version of this chapter was published in the Accord African Journal On Conflict Resolution,
Volume I, Number 2, 2000. The author expresses his gratitude to Sean Byrne of Nova Southeastern
University for the valuable comments and suggestions Dr. Byrne made on earlier drafts of this article.
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and displacement of populations. Thus violence and insecurity have become the
order of the day in the region. This Chapter analyzes the violence and
insecurity in the borderlands of northern Kenya using the social cubism
perspective to demonstrate how issues in a conflict are often related and
interlinked with one another. The Chapter also examines possible strategies for
a third party conflict intervention to control or deescalate the violence.
II. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s communal conflicts have become endemic all over the
World. There are both internal and external events and trends that have
contributed to the emergence of these conflicts.' In Africa for example, conflict
and violence seem to assume different dimensions, ranging from civil wars in
Somalia, Liberia, Congo Democratic Republic and Sierra Leone to genocide in
Rwanda and Burundi. Such conflicts have severely undermined the social
cohesion of African states.
The last twenty years have witnessed an escalation of violence and
insecurity in the form of banditry and cattle rustling (raids) in the borderlands
of northern Kenya.2 Generally speaking, cattle rustling between pastoral groups
cuts across communal lines and national borders. The phrase, "borderlands of
northern Kenya" is used in this article to refer to the region straddling the
Kenyan, Ugandan, Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Somalian borders. The area is
often referred to as "bandit zone" or "bandit belt" because of the illegal firearms
in the hands of pastoral groups who are using them to create havoc in the form
of cattle rustling and banditry.3 The term "pastoralists" is applied in the study
to denote people whose main mode of production is the herding of livestock
such as cattle, camels, goats, and donkeys on extensive bases or in combination
with some form of agricultural activities.4 In Eastern Africa, such communities
include the Turkana, the Pokot, the Samburu, the Somali, and the Borana of
Kenya, the Toposa and the Merille of Ethiopia and Sudan, and the Karamojong
and the Jie of Uganda.
1. TED ROBERT GURR & BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN WORLD POLITICS, (1994);
RODERICK VON LIPSEY, BREAKING THE CYCLE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION (1997);
WILLIAM I. ZARTMAN, COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION OF LEGIMATE AUTHORITY (1995).
2. John Mbaria, Suguta valley of Death, THE EAST AFRICAN, Oct. 9,2000, at 12; Makumi Mwagiru,
Borders, Frontiers and Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Some Preliminary Hypotheses (2000) (unpublished
seminar paper, University of Nairobi).
3. Alex Mwangangi, Kenya's Pastoral Areas- An Arch ofConflict?,THE EASTAFRICAN, September
15-21, 1999, available at http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican /130999/.. ./opinion2.html;
Ferocious Tribal Warfare, WEEKLY REVIEW, March 12, 1999: available at
http://wwww.africaonline.co.ke/weeklyreview/990312/kenya3.html.
4. M. Mahmud Khan, Market Based Early Warning Indicators of Famine for the Pastoral
Households of the Sahel, 22 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 2, 198 (1994).
Thus, a study of the political economy of violence and insecurity amidst
challenges of globalization and the new World order is central to our
understanding of ethnopolitical and communal conflict in Eastern Africa. We
intend in this chapter, to address the following pertinent issues as they relate to
violence and insecurity in the borderlands: What are the main causes of
violence and insecurity in northern Kenya? Is the conflict resource or identity
based? How can the conflict and violence be addressed? What level of conflict
resolution intervention is necessary in the region?
This chapter examines and analyzes the political economy of violence and
insecurity in the borderlands of northern Kenya with particular emphasis on the
banditry and cattle rustling phenomena. Part One of the chapter provides a
contextual background of the pastoral economy as it relates to conflict over
resources, especially in the last thirty years or thereabout. Part Two provides
an analysis of the conflict using the social cubism model. Part Three discusses
what type of third party intervention may be useful in facilitating a resolution
of the conflict. In the conclusion, the chapter provides a compressed discussion
of the key ideas in the study.
Ill. BANDITRY AND CATTLE RUSTLING IN THE PASTORAL ECONOMY: A
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
Much of northern Kenya is semi-arid, and the area is only suitable for a
pastoral mode of production. Available evidence shows that pastoralists have
been able to eke out a frugal existence from the harsh climatic environment of
the borderlands for centuries.' Throughout their history livestock has been their
economic and social lifeline. Some of the pastoralists such as the Turkana and
the Pokot, however, practice transhumance, a settled form of pastoralism
through which only animals are moved in search of pasture and water while the
families settle "permanently" in given locations.
Historically, firearms seem to have not played a prominent role in the early
military organization of East African pastoral and semi-pastoral communities.
It was only in the late 19th century that the pioneer East African Coastal Arab-
Swahili traders and the 'Khatoumers' ventured into the borderlands of Eastern
Africa and the Nile headwaters thereby introducing firearms as a trade item.6
Undoubtedly, at present pastoralists in the borderlands are facing unprecedented
5. See Mohammed Ali Salih, Agro-Pastoralism: An Underestimated Regional Food Production
System, in EASTERN AFRICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH REV. Vol. 1 X, No. 1, at 23 (1993); R. M. A VAN
ZWANENBERG & ANNE KING, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF KENYA AND UGANDA, 1800-1970 (1975);
KATSUYHOSHI FUKUI & DAVID TURTON, WARFARE AMONG EAST AFRICAN HERDERS (1979).
6. See BETHUEL A. OGOT, ECONOMIC ADAPTATION AND CHANGE AMONG THE Jil-SPEAKING
PEOPLES OF EAST AFRICA (1996); ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (Katsuyoshi Fukui &
John Markakis, Eds. 1994); THE WARRIOR TRADITION IN MODERN AFRICA (Ali Mazrui, ed. 1997)
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challenges in their long history that often lead to serious violent struggle for
survival. In the last twenty-five years, for example, ecological cataclysms,
droughts, famines as well as competition for resources have contributed to
conflict and violence among pastoral communities.7 A majority of pastoral
societies in the borderlands have therefore become militarized and increasingly
rely on firearms.
However, Odegi-Awuondo contends that the root causes of the current
socio-economic problems in pastoral areas can be traced to the policies of the
British colonial Government.8 For instance, in its attempt to pacify these
communities, the colonial Government adopted harsh policies, which
contributed to the economic and political marginalization of these communities.
For example, the Government favored the establishment of White settler
plantation agriculture in Kenya at the expense of peasant economy. In order to
make more fertile land available for alienation for White settlement, the colonial
Government demarcated small 'tribal' reserves for African populations. 9 Most
pastoral communities were consequently pushed out of the most fertile land into
the drier parts of the country. Moreover, colonial officials regarded pastoralism
as a primitive mode of production and efforts were therefore made to discourage
it. For instance, the first colonial Governor of Kenya, Sir Charles Eliot declared
that pastoralism had no future in Kenya."° Also colonial anthropologists
propagated myths about the low status of pastoralism in the human social and
economic evolution.
Since colonial times pastoral communities have faced State harassment and
repression. For example, during the colonial period, northern Kenya was a
closed district and was administered by military officers." Free movement of
people and animals in and out of the district was restricted. This policy was
aimed at monitoring activities of the pastoral groups. The British referred to
pastoral groups such as the Turkana and the Pokot as 'war-like', violent, and as
recalcitrant communities. This stereotyping was a way of creating an enemy
image and justification for counter aggression. 2 For example, the Government
often sent punitive military expeditions against the pastoralists. Such
expeditions often led to the killing of people, and confiscation of livestock.
7. ETHNiCITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6, at 147.
8. CASPER ODEGi-AWUONDO, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY OF TURKANA
NOMADS 44 (1990).
9. R.M.A.VAN ZWANENBERG, COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND LABOUR IN KENYA 1919-1939 (1975);
M.P.K, SORRENSON, ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN KENYA (1968).
10. David M. Anderson, Cow Power: Livestock and the Pastoralists in Africa, AFRICAN AFFAIRS
92(366) (1993), at 121.
11. WiLLIAM R. OCHIENG, AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF THE RIFT VALLEY (1980).
12. ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6, at 193.
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The post-independence Kenyan Government seems to have adopted the
same strategy in dealing with frequent cattle rustling activities in the
borderlands.' 3 However, despite the use of force, the State has not achieved its
objectives. Rather it has exacerbated the problem. The bandits and cattle
raiders, for example, often possess more sophisticated weapons than those of the
Government's security forces. The bandits, therefore, appear to reign supreme
in the borderlands. Consequently, as a means of obtaining a few animals and
improving one's fighting ability, raiding had evolved into almost full-scale
military operation. 4 Not only young men were killed, but women and children
were murdered as well. Huts, stores, and harvests were set on fire and shops
looted.
The political turmoil in the neighboring countries in the 1980s provided an
opportunity for pastoralists to easily acquire lethal firearms.'" Moreover, some
African governments, rather than resolving long-standing ethnic conflicts, have
tended to provide weapons to one group to fight against another. For example,
the on-going civil war in Southern Sudan has proved to be a boom for the
firearm trade in the borderlands. 6 For instance, both the Sudanese government
and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) guerillas, provide arms to
their collaborators in the region.
Since the late 1970s, the following combination of factors has contributed
to the apparent destitution of pastoralists in northern Kenya."' First, cattle
diseases wiped out most of the livestock. Second, perennial droughts led to
famine. Third, there was an increase in cattle raids and military attacks by
heavily armed Karamajong and Turkana raiders, collectively termed Ngorokos
(bandits). In addition, between 1984 and 1986, the Kenyan Government sent
a punitive military operation into the pastoral district of Pokot ostensibly to
seize illegal firearms. That major security operation is referred to by the Pokot
as the "Lotiriri," after the noise of the helicopters used in the Government
13. ODEGI-AWUONDO, supra note 8.
14. Mwangangi, supra note 3.
15. ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6; Ferocious Tribal Warfare,
supra note 3.
16. Stop These Merchants of Terror, WEEKLY REVIEW, Feb. 25, 1999, available at
http://www.africaonline.co.ke/weeldr review/990312/editorial.html; and Marc-Antoine P. de Motclos, The
Proliferation of Light Weapons in Pastoral Northern Kenya, in MONOGRAPH, NO.30, CONTROLLING SMALL
ARMS PROLIFERATION AND REVERSING CULTURES OF VIOLENCE N AFRICA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN 8 (1998)
(Cape Town Institute of Strategic Studies, available at http://.iss.co.za/Pubs/ MONOGRAPHS/30
/Section%20 one.html).
17. IN SEARCH OF COOL GROUND: WAR, FLIGHT AND HOMECOMING IN NORTH EAST AFRICA (Tim
Allen, ed. 1996); Eboe Hutchful, Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic Issues, 6
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 2, 1 (1997); ODEGI-AWUONDO, supra note 8.
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onslaught against them and their animals.' 8 During the operations, the security
forces confiscated thousands of Pokot livestock while others died because of the
drought or lack of adequate attention while in the hands of security forces. Such
measures obviously did not achieve the intended results since they seemed not
to address the root causes of cattle rustling.
Furthermore, from the late 1970s cattle rustling operations took a new
dimension based solely on individualistic rather than societal interests. For
example, while traditional raids hinged on communal interests and were
monitored by the community through laid down social norms, these new raids
are based entirely on private interests and are controlled by armed village
leaders.' 9 This tendency has led to the emergence of cattle Warlords. Cattle
warlordism is a phenomenon that emerged among the Pokot and the Turkana in
the 1980s. The phenomenon came into the limelight when a number of
charismatic, influential, and wealthy people arose in these communities
promising the people prosperity and security. These Cattle Warlords include
ex-chief, ex-servicemen, businessmen, and ritual experts. They have created
armed private militia, which, apart from providing local security, also go on
cattle raids against neighboring communities and across the border into Uganda,
Ethiopia, and Sudan. Warlordism has thus apparently turned into a profitable
venture for both Warlords and their retainers.20 For example, they have
maintained a strong trade network with neighboring countries. The Warlords
often organize joint cattle raiding operations, involving thousands of retainers
into Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Cattle Warlords thus appear to be the new
entrepreneurs of violence. According to Reno, a warlord is typically a civilian
who arms civilians with rudimentary weapons to serve his political, economic,
and social interests.21 Ironically, some-State officials, especially security forces
and former servicemen, are also reportedly engaged in cattle rustling activities,
an occupation that has become a lucrative venture for them.
Traditionally, cattle rustling among the pastoralists was a cultural practice
and was regarded as merely a kind of "dangerous sport."22  Under the
traditional government system, the elders had the power to control or sanction
raids. Cattle raids were thus regarded as an acceptable communal response to
natural calamities and as a means for replenishing lost stock. The youth play a
18. Ferocious Tribal Warfare, supra note 3.
19. Charles M. Ocan, Pastoral crisis in north-eastern Uganda: The changing significance of raids,
WORKING PAPER No. 2. (1992) (Centre for Basic Research Publishers).
20. Ferocious Tribal Warfare, supra note 3.
21. See generally WILLIAM S. RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES (1998).
22. John Mbaria, Suguta Valley of Death, THE EAST AFRICAN, October 9. 2000, available at
http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/current/Featurres/Features 1 .html. See also Macharia Gaitho,
Arming the Pokot was Folly; Now Disarm Them, DAILY NATION, March 26, 2001, at 6.
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prominent role in the system of warlordism. They offer their services by joining
the warlord ragtag militia groups. Violence and insecurity in the borderlands
have become serious regional issues and not merely a local problem. Much of
the borderlands is deserted. Most families are often forced to flee their homes
for refugee camps and small trading centers in Kenya and Uganda.23
Banditry and cattle rustling activities in northern Kenya have affected
millions of people, ranging from the Turkana in the north, the Samburu and the
Pokot in the center, and the Keiyo, the Marakwet, and the Tugen in the south of
the study area. Cattle rustling activities however, are more intense among the
Pokot and the Turkana communities. For example, each pastoral group tries to
tilt the military scale to its favor. It keeps on shifting especially between the
Pokot and the Turkana.24 This apparent rivalry leads to an endless cycle of
retributive raids and counter-raids between the two communities. The pastoral
communities are thus involved in an arms race of their own coinage. Bandits
and Cattle Warlords seem to thrive in this environment of lawlessness. The
ability of the Warlords to organize and arm their forces is a clear indication that
the State has lost the monopoly over the use of force.25 It is worth noting that
pastoral groups often live in scattered villages which makes it difficult for the
State to effectively control them. Because of the state of anarchy and
lawlessness in the borderlands of northern Kenya, it is very difficult to
implement any development project. The few Government officers and NGOs
based in the area live in constant fear of bandits.
IV. A SOCIAL CUBISM PERSPECTIVE
The chapter now analyzes the dynamics of violence and insecurity in the
borderlands of northern Kenya using the social cubism framework. 26 The social
cubism model takes cognisance of potential internal factors to elucidate the
complexities of conflict. The framework shows how in ethnopolitical conflicts,
the conflict plays out in diverse dimensions of social life such as the political,
economic, and social realms. It is possible to use the model to demonstrate the
nexus of relationships between economic, political, psychocultural,
demographic, religious, and historical factors. These dynamics of conflict in the
various social locales relate mutually with each other to entrench the conflict
and make it resistant to resolution.
23. Ocan, supra note 19.
24. Ferocious Tribal Warfare, supra note 3; Mwangangi, supra note 3.
25. Id.
26. Sean J.Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Conflict in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, in PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 3(2), at 52. See also Neal Carter & Sean
J. Byrne, The Dynamics of Social Cubism: A View from Northern Ireland and Quebec, in RECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS TO ETHNOPOLmCAL CONFLICT (Sean Byrne & Cynthia L Irvin, eds., 2000).
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The social cubism framework is useful in conflict analysis because it shows
the need for conflict resolution interveners to analyse conflict from all angles
and perspectives. In other words, just like a cube that has six sides, issues in
any given conflict are often related and interlinked to one another.
Consequently, in order to comprehend a conflict we have to identify and address
all factors that impinge on it in one form or another.
V. HISTORICAL FACTORS
Historically, pastoral communities have inhabited the borderlands of
northern Kenya from time immemorial.27 It is important to note that like other
African countries except Ethiopia, Kenyajust like many other African countries,
is a colonial creation or a 'geographical expression'. Before colonialism, each
pastoral group was a separate nation living under its own social and political
institutions. Colonial boundaries, however, incorporated diverse groups of
people who had no cultural or political links or who were traditional enemies
into the same political entity in the name of Kenya.
Many pastoral communities for example, do not see themselves as Kenyans
because of their long distance from the center of political administration.2" For
instance, they refer to any person travelling southward beyond their districts as
'going to Kenya'. Interestingly enough, the economic way of life of pastoral
communities is quite different from that of the majority of other Kenyan groups.
Apparently, the pastoralists seem to feel that they have very little access to state
economic resources. Pastoral communities in northern Kenya generally view
the Government as representing a sort of internal colonialism. For example, in
the 1960s, the Somali of northern Kenya waged protracted though unsuccessful
guerrilla warfare against Kenya in an attempt to secede and join the republic of
Somalia. Apart from missionaries and NGOs, State involvement in economic
development and provision of social services to the pastoral groups in northern
Kenya is minimal.29 Consequently, influential pastoral leaders often instill a
'siege mentality' within their people to make them feel they have been pushed
to the wall and they must react in one form or another to re-assert themselves,
safeguard their interests, and make the Government accede to their various
demands. For instance, Jay Rothman clearly points, conflicts in Africa are often
27. VAN ZWANENBERG & KING, supra note 5, at ch. I.
28. Mwagiru, supra note 2
29. David Western, Drought: Kenyans Have Not Seen Anything Yet, THE NATION, June 29, 2000
available at http://www.climateark.org/articles/2000/2nd/drkehano.html. See also MUKISHA KITUYi,
BECOMING KENYANS: MAASAI PASTORALISM (1992) (African Centre for Technology); ODEGI-AWUONDO,
supra note 8.
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"deeply rooted in existential issues like cultural expressions and survival
itself."3°
VI. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
Psychological factors include identity, self-esteem, fear, and anger, among
others. The pastoralists traditionally regard themselves as a fearless and a
hardened people.3' This feeling is probably due to their harsh environment. For
example, they have high regard for their cultural practice of cattle raiding.
Moreover, they feel that unless they keep their enemies at bay they may be
overwhelmed and defeated militarily. Hence, the tendency to organise raids
against their neighbors. They also have a strong attachment to their culture,
which they feel has passed the test of time.3" Pastoral groups have remained
homogenous in values and interests. Such a uniformity often leads to what Von
Lipsey describes as concern for preserving only those things that are perceived
to be of value to the group or capable of increasing the group's power relative
to others within the society. That preservation of narrowly defined interests
work to the detriment of broader affiliations required for stability within the
society and the state.33
Over the years there has been systematic erosion of the pastoralists' value,
ideology and lifestyles. However, livestock still remains the cornerstone of their
economy.34 For example, cattle have a lot of social and ritual values to most
pastoral groups. Cattle are used in many forms of reciprocal relationships such
as building social alliances, exchanges in times of marriages, to pay fines,
sacrifices, loans to friends and relatives. Pastoralists see their cultural values as
superior and unadulterated by 'outside' influence. Thus, among pastoral
communities, killing of out-groups members (especially warriors) and stealing
their livestock are culturally and socially acceptable practices and a sign of
bravery.35 For example, among the Turkana and Jie (of Uganda), cattle raiding
was such an important activity that everybody was expected to partake in. As
John Lampear observes: "Any one even the uninitiated, could go and fight...
What would uninitiated men eat if they just remained at home? Does the
30. See generally JAY ROTMAN, RESOLVING-IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT IN NATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITIES (1997).
31. KANA ROBA DUBA ET AL., HONEY AND HEIFER, GRASSES, MILK, AND WATER: A HERITAGE OF
DIVERSITY IN RECONCILIATION (1997). See also Mbaria, supra note 22.
32. Id.
33. VON UPSEY, supra note 1.
34. DUBA ET AL., supra note 31.
35. Francis Deng, Reaching Out: A Dinka Principle of Conflict Management, in TRADITIONAL
CURES FOR MODERN AFRICAN CONFLICTS: AFRICAN CONFLICTMEDICINE 95 (1. William Zartman, ed.) (2000);
DUBA ET AL., supra note 3 1.
2002]
950 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:941
stomach distinguish between men?"36 Such 'bravado' attitude encouraged
militancy among the youth who wanted to prove their manliness and military
prowess by going on raids. Traditionally, cattle raiding by pastoral
communities was both a natural response to disasters such as drought, and an
attempt to increase the numbers of their livestock as an insurance against
disasters. Also, it was a cultural practice of proving the worth of one's
community.37
Kenyan Governments, since the colonial era, have attempted to control
pastoral activities. During the colonial period, for example, the aim was
ostensibly to pacify the pastoralists and to enforce law and order.38 Thus, for a
long time the official State policy tended to view cattle rustling as a mere
cultural problem of the pastoralists and not a serious issue of State security.
Yet, cattle rustling has now turned out to be a threat to State security.
VII. ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic factors are also important in our understanding of the violence
and insecurity situation in the borderlands. For example, Ali Said 39 points out
that pastoral groups had self reliant economies which met most of their basic
needs Also, networks of exchange between pastoralists and cultivators have
always existed. Such reciprocal relations could enable the pastoralists to gain
access to cereals, salt, and pasture, among other items when required. However,
at present, because of the strong resource competition and conflict in the region,
the herder-farmer dichotomy has become quite manifest.'
Basically, the age-old economic existence of pastoral economy has been
undermined by three major factors, namely: the emergence of nation-states, the
penetration of the market economy, climatic changes, and ecological
cataclysms. The incorporation of the pastoral economy into the global market
economy to some extent has also impacted negatively on societal structure, as
well as on the ethical, and moral foundations.4 The Government's apparent
bias towards agriculture is a clear indication of the low regard of pastoralism in
36. ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6, at 63.
37. Deng, supra note 35.
38. OCHIENG, supra note 11.
39. Ali Said, Resource Use conflict Between Pastoralism and Irrigation Development in the Middle
Awash Valley of Ethiopia, Vol. 1, No. 2, EASTERN AFRICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH REVIEW 21, 29
(1994).
40. Gudrun Dahl and A. Hjort, Pastoral Change and the Role of Drought, SAREC Report R. 2
(1979) (Stockholm: Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries). See also
Mohammed Babiker, East African Dryland Pastoralism: Some Methodological Anxieties (1999) (unpublished
seminar paper, University of Khartoum).
41. Said, supra note 39.
Osamba
State circles. For example, the international economy puts demand for more
cash crops hence alienation of pastoral land for the establishment of large
agricultural plantations. Much of the traditional pastoral grazing lands have
thus become private property of other people, under the State sanctioned
"willing-buyer-willing seller" principle. As John Mbaria correctly sums it:
"The old symbiosis between the pastoralists and the sedentary farmer has
broken down, suspicion and occasionally bloody conflict have taken its place,
fanned by politicians with a self-aggrandising agenda."42
Undoubtedly, pastoral production system requires extensive land space for
livestock movements in response to changing weather and climatic patterns.
Pastoral groups depend largely on the products of their livestock. Thus to
continue with their age-old pastoral practice they have to raid other communities
to replenish lost stock. Hence, they suffer "tit for tat" raids. Moreover, the
pastoral districts of northern Kenya are largely underdeveloped in terms of
infrastructures, resource allocations, and availability of economic and social
services.
VIII. RELIGIOUS FACTORS
Religion seems not to play a prominent role in the violence and insecurity
of pastoral groups in the borderlands. It is worth noting that most members of
the pastoral communities still practice traditional religion although a significant
number of people have converted to Christianity.43 Traditional ritual experts
(Emuron) had a lot of influence in pastoral societies. In case of conflict, these
religious leaders in tandem with the elders would seek an amicable solution
acceptable to all the parties involved. Ritual experts were regarded as divinely
inspired and no one could challenge their decisions. Moreover, in the traditional
pastoral set up, elders were the judicial and political decision-makers.
The elders, at various levels handled all major conflicts in the society.4
For example, whenever there was a serious conflict between neighboring groups
the elders from both sides would call a peace palaver to try and resolve the
dispute. Members of the public were also allowed to attend and participate in
the peace making ceremony. The meeting would be held in a carnival
atmosphere punctuated with stories, songs, dance, and proverbs. The name of
God and spirits would be invoked during the meeting. A bull would be
slaughtered and its blood sprinkled into the air as a way of binding the
disputants and members of the two communities to the covenant. As a gesture
of reconciliation the whole group would eat the meat together. The whole
42. Mbaria, supra note 22.
43. DUBA E" AL., supra note 31.
44. Id.
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society would thus be part of the agreement and anybody who violated it could
suffer some calamity. By and large, negotiation, reconciliation or peace making
was seen as re-establishment of relationship between the people and also with
their God and spirits that were seen as witnesses and active participants.
Agreements were entered into solemnly by the taking of oaths and participating
in rituals that were regarded as binding and sacred. Punishment, restitution, and
reconciliation were based on the norms and values of the society. Thus,
emphasis was placed on the repair of damaged relations rather than retribution.4"
However, the pastoral societies are currently undergoing transformation
due to Western and Christian influence.' Thus the powers of the elders and
ritual experts have declined as warrior-youth and educated elite acquire more
prominence in the society. Traditionally, before any raiding expedition, the
elders or spiritual leaders had to bless the raiders. Nowadays, however, such
blessings are rare since cattle Warlords themselves tend to organize most raids
without consulting the traditional political leadership. Nevertheless, there are
still a few pockets of ritual experts who bless warriors before raids, for
economic gains. For example, in April 2001, President Moi of Kenya is
reported to have issued a warning to such ritual experts telling them to
discontinue the practice or face arrest by police.47 It is my contention that these
ritual experts are likely to ignore such threats. In reality the State no longer has
effective control over northern Kenya. In that respect there are good reasons to
believe that indigenous approaches to conflict resolution could be valuable in
helping to resolve some of the conflicts in the borderlands.
IX. POLITICAL FACTORS
Politics is a major contributory factor to the current insecurity and violence
in the borderlands. The Government's reaction to its frustration and inability
to control acts of lawlessness has mainly been to send in security forces, who
more often than not opt to harass the civilian population for allegedly
collaborating with bandits and cattle rustlers instead of facing the enemy.48
Such inhuman acts tend to make the State unpopular and the people unwilling
to cooperate with security forces. For example, whenever security forces fail
in their operations against bandits, they often vent their anger on civilian
45. See generally, JANNIE MALAN, CONFLICT RESOLUTION WISDOM FROM AFRICA, ACCORD (1997);
DAVID W. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT MEDIATION ACROSS CULTURES: PATHWAYS AND PATTERNS (1992).
46. DUBA ET AL, supra note 31.
47. DAILY NATION, April 15, 2001 http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation
/15042001/News/News72.html.
48. Ferocious Tribal Warfare, supra note 3; see also Joshia Osamba, The Sociology of Insecurity:
Banditry and Cattle Rustling in Northwestern Kenya, in ACCORD AFRICAN JOURNAL ON CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 1(2), at 1(2000).
population. They are terrorized both by the government and by the bandits.
Hence, the peoples' tendency to run away and escape from the reach of both.
The question that one may ask is what are the options left for the pastoralists?
The pastoral communities feel disfranchised by the Kenyan political
system. 9 For example, leaders of pastoral communities often express feelings
of exclusion from the center of national power and marginalization in all aspects
of life. For instance, the Kenyan Government seems to have adopted economic
and political policies, which tend to perpetuate the marginalization of pastoral
communities. This fact is evident in the distribution of economic and political
resources. The Government appears to recognize the importance of these
societies only when it requires their political support, such as during election
time. As such, pastoral leaders have often used the poverty and
underdevelopment in their areas aS evidence of State marginalization. 5° Some
local political leaders tend to encourage their people to continue with the age-
old cultural practice of cattle rustling. These politicians seem to fear that a
denunciation of the practice of cattle rustling may be politically suicidal. Such
leaders claim to be defenders of their people when in fact their aim is to
safeguard their own interests or to forestall the emergence of any potential
challenge to their authority. It is important to note that while these leaders ask
their people to remain steadfast in their cultural way of life, these same leaders
send their children to local colleges and abroad for higher education.5 This
tends to create a form of class differentiation in the society in which a few
educated pastoral families continue to possess political power at the expense of
the poor majority peasant-herders.
In addition, these local political elite inculcates in their people a 'siege
mentality' by claiming that unless they act decisively to defend themselves they
would be wiped out by their traditional enemies.52 For example, the Pokot
leaders have rejected a call by the President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi that they
surrender all illegal arms to the government. They declared that surrendering
their weapons would make their people vulnerable to attacks by the militarized
Karamonjong of Uganda. The Pokot are thus turning to their history to support
raids and other acts of violence against neighboring communities. For example,
in March 2001, a man by the name of Samuel Moroto was elected the new
Pokot Member of Parliament for Kapenguria to replace one of the alleged Pokot
Warlords, and former Cabinet Minister, the late Francis Lotodo. A few days
49. Id.
50. DAILY NATION, Feb. 21, 2001, available at http./Iwww.nationaudio.com/News /DailyNation
/21022001/index.html; Mbaria, supra note 22.
51. Babiker, supra note 40.
52. Mbaria, supra note 22; see also SUNDAY NATION, Apr. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/22042001/News/News58.html.
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after he was officially sworn in as Member of Parliament, Moroto addressed a
big rally in his constituency, and he declared that the Pokot were going to use
violence (force) to reclaim all land, which historically belonged to them.53
Some of those lands were incorporated in the neighboring districts of Turkana
and Trans Nzoia during the colonial period Moroto's remarks were seen as a
symbolic declaration of 'war' against non-Pokot.
The Pokot are thus using history to justify their actions and to emphasize
territorial and communal cohesion. They feel justified in evicting non-Pokot
who have taken over their ancestral land. As Carter and Byrne note: "Political
elites often attempt to instil a sense of common fate and group solidarity by
emphasizing in-group similarities and out-group differences, depicting group
members as interchangeable and personalizing inter-group conflict. ' 54 Carter
and Byrne at the same time point out that groups tend to focus their story to fit
into their current situation, perception, and worldview.55
There is clear evidence of prejudice and discrimination against pastoralists
in Kenya. For example, they are often referred to as "primitive," "uneducated,"
and a people suffering from a "cattle complex" mentality.56 Moreover, the few
members of pastoral communities in wage employment are mostly performing
menial tasks such as night security guards and waste collectors in towns. This
is due to the fact that western education is not yet rooted among these pastoral
communities.57
As a matter of fact, State officials often threaten local chiefs with dire
consequences for failure to identify bandits and cattle rustlers who may be
operating in their localities. For example, these officials often apply 'collective
punishment' on suspected clans whose members may have participated in a
cattle raid against neighboring communities. Such acts tend to alienate the
people further from the government, whom they see as an outside force
interfering with their way of life. Seemingly, such punishment and coercion
often opens a 'Pandora's box' and often exacerbates conflict. As John Burton
posits "if co-operative and non-violent social relationships are sought by
53. MP Warns Over Land in Pokot, DAILY NATION, March 23, 2001, available at
http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation /2503200l/News/News26.html.
54. Byrne & Carter, supra note 26.
55. Id. at 45.
56. Mbaria, supra note 22; WESTERN, supra note 29.
57. Eric Both, Education, Training and Household Labour among the Rendile Pastoralists of
Northern Kenya, in INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES BULLETIN 22(4) (1991), at 136 (University of
Nairobi); see also MICHAEL A. LrrLE, THE ILLUSIVE GRANARY: HERDER, FARMER AND STATE IN NORTHERN
KENYA (1992).
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societies, social norms, and institutions must be adapted to human aspirations
and not the other way a round."58
The Government has tended to condemn cattle rustling among the pastoral
communities based largely on the false assumption that such raids are a
primitive factor relating to nomadic life.59 Thus, the State does not view raids
as partly an outcome of modern economic intrusion impinging on the socio-
cultural setting of the pastoralists. To a large extent, changing social and
economic relations has compounded the cattle rustling activities.' Part of the
reason is that commercialization and internationalization of cattle rustling
appear linked to the expanding global market for livestock and livestock
products, and the proliferation of weapons, all in the over the years.
Clearly, poverty, hunger and destitution have become part and parcel of
aggressive and predatory pursuance of political goals. In such a scenario, the
State becomes an inconsequential irritant.6 Currently the politics of pastoral
communities seem to be dominated by warlordism. The state of insecurity and
lawlessness in the borderlands and the collapse of social and economic
structures have created a category of poverty-stricken peasant-herders who in
order to survive often resort to acts of banditry and cattle rustling.62
X. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
In the last two decades or so, there has been some significant improvement
in medical services, especially by Christian missionaries and NGOs in the
borderlands.63 Such services have led to a steady rise in the population of the
pastoral people. In addition, the numbers of their livestock have increased.
These factors create demographic pressures resulting in more conflict over
grazing lands and water. At the same time, many people from non-pastoral
communities have acquired land in the pastoral areas. Such land loss inevitably
reduces the ability of the pastoralists to maintain large herds of livestock. The
new landowners have acquired title deeds (certificates) giving them legal rights
over such land. However, pastoral groups traditionally do not recognize
individual ownership of land since their mode of production requires expansive
territory and communal ownership of grazing lands and other resources.'
58. JOHN W. BURTON, VIOLENCE EXPLAINED: THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT, VIOLENCE AND CRIME
AND THEIR PREVENTION 26 (1997).
59. Ocan, supra note 19, at 12.
60. Babiker, supra note 40, at 8.
61. Salih, supra note 5.
62. Osamba, supra note 48.
63. GUFA OBA & WALTER J. LUSIGI, AN OVERVIEW OF DROUGHTS STRATEGIES AND LAND USE IN
AFRICAN PASTORAL SYSTEMS (1998).
64. DUBA ET AL., supra note 3 1.
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Thus, attempts by pastoral societies to ignore individual land ownership and
boundaries tend to exacerbate tensions between pastoral and agricultural
communities. Consequently, there is often a clash of cultures between western
and traditional legal systems of land ownership.
Due to insecurity in the borderlands the pastoral groups have abandoned
more than forty percent of their grazing lands and compressed into smaller
areas.65 This state of affairs affects pastoral economy thereby contributing to
land degradation, which in turn exacerbates conflict.
XI. POSSIBLE THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT
The violence and insecurity that has been created by banditry and cattle
rustling activities in northern Kenya can be addressed at different levels of
intervention. It appears that for a long time the Kenyan State has tended to
adopt a top-down or power-based approach in addressing the issue. Such a
method has failed miserably. Consequently, we suggest that there is a need for
State officials, pastoralists, and other affected parties should come together and
address the problem from a common ground.' Such an intervention process
would involve the use of a "grass-roots-based" or a "bottom-up" approach, an
approach that is often referred to as "peacebuilding from below." At the same
time the conflict could be addressed from an interests-based approach.67 This
is an approach that could help the interveners to assist the parties identify their
concerns and needs, and therefore possibly to be in a better position to develop
common interests on which to build some consensus. In other words, a
transformation of the peoples' attitude and worldview is vital in any conflict
intervention in the borderlands.
For example, the pastoral system must be recognized as an important
component of the Kenyan economy rather than an archaic practice that has to
be discarded. In that respect, both the Kenyan State and the pastoralists must
begin to acknowledge that each has the right to exist. Apparently, it appears
that pastoralists are yet to participate fully in making decisions affecting their
social life and economic development. Thus it is correct to say that many past
development interventions in pastoral areas have become a cropper due to non-
involvement of the pastoralists in their planning and implementation.68 Conflict
resolution intervenors, therefore, must try to address the underlying causes of
65. OBA & LUSIGI, supra note 63.
66. See generally WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO
CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1993).
67. See generally JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN
DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1995); see also DUBA ET AL., supra note 31.
68. See generally GUDRUN DAHL, SUFFERING GRASS: SUBSISTENCE AND SOCIETY OF WASO
BORANA, (1919).
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the conflict rather than merely dealing with the symptoms. Interestingly
enough, more often than not, it is 'outsiders' who decide what they perceive as
problems afflicting pastoralists and suggest their resolutions without involving
the local people themselves. In other words, the policy seems to be that
pastoralists are to be 'seen and not to be heard'. In that regard, these interveners
tend to blame the pastoralists either for "overstocking and overgrazing" rather
than addressing the underlying causes of their problems.69
An important point to remember is that many conflict resolution scholars
and practitioners agree, it is almost impossible to transform a society unless the
underlying needs of the parties involved in conflict are adequately identified,
recognized, and addressed.7" Thus, any solutions recommended by interveners
should take cognizance of the fact that pastoral communities have managed to
survive in their harsh environment for thousands of years. Hence, it would be
unreasonable to expect them to fundamentally change their lifestyle to an
untested future. Thus change must be gradual and should not be imposed from
the top. Due to suspicions and past negative experiences, both the Government
and pastoralists are often marooned in their cocoon unsure of the other's real
intentions.7
Does pastoralism in northern Kenya have a future? Will the pastoral mode
of production survive against the various onslaughts ranged against it? Both
Aronson and Dyson-Hudsons contend that pastoralism faces an uncertain
future.72 On the other hand, Mustafa Babiker73 points out that pastoralists are
not static and throughout their history they have adapted to new socio-economic
and physical conditions when necessary. Babiker at the same time is not
amused with claims of the imminent collapse of pastoralism. Furthermore
Babiker avers that the focus of studies of pastoral systems should change from
the 'crises of survival' model in favor of 'survival in crises' framework.
Moreover, Babiker opines that outsiders under the guise of 'experts' tend to
offer solutions to problems that they have never experienced. Some of their
69. John Helland, Some Aspects of and Implementation of the Development of the Grazing Blocks
in North Eastern Province (1980) (unpublished research paper, Nairobi International Livestock Centre for
Africa).
70. See BURTON, supra note 58; LEDERACH, supra note 67; URY, supra note 66; ROTHMAN, supra
note 30.
71. Maurice Lokong, Dialogue Education-A Tool for the Equitable Incorporation of Nomadic Pastoral
communities in National Development with Special Reference to Turkana of North West Kenya 7, (1987)
(unpublished diploma thesis, University of Readings). See also BOTH, supra note 57.
72. David R. Aronson, Must Nomads Settle? Some Notes toward Policy on the Future of
Pastoralism, in WHEN NOMADS SETTLE: PROCESSES OF SEDENTARIZATION AS ADAPTATION AND RESPONSE
173 (Phillip Carl Salzman, ed. 1980); see also Neville Dyson-Hudson and Rada Dyson-Hudson, The Structure
of East African Herds and the Future of East African Herder, 13 DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 213 (1985).
73. Babiker, supra note 40, at 1.
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recommendations are half-baked and cannot stand the test of time. These
conflict resolution and development experts rarely seek the views of the local
people when deciding on development plans aimed at ameliorating their
conditions.
It is important to note that most of the African borders are porous and
contested.74 Bandits and cattle rustlers thus find it easy to oscillate between the
neighboring States, crossing international borders at will.75 The fact that the
neighboring countries have developed different conflict management strategies
and regulations often makes it difficult to effectively manage cross border
conflicts. For example, in Uganda pastoral groups are often permitted by the
State to own firearms, yet in Kenya the government has banned gun possession
by pastoralists.76
It is our argument that for peaceful coexistence to be achieved, the pastoral
communities must accept the reality that each is part and parcel of the wider
geo-political and economic entity. We suggest that for durable peace in the
borderlands, indigenous methods of conflict resolution and cultural values
should be incorporated into the modern conflict resolution mechanisms. This
hopefully could greatly contribute to the restoration of peace, security, and
stability and cordial relations among the pastoral communities in the
borderlands. Both Aronson and David Western among other scholars of
pastoralism have poignantly argued that social life in the pastoral areas has not
improved.77 For example, pastoralists still rely on nature for their survival.
According to John Burton, for any effective conflict resolution
intervention, third party intervenors must avoid prejudiced and preconceived
views of the local situation.78 Thus, to address a conflict adequately, there is a
need for some change in the institutions and structures of the society. Thus, we
contend that to forestall or to de-escalate the inter-group conflict in the
borderlands it is necessary to address the basic human needs of the people such
as security, recognition, identity, self-esteem, and acceptance. Structural
violence 79 is evident in the way the Kenyan State has handled the predicament
of pastoral people since colonial times. Government policies have impacted
negatively on pastoral economic production. It should be noted that from a
74. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (Andrew J. Day, ed. 1987).
75. MWAGIRU, supra note 2.
76. See, e.g., SUNDAY NATION, April 22, 2000, at 3.
77. Aronson, supra note 72; Western, supra note 29.
78. See generally JOHN W. BURTON, RESOLVING DEEP-ROOTED CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK (1987);
CONFLICT: HUMAN NEEDS THEORY, (John W. Burton, ed. 1990).
79. See generally JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT
DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION (1996); Burton, supra note 86, at 32.
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psychological perspective, feelings of alienation could be dangerous to both the
individual and the group.
It is our contention that for conflicts in the borderlands to de-escalate, it is
necessary to identify the underlying root causes of the problem rather than
blaming the parties involved or merely addressing the symptoms of the conflict.
It behoves conflict resolution interveners to identify and analyze the interplay
of various factors and their internal and external dynamics when addressing the
issue of violence and insecurity in the borderlands, Byrne and Carter point us
in the right direction.
Von Lipsey has developed a conflict resolution model that he refers to as
the "intervention cycle. 80  This framework incorporates the relationship
between prevention, mitigation, and resolution. Durable conflict resolution
measures often require a change in the status quo, and a strong commitment by
parties involved to play according to the 'rules of the game' rather than coercion
or acquiescence on the part of one of the parties. In other words, the building
blocks of peace must be laid on a firm ground. Jay Rothman, Edward Azar, and
Louis Kriesberg hold similar views.8' For example, according to Rothman,
some deep-rooted conflict often cannot be resolved because the conflicts are
"misdiagnosed and handled badly."82  Rothman has proposed the ARIA
(Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, and Action) framework of conflict
management that may help parties in conflict to move from adversarial to
cooperative change. Rothman emphasizes the importance of positive dialoguing
between parties to create a conducive environment of understanding and
problem solving. As Azar correctly points out, identity based conflicts are
bound to recur unless the underlying causes have been adequately identified and
addressed to the satisfaction of all of the parties.8 3
This article therefore suggests that this nexus between human needs and
conflict should be clearly comprehended by local political leaders, the
provincial administration, and the Kenyan State. In that regard, Kenyan
Government policy makers must take cognizance of these facts by identifying
how the environmentally (ecologically) related threat to peace can be contained
deescalated or resolved. In actuality, pastoralism cannot be simply dismissed
as an old-fashioned practice. As Doonrboss correctly puts it, the pastoralists,
"have demonstrated economic and social acumen in the exploitation of their arid
homelands. Those lands are too arid for anything but nomadic, or at best,
80. VON LIPSEY, supra note 1, at 6.
81. See ROTHMAN, supra note 30; Edward Azar, Protracted Social Conflict: Ten Propositions, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (John W. Burton & Edward E. Azar, eds.
1986); LOUIS KRIESBERG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS: FROM ESCALATION TO RESOLUTION (1998).
82. ROTHMAN, supra note 30, at 6.
83. Azar, supra note 81.
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transhumant pastoralism. The only other option is to migrate and leave the bush
to the game." 84
It is necessary to accord the pastoralists the opportunity of determining
their future. In that regard we contend that 'outsiders' should not impose
important decisions and policies affecting pastoral mode of existence without
their active involvement from the initial stages to the implementation process. 85
It is an undeniable fact, to a large extent it is mainly Non-Governmental
Organizations and church missionaries that have attempted to alleviate the
plight of pastoral communities through the provision of schools, boreholes,
health centers, and other facilities.86 As already stated, the Kenyan Government
should change the tendency of ignoring and neglecting the welfare of the
pastoralists in terms of development and the distribution of political and
economic resources. The Government should adopt some affirmative action to
make the pastoralists move up the ladder in terms of provision of government
sponsored social, educational, and economic development services.
By and large, third party intervention should help the disputing parties to
adopt a 'give and take' approach when addressing their conflict. The use of
coercive measures to modify a behavior or resolve conflict may be
counterproductive. This is evident in the failure of government
depastoralization campaigns in the borderlands. In deed, the pastoralists regard
State measures such as the provision of food relief during droughts as a
temporary short-term stop-gap measure as they wait for opportunities to revert
to pastoralism, either through cattle raids or other methods to rebuild their
stock. 7
The "us-them" dichotomy is a common future in human interaction.88
Thus, generalizations, perceptions, and projecting negative attributes on others
is always manifested in conflicts. However, the use of negative and pejorative
terms such as "bad," "primitive," "callous killers," or "bandits," should be
avoided by conflicting parties while they are trying to resolve the problem of
violence and insecurity in the borderlands. Such terms tend to create an
environment of mistrust, vindictiveness, and "passing the buck."
84. ETHNICrrY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6, at 87.
85. Western, supra note 29, Osamba, supra note 48.
86. Gufu Oba, Perception of Environment among Kenyan Pastoralists: Implications for
Development, 19 NOMADIC PEOPLES 33 (1985).
87. Richard Hogg, Pastoralism and Impoverishment: The Case of the Isiolo Boran of Northern
Kenya, DISASTERS 4(3) (1980), at 299.
88. VAMIK VOLKAN, BLOODLINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO ETHNIC TERRORISM (1997).
Osamba
X1I. CONCLUSIONS
This article has attempted to analyze the political economy of violence and
insecurity in the borderlands of northern Kenya using the social cubism model.
It has pointed out that the phenomena of banditry and cattle rustling have
greatly contributed to the emergence of an environment of violence and
insecurity in this region. Cattle rustling appears to have undergone a
fundamental transformation from a cultural practice to an international
commercial venture apparently under the control of cattle Warlords. By and
large, the changing land use, demographic pressures, political, and economic
conditions have contributed to the current increase in conflict and violence in
the borderlands. The institutionalization of violence and the resultant insecurity
has contributed to widespread social, political and economic problems among
the pastoralists.
The Government seems not to have adopted the necessary policies and
mechanisms that could help to forestall and address the underlying causes of
insecurity and violence in the region. Consequently, the situation has become
insurmountable. The Government's laxity has therefore somehow contributed
to the emergence of warlords, who have emerged as the undisputed masters of
the region.
In order to make any meaningful intervention in the conflict; there is a
need to reassure the pastoralists that their age-old way of life will be recognized.
In that connection, it would be appropriate to reinforce the pastoral institutional
capacities with specific reference to traditional norms, rules and regulations of
conflict resolution. By and large, third party intervention in the conflict must
take note of the underlying interests, needs, and aspirations of the local populace
when developing a conflict resolution framework for the region. The State must
try to cultivate good working relations between the security forces and the local
people for the mutual benefit of the State and the local inhabitants. The study
concludes that a concerted effort by the all stakeholders is pivotal in any
meaningful resolution of the conflict in northern Kenya.
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I. COMPLEXITY AS A SHOCK ABSORBER: THE BELGIAN SOCIAL CUBE
Throughout its history, Belgium has been a complex political and social
entity. The King of the Belgians was told in an official report that 'there are no
Belgians.' The country has rapidly shifted from unitary to federal structure,
with different rationales and responsibilities for Regions and Communities.
Demographic changes are somewhat difficult to map due to restrictions on
questions that can be asked during the census. The combination of multiple
levels of political institutions, group conflict, economic disparities, political
symbolism, and psychological factors demonstrate the utility of the Social
Cubism approach to the study of relatively peaceful conflict.' This paper argues
that much of the complexity of Belgium's political institutions is the result of
attempts to mitigate conflict and postpone significant disagreements.
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, St. Bonaventure
University, St. Bonaventure, New York.
1. Sedn Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, 3(2) J. PEACE AND CONFLICT STUD. 52, 52-71 (1996). NEAL CARTER & SEAN
BYRNE, A View From Northern Ireland and Quebec, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN
ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT (S. Byrne & C. Irvin eds. 2000).
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An understanding of identity conflicts is incomplete without examination
of strategic interaction and the various facets of conflict. As a result, this
chapter presents a brief discussion of models of strategic interaction,
emphasizing the structural change model. While this model is fairly useful in
indicating the relationship between structures and actions, it is very general. I
thus combine it with the Social Cubism approach to more fully show the
interaction and the interrelation of the different facets of the Social Cube. The
case study of Belgium clearly illustrates the utility of such an approach in
examining an ongoing, shifting conflict.
11. STRATEGIC INTERACTION
Models of strategic action used to explain the constraints that leaders face
provide valuable insights into the dynamic nature of political action. They
present succinctly the interaction of context, goals, actions and outcomes in
complex situations. Drawing from studies of nested games and conflict
processes, I argue that the actions of political leaders are best understood within
a framework that is sensitive to multiple constraints they confront.
Tsebelis has used 'nested games' to model complex decisions made by
political elites. He argued that politicians have relations with other elites and
with their constituents, and that actions with one group will affect the
relationship with the other.2 Similarly, Panebianco indicated that political elites
involve themselves simultaneously in at least two sets of interactions, which
may be characterized as games. In the first set, 'vertical' relations, elites seek
support from their constituents by attempting to represent and enhance
constituents' interests while also helping to shape those interests. In the second
set, 'horizontal' relations, elites vie amongst themselves for power.3 Because
the relations are 'nested', a leader's movement in one game affects her standing
in the other set of relations. Leaders negotiating intergroup (horizontal)
settlements find themselves constrained by vertical (elite-constituent) power
structures.4 In other words, leaders must be confident that their decisions will
play at home. They can use this constraint to their advantage during
negotiations. In general, strong support for a politician in the vertical game
increases her power to influence other leaders in the horizontal game.
Figure 1 depicts two types of games that are often combined in political
negotiations and invoked to explain politics in Belgium. In consociational
politics, elites (represented in the figure by numerals) interact with their
2. GEORGE TSEBELIS, NESTED GAMES: RATIONAL CHOICE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1990).
3. ANGELO PANEBIANCO, POLITICAL PARTIES: ORGANIZATION AND POWER (M. Silver trans. 1988).
4. ld; Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
(3) INT'L ORG. 427, 427-460; TSEBELIS, supra note 2.
constituents (X with identifying subscript) and with other leaders.
Consociationalism involves elite-level accommodation among separated and
isolated segments, or pillars, of society.5 Originally conceived as a means of
regulating ideological conflict, this theory has been expanded to address ethnic
and cultural cleavages.6 The coalition game involves more complex patterns of
elite interaction, since it entails the need for competing elites (represented by the
numerals) to interact and resolve their differences within a coalition
(represented by numerals within the same ellipse) in order to confront another
coalition. This requires consideration of interaction both within and among
coalitions. Coalitions are essential to -Belgian politics. 7 Combining the two
models provides a more accurate portrayal of the relationships that affect
politicians' decisions, as indicated in the "combined" diagram. This shows
three games: elite-constituents relations; intra-coalition elite relations; and
inter-coalition relations. Because they are nested, each game is affected by
movement in every other relationship. Leaders also compete for constituents
and face factional challenges within their parties, but this figure ignores such
interactions for the sake of simplicity. As the interactions can be viewed as an
iterative game, leaders will pursue strategies that strengthen their overall
position.8 Rudolph's depiction of Belgian constitutional debate exemplifies the
manner in which these games interact: "Each party's [horizontal] move in the
[constitutional] revision process tended to reflect its individual calculation of the
[vertical] electoral advantages of pursuing or opposing the constitutional
reform."9 Many variations could be found on this theme, since horizontal and
vertical relations interact and each action constrains subsequent strategy.
Rudolph also noted that strategies that produce success at an early stage in the
evolution of a party may need to be changed to face new challenges to cohesion
produced by that success.
5. AREND LIPHART, The Power-Sharing Approach, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN
MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES (J.V. Montville, ed. 1991).
6. Sue Halpern, The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy, 9 W. EUR. POL. 181,181-
197 (1996).
7. The coalitions in Belgium are complicated by the joint effects of language and ideology. The
ideological "spiritual families" are officially separated into separate French-speaking and Dutch-Speaking
parties. However, in many constitutional issues, parties will negotiate first within their community to
determine a common strategy with which to confront their partners from the other side of the linguistic border.
Jacques Brassinne, Le Dialgue de Communaut, 4 Communautg: Avril-juillet 1992 [The Dialog of
Communication and Communication: April-July 1992], in COURRIER HEBDOMODAIRE DU CRISP [CRISP
Bulletin] (Centre de Recherch et d'Information Socio-Politiques, Brussels 1992).
8. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979).
9. JOSEPH R. RUDOLPH, JR., Belgium: Variations on the Theme of Territorial Accomodation, in
ETHNOTERRITORIAL POLITICS, POLICY ANDTHEWESTERN WORLD 99 (J. Joseph R. Rudolph & R.J. Thompson
eds. 1989).
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The size and cohesion of various movements are central to elite
calculations, as they affect the relative power of various leaders to impose their
will on, or to reach acceptable accommodation with, others.1" Appearing to be
challenged by internal factionalization may actually improve a leader's
horizontal bargaining position. It may be possible to use the relationship with
constituents to demand accommodation on important issues. Leaders can state
that internal challenges to their position reduce their room for maneuver and
compromise while increasing their need to produce a settlement favorable to
their constituents. However, they also need to convince other leaders that they
can reasonably deliver the acceptance of the settlement by their constituents if
the negotiation is to be successful."
Burton noted the dangers of these relations when dealing with traditional
ideas about conflict. 2 Conflict is generally considered as competition for
material goods rather than involving underlying social goods that are not scarce,
such as identity, recognition, and participation. Leaders are therefore forced to
accept several important restrictions. Since resources are seen as limited, a gain
for one side is considered a loss for the other. This idea leads elites to seek a
settlement in which gains and losses are apportioned, rather than a resolution in
which all parties fulfill their perceived needs and interests. Further, because
each party seeks a settlement in its favor, each presents as forceful an image as
possible, in order to weaken the opponent's resolve. Of course, both sides know
this and may discount the opponents' apparent resolve.
Given this perception of conflict, all parties then face an "entry problem,"
as leaders dislike entering any institutional framework that compromises their
bargaining positions or attracts intra-party charges of appeasement. As conflict
escalates, parties generally restrict their interaction. Even if parties do enter into
institutional frameworks for a settlement, they must be as forceful as possible
when representing the interests of their constituents. They are also likely to
demand final control of the outcome, using institutions more as a mediator than
a decision-making framework. 3
Once a settlement is reached, elites face a re-entry problem. If leaders gain
a new appreciation for the interests of the other party during the negotiations
and the formulation of a settlement, they may have difficulty reporting to their
10. Similarly, Rudolph states, "[the leadership of] a growing party with a still small electoral
following ... will have comparatively little trouble in maintaining a united front in articulating the party's case
against the traditional leaders of the state. But once the party begins to achieve success at the ballot box, it
must face new sets of challenges and its leaders must deal with new sources of stress." Id. at 105.
11. For an argument of the multiple effects of two-level games in negotiation, see Putnam, supra
note 4.
12. John W. Burton, About Winning, 12(1) INT'L ORG. 71, 71-91 (1985).
13. ld. at 78-80.
own constituents that it was not necessary to beat the other party. Constituents
are often mobilized and groups polarized as the conflict escalates prior to
negotiations leading to settlements. The constituents are likely to continue
viewing the situation in win-lose terms, and consider any recognition and/or
accommodation of the other party's interest as a sign of weakness. Leaders may
face challenges from hard-liners, forcing the rejection of a settlement. Burton
advocates a different approach to conflict management, in which teams from the
parties (including oppositions and hard-liners) meet in facilitated problem-
solving workshops as an option that might reduce the dangers of the re-entry
problem.1"
As conflict develops, elites alter their strategies to adapt to changes in the
combination of these nested relationships. 5 Elster argued that developing
specific rational-choice models of particular situations is even more complex,
because it is possible that what seems irrational or sub-optimal in the short-run
may have repercussions that produce the optimal long-run outcome.16 These
considerations limit the potential of developing a specific calculus of decision
making. The notion of nested games does, however, provide a useful metaphor
for the complex constraints within which leaders act. Leaders are aware of
various contextual factors and usually have developed reasons for their choice
of tactics. The Structural Change Model depicts the dynamic nature of the
relationships described by nested games.
Models of sustained conflict should incorporate likely changes in the
structure of such conflicts. The Structural Change Model, based on the writings
of Burton, Coleman and Schumpeter, 17 includes the notion that conflictual
interaction produces three types of structural change: 1) changes in the
psychological states of participants due to 'residues' of the interaction, 2)
changes in the structure or function of groups due to mobilization, and 3)
alterations of the complex social relations of the parties that further affect the
nature of the larger community. During escalation, psychological states are
marked by increasingly hostile and competitive goals, negative attitudes and
perceptions of the other group and of intergroup interaction. This process can
eventually develop into deindividuation and, at an extreme, dehumanization, in
which participants come to see themselves and others strictly as members of
their group, rather than as individuals. Escalation can produce a greater need
for intra-group cohesiveness, thereby increasing the effect of group norms that
14. Id. at 84-85.
15. Anthony Mughan, Accommodation or Defusion in the Management of Linguistic Conflict in
Belgium, 31 POL. STUD. 434,434-451 (1983).
16. ELSTER, supra note 8.
17. JOHN W. BURTON, PEACE THEORY (1962); JAMES SAMUEL COLEMAN, COMMUNITY CONFLICT
(1957); J. SCHUMPETER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM (1955).
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can lead to polarization and enable more militant factions to gain influence,
which in turn affects the structure and nature of groups. In addition, conflicts
often escalate to include more participants, as each side tries to bolster its
position by mobilizing allies.' 8
Figure 2 presents the Structural Change Model. The model combines the
notion of conflict escalation spirals (represented by the solid arrows) with
confirmatory feedback loops (represented by broken lines). Party and Other
denote the participants in the conflict, with Party being the participant whose
viewpoint is being considered most closely. I follow Rubin et al.'s 9 practice of
placing the perceived divergence of interest in the upper left comer. This
perceived divergence of interest is assumed to start the conflict and lead to
action. As Rubin and his colleagues note, this factor may act on other portions
of the model as well. I have altered their model by refusing to restrict the scope
to heavy tactics, since I believe that the mechanisms also work with light
tactics. 20
The Structural Change Model shows the interrelations between actions and
structures within a conflict. It contains a number of feedback loops, and its
circular nature indicates that conflict should be viewed in terms of iterative
interactions. Structural changes can affect psychological states, the structure
and functions of groups, and/or the nature of the larger community. Arrows [A]
and [C] indicate that the actions of one party in the conflict can produce
structural changes which affect the other party. For example, a sneak attack
would affect the psychological state of the opponent, most likely decreasing
trust and increasing hostility. Arrows [B] and [D] indicate that the choice of
tactics is affected by structural conditions. Increased hostility and decreased
trust might produce more contentious tactics and reduce willingness to bargain.
Arrows [M] and [N] indicate that the choice of tactics may also cause structural
changes that affect the party who chose that action. An action may change the
context if, for example, the party rationalizes a sneak attack by further
dehumanizing the other, or by stating that it was a preemptive strike to prevent
an imminent attack. These rationalizations would reinforce the need to choose
heavy contentious tactics. Alternatively, confidence-building mechanisms may
also be reinforced by this method, as the justification of such methods usually
includes a strengthened perception of the possibility of fruitful negotiation.
Arrows [0] and [P] indicate that structural conditions often produce self-
18. JEFFREY Z. RUBIN ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SSETrLEMENT (2d
ed. 1994).
19. Id.
20. "[Llight tactics [are defined] as those whose consequences for Other are favorable or neutral.
By contrast, heavy tactics impose, or threaten to impose, unfavorable or costly consequences on Other." Id.
at 48.
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reinforcement mechanisms, such as self-fulfilling prophecies or selective
perception.
The Structural Change Model provides a basic model for considering the
potential sources of change in conflicts. It remains quite general about the
various types of change that can occur. In addition to the structural changes
listed by Rubin and his colleagues, parties can also act to change the
institutional framework in which their relations may be conducted. This is
particularly important in conflicts over the constitutional framework of
countries such as Belgium. Those involved in the conflict are aware that
constitutional changes will have multiple and lasting effects on their power.
Their bargaining sessions and negotiations are likely to produce residues that
affect future negotiations. Leaders consider the politics of constitutional reform
as an iterative, learning process.
The explanatory power of the model can be greatly increased through the
incorporation of the perspective of Social Cubism. Structural changes may
occur in the various facets of conflict: history, demographics, religion, political
activity, economics and psychocultural factors. Understanding the underlying
nature of the changes, and their interconnections may provide better solutions
for the regulation of conflict.
I. POLMCAL IDENTITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Ethnoterritorial conflict poses a significant threat to international security
in the post cold war era, sparking civil war in some countries and provoking
significant structural changes in others. Key considerations in the study of
ethnoterritorial conflict are the institutional structures that regulate group
interaction and the demands that group leaders make. A better understanding
of the interaction of these considerations can provide early warning of hot
conflict and help us understand the dynamic nature of the interaction between
identity, culture and politics.
Constitutions provide idealized versions of how interaction among groups
should be regulated. As such, constitutions legitimate various institutions and
social groupings. In multicultural societies, various groups may demand
constitutional changes that affect future interactions among groups.
Constitutional politics is an iterative, feedback-driven process of group
representation, group mobilization, group interaction, and structural changes in
the context.2' We need to employ conceptual models to gain better
understanding of the dynamic processes of conflict. This section analyzes the
interaction between group identifications and constitutional politics in Belgium,
focusing on Wallonia. This analysis indicates that each action by groups can
21. TSEBELIS, supra note 2.
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alter the structure of group interaction, thereby shaping the conflict, and that this
structural change then affects the options available to the groups. It illustrates
the crucial importance of understanding the context in which conflict occurs.
The Fourth Reform (since 1970) of the Belgian Constitution in 1993
marked a complete revision of the fundamental construct of the state. Most
significantly, Belgium officially transformed from a unitary to a federal
government. Some politicians from both major communities advocate further
devolution. The debate will continue with the constitutional revisions on the
agenda for the parliament. The Belgian case poses the question of why its
ethnoterritorial conflict is intense and persistent, but also peaceful and
institutionalized. The application of the structural change model and Social
Cubism illustrates the importance of constitutional debate in the regulation of
ethnoterritorial conflict.
After a review of important steps in relations between the two dominant
ethnic groups in each country, I examine the dynamic relationship between
constitutional politics and the political importance of ethnic identity. In the
discussion that follows, the capital letters in brackets refer to the paths depicted
in the Structural Change Model (see Figure 2) and the lower case letters indicate
the facet of the social cube.22
IV. THE GRADUAL CREATION OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
In Belgium, the evolution of ethnoterritorial identities has constrained the
conduct of politics. The gradual shift from strong localized identities to large
ethnoterritorial communities weakened the effectiveness of the unitary state and
the existing provinces. Politicians changed the constitution to create institutions
to address regional and cultural demands better. Francophone Walloon
nationalists, or Wallingants, developed claims largely in response to demands
of the Dutch-speaking Flamingant.23 Walloons are almost evenly divided
between those who primary identification remains Beige and those who identify
themselves as Wallon.24 The current situation in Belgium should be seen within
22. The lower case codes are as follows: c=psychocultural factors; d=demographics; e=economics;
h=history; p=political activity; r=religion.
23. Wallingants seldom refer to themselves as nationalist. They tend to emphasize the importance
of geographic differences. Their label indicates their defensive nature, as it derives from the Flamingant
movement. Flamingants are more likely to use the issues of culture, ethnicity and language. Despite these
differences, both can be referred to as ethnoterritorial movements.
24. Michel Vandekeere et al., Les Declinaisons de I'identite en Waltonie: Couplages et divorces
entre 41ectorats, appartenances et prises de position en matire communautaire et institutionnelle, in IN
ELECTIONS LE FgLURE? ENQUETE SUR LE COMPORTEMENT tLECTORAL DES WALLONS Er DES FRANCOPHONES
(A.-P. Frognier and A.-M. Aish-VanVaerenbergh, eds., 1994).
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the context of the historical development of relations between Flemings and
Walloons.
Although the name "Beige" stems from the Celts who settled the area
around 650 BC, politicians and researchers often assert that a common Belgian
identity is considered artificial.25 Julius Caesar conquered the area in 58-57
BC.26 The arrival of the Franks in early 800s instigated the linguistic division,
as the Gallo-Roman population was settled densely enough to assimilate the
Franks in the south, but not in the north.2 7 For centuries, various city-states,
provinces and empires fought over the territory. No common political or
cultural identity united the people occupying the area. Local identities thus
developed much earlier than, and continue to hinder, the national identity.
In 1792, France occupied the area and enforced centralization and cultural
dominance. With the fall of Napoleon in 1815, the territory was united with the
Low Countries [Cp]. Belgians resented religious differences [P,r] and the
'dutchification' of the administration [P,c]. They declared independence from
the Netherlands in 1830 [A&D,p]. Belgium adopted French as the official
language, although people could choose to speak other languages (Article 23)
[P,p&c]. 28  Suffrage based on strict property requirements assured the
Francophone bourgeoisie of a political majority although most Belgians spoke
dialects of Dutch. At independence, Belgium had no standard form of either
Dutch or French.
Until the mid 1900s, political, economic and social power rested primarily
with the Francophones, even in the northern area now contained in the Flemish
Region.29 Economic development enhanced the power of the southern region
known today as Wallonia [P,e]. Parts of the southern region were early
beneficiaries of the industrial revolution, and developed heavy industries [P,e].
The social and political status of the French language promoted a strong
Francophone presence in Brussels [P,p&d. 30 The Flemish movement, backed
by religious leaders and civil servants, began a cultural campaign to strengthen
Flemish culture and language almost immediately after independence
[N,c&r&p]. Most Belgians, regardless of language, were Catholic, but a debate
over the relationship between church and state increased ethnic tensions [A,r&p,
25. B. BOULANGt AND R. CAVENAILE, LA BELGIQUE DES ORIGINES A L'-TAT FtD8RAL (1990).
26. JOHN FI'IZMAURICE, THE POLITICS OF BELGIUM: CRISIS AND COMPROMISE IN A PLURAL SOCIETY
(1983).
27. BOULANGt & CAVENAILE, supra note 25, at 23.
28. The 1993 constitutional reform included a complete revision and renumbering of the articles in
the constitution. For the sake of simplicity, I use the old numbering to refer to all previous changes.
29. RUDOLPH, supra note 9, at 92.
30. Martine de Ridder and Luis Ricardo Fraga, The Brussels Issue in Belgian Politics, 9 W. EUR.
POL. 376, 376-392 (1986).
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C,r&p]. Most Francophones favored secularism, especially with regard to state-
supported education. Many religious leaders regarded the Francophones as
anticlerical, and therefore sought to protect the use of Flemish [B,r&p].3' In
addition, many Dutch-speakers who had been civil servants during Dutch rule
sought to maintain their status by demanding that Flemish be an official
language [B,c&p; D,c&p]. The 1847 Manifesto of the Flemish Movement set
forth several Flemish demands [B&C,p&c]. In 1898, Flemish became an
official language [O,p&c]. This recognition transformed interethnic relations,
as it strengthened the tendency to see Belgium as a bicultural society
[O&P,p&c]. 32 Francophones reacted defensively against the pressure of the
Flemish [C-M]. In 1912, the Congras Wallon advocated an administrative
separation of Flanders and Wallonia [A,p; M,p]. In 1912, future Minister of
State Jules Destr6e, in an often-quoted "open letter to the King" stated, "Sire,
there are no Belgians. There are only Flemish and Walloons," arguing that
eighty years of nation building had failed to produce a dominant basis of
identification, while ethnoterritorial groups had gained salience.33
With the gradual expansion of the franchise, the Flemings eventually
translated their demographic majority into political power [O,p&d; P,p&d]. 34
Universal suffrage for men was granted in 1893, but multiple votes allowed
Francophones to retain a majority of votes [P,d&p; O,d&p].35 This situation
proved untenable, as it signified the domination of the majority by a
demographic minority. Each reform changed the political and cultural climate
to encourage further changes, but also mitigated the levels of hostility that could
have erupted into violent conflict had Francophones refused to increase
Nederlandophone participation in government. Duffy and Frensley' s assertion
that leaders will prefer institutional conflict over hot conflict gains support from
this case in this period.36
31. BOULANGIt & CAVENAILE, supra note 25, at 100.
32. See Raymond Breton, The Production and Allocation of Symbolic Resources: An Analysis of
the Linguistic and Ethnocultural Fields in Canada, 21(2) CANADIAN REV. OF SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 123,
123-144 (1984). Breton argues that the symbolic importance of relative status of groups is a key factor in the
legitimacy of a state. Although based on the Canadian case, his argument is relevant here. The increased
status of a political or social minority is likely to produce a defensive reaction in those who see their status
as threatened. This is especially important if demographic factors produce a similar phenomenon.
33. Frank Delmartino, A Regional State or a Federal State in the Making?, in FEDERALISM AND
FEDERATION IN W.E. 38 (M. Burgess ed. 1986).
34. ALEXANDER B. MURPHY, THE REGIONAL DYNAMICS OF LANGUAGE DIFFERENTIATION IN
BELGIUM: A STUDY IN CULTURAL-POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY (RESEARCH PAPERS 227) (1988).
35. KENNETH DOUGLAS MCRAE, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES:
BELGIUM 35 (1986).
36. Gavan Duffy and Nathalie J. Frensley, Community Conflict Processes: Mobilization and
Demobilization in Northern Ireland, in INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: MAJOR CONFLICTS
The evolution of ethnic relations was interrupted by the First World War.
World War I exacerbated ethnic tensions within the army, as Francophone
officers commanded Flemish troops. The Flemish Frontpartij demanded the
creation of separate military units for Francophones and Nederlandophones
[Cp&c; Np&c]. The Germans used divide and conquer strategies for the
occupation of Belgium, and promoted Flemish nationalism [Cp&c]. In 1916,
they opened a Flemish university in Ghent [Cp&c]. The Proclamation of 22
December 1917 unsuccessfully asserted Flanders' autonomy [C&N, p&c].37
Flemish leaders linked symbols of power and the French language, portraying
the Flemish as victims who could not understand their Francophone oppressors
[C&N, h&c].
During the interwar period, Flemish nationalists demanded complete
linguistic equality [C&N,c&p]. 1919 marked the first election using the one
man, one vote formula [N-O,p; C-P,p]. By 1928, the national administration
was reformed to accommodate Flemish demands for linguistic parity [C&N,
c&p]. 38 The Flemish, noting an increased presence of Francophones in the
north, pressed for the establishment of the territoriality principle as a basis for
language legislation [0-B,d&c&p]. Francophones, however, argued that
language use should be a matter of individual choice [A-D,d&c&p].39
Unilingualism of primary and secondary education was established in 1930,
with Flemish being used in the North and French in the South. The University
of Ghent was converted into a unilingual Flemish institution the same year
[C&N,c&p]. In 1932, the administration adapted to the notion of two unilingual
regions. These steps, though addressing linguistic issues, reinforced the notion
of a biregional and bicultural State. They increased the salience of the linguistic
cleavage by making it correspond to a territorial cleavage [O&P,c&d&p].
The "Royal Question" reinforced these tensions. During World War II,
King Leopold III surrendered despite his government's pressure to form a
government in exile. At the end of the war, the Catholic Party moved to
reinstate the King, but the Socialists led protests. 4° Riots in Liege and Hainaut
ensued [D, p&d&c]. A referendum on the issue produced a majority in the
King's favor, but the regional disparity was striking [M&A,p&d&c]. Flemings
IN THE 1980S (J.W. Lamare, ed., 1991).
37. MURPHY, supra note 34, at 105-6.
38. Robert Senelle, Constitutional Reform in Belgium: From Unitarianism Towards Federalism,
in FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM 55 (M. Forsyth, ed., 1989).
39. For an evaluation of the differences between the principles of territoriality and personality, see
Kenneth D. McRae, The Principle of Territoriality and the Principle of Personality in Multilingual States, 158
LINGUISITICS: INT'L REV 33 (1975)
40. At the time, the Catholic Party was stronger in Flanders, while the Socialist Party was stronger
in Wallonia. Both parties had constituents throughout the country, however.
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voted overwhelmingly for his reinstatement [N&C,p]. A slight majority of
Walloons opposed the plan, although some Walloon provinces produced a slight
majority in favor [A&M,p]. The King abdicated due to the Walloon opposition,
and the throne passed to his son [P&O,p].4"
After the war, Belgians established the Research Center for the National
Solution of Social, Political and Juridical Problems in the Walloon and Flemish
Regions. The Center reported that the Flemish, although the demographic
majority, had minority status in military, political, diplomatic, business and
cultural circles [O,d&e&p&c]. The center noted a gradual spread of French in
Flemish areas around Brussels and along the linguistic border [O,d].42 These
reports provided additional incentives for mobilization along ethnoterritorial
lines [O&P, c&d&p]. The Flemish demanded that the government redress the
discrepancies [C&N,p]. Walloons counter-mobilized against the threat to their
position posed by the Flemish majority [A&M,p].
Political and economic divisions deepened in the immediate post-war
reconstruction. In Flanders, industrialization proceeded rapidly [O,e], while the
old industries in Wallonia steadily declined [P,e] and Wallonia's portion of
Belgium's population diminished [P,d]. In the 1950s, these changes, combined
with further debate over education policy, encouraged the rise of regional
parties [A&M,p; C&N,p]. 3 Volksunie, a Flemish federalist party, was founded
in 1954 [N,p]. 4 Flemish economic and demographic gains [O,d&e] forced the
Belgian government to recognize the parity of French and Dutch, with separate
administrations for the cultural communities [O&P,p&c]. Meanwhile, the
Rassemblement Wallon and the Front Democratique des Francophones formed
to pursue Walloon and Bruxellois regional interests [P,p&c].41
Despite the rise of regional parties, the three main political parties (Liberal,
Catholic, Socialist) maintained their dominance of Belgian politics. The
Flemish Catholic Party held the strongest position, while the Socialists were
most powerful in Wallonia. In the late 1950s, austerity measures and economic
decline in Wallonia threatened to destabilize the government [P,e&p]. In the
winter of 1960 political leaders called a national general strike against the
government's austerity measures, but participation was exceedingly weak in the
Flemish North. Andr6 Renard, a leader of the strikes, founded the Mouvement
populaire wallon to pursue economic and social reform within Wallonia and
41. MCRAE, supra note 35, at 111.
42. BOULANGE & CAVENAILE, supra note 25, at 103.
43. Els Witte, Belgian Federalism: Towards Complexity and Asymmetry, 15(4) W. EUR. POL. 95,
95-117(1992).
44. Murphy, supra note 34, at 201.
45. The Francophones in Brussels and Wallonia are not always united in their political views. The
regional, territorial dimension often interferes with their ability to cooperate.
avoid relying on Flemish cooperation [P,c&p]. This reinforced the notion that
the two main regions sought different social institutions and followed different
political ideologies [O&P,c&p].
The Belgian government permanently fixed the linguistic frontier in 1962
[O&P,p&c]. Before this change, the government had needed to adjust the
boundary occasionally to reflect the changes in language use indicated by the
decennial census [O&P, p&c&d]. Reacting to the dramatic increase of
Francophones in Flanders reported in the first census after World War II
[O&B,c&d], Flamingants claimed that the use of a census question to determine
the border was unfair since it was an indication of the popularity of languages,
rather than their actual use [N&C,p&c].46 The protest forced the government to
remove linguistic questions from the census [C&N,p&c&d], thereby removing
reported language use as a means of determining language policy [O&P,
c&d&p]. 47 The government created a linguistic frontier to bound linguistic
regions territorially. The line was not drawn cleanly; twenty-five communes
were transferred from the Flemish region to Wallonia and twenty-four were
passed in the opposite direction [O&P,p&c]. According to Dustin, the
government initiated the transfer partially due to party strength in the areas
[N&C,p&d; M&A,p&d]. 48 Especially important were six communes that were
transferred from Li~ge (Wallonia) to Limburg (Flanders).49 In a referendum in
these communes, 93% opposed the transfer, but the government refused to
respect the vote [O&P,p&d&c].5 ° The majority of Francophones in Parliament
also opposed this law [A&M,p]. The transfer was a rare example of important
legislation passed despite sharp linguistic divisions [O&P,h&c].5"
Francophones continue to challenge the legitimacy of this law, especially in
Voeren/Fourons where the Return to Liege list has achieved considerable
success in municipal elections [P&D,c&h]. The Flemish Taal Aktie Komitie
(Language Action Committee) and the Vlaamse Militanten Orde (Flemish
Military Order) conducted an intimidation campaign [C&N,p&c] in response
to Francophone Action fouronnaise activism aimed at returning Fourons to
LiEge [A&M,c&p]. Francophone leader Jos6 Happart rejected an offer for help
46. Although some members of both sides did collaborate with the Germans, the Flemish were
portrayed as more enthusiastic collaborators, and were therefore subjected to harsh treatment after the war.
They may thus have been less likely to indicate that they spoke Flemish [O&P,h&c].
47. MCRAE, supra note 35, at 35.
48. Interview with Femand-Daniel Dustin, PSC Archivist (1995).
49. These communes were often collectively referred to as les Fourons in French, and Voeren in
Flemish.
50. MCRAE, supra note 35, at 153.
51. Xavier Mabille, . Le ddbat politique d'avril 1990 sur la sanction et la promulation de la loi,
COURRIER HEBDOMODAIRE DU CRISP [CRISP Bulletin] (Centre de Recherch et d'Information Socio-
Politiques, Brussels 1990).
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in sustaining a terrorist campaign, perhaps preventing a serious escalation of the
conflict [A&M,h].52
Politicians confronted another problem with the construction of the
linguistic border. They could not ignore that Brussels, located on the Flemish
side of the linguistic boundary, contained about one-fourth of all Francophones
in the country, and had only a small minority of Flemish-speakers [O&P,c&d].
In order to keep this "oil-stain" 3 from spreading, the Flemish pushed for, and
in 1963 attained, the designation of Brussels as bilingual with limited territory
[O-B-N&C, c&p].
By 1969, the Flemish raised another problem. Although the territory of
Brussels had been set, the "oil-stain" of Francophones in Flanders was growing
towards the University of Louvain/Leuven, which is east of Brussels in Flemish
Brabant [O&P,c&d]. Flemish speakers in the university agitated for the
removal of the Francophones from the University [O-B-C&N,p&c&d]. The
splitsing (division) of the university, with the creation of Louvain-la-Neuve,
symbolized the larger divisions within the country
[A&M,c&d&p;C&N,c&d&p]. These changes reduced support for the unitary
state as the notion of a common Belgian identity lost credibility [O&P,c&h].5 4
Structural changes thus accumulated over time, shaping patterns of
behavior and perceptions of the groups. The iterations of the conflict spiral,
with behavioral structures mutually affecting each other, weakened the support
for a common identity and increased demands for ethnoregional autonomy. The
constitution itself would become the political battleground.
V. BELGIAN CONSTrrUTIONAL REFORM
By the end of the 1960s, Belgium required major constitution revision.
The Belgian constitution has been significantly modified four times since 1970.
Each package of constitutional amendments involved institutional reform to
reduce the need for agreement across the linguistic border. Increasingly, leaders
had more independence to make decisions within each linguistic community or
region.55 Belgium has abandoned its unitary structure in favor of a complex
52. Jost HAPPART, AU NOM DE LA LIBERTI [IN THE NAME OF LIBERTY] (1984). Jost HAPART AND
MARIE-PPAULE ESKENAZI, JOSt HAPPART: PORTRAIT DUN REBELLE TRANQUILLE [JoSt HAPPART: PORTRAIT
OF A QUIET REBEL] (1987). JOSt HAPPART AND VINCENT VAGMAN, HAPPART DE A A Z: ENTRETIENS AVEC
VINCENT VAGMAN [HAPPART FROM A TO Z: CONVERSATIONS WITH VINCENT VAGMAN] (1989).
53. Flamingants used this term to symbolize the concentration of Francophones in the Flemish
region. It indicated that Francophones marred the Flemish region, that they were hard to remove, and that they
could spread and cause more damage to the Flemish fabric.
54. Murphy, supra note 34.
55. Unlike most federations, federal laws do not overrule regional or community decrees within their
jurisdiction. There are a few exceptions to this, such as questions of educational policy.
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federation composed of communities and regions, whose boundaries overlap.
This section traces the principal political dimensions of these four changes.56
A. The 1970 Reform
1967-71 produced a major reform of the Belgian constitution. The reform
instituted several structural changes that significantly altered the tactics used by
the parties. Politicians institutionalized the binary nature of Belgium,
establishing the "Cultural Communities" (Article 59bis) Each of the three
communities-the Flemish-speaking, the French-speaking, and the German
speaking communities-received its own Council and powers to enact decrees
concerning cultural affairs and, to a limited extent, education and the use of
language [O&P,p].58 Flemish leaders had led the drive for the establishment of
the Communities [C&N,p&c], but Francophones favored regionalization
[A&M,c&p]. Walloons demanded decentralization of social and economic
matters in order to address their region's economic crisis [D-A&M,c&e&p]. 5 9
The revised constitution recognized three regions, but failed to define
administrative responsibilities for each [O&P,c&p]. Details were postponed, "a
la belge," for future constituent assemblies. Francophones demanded
recognition of Brussels as a region equal to Flanders and Wallonia [A&M,c&p].
Flemish leaders opposed giving Brussels regional status, fearing that such
recognition would lead to a shift from parity to a two-to-one advantage for
Francophones [C&N,c&p]. The compromise was only a partial victory for each
side, since they created regions, but left the status of Brussels ambiguous.
Other important constitutional revisions included mandatory linguistic
parity in the Cabinet, with the exception of the Prime Minister (Article 86bis).
The major governmental portfolios were divided equally between Francophones
and Nederlandophones [O&P,p]. This requirement did not include secretaries
of state (sub-cabinet portfolios), which can be used to reflect the relative
strength of coalition partners and usually favors the Flemish.' Additionally, the
1970 package initiated an "alarm bell" procedure, in which a motion of concern
56. Constitutional amendment in Belgium is conducted within the Belgian Parliament. The
government must produce a list of articles that it wishes to review for amendment. Parliament is then
dissolved, and election of a Constituent Assembly follows. Coalition formation after the election includes
inter-party negotiation over the issues. A two-thirds majority is required for any amendment.
57. Article numbers cited here refer to their original numbering. The 1993 reform included a
complete renumbering of the articles in the constitution.
58. While the German-speaking community was given powers, it has a very small population (less
than 1% of the total population), and does not play a key role in national politics.
59. ANDR9 ALEN ANDRUSEN ERGEC, BRUSSELS: MINISTRY OFFOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXTERNAL TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 15 (1993).
60. McRAE, supra note 35, at 185.
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signed by three-fourths of the members of parliament from either language
group could return a bill to the executive for reconsideration [O&P,c&p]. 61 This
procedure can be used in the Belgian parliament (Article 38bis) and Brussels
Council (Article 108ter, section 3). The symbolic nature of the alarm bell
increased confidence that the majority will act with respect for the minority
[O&P,c].
B. The 1980 Reform
Belgian politicians again modified the constitution in 1980 in order to
better adapt the new division of powers. This revision expanded the powers of
the Cultural Communities to include "personalized services" such as protection
of minors and health policy, but reduced their name to "Communities"
[O&P,c&p]. 62  The government again temporarily ignored the question of
Brussels in order to reach an agreement [O-B,p; P-D,p]. Special legislation only
partially clarified the role of the Walloon and Flemish regions, and the future
of the regions remained in question.
The 1980 revision also introduced the Court of Arbitration (Article 107ter)
to settle disputes between Communities, Regions and the National Government
[O&P,p]. Its early decisions increased confidence in the Court's fairness
[O&P,c], and the 1988 reform increased its jurisdiction from only governments
to "any person proving an interest".63
C. The 1988 Reform
The "Happart Affair" is widely credited with causing the crisis that led to
the fall of the government and the election of a constituent assembly in 1987.
Happart was both a Member of the European Parliament and Bourgmestre
(mayor) of Fourons.64 Fourons had been transferred in 1962 from the Walloon
61. MAUREEN COVELL, Belgium, The Variability of Ethnic Relation, in THE POL. OF ETHNIC
CONFLICT REG.: CASE STUDIES OF PROTRACTED ETHNIC CONFLICTS 289 (J. McGarry & B. O'Leary eds.
1993); MCRAE, supra note 35, at 183.
62. ALEN, supra note 59, at 15; COVELL, supra note 61, at 290.
63. ALEN, supra note 59, 21-22.
64. Technically, Happart was premier dchevin faisant fonction, i.e.,acting Bourgmestre. The
provincial government of Limburg could prohibit him from being appointed Bourgmestre but not from being
elected as a councilor (dchevin). Article 107 of the Communal law stated that the First Councilor (premier
ichevin) would become acting mayor if the Bourgmestre was unable to fulfill his duties. The Fouronnais thus
elected Happart as premier dchevin, but the office of Bourgmestre was left empty after October 1986 as a
result of a decision by the Flemish chamber of the Council of State. This resulted in the "carousel" in which
the provincial government would disallow the election, but new elections would produce the same results.
This crisis thus indicates the importance of the connections between institutions and conflict. See JOSE
HAPPART, LETrRES QUESTIONS AU MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR MONSIEUR JOSEPH MICHEL [L.ETrERS AND
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province of Li~ge to the Flemish province of Limburg as part of a compromise
that led to the "permanent" delineation of the linguistic boundary
[O&P,c&h&p].65 The transfer was enacted despite a local referendum in which
most Fouronnais opposed the transfer and despite dissenting votes by the
majority of Francophones in Parliament. Happart and his "Happartiste" allies
continued the struggle, claiming that the transfer was illegitimate [A&M,c&p].
They created several organizations to fight what they considered a Flemish plan
to dominate the country [A&M,c&p]. In 1987, the situation in Fourons again
reached a boiling point. Noting legal ambiguities, Happart refused to submit to
the linguistic tests required of mayors in Flanders, thereby producing a legal
contradiction in which Happart was both commanded and forbidden to perform
his mayoral duties [A&M,c&p]. 66 The governor of Limburg postponed
Happart's re-election as Bourgmestre, upon which the local municipal
government dissolved itself to force a new election [B-N&B-C,p]. Happart won
again. A similar case emerged in Brussels. Several rounds of this carousel, as
it was popularly labeled, provoked dissatisfaction on both sides of the linguistic
frontier [A-O,c&p;M-P,c&p]. In 1987-88, political leaders engaged in a new
round of constitutional negotiations.
Debate over this reform shows the complexity of divisions within the
Francophone community and the importance of dynamic models of conflict.
The original controversy over Happart's ability to perform mayoral duties
escalated to the point that the government collapsed and Belgium's political
parties spent about six months negotiating a settlement extending far beyond
Happart's specific plight. The politicians involved all had multiple objectives.
Francophone leaders needed to defend themselves from Happartiste criticism
[P-D,p]. Francophone Social Christian leader G6rard Deprez needed to defend
his actions against accusations that he agreed to the plan simply to change
coalition parties and that he had 'sold out' to the Flemish [M,p]. Within the
Francophone Socialist Party, those who supported Jos6 Happart's regionalist
policies protested that party President Guy Spitaels had missed a unique
opportunity to reestablish Fourons as a part of Liege [M,c&p]. In their eyes,
Spitaels had surrendered to the unending, ever-increasing demands of the
Flemish.67 Spitaels, however, argued that he had chosen the best strategy for
Belgium, leading toward a federal system [A&M,p]. He noted that he had never
QUESTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR JOSEPH MICHAEL] (1987).
65. Although the boundary can be changed by an act of law, such an act would require a special
majority that would include the majority of representatives from both major linguistic groups-an unlikely
event.
66. HAPPART, supra note 64.
67. Interview with Jean-Maurice Dehousse (1995).
2002]
980 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:963
promised that Fourons would return to Liege.6s Many Socialists feared that the
Happartistes would ignore the Socialist platform, or effectively change it to
privilege regional rather than class conflict [P,c&p].
As part of the agreement, the Special Law of 9 August 1988 altered the
regulations for communal elections, consequently preventing Happart from
being re-elected Bourgmestre [M&C-P-D,p]. 69 The government established a
three-phase plan to alter the fundamental structure of the unitary state. The first
phase required the legal recognition of Francophone rights in the Brussels
periphery, the creation of a Brussels-Capital Region with powers equal to the
other two regions and the extension of the Court of Arbitration's jurisdiction
[P&O,p]. The second phase extended the German-speaking Community's
power to pursue international relations (Article 59ter) and included special laws
clarifying the powers of Communities and Regions [O&P,p]. The third phase
established direct elections for Regions and Communities [O&P,p]. The 1988
reform also included a new system of financing the communities and regions
[O&P,p].70 The communities gained virtually complete control over education
(Article 59bis) [O&P,p].
The compromise reached by the parties in this third constitutional reform
neither instituted new and innovative institutions nor completed the process of
federalization. It did, however, further extend the power of the regions, and
recognized Brussels as a region in itself, marking a major turning point in
interethnic relations. As such, it created structural changes that increased the
drive toward federalism.
D. The 1993 Reform
The reforms of 1988-89 left several issues unsettled. In the midst of yet
another crisis in 1991, the executive declared every article of the constitution
subject to revision, and dissolved parliament, thus requiring new elections. The
Christian and Socialist parties formed a new coalition based on an agreement
that was much less precise than that constructed in 1988. The accord cemented
the official federalization of the country, including direct elections for the
governments of the constituent units. This reform involved a complete revision
68. Dider Caudron,. Guy Spitaels:ouitdlafinducarrouselfouronnaismais pas en capitulant, LE
PEUPLE, May 18, 1987; Guy Daloze et al, Guy Spitaels: pas touche 6 la sdcuritJ social, LA LIBRE BELGIQUE,
Jan. 16, 1989, at 4.
69. Happart says this continues to cause him great pain, but he remains active in the PS. As a
Socialist Member of European Parliament, Happart fought for increased regionalization, and now advocates
a biregional status for the Fourons/Voeren. Jose Happart (interview with author, 1995). He remains a
controversial, but popular, Walloon politician. He is currently agricultural minister for Wallonia.
70. ANDRI ALEN AND RUSEN ERGEC, FEDERAL BELGIUM AFTER THE FOURTH STATE REFORM OF
1993 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade and Development Cooperation, Brussles, 1994).
of the constitution, and entrenched both social and political rights. The old
numbering system of the articles was changed. Most significantly, Article 1
now reads, "Belgium is a federal State made up of Communities and Regions"
[O&P,p] Article 138 empowers the French Community to vest its authority in
the Walloon Region and the French linguistic group in Brussels-Capital [P,p].
The Fourth Reform also expanded the international powers of regions and
communities in trade and cultural matters, although their actions must be
compatible with national policies [O&P,p]. The federal government does
maintain the right to require an intergovernmental conference about a proposed
treaty, and if specific criteria are met, the King may suspend a treaty. Most
disputes among governments continue to be addressed by the Court of
Arbitration.
As a result of these changes, three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and
Brussels) and three communities (Flemish, French, and German-speaking)
comprise the State. The German-speaking community is geographically located
within the Walloon region, which is dominated by Francophones. The
Francophone community is located in the Walloon region, except for the
territory occupied by the German-speaking region, plus the Brussels-Capital
Region. The Flemish community is located in the Flemish Region, plus the
Brussels-Capital Region. The new Belgian constitution outlines the
responsibilities of the communities and the regions (Articles 115-140). Regions
have jurisdiction over such issues as the environment, development, housing,
economic policy, energy policy, employment policy, and international
cooperation. Distinct from the regional authority, the community institutions
have competence concerning education and cultural matters such as language
policy, fine arts, cultural heritage, libraries, broadcasting, and youth policy. The
communities also have jurisdiction over personalized matters such as health
policy, and aid to individuals.7
VI. CONCLUSION
Through these structural changes, Belgians have adapted to increasing
demands for devolution. The transformation of the state has been conducted in
stages to address ethnoterritorial concerns, leaving several issues aside until
agreement can be reached. Trust that issues will be addressed later is crucial to
the sense that participants are being treated fairly and to the success of
negotiations.72 Nevertheless, the reforms have reinforced the salience of the
linguistic and regional division and reduced the incentive for cooperation. As
71. Id.
72. Interview with Marc Uyttendael (1995).
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politicians continue to address ethnoterritorial concerns, institutional revision
is a constant possibility.
Due to time and space constraints, I have chosen not to address the
influence of membership in the European Union. However, EU membership
does change some of the political and economic implications of various policy
options. Arguably, the EU would minimize the costs of a break-up of Belgium
into two or three states. However, the status of Brussels still continues to be a
source of contention, since it is predominantly Francophone, but located within
Flemish Brabant. Regional economic differences continue to plague Belgium,
adding to the tension. The Belgians will continue to face significant challenges
as they attempt to regulate ethnoterritorial conflict.
This article has shown the significant interactions among the six facets of
the social cube. Demographics, history, religion, economics, politics and
psychocultural factors all play important roles in the strategies adopted by the
various politicians. Religion emphasized the differences since even though the
entire country is predominantly Catholic, Flemings were seen as more loyal
Catholics. Although history was not frequently used in the coding, the past
history recounted here does strongly constrain the alternatives considered in
contemporary politics. Demographic considerations may change the relative
strength of groups; therefore the government has made the collection of
demographic data concerning language use extremely difficult and will not
allow such questions on official surveys or the census. Immigration, especially
in Brussels may shift political considerations in the near future. Economic
power has shifted over the years from Wallonia to Flanders. In addition,
political institutions have shifted, giving more power to Flemings and
decentralizing decision-making. These considerations are further influenced by
psychocultural factors such as group identification and perceptions of outgroups
and motivations. These factors are compounded by the fact that the
Francophone minority long held political, economic, and social advantages,
leading the Flemings to become a "majority with a minority complex".73 The
increasing complexity of governmental institutions in Belgium is an indication
of various paths that can be taken to regulate conflict, and may act as a shock-
absorber as the general public is forced to rely on the politicians and lawyers to
sort through the implications of further changes.
As we analyze conflicts, it is important to remember that a single approach
is unlikely to completely address the problem. However, various efforts to
reduce a conflict, including symbolic, institutional, and economic measures may
promote de-escalation. These approaches will then create additional structural
change that will influence the choice of the parties' tactics. An increased
73. Interview with John Fitzmaurice (1995).
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understanding of structural change is promoted by sensitivity to the
interconnections of the various sides of the social cube.
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I. INTRODUCCION
Con el colapso del comunismo y del orden geopolftico de la Guerra Frfa,
surgieron tres tendencias ligadas a la perdida del poder de las ideologfas basadas
en la racionalidad moderna;' la formaci6n de un nuevo orden transnacional con
un sistema financiero integral, patrones de producci6n y de consumo; la deca-
dencia relativa de estados centralizados y una soberanfa territorial moderna.2
La escalada de conflictos etno-polfticos conformado tanto por factores
indigenas como por impedimentos globales.3 Niveles de interacci6n comunitaria
conducen a conflictos inter comunitarios. Debido a los conflictos, tanto el
sistema intemacional, como las relaciones entre los estados y las relaciones
internas de los mismos, deben ser consideradas.4 En el dnbito del sistema
intemacional, el flujo de capital, las ideologfas, el nacionalismo y el ejercicio
del poder hegem6nico influyen en la intensificaci6n del conflicto externo e
interno de los estados. La fuerza de asuntos micro-nacionalistas dentro de las
* Ph.D. El director de Programas Doctorales y Profesor Asociado, el Departamento de la
Resoluci6n de ia Disputa, Nova Southeastern University Cursos de Posgraduado de Humanidades y Ciencias
Sociales, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
** Professor Ayudante de la Ciencia Polftica, El departamento de la Ciencia Polftica, St.
Bonaventure University, New York, New York.
*** Profesor Ayudante en el Departamento de Conflicto Andlisi y Resoluci6n, Escuela de
Huamnidad y Ciencias Sociales. Nova Southeastern University.
**** Este articulo fue traducido por Horacio Luna.
1. Fred Pearson et al., Overcoming Wilsonianism: American Conflict Resolution and Ethnic
Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING
POINTS IN ETHNOPOLrricAL CONFLICTS 23-40 (Sefn Byrne & Cynthia Irvin, eds. 2000).
2. Id.
3. Ho Jeong (ed.). 1999. Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure.
4. ANDREA K. GROVE & NEAL A. CARTER, POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, NOT ALL BLARNEY IS CAST
IN STONE: INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 725 (1999).
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estructuras estatales ha generado conflictos etno-polftico prolongados,
resultando en micro-macro tensiones y en estancamientos.
El Estado esta perdiendo parte de su poder original de evidente identidad
colectiva, de un bien comdin y de su legitimidad de auto determinaci6n.5 La
identidad social y la clase esti siendo reemplazada en algunas dreas con
afiliaciones 6tnicas, religiosas y territoriales.6
Estas nuevas identidades ahora luchan por su autodeterminaci6n, por la
celebraci6n de sus expresiones rituales y sus normas de grupo, por impulsar la
movilizaci6n 6tnica, por los conflictos etno-politicos, por la divisi6n estatal y
por el regionalismo, alrededor del mundo.7
La globalizaci6n ha trabajado en el reforzamiento de esas devociones y
caracteristicas locales, en respuesta a la identidad econ6mica generada por el
orden hegem6nico transnacional del mercado mundial.' En vez de una
manifestaci6n directa del capitalismo laissez faire, apreciado en las normas
legales y en la prosperidad sometida al constructivismo liberal internacional o
la "condici6n" post moderna; el nuevo orden, revel6 una sorprendente
semejanza al desorden pre-moderno alimentado por la inestabilidad y la
protesta contra la movihzaci6n y la limpieza 6tnica en busca de homogeneidad
cultural y pureza racial. 9 Es un verdadero esfuerzo intelectual tratar de darle
sentido a esta "ficci6n medular"-a la transici6n entre refugiados, Netscape,
Gerry Adams, McDonalds, (Jihad), Disney, Violencia Domestica, Reducciones
Corporativas y Sarajevo.
Desde la terminaci6n de la Guerra Fria, los conflictos 6tno-polfticos se han
incrementado en frecuencia e intensidad.'0 Sin embargo, el conflicto 6tnico o
5. John Agnew, The Geopolitical Context of Contemporary Ethnopolitical Conflict, in
RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN ETHNOPOLITCAL CONFLICTS 98 (Sedn Byme & Cynthia
Irvin, eds., 2000).
6. Patrick G. Coy, et. al., 2000. (Editores). Social Conflicts and Collective Identities [Conflictos
Sociales e Identidades Colectivas]. Lanham, MD: Rowman y Littlefield.
7. David Carment & Patrick James, 1998. (Eds). Peace in the Midst of Wars: Preventing and
Managing International Ethnic Conflict [Paz en medio de Guerras: Previniendo y rnanejando Conflictos
Etnicos Internacionales]. Columbia, SC: Universidad de Prensa de Carolina del Sur.
8. John Agnew, 2000. The Geopolitical Context of Contemporary Ethnopolitical Conflict [El
Contexto Geopolftico del Conflicto Ethno-Polftico Contempordneol, en Sedn Byrne y Cynthia Irvin, eds.,
Conflicto y Cambio Pac(fico en Sociedades Divididas: Teorias y Usos. West Hartford, CT: Prensa Kumariana,
pp. 98-125.
9. Hugh Miall, y sus colejos, 1999. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention,
Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts [Resoluci6n del Conflicto Contempordneo: La
Prevenci6n, El Manejo y La Transformaci6n de los Conflictos Mortales.] Cambridge: Prensa del R~gimen.
10. Ted Robert Gurr, 2000. People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Twenty-first
Century [El Pueblo Contra Los Estados: Minortas enRiesgo en elNuevo Siglo Veintiuno]. Washington
Instituto de los Estados Unidos deLa Prensa de Paz.
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comunal, no es simplemente un fen6meno de la post-Guerra Frfa. Durante los
anos sesenta, teorizantes de la modemizaci6n desvanecerfan, en la medida en
que la industrializaci6n, las comunicaciones, la tecnologfa y el mercado
internacional se expandieran." El surgimiento del nacionalismo 6tnico en el
oriente desarrollado conlleva dudas en el prospecto de integraci6n y en el futuro
de un estado multi-&nico.
Inglaterra, la primera naci6n industrial y modelo de estabilidad
democrdtica, se alboroto por el conflicto 6tnico en Irlanda del Norte y la
aparici6n del nacionalismo en Escocia y en Wales. 2 La pr6spera Canada ha
experimentado grandes dificultades tratando de acomodar el sentimiento 6tnico-
nacional en Quebdc. 3
Aunque las relaciones cooperativas entre grupos han mantenido disparidad
lingfifstica, religiosa y costumbres culturales no necesariamente constituyen la
excepci6n a la regla, las relaciones son frecuentemente tirantes durante periodos
de dificultad social y econ6mica, con temores, incertidumbre y miedo. 14
Desafortunadamente, los asuntos fundamentales asociados con periodos de
transici6n polftica (por ejemplo, la corrupci6n, los malos manejos y la
ineptitud) frecuentemente se enrarecen por la retorica nacionalista de
oportunistas que encuentran mis ventajoso jugar la "carta 6tnica" y promover
la lucha 6tnica, que promover su propia muerte polftica. 5
Durante la 6poca colonial, en Africa central, las autoridades belgas
transformaron a sus vecinos en enernigos mediante la expedici6n de las cartas
Ruandas, disenadas para establecer identidades. Esta campana institucionaliz6
y ayud6 a proveerle razones 6tnicas a la subsiguiente dominaci6n Tutsi. 16 La
11. Samir Amin, 1977. Imperialism and Unequal Development [Imperialismo y Desarrollo
Desigual]. Nueva York, N.Y.: Revista Mensual de Prensa. Cardosa, Fernando Henrique, 1972. Dependencia
y Desarrollo en America Latina, Revista Nueva Izquierda 74 (2): 83-95. Dos Santos, Theotonio, 1970. La
Estructura de Dependencia, Revista Econrmica Americana 60(2): 231-236. Gunder Frank, Anders, 1983.
Critica y Anti-critica: Ensayos sobre Dependencia y Reformismo. Nueva York, N.Y; Praeger.
12. Hechter, Michael, 1975. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National
Development [Colonialismo Interno: la Franja Celica en el Desarrollo Britdnico Nacional], 1536-1966.
Londres: Routledge y Paul Kegan.
13. Neal Carter y SeAn Byrne 2000. The Dynamics of Social Cubism: Aview From Northen Ireland
and Quebec [La DinAmica del Cubismo Social: Una Visi6n de Irlanda del Norte y Quebec.] En Sen Byrne
y Cynthia Irvin (Eds).. Diferencias Reconciliables: Puntos decisivos en Conflictos Ethno-Politicos. West
Hartford, CT: Prensa Kumariana, 41-64.
14. Donald Horowitz, 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict [Grupos [rnicos en Conflicto]. Berkeley,
CA: Universidad de Prensa de California.
15. Tom Woodhouse & Oliver Ramsbotham, (eds.). 2000. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution
[Pacificacirn y Resolucidn de Conflicto.] Londres: Frank Cass.
16. George McCall y Miranda Duncan, 2000. South Africa's National Peace Accord and Laue's
Developmental Vision for community Conflict Intervention [El acuerdo de paz Nacional de la Suddfrica y la
Visi6n del Desarrollo de Laue para La Intervenci6n en el Conflicto ComunitarIO], en SeAn Byrne y Cynthia
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desenfrenada economfa y la incertidumbre polftica que abrumaba a Europa
oriental a finales de los ahios ochenta condujo a un nimero de politicos
inescrupulosos a salirse de la senda."7 Respondiendo con represi6n al
irredentismo, el r6gimen de Zhivkov en Bulgaria y el de Chausesco en Rumania,
por ejemplo, avanzaron en sus campafias de "Regeneraci6n" y de creaci6n de
estados de nacionalidad pura. En Bulgaria, el "proceso de Regeneraci6n" se
enfoc6 a forzar la asimilaci6n bajo un c6digo civil nacional, forzando a los
Turcos Bfilgaros y a los Musulmanes Eslavos (pomaks) a adoptar nombres
Bdllgaros. La politica de Regeneraci6n tambi6n fue responsable por el cierre de
Mezquitas, de la prohibici6n del uso de la lengua turca en lugares ptiblicos, del
desaliento de prdcticas culturales y religiosas y la consulta del credo isl6.mico
(sher a). Muy similar en su forma fueron las politicas asimilatorias adoptadas
por el gobierno rumano en la erradicaci6n de la identidad 6tnica htingara de la
poblaci6n en Transilvania. En el aflo 1989, la campana nacionalista de Zhivkov
condujo a un 6xodo masivo de turcos Btilgaros y pomaks a Turqufa con
devastadoras repercusiones en la economfa btlgara lo que caus6 que el r6gimen
tomara una serie de medidas represivas adicionales.18 Tales medidas coercitivas
inclufan los trabajos forzados y el envfo de personas, de la ciudad al campo,
para la recolecci6n de las cosechas. En el mismo aflo, la masacre en Timisvar
y Transilvania dispar6 la resoluci6n Rumana Anti-Comunista y la cafda del
r6gimen totalitario de Chausesco."9
En general, los estados autoritarios (por ejemplo, la Espafia de Franco, la
Bulgaria de Zhivkov, la Yugoslavia de Tito, la Serbia de Milosevic y la
Rumania de Chausesco) indefinidamente fracasaron, miserablemente, en la
erradicaci6n de la expresi6n 6tnica. Desde otra perspectiva, el vacfo dejado por
el fracaso del atractivo del movimiento comunista, fue visto, tanto por el
nacionalismo anti-elite como por el transformado antiguo comunismo
nomenclamenture, como un beneficio potencial rescatable. Como resultado del
vacfo politico, todos los antiguos parses comunistas que alguna vez adoptaron
una organizaci6n federal territorial (URSS, Checoslovaquia y Yugoslavia) se
derrumbaron tras el desvanecimiento del planeamiento centralizado, y alguna
vez privilegiado,
En contraste, el estado democrdtico liberal (Inglaterra, Francia, Canada,
los Estados Unidos y Alemania) trata de hacer de la etnicidad algo irrelevante,
empujando a los miembros de los grupos 6tnicos a unirse a la corriente popular.
Irvin, editores., Conflicto y Cambio Pacfico en Sociedades Divididas: Teortas y Usos. West Hartford, CT:
Prensa Kumariana, pp. 154-173.
17. Pearson, et al., supra nota 1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Pero ni aun los estados liberales democriticos han podido romper con las
cadenas del pasado. 20  Largas y complejas historias locales de lucha, de
querdlas, de identidad nacional, de irredentismo, de nacionalismo, de soberanfa
y'de violencia polftica, han contribuido a la gestaci6n de actitudes hostiles y
extremistas entre grupos 6tnicos en estados de Africa, de Asia Sur oriental, de
Europa, del Medio Oriente y de Norte Am6rica.2' Prejuicios hist6ricos, opresi6n
y odio; fuertes lealtades de grupo y de identidad 6tnica; recuerdos colectivos de
glorias pasadas, disputas y traumas, han causado danos ffsicos y emocionales
que han brutalizado a los pueblos.22 El Domingo Sangriento, el Enniskillen, el
Omagh, el Hebron, el Netzarim, el Soweto y las Masacres de Boipatang, por
ejemplo, han dejado marcas indelebles en las memorias, en la cultura y en el
folclor del pueblo de Irlanda del Norte, de Israel y de Sur Africa.23 El fracaso de
los acad~micos e igualmente el de los analistas polfticos en reconocer y sefialar,
el penetrante y ubicuo mecanismo mediante el cual la etnicidad influye en los
campos polfticos, social, econ6mico y territorial de estados multi-6tnicos ha,
indudablemente, contribuido al exilio, a la fuga, a la perdida del hogar y a la
muerte de aquellos atrapados en la violencia que el conflicto 6tnico
generalmente produce. 24
La paz es un proceso desgastador y los problemas asociados al
incremento del desempleo, de la pobreza y de la distribuci6n de recursos,
tensinas los acuerdos polfticos. 25 La violencia de los grupos radicales excluidos
de los procesos de paz puede ejercer presiones polarizantes en los negociadores.
Por ejemplo, las recientes actividades de los Hamas, de la Hermandad
Musulmana y del Jihad Isl.mico, en la Banca Occidental yen la Franja de Gaza,
pusieron enorme presi6n en Ahuate Barak para que renunciara a la primera
magistratura de Israel.
20. Hugh Miall, et al., 1999. Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and
Transformation of Deadly Conflicts [Resolucidn Contempordnea de Conflicto: la Prevenci6n,el Manejo y la
Transformaci6n de los Conflictos Mortales]. Cambridge: Prensa del R6gimen.
21. Johan Galtung, 1996. Peace by peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict Development and
Civilization [Paz por Medios Pacficos: Paz y Desarrollo de Conflicto y Civilizaci6n]. Londres: Sage.
22. Jay Rothman, 1997. Resolving Identity Based Conflicts [La Resoluci6n de Conflictos Basados
en la Identidad]. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. Volkan, Vamik, 1998. Lineas de Sangre: Ddl Orgullo
ttnico al Terrorismo tnico.Boulder, CO.: Prensa de Westview.
23. Sean Byrne, 1999. Northern Ireland, Israel, and South Africa At the Crossroads: Understanding
Intergroup Conflict, Peace Building, and Conflict Resolution [Irlanda del Norte, Israel, y Sudiffica En un
Cruce de Caminos: Entendiendo el Conflicto Inter-grupo, Haciendo la Paz, y Resoluci6n de Conflicto], Diario
Internacional de Tensiones de Grupo 28 (3/4):231-53. Byrne, Sean, 2000. Poder Polftico Como.
24. CONFLiCT RESOLUTION: DYNAMICS, PROCESS AND STRUCrURE, supra nota 3.
25. John Paul Lederach, 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies
[Construyendo La Paz: Reconciliacidn Sostenible en Sociedades Divididas]. Washington, D.C.: Instituto de
Prensa de Paz de los Estados Unidos.
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En consecuencia, el reto enfrentado por los investigadores y los
practicantes de resoluci6n de conflictos es tratar de entender la profundidad
hist6rica y cultural del nacionalismo dtnico, que ha demostrado enorme
incidencia dentro de los conflictos dtno-polfticos.26 Necesitamos tomar todo 6n
cuenta, el por que de la desigualdad estructural, de la dinrnica polftica, de la
identidad comunal, de los atributos culturales, de las lealtades de grupo, de las
diferencias del conocimiento y del temor del "otro" frecuentemente reforzado
por los medios de comunicaci6n y la educaci6n, conducen y alimentan
incrementadamente el conflicto 6tnico sin derivar y aplicar exitosamente t6cnica
de resoluci6n de conflicto, procedimientos y modelos a tales conflictos.7 Seria
mas apropiado ahora tratar de entender el de grupo, de las diferencias del
conocimiento y del temor del "otro" frecuentemente reforzado por los medios
de comunicaci6n y la educaci6n, conducen y alimentan incrementadamente el
conflicto dtnico sin derivar y aplicar exitosamente t6cnica de resoluci6n de
conflicto, procedimientos y modelos a tales conflictos. Seria mas apropiado
ahora tratar de entender el nivel cultural local ya que mecanismos nativos de
resoluci6n de conflictos pueden crear nuevas oportunidades de acuerdos justos
a los prolongados conflictos 6tnicos.28
Presentando aplicaciones nuevas de resoluci6n de conflictos se dardn
contactos mas cercanos entre practicantes de resoluci6n de conflictos y una
amplia variedad de grupos arraigados e instituciones-los sindicatos de
comercio, la policfa, las escuelas, los grupos ligados a la iglesia, las
organizaciones profesionales y los grupos comunitarios entre otros. 29 En
consecuencia, los practicantes tienen que estar conscientes de la dinfniica del
conflicto entre grupos, ayudar a la adquisici6n de habilidades interpersonales
esenciales y a la introducci6n de mecanismos apropiados de resoluci6n de
conflictos que disminuyan y disuelvan los temores y las sospechas entre las
comunidades opositoras.
30
26. Louise Diamante, Louise yJuan McDonald, 1996. Multi-Track Diplomacy: A systems Approach
To Peace [Diplomacia Multi-Pista: Un Acercamiento de Sistemas Hacia la Paz]. West Hartford, CT: Prensa
Kumariana.
27. Sean Byrne & Loraleigh Keashly, 2000. Working With Ethno-Political Conflict: A Multi-Modal
and Multi-Level Approeach to Conflict Intervention, International Peacekeeping [Trabajando con el Conflicto
Etno-Politico: Un Acercamiento Multi-Modal y Multi-Nivel en la Intervenci6n de Conflictos, Pacificaci6n
Internacional]. 7 (1 y :97-120).
28. John Paul Lederach, 1995. Prepairing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures
[Preparando La Paz: Transformaci6n de Conflicto A Traves de las Culturas]. Syracuse, N.Y: Prensa de
Universidad de Syracuse.
29. Louise Diamond & John McDonald, 1996. Multi-Track Diplomacy: A systems Approach To
Peace [Diplomacia Multi-Pista: un Acercamiento de Sistemas Hacia la Paz]. West Hartford, CT: Prensa
Kumariana.
30. Lederach, supra nota 28.
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H1. EL POTENCIAL ANALfIICO DEL CUBISMO SOCIAL.
En la medida que la dindmica del conflicto evoluciona, asf mismo deben
evolucionar las t6cnica de intervenci6n en el conflicto.3' Si tenemos que deducir
y aplicar exitosamente los andlisis y los modelos a conflictos modernos,
tenemos que tener en consideraci6n el por qu6 la desigualdad estructural, la
dinknica polftica, las identidades comunales, la lealtad de grupo, las diferencias
del conocimiento y el temor al otro conducen y fomentan el conflicto 6tnico 2
Como consecuencia, uno de los principales retos enfrentados por los
investigadores y los practicantes de resoluci6n de conflictos es entender la
profundidad hist6rica y cultural del nacionalismo 6tnico que ha demostrado
enorme incidencia dentro de los conflictos etno-polfticos 3 Simultneamente,
debemos evaluar con precisi6n las instituciones y los mecanismos inherentes a
la creaci6n del conflicto social asf como aquellos disefiados para ayudar a curar
y rehacer a los individuos, a las comunidades y a las sociedades despu6s del
intenso conflicto 4 Por ejemplo, mientras las guerras en Bosnia, en Kosovo, en
Libano, en Irlanda del Norte, en Ruanda y en Sur Africa, pueden en gran
medida estar terminando, todavfa no esta claro que clase de instituciones y
t~cnica son necesarias para ayudar a esas sociedades a construir una paz,
positiva, justa y duradera. Este, entre otros, es apenas unos de los muchos retos
con los que modelos existentes de resoluci6n de conflictos y transformaci6n,
estdn actualmente afrontando.
Modelos de resoluci6n de conflicto basados en costumbres de la cultura
occidental, valores y estilos de inclusi6n y exclusi6n no consideran enteramente
la profundidad hist6rica y cultural del nacionalismo 6tnico que ha continuado
persistiendo a pesar de la reconfiguraci6n del orden global. Igualmente, esos
modelos causan un andlisis superficial de otros conflictos sociales, tales como
los que persisten entre las instituciones y las comunidades locales. El andlisis
superficial de tales conflictos puede proponer soluciones inviables,
frecuentemente polarizando las piezas claves y enfrascandolas en largos
31. Ronald Fisher, 1996. Interactive Conflict Resolution: Pioneers, Potential, and Prospects.
[Resoluci6n Interactiva de Conflicto: Pioneros, Potencial, y Perspectivas]. Syracuse, N.Y: Prensa de la
Universidad de Syracuse. Kriesberg, Louis, 1998. Conflictos Constructivos: de Escalada hacia la Resoluci6n.
Lanham, MD: Publicaciones Rowman y Littlefield.
32. Byrne y Keashly, supra nota 21.
33. Louise Diamond, Louise & John McDonald, 1996. Multi-Track Diplomacy: A systems
Approach To Peace [Diplomacia Multi-Pista: un Acercamiento de Sistemas Hacia la Paz]. West Hartford, CT:
Prensa Kumariana.
34. Janie Leatherman, et al., 1999. Breaking Cycles of Violance: Conflict Prevention in Intraestate
crises [Rompi ndo los Ciclos de Violencia: Prevenci6n de Conflicto en Crisis entre Estados]. West Hartford,
CT: Prensa Kumariana.
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conflictos.35 En otras palabras, aproximaciones convencionales para manejar tan
complejos conflictos casi siempre fallan como resultado de un andlisis pobre de
la din~nica subyacente que alimenta los conflictos sist6micos en medio de
rdpidos cambios end6genos y ex6genos.3 6 Por lo tanto, el Cubismo Social
puede ayudar, a terceros intervinientes, en como analizar efectivamente las
relaciones y los mecanismos, de manera tal que los conflictos puedan manejarse
efectiva y cooperativamente, incorporando ambos extremos socialesY
Los teorizantes y practicantes de resoluci6n de conflictos deben entender
y considerar cuidadosamente las fuerzas sociales inter-relacionadas que se
asocian para "crear patrones de auto-reforzamiento de comportamiento inter-
grupal. 38 Los andlisis de Byrne y Carter (1966) y de (2000) hacen un hbil uso
del cubo estructural como un marco para examinar seis fuerzas sociales inter-
relacionadas en el trabajo en Irlanda del Norte y en Queb6c. El incremento del
conflicto 6tno-polftico del Cubo Social muestra que seis fuerzas sociales-la
demograffa, la econonfa, la historia, la polftica, la Psico-cultura y la religi6n-
interactiva y simult~neamente se combinan para crear mtltiples relaciones y
patrones de comportamiento inter-grupal a trav6s del contexto y el tiempo.39 El
Cubismo Social irrumpi6 el pensamiento dualfstico de Menichean que explica
como el para-academismo analiza e interviene en el conflicto social. En cambio,
esto atrae la atenci6n a las complejidades, asf como a las din nicas
interacciones entre las seis fuerzas sociales que dan las sefiales para el
escalaniento y/o desescalaniento de los conflictos sociales.
En consecuencia, el Cubismo Social se puede aplicar a un abanico de
situaciones para analizar un conflicto social y determinar la mejor manera de
resolverlo. El foco de este particular asunto estA en entender como el marco
analftico del modelo de cubismo social puede ser aplicado tanto a los niveles
35. Deborah Kolb, y Jean Bartunek, (eds). 1992. Hidden Conflict in Organizations: Uncovering
Behind The Scenes Disputes [El Conflicto Oculto en las Organizaciones: Destapdndo la Disputa Entre
Bastidores]. Londres: Sage.
36. Susan Carpenter, Susan, y W.J.D. Kennedy, 1988. Managing Public Disputes: A Practical Guide
to Handling Conflict and Reaching Agreements [Manejando Discusiones Ptiblicas: Guia Prdctica para el
Manejo de Conflictos y el logro de Acuerdosl. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. Gray, Barbara, 1989.
Colaboraci6n: Encontrdndo Bases Comunes para Problemas Multi-partes. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.
Ury, William, Jeanne Brett y Stephen Goldberg, 1993. Resolvidndo Conflictos: Disefiando Sistemas para
Reducir los Costos del Conflict. Cambridge, MA. PON Libros.
37. Sean Byrne, 2001. Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern
Ireland [Consocianal y Aproximaciones de La Sociedad Civil para Contruir la Paz en Irlanda del Norte].
Diario de Investigaci6n De paz 38 (3 y :327-52).
38. Sean Byrne y Neal Carter, 1996. Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics
in Northern Ireland and Quebec, Peace and Conflict Studies [Cubismo Social: Seis Fuerzas Sociales de
Polftica Ethno-Territorial en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec, Estudios de Paz y Conflictol 3 (2):p. 53.
39. Id. en 52-72.
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macro como a los niveles micro de los conflictos entre grupos y la
conceptualizaci6n de otros conflictos sociales comunes.
El Cubismo Social proporciona a los teorizantes y practicantes de
conflictos una metodologfa sinerg6tica para analizar a los actores y los
acontecimientos dentro del tiempo y el contexto en la medida en que estos
surgen y operan en el mundo (sumario). Produce un holfstico hist6rico y un
marco analftico interactivo para ayudar en el andlisis de relaciones que se estdn
transformando en el tiempo y el espacio mientras 6stas se reproducen, se
integran y se transforman para dirigirse a nuevos contextos. El Cubismo Social
es la medida de pensamiento y el lenguaje que aclara y simplifica la compleja
realidad del conflicto.
El nombre, "Cubismo Social", se inspir6 en el movimiento artfstico cubista
y el rompecabezas hexagonal-"El Cubo de Rubik."4° En el movimiento
artfstico cubista, pintores como Georges Braques y Pablo Picasso, trataron de
transformar objetos tri-dimensionales a dos dimensiones y asf transformarfan
perspectivas mtltiples al instante.
El Cubo de Rubik tambi6n presenta un desaffo analftico significativo donde
el objetivo de convertir cada lado en uno solo, puede ser alcanzado teniendo una
profunda comprensi6n y habilidad de la interconectividad de los lados.
Consiguientemente, la perspectiva del Cubismo Social enfoca las complejidades
del conflicto social sosteniendo que seis, interconectadas e interdepedientes,
fuerzas sociales - la demograffa, la economfa, la historia, la polftica, la religi6n
y los factores psico-culturales - trabajan al unfsono para producir patrones de
conducta de conflicto auto-reforzadores. De esta manera, necesitamos entender,
simultdneamente, las muchas facetas del Cubo Social.
El Cubo de Rubik tambi6n presenta un rompecabezas significativo, ya que
lograr la meta de volver cada lado a un solo color requiere un entendimiento de
las interconecciones entre los varios lados. El Cubismo Social es entonces una
aproximaci6n que enfatiza las complejidades de las situaciones de conflicto.
Nosotros sostenemos que varias facetas influyen en cada una de ellas y que
concentrandose demasiado en uno o dos de los lados del cubo puede demeritr
el conocimiento total del conflicto. Es mejor entender como cada factor influye
al otro y tratar de manipular todos los factores en armonia cuando se interviene
en los conflictos. El Cubismo Social es un experimento Friereano y Gandiano
con la verdad. Ayuda a los te6ricos y practicantes a entender las relaciones entre
conocedor y conocido a trav6s del tiempo, el espacio, la mortalidad, asf como
el lenguaje mediante el andlisis de cuestiones estructurales profundamente
arraigadas y los comportamientos disfuncionales, dentro de los conflictos
40. id. Byrne y Carter, supra nota 14.
2002]
994 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:985
sociales condensados y plismicos. 41 La historia es la fuerza del cubo, que
influye en la temperatura de los acontecimientos en los conflictos sociales. Los
cubos, representados por las seis fuerzas de la realidad social, no estdn aislados,
entre ellos mismos. Por el contrario, asf como las entrelazadas rafces del
fen6meno del conflicto, los cubos podrfan parecerse a cilindros rotando
dindmicamente-constantemente emergiendo, sumergiendo y reemergiendo. Asf,
la intervenci6n en los conflictos, y mdltiples metodologfas deben flexibilizarse
en el transcurso del tiempo.
Un modelo multi-dimensional de soluci6n de conflictos constructivo y
edificador de paz debe considerar, entonces, c6mo la relaci6n entre todas estas
fuerzas sociales opera simultineamente a distintos niveles dentro del dmbito del
conflicto. Ademas, un sistema flexible y de varios modelos de aproximaci6n
debe coordinar las intervenciones de una diversa gama de individuos, grupos
gubernamentales y no gubernamentales con sus propias aproximaciones,
perspectivas y recursos 2 Por consiguiente, la aproximaci6n circunstancial al
ascensi6n de conflictos 6tno-politico y otros conflictos sociales pueden
proporcionarlas sefiales para secuenciar y/o coordinar las intervenciones
apropiadas para el conflicto.
43
La interacci6n dintmica entre las seis fuerzas produce mas de setecientas
veinte (720) relaciones complejas que necesitan estar conectadas
al modelo circunstancial de intervenci6n de quien participe. Asf, se requerirdn
los esfuerzos combinados en un numero de frentes para bajar, de una fase
cuatro del conflicto, a un nivel mas manejable. Las intervenciones de terceros,
en el proceso de desescalaniento del conflicto, se pueden optimizar a trav6s de
una secuencia coordinada del modelo contingente de varios niveles y varios
modelos, con un sistema eficaz inherente de alarma. Tal aproximaci6n acepta
la mezcla subjetiva y objetiva del Cubo Social subyacente en la mayoria de los
conflictos sociales.' El modelo tambi6n reconoce la necesidad de coordinar las
singulares virtudes de una variedad de terceros intervinientes y de mecanismos
de manera tal que ellos no est6n en competencia, y quizds, minando los
esfuerzos de cada uno de los otros.
El objetivo de este particular asunto no es simplemente presentar cuentas
descriptivas de andlisis de conflicto y de resoluci6n. Tampoco es nuestro
41. Esta discusi6n result6 de una conversaci6n de fondo entre el autor y el Dr. Tom Boudreau sobre
el concepto del cubismo, Primavera, 2001.
42. Byrne y Keashly, supra nota 27.
43. Loraleigh Keashly y Ronald J. Fisher, 1996. A on Conflict Interventions: Theoritical and
Prectical Considerations [PerspectiveUna Perspectiva de Contingencia de Intervenci6n de Conflictos:
Consideraciones Te6ricas y PrActicas], ed. de Jacob Bercovitch Resolviindo Conflictos Internacionales:
Teoria y Preictica de la Mediaci6n. Roca, Co.: Lynne Rienner Eds., pp. 235-63.
44. Byrne y Carter, supra nota 38 en 52-72.
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objetivo emitir juicios sobre cual de los lados puede estar en lo "correcto." El
prop6sito de este asunto especial es identificar y sefialar las causas, las
respuestas y las consecuencias del conflicto social y su resoluci6n. Haciendo
esto, esperamos refinar, contribuir y mejorar la teorfa, la metodologfa y el
entendimiento prdctico del conflicto social en general.
El asunto particular tiene razonamientos tanto conceptuales como
analfticos e importancia polftica y practica porque incluye conflictos
seleccionados, contempordneos interpersonales, inter-grupos, institucionales, y
sociales, a niveles internacionales y comparativos que tienen caminos
institucionales para manejar quejas y prevenir o limitar el conflicto; muchos de
los mas serios conflictos sociales actuales estfn en ambientes carentes de
canales institucionales para limitar su intensificaci6n. Estos prolongados
conflictos no han resultado en conveniencias mutuas. Dada la percepci6n, entre
el publico y los que establecen las polfticas, de que los conflictos sociales estdn
entrando en el debate publico, 6ste asunto particular sirve de amplio fundamento
para aquellos debates asf como para desarrollar resoluciones de conflicto y
contribuir a elaborar teorfa.
m]. CUBISMO SOCIAL: TEORfA Y APLICACION.
Los colaboradores de este volumen ofrecen una mezcla rica de documentos
que ilustran la importancia de sintetizar las aproximaciones de diferentes
disciplinas para proporcionar un estudio comprensivo del andlisis y la
resoluci6n de conflictos. Es nuestra creencia que este asunto particular ofrece
pensarnientos ditiles para aquellos en bfisqueda de trabajo aplicado, asf como de
aquellos interesados en la teorfa del conflicto social. Lo mds importante de este
asunto particular es que serA i til para estudiantes, practicantes y para el claustro
interesados en una imdgen m~s holistica del campo del conflicto social y de su
resoluci6n. Atraer, a aquellos buscando trabajo aplicado asf como para los
interesados en la teorfa del conflicto social. Los articulos combinan criticas de
teorfa existente con estrategias novedosas para la resoluci6n y transformaci6n
del conflicto y un profundo entendimiento de las causas, estrategias y m6todos
a trav6s de los cuales se perpetda el conflicto social.
Los artfculos discuten aspectos de la base subyacente te6rica y
metodol6gica de entendimiento del conflicto y de sus relaciones con diferentes
asuntos y respuestas al conflicto. Los articulos analizan tambi6n temas
seleccionados de conflictos sociales, tales como conflictos de lugar de trabajo
y violencia policial, asf como conflictos 6tno-polfticos. Finalmente, los artfculos
tambi6n analizan a fondo algunos casos, en diferentes contextos, para ilustrar
posibles aproximaciones a la prevenci6n de conflictos, desescalaniento y
arreglo. Adicionalmente, los artfculos demuestran que el Cubismo Social es un
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concepto simplista, asi como enigmitico y plfsmico. Tomados en conjunto, los
artfculos demuestran una contribuci6n significativa al estudio del andlisis y
resoluci6n del conflicto dentro de una metAfora Social Cubista.
Estos estudios tambi6n utilizan el concepto analftico del cubismo social
para explorar los micro-macro factores subyacentes que tienden a intensificar
los conflictos sociales. Estos articulos demuestran que esos factores solidifican
identidades en competencia e intensifican tensiones entre los grupos, las
instituciones, las comunidades y las organizaciones. Exploran algunas de las
causas de los conflictos sociales y de como fuerzas sociales globales y
especificas afectan la intensificaci6n e influyen en la prolongada naturaleza de
los conflictos sociales. Ademfs de analizar las aproximaciones te6ricas para
entender algunos de los asuntos ex6genos y end6genos que afectan los
conflictos sociales, uno tiene tambi6n que considerar otras variables en su
andlisis. Por ejemplo, el papel de las corporaciones multi-nacionales, los
objetivos de individuos y de grupos, los intereses y capacidades, los medios de
comunicaci6n y los escasos recursos naturales son crfticos para nuestro
entendimiento de la naturaleza prolongada de los conflictos sociales. Cualquier
individuo o grupo que entra en un proceso de intensificaci6n tendrl sus propios
intereses fundamentado en su deseo de un resultado positivo. Este
entendimiento mis amplio permitiri al estudiante de conflictos sociales apreciar
mds globalmente la compleja y entrelazada dindiica de dichos conflictos.
El primer artfculo es en colaboraci6n con Lana Russ Trent. El Cubismo
Social Integrativo Inductivo de Russ-Trent es un anilisis complejo y crftico de
complejos contextos conflictuales. En verdad, sea en guerra entre naciones o
en disputas familiares, el conflicto social es causado por muchos factores y
fuerzas, micro y macro, tanto internas como externas. Ademd.s, las tensiones
de la estructura gubernamental son end6micas en el anflisis del conflicto social,
asf como tambi6n en la esencia de la amplia gama de decisiones tomadas para
actuar, para ajustar o para negociar, de manera critica, los frecuentes ambiguos
y/o contradictorios contextos relacionados, grandes y pequefios.
El Cubismo Social Integrativo Inductivo (CSIl) sugiere que la
ampliamente discutida adivinanza de la estructura gubernamental es un baile
dindmico, naciente e infinito de negociaci6n. Ademds, el CSII propone un
antlisis te6rico, dial6ctico, postmodernista, feminista, heurfstico,
fenomenol6gico y evocativo, mds integrativo que oposicional, que requiere un
pensamiento critico inductivo e integrativo. Basado en el Cubismo Social de
Byrne y Carter (1966) del Cubo de Rubik modelo de seis caras, el CSII sugiere
tres cubos de Rubik con dieciocho caras, "un cubo, dentro de un cubo, dentro
del cubo." Por lo tanto, el conflicto es analizado dial6cticamente de afuera hacia
dentro, luego al contrario.
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En el CSII, consideramos cada cubo, en t6rminos de cada contexto
dramattirgico, a saber Cubo I contiene las caras del cubo de Caricter-Macro-
Estructural de la etapa anterior, el Cubo H contiene las caras del cubo del
Caracter-Orgdnico-Estructural de la etapa posterior y, el Cubo m, contiene las
caras del cubo de Caricter-Orgdnico-Individual del actor. En verdad, el CSII
es "un complejo juego de interacciones (intersecciones) y motivaciones en un
infinito y continuo reajustamiento."
El segundo articulo destaca el trabajo de Mike Hare quien sostiene que la
historia de la teorfa social, en un sentido, ha sido una continua lucha para
entender mejor la interacci6n de las fuerzas sociales relacionadas con el 6rgano
y la estructura tanto a nivel macro como micro. A pesar de que los soci6logos
clsicos ofrecieron teorfas acerca de estos aspectos, en ambos extremos del
espectro, tambi6n estuvieron claramente preocupados con los vinculos que los
enlazan. En tiempos modemos, la teorfa parece haberse enfocado mds en los
paradigmas opuestos, empefidndose por la pureza te6rica. Sin embargo, mds
recientemente, parece haber un renovado inter6s en la integraci6n y sintetizaci6n
de las teorfas hacia un paradigma mds holfstico y balanceado, para entender el
conflicto a niveles locales, nacionales e internacionales. Este articulo examina
brevemente algunas de estas consideraciones y busca estimular el inter6s
adicional y el desarrollo de modelos adecuados de teorfa social, para lograr un
entendimiento mds completo de la teorfa social, especialmente en lo relacionado
al conflicto y a sus resoluciones. Especificamente, se discuten dos modelos: El
de George Ritzer, Mayores Niveles de Andlisis Social y el de Sean Byrne y Neal
Carter, el Cubismo Social.
El tercer articulo resalta el anAlisis de Bini Litwin de disputas en lugares
de trabajo dentro de la Uni6n Europea, con los Estados Unidos como caso de
estudio. El articulo de Bini analiza la violencia en lugares de trabajo, la que es
vista como un proceso dindmico que ocurre a lo largo de un continuo
surgimiento, a diversos niveles, de mtltiples origenes. El andlisis empieza por
definir la violencia de lugar de trabajo la cual, para prop6sitos de este andisis,
incluye violencia directa (ffsica), estructural y cultural. Las tasas actuales de
ocurrencia y las tendencias de violencia en los lugares de trabajo son
presentadas a nivel de la Uni6n Europea y de los Estados Unidos basadas en la
Companfa Nacional de Seguros de Vida Northwestern (NWNL), Informe del
Ministerio de Trabajo del afio 1999, Trabajo Futuro y actuales recursos
relacionados con lugar de trabajo.
Los orfgenes de la violencia en el lugar de trabajo estln identificados y
definidos de acuerdo con el modelo de cubismo social de Byrne y Carter. El
modelo ha sido adaptado para prop6sitos del an6.lisis y la clasificaci6n de los
factores de conflicto en el lugar de trabajo, de conformidad con factores
demogrdficos, hist6ricos, econ6micos, balance de poder, politicos y sico-
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culturales. Este anilisis multi-factor, multi-nivel establece un marco para las
estrategias de conflicto a desarrollar que son especificas al origen y al tipo de
violencia manifestada dentro del lugar de trabajo. Se ha propuesto que ambas
fuentes del conflicto, la estructural y la de relaci6n, necesitan ser dirigidas,
desde el nivel individual, organizacional y societario cuando se disenen sistemas
para disputas. Finalmente, se ofrecen estrategias para cada uno de los seis
factores de conflicto identificados de acuerdo con aproximaciones preventivas,
Resoluciones de Disputa Apropiadas (RDA) negociadas y Resoluciones de
Disputa Apropiadas RDA facilitadas. Conclusiones e implicaciones para
politicas relacionadas con la administraci6n de asuntos de fuerza laboral se
ofrecen con base en el an;lisis proporcionado. Se ha anticipado que este
modelo puede ser aplicado para manejar y resolver conflictos de lugar de trabajo
a todos los niveles organizacionales local, nacional e internacionalmente.
El cuarto artfculo esti basado en la especulaci6n de Karen Michell Scott
que en afios recientes ha habido un crecimiento de las preocupaciones en
muchos parses yen todos los Estados Unidos respecto al uso de fuerza excesiva,
por parte de oficiales de la policfa, durante los encuentros con minorfas. Muchas
de esas preocupaciones han surgido de una renovada conciencia de una sociedad
que reclama un legado de justicia y libertad para todos, ha en efecto, mantenido
un patr6n de violencia institucionalizada en contra de las minorfas raciales y
tnicas - incluyendo Nativos Americanos, Afro Americanos, Asidtico
Americanos e Hispano Americanos.
Una cantidad significativa de literatura en conflictos de policfa-grupos
minoritarios en los Estados Unidos se enfoca en el racismo como la fuerza
impulsora que esti detris de la mayorfa de los casos de uso excesivo de fuerza
por parte de la policfa. Esto se debe a que asuntos de discriminaci6n racial y
odio estdn profundamente arraigados en muchos de los conflictos inter-grupales
en la sociedad Americana, y tambi6n, a que diferencias ffsicas, tales como la
raza y el g6nero, son los mas ficiles de identificar durante un conflicto entre
miembros de diferentes grupos. Sin embargo, hay una consecuencia negativa
asociada a la limitaci6n del andlisis de conflictos inter-grupales, entre la policfa
y los grupos minoritarios, a la dindmica racial. Cuando este lente etrecho de
andlisis se utiliza, se da muy poca viabilidad e informaci6n sustancial en la
manera de dirigirse al conflicto.
Para motivar un anilisis mds comprensivo en referencia a la complejidad
de factores que se forman para producir prolongados conflictos inter-grupo,
tales como los entre la policia y los grupos minoritarios en muchas 6reas del
mundo incluyendo Am6rica. El modelo de cubismo social aproxima los
conflictos inter-grupo como un complejo rompecabezas de dindmicas sociales,
que se combinan como una unidad integrada para mantener los
comportamientos del conflicto inter-grupal. Asf, dada la naturaleza compleja del
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prolongado conflicto entre la policia y miembros de grupos minoritarios en
America, Scott utiliza el marco del Cubismo Social para ampliar el lente a trav6s
del cual se examina este conflicto.
En el quinto artfculo, Judith McKay afirma que la teorfa del Cubismo
Social,45 una teorfa originalmente disefiada para el anlisis de conflictos
internacionales etno territoriales, podrfa ser usada en el andlisis de micro-
conflictos en otros ambientes, tales como las comunidades Americanas. Muchas
comunidades Americanas son multi-6tnicas y multi-culturales. Ademis, en
algunas dreas de los Estados Unidos, tales como el sur de la Florida, las
comunidades pueden tener mucho md.s diversidad 6tnica de la que se encuentra
en otras partes del mundo. Esto presenta una variedad de desaffos en el andlisis
de asuntos que confronta la comunidad.
A diferencia de otras teorfas que pueden mirar un asunto desde una o dos
perspectivas, el cubismo social conduce al investigador a mirar un asunto desde
una multiplicidad de perspectivas y a reconocer que en tiempos diferentes, bajo
diferentes circunstancias y en diferentes ambientes, los factores se
interrelacionardn en vfas dindmicamente diferentes. En una comunidad que
contiene un ntimero de grupos 6tnicos, el cubismo social tiene la capacidad de
inter actuar dinimicamente y de considerar un amplio espectro de factores en
una multiplicidad de circunstancias cambiando y evolucionando.
La aplicaci6n del cubismo social en una comunidad local de los Estados
Unidos es tnica y contribuirA a los campos de resoluci6n de conflictos
etnoterritoriales y a la estrategia de planeaci6n comunitaria. Los resultados de
tal investigaci6n informardn a la comunidad y permitirdn a la fuerza ptiblica, a
los lideres politicos y cfvicos, a la educaci6n y a los proveedores de servicios
tener informaci6n para un plan estrat6gico comunitario.
Permitiri tambi6n a las comunidades analizar otros conflictos y problemas
mis all de aquellos relacionados solamente a conflictos dtnicos.
Asuntos tales como prevenci6n de violencia e intervenci6n dentro de las
familias, vecindarios y escuelas serfan ejemplos apropiados del uso de este
marco analftico.
Otras teorfas internacionales tales como la Teorfa de Intervenci6n Multi-
Modal, 46 (2000). El Paradigma Anidado Integrado de Lederach,47 la visi6n
compartida de paz de Boulding48 y la Diplomacia Multi-Senderos de Diamond
45. Id. en 52-71.
46. Byrne y Keashley, supra nota 27.
47. Lederach, supra nota 25.
48. Elise Boulding, Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World
[CONSTRUYENDO UNA CULTURA CiVICA GLOBAL: EDUCACION PARA UN MUNDO INTER-DEPENDIENTE.] 95-
117 (1988).
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y McDonald 9 pueden haber contribuido significativamente a la estructura de
manejo de conflictos y al modelo de resoluci6n de conflictos en las
comunidades de los Estados Unidos. De este modo, la teorfa intemacional de
mantenimiento de la paz puede haber tenido implicaciones mis amplias que las
previamente imaginadas.
En el artfculo sexto, Karen Jenkins sostiene que en el ambiente de la post-
Guerra Frfa, el intimidante desaffo para los estudiosos y practicantes de soluci6n
de conflictos, trabajadores gubernamentales y actores no estatales es el de
desarrollar mecanismos multi-modales y multidimensionales para lidiar con
estados fracasados y sociedades traumatizadas. Por mi.s de doscientos ahios,
Haitf ha sufrido los traumas de la esclavitud y la colonizaci6n, una sucesi6n de
dictaduras rapaces, sanciones econ6micas y aislamiento internacional. Este
artfculo examina la efectividad del Cubismo Social como un marco analftico
para lidiar con los conflictos multifac6ticos en Haitf.
El Cubo Social de conflicto tiene seis facetas o fuerzas inter- relacionadas:
La historia, la religi6n, la demograffa, las instituciones politicas, la economfa y
los factores sicoculturales. Estas seis fuerzas, cuando se combinan, producen
diferentes patrones de conducta o interacci6n inter grupal. Si bien los factores,
cuando se combinan, podrfan producir diferentes patrones de importancia o
urgencia, es importante no permitir a un factor ensombrecer a los otros solo
porque parezca mds destacado en el momento. El Cubismo Social permite la
identificaci6n de varios factores sociales interrelacionados o inter-engranados
y sus efectos nocivos en Haitf. Para los Haitianos, como sociedad que emerge
de su "pabell6n de victimidad," es importante analizar el dilema actual usando
la aproximaci6n del Cubismo Social a los conflictos inter-grupos para explicar
como interactdian los mecanismos estructurales y sicoculturales para exacerbar
o anilnorar el conflicto politico, la lucha econ6mica y la divisi6n cultural que
el pals enfrenta.
El sdptimo artIculo resalta el trabajo de S.I. Keethaponcalon.
Considerando los paralelos entre manejo y resoluci6n de conflicto en Sri Lanka,
este andlisis hace un habilidoso uso del instrumento de proceso analftico, el
Cubo Social, para examinar los niveles de interacci6n comunal que dan forma
a conflictos inter-comunales. Para conflictos etnopoliticos, debe considerarse
tanto el sistema internacional, como las relaciones entre estados y las relaciones
dentro de los estados nacionales. La vitalidad de asuntos micro-nacionalistas
dentro de las estructuras del estado ha producido prolongados conflictos
etnopoliticos resultando en estancamientos suma-cero.
El octavo artfculo enfocado en la resoluci6n de conflictos 6tnicos en Kenya
del Norte es escrito por Joshia Osamba. El argumenta que desde los anos
49. Diamond y McDonald, supra nota 26, en 11-25.
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ochentas, los conflictos y la violencia se han vuelto enddmicas, comprometiendo
comunidades pastorales en las fronteras de Kenya del Norte. La violencia ha
tornado especialmente la forma de bandolerismo y cuatrerismo. El surgimiento
de jefes de guerra ganaderos dentro de los grupos pastorales y la
internacionalizaci6n y comercializaci6n de actividades de cuatrerismo, tienden
a exacerbar tal violencia. Actos de bandolerismo y cuatrerismo han Ilevado a la
perdida de vidas humanas, al robo de ganado, al desplazamiento de poblaciones,
asf como a crear un ambiente de permanente inseguridad en la regi6n. Este
artfculo analiza la violencia y la inseguridad en las fronteras de Kenya del Norte
usando la perspectiva del Cubismo Social para demostrar como los asuntos en
un conflicto estdn frecuentemente relacionados e interconectados entre sf. El
artfculo tambidn examina posibles estrategias para la intervenci6n de terceros
para controlar o desescalar la violencia.
Finalmente, el artfculo de Neal Carter (St. Bonaventure University)
argumenta que B61gica, a trav6s de su historia, ha sido una entidad polftica y
social compleja. Al Rey de los Belgas se le dijo en un informe oficial que "no
habfan Belgas", no obstante retiene su tftulo. El pals ha cambiado rnpidamente
de estructura unitaria a federal, con diferentes raciocinios y responsabilidades
por Regiones y por Comunidades. Los cambios demogrdficos de alguna forma
han dificultado la planeaci6n debido a restricciones en los asuntos que pueden
ser preguntados durante el censo. La combinaci6n de mtltiples niveles de
instituciones polfticas, de conflictos de grupo, las diferencias econ6micas, los
simbolismos politicos y los factores sicol6gicos demuestran la utilidad de la
aproximaci6n del Cubismo Social para el estudio de conflictos relativamente
pacfficos. Este artfculo argumenta que mucha, de la complejidad de las
instituciones polfticas belgas, es el resultado de intentos de mitigar el conflicto
y de posponer desacuerdos significativos.
IV. CONCLUSIONES
Factores globales, nacionales e indfgenas deben considerarse cuando se
trate de generar concenso dentro de un contexto, donde indivfduos, grupos y
comunidades se hayan enfrascado en una lucha por un largo peri6do de
tiempo.50 Debemos considerar un ntimero de interrogantes en el diseo de un
modelo de intervenci6n de contingencia5' o de una intervenci6n "multi-modal
y multi-nivel.52 Por ejemplo, cu6d es el papel exacto que juegan los actores
externos en la escalaci6n y desescalaci6n del conflicto social? Deberdn ser
50. Lederach, supra nota 25.
51. Keashly et al., supra nota 43.
52. Byme y Keashly, supra nota 27.
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responsables ambos extremos sociales, el pueblo y la elite que toma las
decisiones, por la "edificaci6n del consenso" en los conflictos sociales
prolongados? Qui6n deberia tomar el liderazgo en la incorporaci6n de
incentivos super ordenados para cooperaciones en marcha en alguna adaptaci6n
de los intereses de las partes? Qu6 papel tienen los practicantes de resoluci6n
de conflictos en la transformaci6n de las relaciones en los escenarios del
conflicto social? La aproximaci6n del "Cubismo Social" sugiere que las
estrategias se pueden combinar para provocar la reestructuraci6n del conflicto
social, de manera tal que pueda darse una desescalaci6n efectiva. Por ejemplo,
el proceso narrativo puede ayudar a los practicantes a implementar sistemas
culturales de conocimiento indfgenas adentrdndose en historias culturales de
intervenci6n y transformaci6n de conflicto.53
En este artfculo introductorio, se discutieron las fuerzas sociales y la
combinaci6n de mecanismos para escalar y desescalar los conflictos sociales.
Se da particular atenci6n al papel del "Cubo Social" para el andlisis y la
resoluci6n de conflictos, especialmente en el diseo de una fuerza de anlisis de
campo de los conflictos sociales. Estos valiosos factores deben ser incorporados
en los procesos de resoluci6n de conflictos de los practicantes para que ocurra
una desescalaci6n efectiva de los prolongados conflictos sociales. La
intervenci6n efectiva de terceros extemos necesita una aproximaci6n holfstica
e interactiva que transforme las desigualdades estructurales subyacentes y las
dindmicas subjetivas que separan a los individuos, a los grupos, a las
comunidades y a las naciones.
El objetivo primario de este asunto especial es el de explorar el
apuntalamiento te6rico y las implicaciones metodol6gicas del Cubismo Social.
En ese intento, los autores proporcionan abundante material te6rico para los
practicantes y estudiosos para considerar cuando se analizan las fuerzas sociales
que interactuan para escalar el conflicto social. Tambi6n se le proporciona al
estudiante de conflictos sociales observaciones perspicaces de las experiencias
personales de los autores en el campo, para un entendimiento mds completo de
la din mica de 6xitos y fracasos en la intervenci6n de conflictos, en los
conflictos sociales.
Los contribuyentes tambi6n usan el m6todo de estudio-caso usando el
dispositivo analitico del Cubo Social para proveer formulas perspicaces para
explicar el conflicto social y como 6ste se podrfa resolver. Los articulos
tambi6n exploran las lecciones aprendidas acerca de las causas del conflicto
53. Jessica Senehi, 2000. Constructive Storytelling in Intercommunal Conflicts: Building
Community, Building Peace (Narraci6n Constructiva en Conflictos Inter-comunales: Haci6ndo Comunidad,
Pacificando], en SeAn Byrne y Cynthia Irvin (Eds.).. Diferencias Reconciliables: Puntos decisivos en
Conflictos Eno-Political. West Hartford, CT: Prensa Kumariana.
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social en la etnia, la comunidad y el lugar de trabajo. Finalmente, los artfculos
tambi6n conjugan el Cubismo Social con la resoluci6n de conflicto y la
pacificaci6n. Los documentos usan estudios de casos para explorar los esfuerzos
en resoluci6n de conflictos sociales basados en la 6tnia, la organizaci6n y la
comunidad.
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I. INTRODUCCION
Los estudios de poliftica ethnoterritorial tipicamente examinan estructuras
polfticas y econ6micas para acentuar los intereses que compiten de grupos, o
usar una aproximaci6n psicoanalftica de acentuar fuerzas psicol6gicas y
culturales. Investigadores que dirigen factores materiales y psicol6gicos a
menudo intentan pesar su importancia relativa como los motivos de conflicto.
Nosotros al contrario, proponemos que los estudios de conflicto ethnoterritorial
sean formados de la perspectiva de cubismo social, implicando la interacci6n
de mecanismos materiales y psicol6gicos.' Nosotros al contrario, proponemos
* Ph.D. El director de Programas Doctorales y Profesor Asociado, el Departamento de la
Resoluci6n de la Disputa, Nova Southeastern University Cursos de Posgraduado de Humanidades y Ciencias
Sociales, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Este ensayo ha sido reconocido con la Menci6n honorifica en Otto
Klineburg 1996 el Premio de Relaciones Intercultural e Internacional. Una versi6n mds temprana de este papel
ha sido publicada en la Paz y Estudios de Conflicto (1996). Agradecemos al redactor, Ho-Won Jeong, por
el amablemente damos a nosotros el permiso de republicar el artfculo en este volumen coedited. Los autores
agradecen a Tom Boudreau, Ho-Won Jeong, Loraleigh Keashley, y Jessica Senehi, por su crftica constructiva.
** Profesor Ayudante de la Ciencia Polftica, El departamento de la Ciencia Polftica, St.
Bonaventure University, New York, New York.
*** Este articulo fue traducido por Franchesco Soto y Carlos Jiminez.
1. Vea, por ejemplo, Wayne G. Reilly, 1994. "The Management of Political Violence in Quebec
and Northern Ireland: A Comparison."[La differencia de violencia en Quebec y Irlanda del Norte] Terrorism
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que los estudio de conflicto ethnoterritorial sean formados de la perspectiva de
cubismo social, implicando la interraccion de mecanismos materiales y
psicologicos.2
El tirmino cubismo social evoca las imagines utiles para describir nuestra
perspectiva. Similar al cuba de Rubic, la politica ethnoterritorial representa un
rompecabezas multi-enfrentado.3 Similar al cubo de Rubic, la polftica
ethnoterritorial representa un rompecabezas multi-enfrentado. Personas que
concentran en un solo aspecto, o lado del rompecabezas, son improbable ha
producir una soluci6n completa o imagen completa del problema. S61o cuando
uno piensa en las interrelaciones de las caras del rompecabezas, puede uno
progresar hacia una soluci6n mds holfstica. Una perspectiva multidimensional
tambi6n fue abogada por los artistas cubist, como Bracque y Picasso, quienes
intentaron rendir sobre una encuesta dos dimensional la multitud de
perspectivas complicadas en la inspecci6n de objetos tridimensionales.
Similarmente, nosotros aislamos factores claves para demonstrar como se
combinan para formar los modelos complejo de politicas etnicas.
Nosotros usamos el cubo como un marco analftico para examinar Irlanda
del Norte y los conflictos de Quebec. En esta comparaci6n, no intentamos de
cubrir el drea entera de cada lado del cubo, pero tratamos de destacar algunos
de los temas mas salientes de los conflictos complejos. Confiamos en gran
parte en los descubrimientos de otros investigadores relativo a otras facetas.
Nuestra contribuci6n principal estS en la combinaci6n de las facetas y el
andlisis de como su interacci6n afecta las dindmicas del conflicto y regulacion
ethnoterritorial. Mientras varios investigadores han indicado que la naturaleza
de conflictos cambia atravez del tiempo, relativamente poco trabajo se ha hecho
and Political Violence, [Terrorismo y Violencia Politica] Vol. 6, Spring, pp. 44-61. Vea tambien Marc
Howard Ross, 1993. The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative
Perspective. [El mantenimiento de Conflicto: Interpretaciones y Intereses en Perspectiva Comparativa]. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
2. Vea Sedn Byrne y Neal Carter, 1996. Social Cubism : Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial
Politics in Northern Ireland and uebec, in Peace and Conflict Studies 52-72 [Cubismo Social: Seis Fuerzas
Sociales de Polftica Ethnoterritorial en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec, la Paz y el Conflicto Estudian] 3 (2): 52-
72; Carter, Neal y SeAn Byrne, 2000. The Dynamics of Social Cubism : A view from Northern Ireland and
Quebec, in Reconcilable Differences: Turning Points in Ethnopolitical Conflicts, [La Dinimica de cubismo
Social: una vista de Irlanda del Norte y Quebec, en Sein Byrne y Cynthia Irvin, editores., Conflicto y Cambio
Pacffico de Sociedades Divididas: Teorfas y Usos]. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Prensa, pp. 41-65.
3. Esta metdfora fue sugerida por Jessica Senehi durante una conversaci6n con los autores. Para
su las opiniones del conflicto, yea Senehi, Jessica, 1996. 'Language, Culture and Conflict: Storytelling As
A Matter of Life and Death', Mind and Human Interaction 7(3): [Lengua, Cultura y Conflicto: Contando una
historia de vida y muerte] 150-64; Senehi, Jessica, 2000. 'Constructive Storytelling in Inter-Communal
Conflicts: Building Community, Building Peace', in Sein Byrne & Cynthia Irvin, eds., Conflict and




para examinar la interacci6n de varios factores que gradualmente le dan forma
a los conflictos.
Vemos que el cubo social de conflicto teniendo seis facetas o fuerzas
interrelacionada: la historia, la religi6n, instituciones demogrdficas de la
informaci6n, polfticas y el no comportamiento institucional, la economfa, y
factores sycocultural (vea figura 1). Estas seis facetas o fuerzas sociales son
combinadas para producir el modelo de comportamiento de intergrupo. Por
ejemplo, las historias relatadas por grupos competitivos, a menudo evocan
previos modelos de economfa, de politicas, o de la interacci6n religiosa para
suportar relcamos contemporarios, mientras el simbolismo produce respuestas
efectivas hacia grupos y hacia la interacci6n de intergrupo.4 Como nota Connor,
estos factores tfpicamente son estudiados como los motivos independientes del
conflicto, fallando ha producir explicaciones convenientes De otra parte,
ethnonasionalismo debe ser visto como un fenomeno psicol6gico
demonostrando varias diferencias del intergrupo para producir el sentido de la
cohesi6n de grupo. La interacci6n entre los lados del cubo produce el modelo
de comportamiento de intergrupo
Irlanda del Norte y Quebec son muy rara las veces que son comparadas
directamente,7 indicando la complejidad de la relaci6n entre factores
psicol6gico y materiales. Al menos a la primera vista, varios factores indican
que el conflicto deberfa proceder en el modelo similar en ambos casos. Ambas
regiones han sido miembros del Imperio Britdnico en el que los Cat6licos eran
4. Vea generalmente, John Agnew y Stuart Corbridge, 1994. Masterin Space: Hegemony,
Territory and International Political Economy. [Dominaci6n de Espacio: Hegemonfa, Territorio y Economfa
Internacional Polftica.] Nueva York: Routledge; Gidon Gottlieb, 1993. Nation against State : A New
Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and The Decline of Sovereignty. [Naci6n Contra estado: una Aproximaci6n
Nueva a Conflictos ttnicos y la Disminuci6n de Soberanfa.] Washington D.C.: Un Consejo sobre Libro de
Relaciones exteriores (extranjeras); Gurr, Eduardo Robert, editor (redactor) 1993. Minorities at Risk : A
Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. [Minorfas en peligro: una opinion Global de los conflictos de
Ethnopolitica]. Washington D.C.: Instituto de los Estados Unidos de Prensa de paz; Gurr, Eduardo Robert
y Barbara Harff, 1994. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. [Conflicto 6tnico en Poiftica Mundial]. Roca:
Westview Prensa; McGarry, Juan yBrendan O'Leary, 1993, (Ed). The politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation:
Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts. [La Polftica de Regulaci6n ttnica de Conflicto: los Estudios
de Caso de los Largos Conflictos ttnicos]. Nueva York, Routledge.
5. Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. [Ethnonacionalismo: La
Btscada para el Entendimiento]. Princeton: Princeton University Press (1994).
6. Sedn Byrne y Loraleigh Keashly, Working with ethno-Political conflict: A Multi Modal and
Multi-Level Approach to Conflict Intervention, [Trabajando con Ethno- Conflicto Politico: un Multi-modal
y Acercamiento de Multi-nivel hacia resolucion de conflicto], Pacificaci6n Internacional. 7(1): 97-120
(2000).
7. Vea Byrne y Carter (1996), supra nota 2; Carter y Byrne (2000), supra nota 2; Reilley, supra
nota 1; Catherina O'Sullivan Ve, 1986. FIRST WORLD NATIONALISM: CLASS AND ETHNIC POLITICS
IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND QUEBEC [Primer Mundo Nationalisms: Clase y Polftica ttnica en Irlanda
del Norte y Quebec]. Chicago y Londres: Universidad de Chicago Press.
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una parte significativa de la poblacion cuales su mobilidad de educacion y
economia fueron limitadas. Y en Irlanda y Quebec, el tema de supervivencia
resuena en la historia. Sin embargo, Quebec ha experimentado relativamente
poca violencia, mientras la actividad terrorista ha obligado a las vidas diarias
del Irland6s del Norte. Proponemos que la interrelaci6n de las seis facetas
pueden ayudar ha explicar los niveles que se diferencian en la regulaci6n de
conflicto acertada pacifica.
En describiendo los conflictos, nos vemos obligados a usar etiquetas que
simplifican las complejas interrelaciones de las facetas. Por ejemplo, el uso de
las categorias "Cat6lica" y "Protestante" en Irlanda del Norte y "Franc6fono"
y "Anglophone" son tltil como directrices generales para membrecia.
Lamentablemente, ellos tambi6n obscurecen un numero de diversidad interna.
Nosotros quisieramos acentuar que usando estas categorias nosotros no estamos
declarando que la lengua o la religion es la causa o la esencia del conflicto. En
cambio, nosotros estamos usando categorias que son prominentemente usadas
por los partidos envolucrados. Vamos ahora ha proceder a una comparaci6n de
las seis facetas del conflicto ethnoterritorial. Los aspectos salientes de cada
factor son resumidos en la figura 2.
Aunque ellos nos obliguen a comparar todos los seis factores de los
conflictos, vamos a intentar ha demostrar que las divisiones son a un estremo
artificial. El punto crucial de nuestro andlisis es que el cubismo social enfoca
su atenci6n en la interraci6n de sus factores. Esta nocion nos permite avansar
mds alld de las nociones etnicas primordialista y instrumentista de conflicto
combinando las nociones de la importancia sicologica de grupos sociales y la
utilidad polftica de acentuar los desacuerdos de grupo.8
II. FACTORES HISTORICOS
La historia, relatada por aquellos envuleto en conflictos, establece el
contexto actual de politicas ethnoterritorial. Historias de eventos pasados, visto
de puntos diversos, influye la legitimidad de instituciones corrientes, las
percepciones de las possibilidades politicas y las motivaciones atribuida a los
varios grupos. 9 Este breve resume de la historia de Quebec y Irlanda del Norte
8. Vea, por ejemplo, Daniele Conversi, 1995. Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism:
Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation, [Reexaminaci6n de las Teorfas corrientes de
Nacionalismo: Nacionalismo como Mantenimiento Divisorio y Creaci6n.] Nacionalismo y Polftica ltnica,
vol. 1, No 1, Primavera, pp. 73-85; Antonio D. Herrero (1995). Gastronomy, or Geology? The Role of
Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations, [tGastronomfa o Geologia? El Papel de Nacionalismo en la
Reconstrucci6n de Naciones. Naciones y Nacionalismo], vol. 1, No 1, pp. 1-34.
9. Senehi, supra nota 3 en 150-64; Jessica Senehi, Constructive Storytelling in Intercommunal
Conflicts: Building Community, Building Peach, in Reconcilable Differences: Turning Points in
Ethnopolitical Conflicts [Narraci6n Constructiva en Conflictos Inter-comunales: Construyendo Comunidad,
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illuminan solamente algunos de los eventos historicos, que frequentemente son
envocados por los partidos involucrados.
Los problemas de Irlanda del Norte a menudo son reparados por una larga
historia de hostilidad 6tnica. Las incursiones Normandas de Inglaterra en
Irlanda durante el siglo duodecimo establish una presencia military dominando
los chieftain Gaileco.' El feudalismo elimin6 las prdcticas comunales y las
leyes Brehon de la gente indfgena. Insurrecciones sucesivas por la nobleza
Irlandesa han sido aplastadas por las trupas de Inglaterra. La victoria de
William of Orange en 1690 en la batalla de Boyne, elemino el poder de la
nobleza irlandesa y establecieron una era de predominio Protestante. 1 Las
leyes penales 1692 aseguraron la relacion dominante que permitieron la
comunidad Protestante obligar a la mayor parte Cat6lica afuera del sistema
socioeconomico y politico. 12 Los Cat6licos no podfan ser escogidos a la oficina
polftica, practicar su religi6n, hablar su lengua Gadlica ptiblicamente, o legaron
la propiedad caracterfstica a no ser que el heredero se convirtiera a-la fe
Protestante. La discriminaci6n cultural contra los Cat6licos sigui6 hasta que
Daniel O'Connell satisfactoriamente movilizara los campesinos Irlandeses, para
insitar representacion politica en el parlamento, y ayudar a ganar la
emancipaci6n en 1833 para la mayorfa Cat6lica en la isla de Irlanda. 13 En el
siglo diecinueve, bajo el reino domestico de Charles Stuart Parnell se dividio
la isla entre unionistas en el industrial noroeste de Ulster y nacionalistas en Sur
agrario de Irlanda. 4 El llamado de Parnell "Reino Domestico de Irlanda," fue
interpretado por los Protestantes Ulster como "La Regla de Roma" porque la
grieta religiosa ha sido sobrepuesta sobre la cuestion nacional. En 1912 los
Protestantes del Ulster, temiendo la prospecta de una Irlanda dominado por
Catolicos, formaron la Fuerza Voluntaria de Ulster (UVF), para resistir el Reino
Domesitco.15 Una polarizaci6n polftica que es hecha mds honda entre ambas
Construyendo Paz ', en SeAn Byrne y Cynthia Irvin, editores., Conflicto y Cambio Pacffico de Sociedades
Divididas: Teorfas y Usos]. (SeAn Byrne & Cynthia Irvin eds., 2000).
10. (1983). PADRAIG O'MALLEY, THE UNCIVILL WARS: IRELAND TODAY (1983).
11. Vea generalmente, Se~m Byrne, Growing up in a Divided Society: The influence of Conflict
on Belfast School Children [Conflicto y Muchachos: Inegrada Educacion en Irlanda del Norte] (1997).
12. J.J. Lee, 1989. Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics and Society. [Irlanda, 1912-1985: Politicas y
Sociedad], Cambridge University Press.
13. McGarry y O'Leary (1993), supra nota 4; Cynthia Irvin, 1999. Militant Nationalism: Between
Movement and Party in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country [Nacionalismo Militante: Entre
Movimiento y Partido en Irlanda del Norte y el Pais vasco]. Duluth, MN: Universidad de Minnesota Prensa
(1999).
14. HENRY PATTERSON, CLASS CoNFLIrCT AND SETARIANISM: THE PROTESTANT WORKING CLASS
AND THE BELFAST LABOR MOVEMENT 1868-1920 (1980). [LA CLASE TRABAJADORA PROTESTANTE Y EL
MOVIMIENTO DE LABOR DE BELFAST 1868-1920] (1980).
15. PAuL DIXON, NORTHERN IRELAND: POWER, IDEOLOGY AND REALITY (2001).
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partes de la isla fue mas irritada por la Rebeli6n de Pascua de los Voluntarios
irlandeses de 1916, una insurrecci6n que no logr6 romper la conexi6n
Britanica. La guerra de independencia de 1919-21 entre el army de la
Republica de Irlanda y el gobierno Britanico produjo la particion de 1921 de
Irlanda, cuyo altero, pero no termino la serie de relaciones hostiles en Irlanda
del Norte cuales intensificaron durante el decimoseptimo siglo y hoy en dias
todavia mantienen entrancada las comunidades etnicas en la lucha sectaria.17
Entre el Acto de 1920 del Goberino de Irlanda y el reino directo de
Londres en 1972 un gobierno de control directo en Irlanda del Norte fue
dominado por el viejo partido Unionista Protestante.18 Attempts by the non-
violent Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in the late 1960s to
reform the region failed and spiraled into chaos when NICRA was replaced by
a militant IRA who confronted the British army on the streets.' 9 Desde que
1972, varias tentativas para formular una armaz6n constitucional delegada para
gobernar a Irlanda del Norte ha reunido con exito pequefio.20 El terrorismo
popagado por Republicanos y Lealistas intensifico la polarizacion entre
comunidades, las tentativas que frustran de accomodation de elite.". Las
negociaciones actuales entre los Ingleses y gobiernos Irlandeses y los partidos
constitucionales en Irlanda del Norte, la actividad de terrorista en el despierta
del 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA).22
16. TOM WILSON, ULSTER: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1989).
17. ARTHuR AUGHEY, UNDER SIEGE: ULSTER UNIONISM AND THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT [BAJO
Smo: ELULSTEREL-SINDICALISMOYACUERDO EL-IRLANDIS DEANGLOAMERICANO] (1989); NORMAN PORTER,
RETHINKING UNIONISM: AN ALTERNATIVE VISION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (1996). [Replaneamiento de
Sindicalismo: una Visi6n Alternativa pin-afo Irlanda del Norte].
18. Vea a PAUL BEW ET AL., THE STATE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1921-72: POLITICAL FORCES AND
SOCIAL CLASSES (1979), [el Estado en Irlanda del Norte], 1921-72: Political Forces and Social Classes
[Fuerzas Polfticas y Clases Sociales] (1979); PAUL BEW ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND, 1921-1994: SOCIAL
CLASSES AND POLITICAL FORCES [CLASES SOCiALmS Y FUERZAS POLITIcAS] (1995).
19. Paul Arthur, The People's Democracy, [La Democracia del Pueblo] 1968-73 (1974).
20. Vea generalmente, McGarry y O'Leary (1993), supra nota 4; Paul Bew y Henry Patterson, The
British State and Ulster Crisis: From Wilson to Thatcher [El Estado Brit~nico y el Ulster Crisis: de Wilson
a Thatcher] (1985); Paul Bew, y Henry Patterson, The New Stalemate: Unioinism and the Anglo-Irish
Agreement in Beyond the Rhetori: Politics, The economy, and Social Policy in Northern Ireland [Las Tablas
Nuevas: Sindicalismo y el Acuerdo IrlandA-s de angloamericano ', en Mfs allh de la Ret6rica: Politica, la
Economfa, y Polftica Social en Irlanda del None] 25 (Paul Teague, editor 1987); Paul Bew y Henry Patterson,
Scenarios for Progress in Northern Ireland [Guiones para Progreso en Irlanda del None] (1990).
21. Vea Adrian Guelke, 1995. The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System [La
Edad de Terrorismo y el Sistema Internacional Polftico. Nueva York: San Martin Prensa] (1990). Sen Byrne,
Conflict Regulation or Conflict Resolution: Third Part Intervention in the Northern Ireland Conflict -
Prospects for Peace, 7(2) TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1-25 (1995).
22. Sefin Byrne, Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa at a Crossroads: Understanding
Intergroup Conflict, Peace-Building, and Conflict Resolution, 28 INT'LJ. OF GROUPTENSIONS 231 (1999);
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Los canadienses recuerdan un pasado menos violento que el de los Irland6s
del Norte, pero el Francophones y Anglophones relatan la historia de manera
diferente.2 ' Francophones dedican mis estudio que Anglophones al perfodo
antes de la confederaci6n 1867 de CanadA. Y grupos lingtifsticos celebran a los
h6roes de su grupo lingifstico y acentian la importancia de supervivencia
cultural. Qu6b6cois franc6fono se consideran una naci6n distinta continuamente
amenazada con la exterminaci6n cultural, mientras Anglophones luchan para
mantener una identidad Canadiense en la sombra de los Estados Unidos.
Despu6s de la conquista Britdnica de Francia Nueva en 1763, polftica
Britdnica hacia el Francophones alternaban entre atemptos para asimilarlos en
la sociedad anglophone y atemptos para acomodar las diferencias sin
desestabilizar el control de ellos. La Rebeli6n 1837 Papineau estaba
presupuesta sobre exigencias para el gobierno responsable y el retiro de la
Pandilla Chateau Clique, un grupo de sobre todo anglophone elites que
gobiernan la colonia.24 Posteriormente designaron al sefior Durham el
Gobernador general y estaba supuesto a reportar sobre la situaci6n. tl abog6
por un sistema nuevo que fuera asimilar el de los Francophones. Esta
recomendaci6n produjo la Provincia Unida de Canadd, una uni6n legislativa a
dos regiones igualmente representadas, uno predominantemente franc6fono,
uno sobre todo anglophone.25
Entre los afios 1860, Anglophones excedian en nimero comparado a los
Francophones dentro de la Provincia Unida de Canadi. Reformadores
Anglophonos, comenzaron a pedir la representaci6n por la poblaci6n. Una
combinaci6n de desacuerdos 6tnicos e ideol6gicos produjo el punto muerto
polftico. La Confederaci6n 1867 de Canadd uni6 Nuevo Brunswick y Nova
Scotia con Quebec y Ontario (los ultimos dos fueron sacados de la Provincia
Unida de Canada), estableciendo de la provincia principalmente franc6fona de
Quebec dentro de un predominantemente anglophone pals.26
Los canadienses franc6s establecieron dos accesos hacia la supervivencia
cultural. Los federalistas discutieron que el mejor modo de proteger la sociedad
franc6fona es de participar activamente en asuntos Canadienses federales,
SeAn Byrne, Power Politics as Usual in Cyprus & Northern Ireland: Divided Islands and the Roles of
External Ethno-Guarantors, 6(1) NATIONALiSM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 1-24 (2000); SeAn Byme,
Consocialtional and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, 38(3) J. PEACE
RESEARCH 327-52 (2001).
23. Vea generalmente DAVID V.J. BELL, THE ROOTS OF DISUNITY: A STUDY OF CANADIAN
POLmCAL CULTURE (1992).
24. Vea LAURIER LAPIERRE, CANADA MY CANADA: WHAT HAPPENED? 86-99 (1992); J. ARTHUR
LOwER, CANADA: AN OUTLINE HISTORY 86-87 (1991).
25. LOWER, en 90-91.
26. Vea generalmente P.B. WAITE, THE CONFEDERATION DEBATES IN THE PROVINCE OF CANADA,
1865 (1963).
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asegurando que Francophones fueron envueltos en el proceso de hacer
decisiones polftica. Este acercamiento de activista ha sido atacado por la
Iglesia Cat6lica y nacionalistas, quien abogaron por el aislamiento cultural.27
The struggle between federalists and nationalists has continued to dominate
francophone Qu6bec's political landscape. Anglophone Quebecers, on the
other hand, have generally promoted a strong federal government. Several
events increased the tension between federalists and nationalists. El Partido
liberal Radical durante el perfodo de la Colonia Unida de Canadi abog6 por una
forma republicana de gobierno quitado de la secci6n anglophone, mientras los
Liberales Conservadores favorecieron la cooperaci6n con otros Canadienses.
La Rebeli6n Riel en los afios 1880 exacerb6 relaciones tensas entre
Francophones y otros, reforzando el compromiso nacionalista de mantener un
compromiso fuerte a Quebec. La p6rdida de protecci6n para derechos
franc6fonos en Manitoba debilit6 la posici6n de los federalistas. Cuando el
alistaniento ha sido institufdo para ayudar con el esfuerzo de ambas guerras
mundiales, los nacionalistas Franc6fonas discutieron que estaba incorrecto de
enviar a su gente para luchar "la Guerra Britdnica" aunque mucho
Francophones ya se hubiera ofrecido. Recientemente, negociaciones fracasadas
constitucionales y refer6ndums sobre la soberania de Quebec han dividido
Quebecers.
Durante los afios 1960, reformas educativas y una disminuci6n en la
influencia politica de la Iglesia cat6lica redujeron la naturaleza parroquial de
las escuelas. Durante el supuesto 'Revolucion Callada,' un grupo nuevo de
nacionalistas abog6 por la creaci6n de un cuadro econ6micamente competitivo
de francophones, indices de natalidad cayeron, y la legislatura de Qu6bec
pasaron leyes que promovieron el empleo de los Franceses. El objetivo era la
resistencia mds pasiva para survivance. En cambio, Quibicois exigi6 los
instrumentos y ocasiones necesarias para dpanouissement (la prosperidad).
Desde entonces, mucho debate ha enfocado a la relaci6n apropiada entre
Quebec y 'el Resto de Canadi.' En el debate de refer6ndum reciente, por
ejemplo, los nacionalistas usaron al Sefior Durham el Informe como la
evidencia de la amenaza de asimilaci6n, mientras los federalistas citaron las
ventajas de cooperaci6n inter6tnica.
Varios eruditos destacan los cambios masivos de la sociedad de Quebec
causada por Pierre Elliott Trudeau durante su tenencia como el primer ministro
Canadiense (1968-1979; 1980-1984).28 McRoberts discute que los cambios que
Trudeau introducido en Canadi, sobre todo en lo que incluye al bilingtiismo,
27. Vea generalmente, Laurier LaPierre, Canada my Canada: What Happened? 86-99 (1992); J.
Arthur Lower, Canada : An Outline History [la Genesis de una Naci6n] 86-87 (1966).
28. Vea, por ejemplo, ROGER GIBBINS. CONFLICT AND UNITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CANADIAN
POLITICAL LIFE (1994); LOWER, supra nota 24.
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multiculturalism, y constitutionalism considerablemente han reducido el
potencial para la reconciliaci6n entre Quebec y el resto de Canadd.29 La legacia
historica de Trudeau se mantiene como topico de controversia todavia hoy en
dias. La historia reciente, sobre todo en cuanto a la polftica lingifstica y la
btisqueda del reconocimiento constitucional como una sociedad distinta, seri
dirigida en otras secciones.
Cuando es claro de esta vista general rapida de la evoluci6n hist6rica de
la polftica de ethnoterritorial en estos dos casos, los grupos 6tnicos acentdian los
factores diferentes como ellos interpretan el pasado. Estas diferencias pueden
aumentar hostilidad si sus historias proporcionan interpretaciones bruscamente
diferente de otros grupos.
Im. FACTORES RELIGIOSOS
Con la expansion de investigaci6n de guerra post-frfa sobre identidad,
varios investigadores han notado la necesidad de aumentar nuestro
entendimiento de la dindnica psicol6gica de identidad y transferir nuestro
conocimiento al reino politico. Brewer advierte de los peligros de estiramiento
conceptual del concepto de identidad social.3° Ella distinge entre la identidad
basada por persona, la identidad basada por papel, la identidad basada por
grupo y la identidad colectiva, y ella pide theorisazion que reconoce las
implicaciones de estas bases diferentes de identificaci6n y ain podrfa dirigir las
interacciones entre ellos.3  Los eruditos tienen que entender mS
completamente los caminos en los que la gente maneja las bases mtiltiples de
identificaci6n. Huddy discute que hay cuatro problemas clave que hacen dificil
el uso acertado de investigaci6n psicol6gica sobre la teorfa de identidad social
a cuestiones politicas que son 1) la gama de opciones la gente tiene para
escoger sobre su identidad, 2) El significado subjetivo que la gente le da a las
identidades, 3) las diferencias de la fuerza o identidades de potencia y 4) la
estabilidad de varias identidades polfticas y sociales.32  Estas dificultades
requieren mucho matiz en la discusi6n de conflictos de identidad polfticas, que
son por qu6 abogamos por el examen de las varias facetas del cubo social.
Por ejemplo, instituciones sociales y polfticas que son unidas a la religi6n
crean sociedades bipolares en ambos Irlanda del Norte y Quebec. En Irlanda del
Norte, los Protestantes y Cat6licos asisten escuelas y iglesias separadas, rara
29. See generalmente KENNETH MCROBERTS, MISCONCEIVING CANADA: THE STRUGGLE FOR
NATION UNITY (1997).
30. Mailynn B. Brewer, The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implicationsfor Political Psychology
22(1) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY en 115-125 (2001).
31. Id.
32. Leonie Huddy, From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity
Theory, 22(1) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY en 127-156 (2001).
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son las veces que se intercasan, y viven en vecindades separadas para la
protecci6n ffsica y psicol6gica; la religi6n conserva el modo de vivir de cada
grupo.33 En Canadi, la afiliaci6n religiosa promovi6 modos de vivir distintos,
como diferencias econ6micas y escuelas parroquiales reforzaron la polarizaci6n
religiosa y lingtifstica. Acentuamos el saliente de lealtad condicional, hablada
debajo, en la promoci6n de relaciones tensas de intergrupo y la polarizaci6n,
teniendo en cuenta el saliente politico de religi6n en Quebec que ha disminuido
drdsticamente desde los afios 1960 mientras esto permanece una preocupaci6n
central en Irlanda del Norte.
Los cat6licos en Irlanda del Norte son relativamente homog6neos en sus
creencia religiosas y su identificaci6n con la naci6n Irlandesa 4 Esta cohesi6n
resiste enormes diferencias entre las agendas polfticas del Social Democrdtico
y el Partido Laborista (SDLP) y el Sinn Fein, el ala politica del Ej6rcito
Republicano Irland6s Provisional (PIRA) sobre cuestiones como la legitimidad
de violencia y el papel de consentimiento en la eliminaci6n de Irlanda del
Norte.35 Por ejemplo, Grove y Carter examinan la ret6rica de John Hume y
Gerry Adams para demostrar la tentativa que compite de movilizar la poblaci6n
nacionalista/Cat6lica en Irlanda del Norte e ilustrar las interconexiones entre
el contexto del conflicto y la ret6rica.3
6
La heterogeneidad en las creencia religiosas del Ulster Protestantes no
influye directamente ha su identidad nacional. 37 La diversidad religiosa sin
embargo, crea algtin conflicto entre los miembros de las denominaciones
diferentes y entre el liberal y Protestantes fundamentalistas o extremistas.38 El
conflicto Intra-Protestante se disminuye cuando los Protestantes evocan un
decimos6ptimo convenio del siglo religioso con el monarca para unirse en un
bloque homog6neo para oponerse a alguna amenaza percibida a sus intereses,
sobre todo los socios de la Irlanda del Norte del Reino Unido (el REINO
UNIDO).
3 9
33. Vea generalmente JOHNWHYTE, INTERPRETINGNORTHERNIRELAND(1990); NORTHERNIRELAND
AND THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION (Dermot Keogh & M.H. Haltzel eds. 1994).
34. Vea JOHN MCGARY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND: BROKEN IMAGES
(1995); EDWARD MOXON-BROWNE, NATION, CLASS AND CREED IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1983).
35. IAN MCALLISTER, THE NORTHERN IRELAND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY: POLITICAL
OPPOSmON IN A DIVIDED SocmY (1977).
36. Andrea Grove y Neal Carter, Not All Blarney is Cast in Stone: International Cultural Conflict
in Northern Ireland, 20(4) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 725-65.
37. Vea generalmente JOHN D. CASH, IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY AND CONFLICT: THE STRUCrURATION
OF POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1996); RICHARD ROSE, GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: AN IRISH
PERSPECrIVE (1971).
38. Vea generalmente FRANK WRIGHT, NORTHERN IRELAND: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1987).
39. Vea generalmente STEVE BRUCE, GOD SAVE ULSTER! THE RELIGION AND POLITICS OF
PAISLEYISM (1986); STEVE BRUCE, THE RED HAND: PROTESTANT PARAMILITARmS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
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Un factor clave entre la cooperaci6n protestante es la lealtad condicional,
una idea similar a la noci6n Escocesa contractarian de covenanting: "si la regla
no logra cumplir con su obligaciones, los sujetos no deberfan abandonar el
contrato, pero bastante deberfan rechazar el cumplimiento con las leyes e
intentar obligar a la regla en el cuidado del negocio."4 La lealtad condicional
ayuda explicar "como los unionistas evitaron la crisis de identidad nacional la
que los nacionalistas tan a menudo predicen para ellos."' Los unionistas son
leales al monarca en su papel como el jefe de la iglesia establecida asi como el
jefe del estado Britdnico. El parlamento, sin embargo, carece de la legitimidad
religiosa de la Reina. No hay ninguna contradicci6n en la oposici6n del Norte
Irlandesa Protestante para el Parlamento Britf.nico ya que la mayor parte
Protestantes son en tiltima instancia leales no a instituciones politicas, pero a
su identidad ethnoreligious.42 Los protestantes permanecerdn leales a Gran
Bretafia s6lo mientras Gran Bretafia les garantiza una mayorfa en Irlanda del
Norte.43
Varios ej emplos hist6ricos ilustran la naturaleza contractarian de ideologfa
de Unionista-la protecci6n del Monarca del Ulster de la comunidad Protestante
la identidad y accesorios politicos al Reino Unido. Por ejemplo, las crisis de
Regla De casa de 1886, 1893, y 1912 vieron un aumento de disturbios en
Belfast, la creaci6n de un Ulster, el ej6rcito Protestante, y el desarrollo del UVF
en el que los Protestantes procuraron oponerse, en casa a la Regla por la fuerza.
De hecho, la primera guerra mundial por poco apart6 una guerra civil en
Irlanda." La oposici6n protestante para el mando directo de Londres en 1972,
el Acuerdo 1985 Irland6s de angloamericano, y el Marco 1995 para la Paz ms
lejos ilustra la profundidad de miedo Protestante y la traici6n asf como la
estrategia de intra-la cooperaci6n protestante para proteger su identidad
ethnoreligious y oponerse (resistirse) lo que ellos perciben como una
incorporaci6n forzada en Irlanda unida.
La religi6n ha jugado un papel diferente en Canadi. La lealtad religiosa
antes de los afios 1960 ayud6 a Canad, mantener relaciones de grupo
relativamente pacfficas inter6tnicas. El modelo colonial en Nueva Francia no
(1992); SeAn Byrne & Aimee Delman, Group Identity Formation and Intra-group Conflict, 25(4) THE J. OF
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 35-57.
40. DAVID MILLER, QUEEN'S REBELS: ULSTER LOYALISM IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE 5 (1978).
41. John Hunter, An Analysis of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, in POLITICAL COOPERATION IN
DIVIDED SOCIETIES: A SERIES OF PAPERS RELEVANT TO THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 25 (Desmond
Rea, ed. 1983). Vea tambien ROSE, supra nota 37, en 40-88; WHYTE, supra nota 33; BRUCE, supra nota 39.
42. ARTHUR AUGHEY & DUNCAN MORROw, NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICS (1996).
43. Vea Moxon-Browne, supra nota 34; RoY WALLIS ETAL., NoSURRENDER: PAISLEYISM AND THE
POLmCS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1-35 (1986).
44. McGarry y O'Leary, supra nota 4.
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logr6 producir instituciones fuertes gubemamentales, abandonando la Iglesia
cat6lica como la organizaci6n mAs importante comunal. En 1659, Monseigneur
de Laval, el obispo de Quebec, estableci6 la tradici6n de ultramontism, la
doctrina que la Iglesia estd predominante en todos los asuntos sociales y es
polfticamente superiora al estado. 5 Despu6s de la Conquista Brimica de
Quebec, el Acto 1774 de Quebec aprobado y apoyado el predominio de la
Iglesia cat6lica, la que en la vuelta abogaron por la aceptaci6n de regla
Britdnica. Permitieron a protestantes (principalmente Anglophones) establecer
instalaciones separadas sociales. Escuelas parroquiales reforzaron el poder de
la Iglesia y permitieron a cada grupo religioso controlar la socializaci6n de sus
propios miembros. Norteam6rica 1867 Britdnica Acto (ahora Acto de
Constituci6n llamado, 1867) politica de educaci6n reservada para las
provincias. Quebec mantiene su sistema escolar parroquial, aunque la reforma
sea para cambiar juntas escolares de basarse en religi6n a la definici6n segtn
la lengua.
Las relaciones entre grupos religiosos en Quebec no han sido como
estiradas hist6ricamente como en Irlanda del Norte. Poca competici6n
econ6mica o territorial surgi6 entre facciones religiosas. Despu6s de la
Conquista, Protestantes Ingleses tendi6 al racimo en regiones especfficas, sobre
todo Montreal y los Municipios Orientales, y era relativamente libre de unir la
elite Canadiense dtnica de mayorfa y de negocio.46 Mientras la mayorfa
Cat6lica permaneci6 sobre todo en el sector primario, anglophone Protestantes
tendieron hacia empresas emprendedoras, proporcionando la capital para la
industrializaci6n.
La historia de ultramontism influy6 en identidad ethnonational de
Canadienses Franceses. Como con el Ulster los Protestantes, la lealtad
canadiense a la religi6n eran fuertes que esto al parlamento o la corona. La
identidad religiosa promovi6 lazos fuertes entre los miembros de una parroquia.
Desde la Revoluci6n Tranquila, la disminuci6n de la Iglesia como un actor
social poderosa parece haber cambiado el foco de lealtad de grupo. Las
funciones mis sociales hist6ricamente realizadas por la Iglesia, como la
educaci6n, la salud, y el bienestar, ahora se caen bajo la jurisdicci6n
provincial.47 Como el abastecedor de estos cambios de funciones, tambi6n hace
la identificaci6n ciudadana con instituciones sociales. Este cambio de la lealtad
es ilustrado por un cambio de la auto-identificaci6n: durante la Revoluci6n
Tranquila, Canadienses Franceses que habitaban Quebec comenzaron a
45. Vea supra nota 7 en 50.
46. Vea J. LEwIS ROBINSON, CONCEPTS ANDTHEMES INTHEREGIONALGEOGRAPHYOFCANADA 101-
117 (Talonbooks revised ed. 1989); SHEILAMCLEODARNOPOuLOS &DOMINIQUECLIFr, THEENGLISH FACr
IN QUEBEC (1980).
47. Vea LaPierre, supra nota 27 en 178-95.
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referirse a ellos mismo como Qugbcois mds bien que Canadiensesfranvais.48
La historia de ultramontism, transferido a la lealtad provincial, aumenta el
potencial para rechazar la monarquia limitada y la federaci6n. Ademis, la
herencia del 6nfasis de la Iglesia Cat6lica sobre la lengua aument6 el saliente
de diferencias culturales, que actualmente dominan el debate constitucional en
Canadi.
Hoy, la religi6n se mantiene mds saliente como una categorfa social en
Irlanda del Norte que en Quebec. En Irlanda del Norte, la diferencia religiosa
tiende a crear un rechazamiento moral de compromiso. En diferencias de
Quebec, religiosas hist6ricamente ayudadas mantienen la coexistencia
relativamente pacffica, desde la Iglesia Cat6lica a la aceptaci6n abogada de
Canadi a cambio de un nivel de autonomfa cultural en el nivel provincial.
Ir6nicamente la disminuci6n de importancia a la religi6n en Quebec puede
aumentar el potencial para el conflicto de intergrupo, como Quebicois la
identificaci6n cambiada de la iglesia a la provincia sin reducir la importancia
de diferencias lingifisticas.
IV. FACTORES DEMOGRAFiCOS
Factores demogrdficos son los aspectos cruciales de los dos conflictos. En
Quebec, francophones componen aproximadamente el 85% de la poblaci6n y
dominan el sistema politico de la provincia a pesar de su estado de minorfa
(aproximadamente el 20% de la poblaci6n) en Canadi en total. El fndice de
natalidad bajo de Quebec francophones aumenta exigencias para la
participaci6n social provincial, la lengua, y la polftica de inmigraci6n. En
Irlanda del Norte, los Cat6licos (principalmente de pendiente Gadlica)
permanecen una minorfa, aunque su tamafio relativo cultive debido a los indices
de natalidad que exceden a los Protestantes. La disminuci6n de los aumentos
de posici6n relativos de los Protestantes teme de dominaci6n Cat6lica.
Diferencias demogrificas en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec conducen al
modelo socio-psicol6gico, el que pueden ver como un conflicto sobre la
identidad nacional entre "minorfas dobles. '4 En Ilanda del Norte, Cat6licos
y Protestantes se yen como minorfas, pero simultdneamente son vistos por otra
comunidad como una mayoria de amenazas.5 ° Minorfas dobles refuerzan la
necesidad de la seguridad y el reconocimiento de las reclamaciones territoriales
48. Louis Dupont and Dean Louder, QueUes Cultures Reproduire? (el papel present6 en la 1995
Conferencia de la Asociaci6n para Estudios canadienses en los estados unidos, 15-19 Nov., 1995).
49. HAROLD JACKSON y ANNE MCHARDY, THE TWO IRELANDS: THE PROBLEM OF THE DOUBLE
MINORITY (3d ed. 1984); WHYTE, supra nota 33, en 100-02; John Whyte, How is the Boundary Maintained
Between Both Communities in Northern Ireland?, 9(2) ETHNIC AND RACIAL STuDIES en 219-34 (1986).
50. Vea Terrie Northrup, Dynamics of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict, in INTRACTABLE
CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 55-82 (Kriesberg et al., eds., 1989).
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de cada grupo. Cat6licos se ven como una minorfa irlandesa en Irlanda del
Norte y una mayorfa en un contexto de todo-Irlanda. Los protestantes
componen la mayorfa de la poblaci6n en Irlanda del Norte, pero una minoria de
la poblaci6n total en el REINO UNIDO y en cualquier futuro Irlanda unida. De
ahf, Irlanda del Norte Protestantes se ven como una minorfa situada, cerrada en
una lucha eterna para defenderse contra fuerzas ambas internas y externas.
En Irlanda del Norte, referencias hist6ricas a las campafias de genocidio
afectan las percepciones y teme que cada grupo sostenga "del otro." Los
protestantes en Irlanda del Norte se han desarrollado un pronunciado "la
mentalidad de sitio." Ellos consideraron a la Repfiblica de Irlanda como hostil
a sus intereses e identidad y asf consideraron cualquier movimiento hacia el
acercamiento con Cat6licos en Irlanda del Norte como la aceptaci6n de
unificaci6n eventual irlandesa.52 Los cat6licos han sido enajenados por su
tratamiento dentro de Irlanda del Norte y contemplan(buscan) el gobiemo en
Reptiblica de Irlanda para proteger sus intereses. Cada grupo, recordando una
historia de conflicto de comunidad, busca una mayorfa dentro de instituciones
polfticas para prevenir la discriminaci6n o la supresi6n. La minorfa doble en
Irlanda del Norte debajo de disminuciones el potencial para la formaci6n "de
un medio del terreno" polftico entre las comunidades.53
La minoria doble en Quebec, sin embargo, en realidad puede mitigar el
conflicto el federalismo debido a canadiense. La minorfa anglophone en Quebec
pertenece a la mayorfa anglophone la comunidad en Canadd y Norteam6rica.
La mayorfa franc6fona en Quebec tambi6n desarroll6 una mentalidad de sitio,
vi6ndose como una poblaci6n de minorfa hundida en un ambiente anglophone
aunque esto sostenga una mayorfa provincial. Los nacionalistas de Quebec
tradicionalmente abogaron por fndices de natalidad altos lograr "la venganza
de la horquilla" y mantener la cultura franc6fona.
Quebec francophones demanda que la limitaci6n legal del empleo de
ingl6s en la educaci6n, negocios y la publicidad es necesaria de neutralizar la
mayorfa aplastante de Anglophones en CanadA. Ademds, Qu6b6cois polfticos
han usado la polftica de educaci6n para aumentar la asimilaci6n de inmigrantes
en el franc6fono, mIs bien que el Anglophone, la comunidad. Anglophone
51. Los caciques Gaklicos' 1641 masacre de protestantes de Ulster y la masacre de siglo XVII
Cromwellian de los habitantes Cat6licos de Dundalk y Drogheda ilustra este punto. Vea A.T.Q. STEWART,
THE NARROW GROUND: ASPECrS OF ULSTER 1609-1969 23-34 (1977); ROSE, supra nota 37, en 180-204;
MICHAELFARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 2-98 (1980); Michael MacDonald, Children of
Wrath: Political Violence in Northern Ireland (1986).
52. Vea generalmente JOSEPH RUANE&JENNiFERTODD, THEDYNAMICSOFCONFLICTINNORTHERN
IRELAND: POWER, CONFLICr AND EMANoPATION (1996).




Quebecers son una minorfa especial dentro de la deuda de provincia en parte al
predominio de ingl6s en todas partes de CanadA y su presencia bien establecida
en Quebec.
Mucho Anglophone Quebecers piensa en ellos como una minorfa polftica
en Quebec, fuerte se opone la politica Qu6b6cois nacionalista, y teme que la
creaci6n de Quebec independiente cortara su lazos(corbatas) con el resto de
Canadi. Otros acenttian la importancia de mantener el estado especial de ingl6s
en Quebec, tambi6n celebrando Qu6bec's la claridad cultural.
Sin embargo, hoy la inmigraci6n afecta el estado relativo de ambos grupos.
El modelo demogrffico que se cambia, sobre todo en Montreal, afecta la fuerza
relativa polftica de Anglophones y Francophones. Como los afios Franc6fonos
Quebecer demogr~ficos, con un indice de natalidad bajo, la probabilidad de
soberanfa de Quebec que gana un refer6ndum aparece reducir como el tiempo
va por. Esto bien puede aumentar los sentimientos de Quebec Francophones
como ser una minorfa y necesitando aumentar el control de la polftica cultural.
Claramente, este "la minorfa doble" tiene implicaciones para el
camino(manera) el que estos grupos en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec ven el
mundo.5 4 En general, Irlanda del Norte experimenta mis problemas con el
terrorismo y el saliente de simbolismo, y el conflicto identidades nacionales que
Quebec debido a la inseguridad de cada grupo 6tnico. La carencia de las
comunidades de control de la politica, la sospecha mutua hacia la traici6n, y el
empleo de terrorismo y el simbolismo que promueve una mentalidad de sitio
todos reduce el potencial para Irlanda del Norte para crear el sentido "de la
identidad compartida.' ' 5" Al contrario las ventajas de Quebec de la existencia
de federalismo canadiense, que reduce ambos grupos al estado de minorfa en
algunas dreas, pero los establecen como una mayoria en otros. Esto puede
promover algfin reconocimiento mutuo. Sin embargo, el fracaso continuado en
la negociaci6n de asuntos constitucionales reduce la buena voluntad a ambos
lados del debate. A pesar del potencial para el alojamiento presentado por los
aspectos positivos de minorfas dobles (grupos puede ampliar la consideraci6n
especial a minorfas dentro de su territorio, si pueden esperar la reciprocidad),
los problemas todavfa amenazan al equilibrio. El tamafio relativo y la tarifa de
cambio demogrifico de los grupos son significativos. La p6rdida relativa de
poblaci6n para Protestantes del Norte Irlandeses puede aumentar sus
inseguridades. En Quebec, rehusando fndices de natalidad y la inmigraci6n
aumentada obligan a nacionalistas Qu6b~cois a redefinir la base para la
identificaci6n con su grupo, y tambi6n formar su polftica acerca de la educaci6n
de no cristianos la cuya lengua materna no es ni Franc6s, ni Ingl6s.
54. Vea WHYTE, supra nota 33, en 25-43.
55. Vea generalmente BYRNE, supra nota 11.
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V. FACTORES POLITICAS
La regulaci6n pacffica de conflicto ethnoterritorial confia pesadamente en
legitimidad poliftica del estado, la inclusividad de instituciones polfticas, y el
predoninio de conflicto no institucionalizado como el terrorismo. Estas
funciones son interrelacionadas, pero varias combinaciones son posibles. En
esta secci6n dirigimos a la importancia de fronteras y el terrorismo como a los
factores politicos. Estos factores enormemente influyen en la legitimidad del
estado y el potencial para la regulaci6n pacffica de conflictos.
Muchos movimientos ethnoregional acenttian la delineaci6n territorial de
instituciones polifticas en las que ellos pueden participar. Las fronteras
provinciales de Qu6bec permiten al Qudbdcois algtin grado de control de un
territorio especffico dentro del contexto ms grande canadiense. Irlanda del
Norte, sin embargo, tiene un limite que no satisface las exigencias de la
comunidad ya sea Protestante o Cat6lica.56 El debate sobre el lfmite en Irlanda
del Norte y la hostilidad de grupo de aumentos como el saliente de identidad
nacional se hacen una amenaza tangible a la existencia de la posici6n de Irlanda
del Norte dentro del Reino Unido.57 Cuando las discusiones sobre fronteras e
instituciones pasan a acci6n terrorista, el potencial para la regulaci6n pacffica
es reducido, como la capacidad del estado para permanecer global es desafiada.
A. Fronteras
La partici6n politica de Irlanda del Norte del Estado irland6s Libre(gratis)
por el Gobierno 1920 de Irlanda el Acto no resolvi6 el conflicto 6tnico. La
fundaci6n de la frontera sirvi6 s6lo para criar la polftica sectaria. Modere a los
miembros Nacionalistas del SDLP y los miembros militantes Republicanos de
Sinn Fein en la comunidad Cat6lica siguen agit6.ndose para Irlanda unida.
Modere a los miembros de Unionista del Partido de Unionista Oficial (OUP)
y los miembros de Legitimista militantes del Partido de Unionista Democrdtico
(DUP) dentro de la comunidad Protestante procuran mantener la paz por la
seguridad,58 discutiendo que las amenazas y ataques terroristas y por la
56. McGarry, John, 1998. 'Political Settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa', Political
Studies [Arreglos Politicos en Irlanda del Norte y Sur Africa, Estudios Politicos] 46(5):1-17; O'Leary,
Brendan, 1997. 'The Conservative Stewardship of Northern Ireland, [La administracion conservativa de
Irlanda del Norte] 1979-97: Sound-Bottomed Contradictions or Slow Learning', Political Studies 45(3):663-
76.
57. Veageneralmente, KEVIN BOYLE&TOM HADDEN, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE CHOICE [IRLANDA
DEL NORTE: LA DECISI6N] (1994).
58. See generally MICHAELFARRELL, ARMING THEPROTESTANTS: THEFORMATION OFTHEULSTER
SPECIALCONSTABULARY ANDTHEROYALULSTERCONSTABULARY 1920-27 (1983); EAMoNNMCCANN, WAR
AND AN IRISH TOWN (1974).
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Continuidad y el IRA Verdadero hacen medidas de seguridad especiales
necesarias.59
Protestantes y Cat6licos mantienen sus posiciones firmemente enraizadas
acerca del estado politico de Irlanda del Norte como la parte del Reino Unido
o un potencial Irlanda Unida. Segdin normas internacionales, Irlanda del Norte
no es un miembro de pleno derecho del Reino Unido al mismo grado que
Escocia y Pafs de Gales.6° El limbo constitucional de Irlanda del Norte anim6
la violencia politica del PIRA solidificando la mentalidad de sitio de
Protestantes. Modere a Unionistas y Legitimistas militantes son determinados
para proteger el eslab6n Britinico, asf salvaguardando la herencia Protestante
y la identidad. Los nacionalistas Moderados creen que la rafz del conflicto es
la presencia Britinica en Irlanda del Norte, y el deseo de terminar la partici6n
por el medio pacffico democrdtico, contrariamente a la violencia politica del
PIRA.6 La competencia politica sobre el espacio geopolftico de Irlanda del
Norte realza los sentimientos de miedo, sospechas y la incertidumbre, formando
asi la agenda polftica para ambas comunidades. Sin embargo, todos los partidos
constitucionales en Irlanda del Norte, el Nacionalista y el Unionista, aceptan la
legalidad de partici6n y convienen que el cambio requerir el consentimiento
de la mayorfa dentro de Irlanda del Norte.62
La frontera entre Irlanda del Norte y la Reptiblica de Irlanda asegura que
los Protestantes y Cat6licos se identifican con un Protestantes diferentes
polfticos del norte de entidad con Gran Bretafila y Cat6licos del Norte con
Repdiblica de Irlanda. Ambas comunidades viven bajo la tensi6n psicol6gica de
una minorfa sitiada seg-in la lente conceptual son usadas para considerar el
contexto geopolftico.63 Esto a su turno permite cada comunidad mostrar el
59. Bill McSweeney, 1996. 'Security, Identity and the Peace Process in Northern
Ireland',[Seguridad, identidad, y el Proceso de paz en Irlanda del Norte] Security Dialogue [dialogo de
seguridad] 27(2): 167-78.
60. Vea generalmente, ADRIAN GUELKE, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
(IRLANDA DEL NORTE: LA PERSPECTIVA INTERNACIONAL] (1988).
61. Vea MICHAELCUNNINGHAM, BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, [POLISA DE
GOBIERNOBRITANICOENIRLANDADELNORTE] 1969-89(1991); MICHAELCUNNINGHAM, BRITISHGOVERNMENT
AND THE NORTHERN IREAND QUESTION: GOVERNING A DIVIDED COMMUNITY [GOBIERNO BRITANICO Y LA
PREGUNTA DE IRLANDA DEL NORTE: GOVERNANDO UNA COMMUNIDAD DIVIDIDA] (1994).
62. Vea generalmente, DAVID BLOOMFIELD, PEACEMAKING STRATEGIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
BUILDING COMPLEMENTARITY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENTTHEORY [ESTRATEGIAS PARA MANTENER LA PAZ EN
IRLANDA DEL NORTE: CONSTRUYENDO TEORIAS EN EL MANEJO DE CONFLICTOS] (1996).
63. Vea Paul Dixon, Consociationalism and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: The Glass Half
Full or Half Empty, [Consociationalism y Irlanda del Norte Proceso De paz: la mitad de el vaso leno, o Ia
mita de el vaso vacIO] NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 20-37 (1997); Paul Dixon, Paths
to Peace in Northern Ireland (I): Civil society and Consociational Approaches, [Paso a la paz en Irlanda del
Norte (1) Intentos a la Sociedad Civil y Consasionall DEMOCRATIZATION, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 1-27 (1997); Paul
Dixon, Paths to Peace in Northern Ireland (11): The Peace Processes 1973-74 and 1994-96, [Pasos para la
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miedo y la sospecha hacia las intenciones politicas "de otro lado" como la
violencia politica de los paramilitares previene un medio del terreno s61ido del
surgir. Como Whyte apunta, la dificultad de regular el conflicto en Irlanda del
Norte se deriva de los hechos que "las minorfas son los grupos que se sienten
amenazados; estos amenazados grupos son obligados a ser hipersensibles; en
Irlanda del Norte ambos grupos muestran estas caracteristicas. '
Las fronteras tienen una importancia diferente en Canadi. Las fronteras
provinciales de Qu6bec permiten al Qu~bcois afirmar mucho control de sus
asuntos culturales. El conflicto existe sobre el grado de poder para ser
sostenido en los niveles provinciales y federales de gobierno. Estas fronteras
federales son menos propensas para estar en desacuerdo que las fronteras mds
institucionalmente divisivas en Irlanda del Norte. La naturaleza ambigua de
fronteras federales aumenta la oportunidad para la regulaci6n pacffica de
conflicto.
Mientras lideres de Quebec se debaten la soberanRa, las fronteras ganan
importancia. El limite entre Quebec y Terranova nunca ha sido formalmente
delineado. Reclamaciones de tierra excepcionales de los aborigenes y enclaves
anglophone podrian obstruir la simple secesi6n de Quebec. Ademds, algunos
analistas discuten que Quebec s6lo podria marcharse con sus fronteras
originales y asi se obligarfan a ceder toda la tierra concedida a ellos por el
gobierno federal.65 En el debate pasado sobre el Ministro canadiense de
Asuntos Intergubernamentales surgi\ la sugerencia de Stephane Dion que las
partes de poblaci6n Qu6bec's (sobre todo Anglophones y Aborigenes) pudieran
permanecer en Canadd en caso de una declaraci6n Qubgcois de soberanfa.66
Esto puede ser remontado a un miedo de muchos afios de que los Anglophones
podrian ser separados del resto de CanadA.67 Una vez que el lfmite es percibido
como el requerir de una divisi6n estricta de grupos, el nivel de saliente y la
hostilidad de aumentos de discusiones territoriales dramiticamente.
Como consecuencia a la tentativa de 1995 de declarar la independencia,
el tribunal canadiense federal dictamin\ que Quebec no tiene el derecho a tal
paz en Irlanda del Norte (11): El processo de paz 1973 y 1994-96] DEMOCRATIZATION, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 1-25
(1997).
64. WHYTE, supra nota 33 en 100.
65. Vea, por ejemplo, DAVID L. VARTY, WHO GETS UNGAVA? [QUIEN COJE A UNGA VA?] (1991).
66. Vea Lubin, Martin, 1996. "Political Issues in Contemporary Quebec: Whither Party Politics
in Quebec since the Referendum'?" [Temas politicos en el Quebec contemporario: Politicas Whiter partido
en Quebec desde el Referendum?] Papel Presentado en la Reuni6n 1996 de estado de Nueva York Asociaci6n
de Ciencia Polftica, el 29-30 de marzo, Ithaca, Nueva York; Antonio Wilson-Smith, Resistencia, Maclean,
el 5 de febrero 1996, pp. 10-14.
67. Vea, por ejemplo, George Koch, The Price of Separation,[El precio de separacion] ALBERRTA
REPORT, 17 March 1990, p. 13. Ingrid Peritz, Anglo Separatists Surface Again, [Superficie de
Angloamericano Seperatists Otra vez] MONTREAL GAZETTE, 20 April 1991, p. B4.
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declaraci6n, pero que Canadi se podrRa ver obligada a negociar una mayorfa
clara de Quebecers respondiese clararamente sobre la soberanfa de Quebec.
Esto simplemente movi6 el debate a las cuestiones de que constituyen una
mayorfa clara y una pregunta clara. El volumen de ventas en las arenas
federales y provinciales politicas sigue. El Partido de Reforma ha sido
substitufdo por la Alianza canadiense con el lfder Stockwell el Dfa. Con la
dimisi6n de Lucien Bouchard, Bernardo Landry se hizo el Primer ministro de
Quebec el 8 de marzo 2001. La cuesti6n de soberanfa probablemente va a
permanecer como debate durante algn tiempo.
B. Terrorismo
El terrorismo ha sido usado en ambas regiones para llamar la atenci6n
hacia conflictos. Considerablemente, el terrorismo nacionalista en Quebec ha
sido dirijido principalmente a los sfmbolos de dominaci6n colonial o federal,
mientras que la violencia Republicana en Irlanda del Norte ha sido dirijida a
civiles ademds de propiedades y sfmbolos del estado Brit6.nico. Los ataques
sectarios conducidos por Legitimistas y Republicanos produjeron un estado de
miedo y la ineficacia marcada por un modelo infinito de fuerza de disuasi6n y
la venganza.6
En Irlanda del Norte, persistente la violencia paramilitar en forma de
castigos, palizas y tiroteos desde 1996 indicando que el curso futuro del proceso
frigil de paz podrfa ser marcado por una vuelta a la violencia. Una contienda
reciente interna por el UVF Y el UFF emparejado por actividades continuadas
paramilitares y por la Continuidad y el IRA Verdadero sugiere que el proceso
corriente de paz no sea dado por sentado.69 En el pasado, la violencia
paramilitar de los Republicanos PIRA para obligar al gobierno Britdnico de
Irlanda del Norte y por el Legitimista UVF para mantener Irlanda del Norte
Britinico ha reclamado muchas vidas en el pasado, asegurando un conflicto
bicommunal duradero.7° Por ejemplo, la Amapola Enniskillen, la matanza de
Da de once Protestantes en 1987 por el PIRA, los asesinatos de patrones
Cat6licos y Protestantes en una barra en Greysteel en 1992 por el UVF, los
asesinatos de PIRA de diez Protestantes en la pescaderia de Frizzell en el Oeste
Belfast en 1993 y continuo el bombardeo de IRA a civiles Protestantes y
Cat6licos en Omagh Compafifa en 1998. Tyrone reforz6 hist6ricos temores de
68. See Wright, supra nota 38 en 11-12. ALLEN FELDMAN, FORMATIONS OF VIOLENCE: THE
NARRATIVE OF THE BODY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. (1991).
69. Byrne, Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern
Ireland, [Sociedad Consocionacional y Civica, Caminos para lograr Paz en Irlanda del Norte] supra nota 21.
70. Vea Generalmente, Andy Pollak & Torkel Opsahl, Eds, A CITIZEN'S INQUIRY: THE OPSAHL
REPORT ON NORTHERN IRELAND [LA INTRIGA DE UN CIUDADANO: EL REPORTE OPSAHL SOBRE IRLANDA DEL
NORTE] (1993).
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genocidio en ambas comunidades. La violencia paramilitar legitimista se ha
intensificado durante los perfodos de crisis cuando iniciativas Britinicas de
politica han sido percibidas como una amenaza para abandonar a Protestantes
a la naci6n Irlandesa. La violencia republicana, de otra parte, ha sido apuntada
al forzar a una retirada Brit~nica creando Irlanda Unida.
La Violencia ha polarizado ambas comunidades en Irlanda del Norte
desacreditando alternativas moderadas. El PIRA ha rechazado rendir sus armas
a cambio de la participaci6n de Sinn Fein en la asamblea del Norte. Modere
Nacionalistas representados por el SDLP y mod6rese los Unionistas
representados por el OUP ahora temen que tras el decomizo de armas se
encuentren en un callej6n sin salida, que si las concesiones no son pr6ximas por
Republicanos y Legitimistas, entonces los abogados de fuerza ffsica como la
continuidad y el IRA Verdadero asf como los Defensores Rojos De la mano y
los Voluntarios De naranja puedan reclamar para ofrecer la inica soluci6n.7"
El pico de actividad terrorista en Quebec fuJ en los afilos 1960, implicando
grupos como el Frente de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) quien dibuj6 la
inspiraci6n de anti-colonial y campafias por los derechos civiles, el Marxismo
y el PIRA.72 En el temprano de los afios 1960, el FLQ condujo una campafia de
bombardeo contra los sfmbolos de dominaci6n colonial o federal. El FLQ
parece haber tenido aproximadamente a 30 miembros activos, la mayor parte
de quien fueron detenidos en 1963. Sin embargo, varios grupos al parecer no
relacionados se identificaron como c6lulas de FLQ. Bombardeando actividades
intensificadas en 1968-9 y en 1970 el comisionado BritAnico Comercial James
Cross y el Ministro de trabajo de Quebec Pierre Laporte fueron secuestrados.
Estos raptos aparecen haber sido los actos de aproximadamente diez personas,
pero el primer ministro canadiense Pierre Trudeau reaccion\ fuertemente,
revocando la protecci6n de libertades civiles, deteniendo 450 sospechosos,
destruyendo prensa y movilizando 10,000 fuerzas militares y especiales de
policia.73  La opini6n popular, suavemente en el apoyo del FLQ, cay\
dramdticamente cuando Laporte fuJ ejecutado por sus raptores. En Quebec, el
contragolpe gubernamental provocado por los ataques no logr6 producir la
reacci6n deseada por los terroristas: en vez de la crftica del gobiemo federal
71. Byrne, Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern
Ireland, [Sociedad Consocionacional y Civica, Carninos para lograr Paz en Irlanda del Norte], supra nota 21.
72. PIERRE VALLIRES, WHITE NIGGERS OF AMERICA: THE PRECOCIOUS AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A
QUEBEC 'TERRORIST" [NEGROS BLANCOSEN AMERICA: LAAUTOBIOGRAPHIASOBREUNTERRORISTADEQUEBEC]
(Joan Pinkham, trans., 1971).
73. Vea SHEILAGH HODGINS MILNER & HENRY MILNER, THE DECOLONIZATION OF QUEBEC: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEFT-WING NATIONALISM 195-223 (1973) [LA DECOLONISACION DE QUEBEC: UN ANALYSES DE
NACIONALISMO DEL PARTIDO IZQUIERDO]; JEAN-CLAUDE ROBERT, Du CANADA FRANCAISAU QUtBECLIBRE:
HISTOIRE D'UN MOUVEMENT IND&PENDANTISTE [FRENCH CANADA AND FREE QUEBEC: HISTORY OF THE
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT] 283-86 (1975).
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para invocar el Acto de Medidas de Guerra, los ciudadanos culparon a los
agitadores por interrumpir este pacffico y sin igual sistema.74 Los intentos
fracasados para enmendar el Acto de Constituci6n 1982, promulgado a pesar
de la oposici6n del gobiemo de Quebec, combinada con el refer6ndum
derrotado a la soberanfa de Quebec puede reducir el atractivo de politica
institucional para nacionalistas de Quebec. Algunos negocios que se opusieron
a la soberanfa durante el refer6ndum han recibido cartas en papel con membrete
FLQ como amenaza a la venganza de cualesquiera remotas acciones de anti-
soberana.
El Terrorismo permanece como una amenaza en Quebec. Los bombardeos
recientes a caf6s con nombres de Anglophones han sido relacionados con el
nuevo FLQ. Reaccionando no solo en contra de la hendidura lingtifstica-
cultural-politica en Canadd sino tambi6n contra la globalizaci6n se podrfa
afirmar que Quebec una vez mis estar< en un perfodo de lucha contra el
terrorismo. Esta posibilidad serd reducida si la polftica institucional puede
dirige las cuestiones de inter6s de los que podrfan dar vuelta a la violencia.
Una diferencia entre las dos regiones asf parece ser que el Qugbcois tiene
acceso a las instituciones con mayor vista legftima, mientras a muchos
Irlandeses Cat6licos del Norte ven las instituciones polifticas como instrumentos
Protestantes de represi6n. Los Quebecers son capaces de protestar contra
cuestiones especificas sin procurar destruir el sistema entero politico. La
politica institucional puede m<s tarde criar menos opiniones antagonistas del
outgroup, mientras la violencia aumentard el antagonismo mdtuo de los grupos.
La estructura federalista de Canadi permite m<s regulaci6n pacffica del
conflicto.75 La carencia de una estratJgia de Irlanda del Norte previene
hendiduras cortando los cruces, conduciendo asR un callej6n sin salida
institucional y constitucional. Las diferencias politicas en Irlanda del Norte
crean relaciones tensas y percepciones malas entre las comunidades, causando
una sociedad bipolar.
VI. FACTORES ECONOMICOS
Las diferencias econ6micas pueden ser encontradas en las comparaciones
de prdcticamente cualquier grupo. Ellos se hacen importantes en el conflicto
ethnoterritorial al grado que las disparidades pueden ser unidas para la
competencia entre grupos, el favoritismo institucional, los estereotipos y otros
74. DianeFrancisca, Threatning Cards and an FLQ Logo, [AmenazandoA cartasy un Logo FLQ],
el 22 de abril 1996 DE MACLEAN, P. 11.
75. Vea generalmente generally MICHAELBEHEILS, THEMEECHLAKEPRIMER: CONFLICTINGVIEWS
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD (1989) [LA CARTILLA DE LAGO MEECH: LAS OPINIONES DE CONFLICTO
DELACUERDO 1987 CONSTrrUCIONAL (1998)]; MCROBERTS, supra nota; PATRICK J. MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE:
THE INSIDE STORY [EL LAGO MEECH: LA HISTORIA DEL INTERIOR] (1991).
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factores, dividen los grupos. Los lideres de movimientos ethnoterritoriales
pueden explotar disparidades en la distribuci6n de recursos econ6micos desde
movilizar un distrito electoral particular para apoyar sus exigencias. La
conciencia de discriminaci6n de intergrupo agrega preocupaci\n econ6mica a
la clasificaci6n total del Otro.
Los Protestantes de Irlanda del Norte hist6ricamente han tenido el un
acceso mds grande a recursos politicos y econ6micos que los Cat6licos.76 Las
<reas cat6licas tienen el nivel del desempleo mIs alto que las dreas
Protestantes. Las prcticas de reclutaniento, la carencia de desarrollo
industrial, la emigraci6n y la discriminaci6n aumentan el hueco econ6mico
entre Protestantes y Cat6licos, dividen las clases obreras, y refuerzan la
discriminaci6n de intergrupo." Privilegios econ6micos en el alojamiento y el
empleo disfrutado por Protestantes redujeron el saliente de esta clase de
conflicto y en parte puede explicar el apoyo continuado Protestante para
eslabones institucionales con Gran Bretafia.78 Aunque ambos grupos tengan las
distribuciones similares de miembros que se identifican con varias clases
econ6micas, ellos probablemente van a ver diferencias de intergrupo como mds
importante que la disparidad intragrupo.79
76. See John Agnew, Beyond Reason: Spatial and Temporal Sources of Ethnic Conflicts, in
INTRACTABLECONFLICTS ANDTHEIRTRANSFORMATION [Mds alii de raz6n: las fuentes espaciales y temporales
de conflictos &nicos, en conflictos insuperables y su transforrnaci6n] 44-46 (Louis Kriesberg et al., eds.,
1989); MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE [IRLANDA DEL NORTE: EL ESTADO
NARANJA] 2-98 (1980); WALLIS Er AL., supra nota 43 en 1-35; LAM O'DOWD ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND:
BETWEEN CIviL RIGHTS AND CIVIL WARS [IRLANDA DEL NORTE: ENTREDERECHOS CIVILES YGUERRAS CIVILES]
(1980); John Agnew & James G. MacLaughlin, Hegemony and the Regional Question: The Political
Geography of Regional Industrial Policy in Northern Ireland, [ Hegemonfa y la pregunta regional: la
geograffa polftica de polftica regional industrial en Irlanda del Norte] ANNALS OF THE Assoc. OF AMER.
GEOGRAPHERS, Vol. 76 (1986), pp. 247-261.
77. Vea PAUL ARTHUR & KEITH JEFFREY, NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE 1968 [DESDE 1968 IRLANDA
DEL NORTE] (1988); R.J. CORMACK & ROBERT D. OSBORNE, RELIGION, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT:
AsPECTSOFEQUALOPPORTUNITYINNORTHERNIRELAND [EDUCACiON Y EMPLEO: ASPECTOS DEOPORTUNI-DAD
IGUALES EN IRLANDA DEL NORTE] (1983); Bill Rolston, Alienation or Political Awareness? The Battle for the
Hearts and Minds of Northern Nationalists, in BEYONDTHERHETORIC: POLITICS, THEECONOMY, ANDSOCIAL
POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND [ENAJENACIONOENTENDIMIENTO POLITICO? LA BATALLA POR LOS CORAZONES
Y LAS MENTES DE LOS NACIONALISTAS DEL NORTE EN MAS ALLA DE LA RETORICA : POLITICA, LA ECONOMIA, Y
POLICA SOCIAL EN IRLANDA DEL NORTE] 58-91 (Paul Teague ed., 1987).
78. Vea FRANK GAFFIKIN & MARTIN MORRISSEY, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE THATCHER YEARS
[IRLANDA DEL NORTE: LOS TIEMPOS DE THATCHER] (1990); RONNIE MUNcK, IRELAND: NATION, STATE AND
CLASS STRUGGLE [IRLANDA: NACION, ESTADO, Y LUCHA DE CLASSES] (1985); BELINDA PROBERT, BEYOND
ORANGE AND GREEN: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CRISIS [MAS AYA DE EL
ANARANJADO Y VERDE: LA ECONOMIA POLITICA DE EL CRISIS EN IRLANDA DEL NORTE] (1978).
79. SeAn Byme & Michael Ayulo, External Economic Aid in Ethno-Political Conflict: A View
From Northern Ireland, [Ayuda externa para la economia en conflictos ethno-politico: Como visto de Irlanda
del Norte] SECURITY DIALOGUE, Vol. 29 No. 4 (1998), pp. 219-33.
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Quebec hace mucho expuso el modelo econ6mico similar al de Irlanda del
Norte. El protestantismo correlacion\ fuertemente con el capitalismo; Quebec
fuJ dominada econ6micamente por la minoria anglophone, asi como los
Cat6licos Franc6fonos tendieron a evitar empresas capitalistas. En los afios
60's, los estudios de disparidad econ6mica mostraron diferencias enormes del
bienestar econ6mico de las dos comunidades lingUfisticas de Quebec. 0 Esta
desigualdad ayud\ a cambiar el sentimiento nacionalista en Quebec del
aislacionismo ultramontane al cosmopolitanismo secular como tambiJn el
Quibgcois comenz6 a buscar el control politico de recursos provinciales. Los
gobiernos federales y de Quebec iniciaron leyes de lengua para dirigir las
percepciones nuevas de discriminaci6n econ6mica contra Francophones. Sin
embargo, las dos lenguas permanecen asimetricas y esto es generalmente mds
ventajoso para los Francophones para aprender el ingl6s que para Anglophones
para aprender el frances. Los politicos de Quebec defienden sus leyes de
lengua relativamente estrictas sobre la necesidad de neutralizar esta asimetrfa.
Desde la Revoluci6n Tranquila, Quebecers franc6fono ha mejorado
enormemente su estado econ6mico y sus niveles de educaci6n.
Las dos Irlanda del Norte y Quebec han expuesto modelos de nepotismo
que aumentan la solidaridad dentro del grupo. Si este modelo es aceptado por
los grupos, como en Quebec tradicional, esto no seri dafioso al alojamiento de
intergrupo. Sin embargo, si la competencia econ6mica se domina o un cambio
ocurre con tendencias econ6micas, la polarizaci6n y la hostilidad muy bien
pueden aumentar.
VII. FACTORES SiCOCULTURALES
Las relaciones y emociones tensas a menudo se intensificaban durante el
cambio social o cuando se percibfan crisis polfticas entre Protestantes y
Cat6licos en Irlanda del Norte y entre Anglophones y Francophones en Quebec.
Durante la crisis, cada grupo retrata la cultura contraria como un outgroup o el
enernigo para reunir el ingroup contra el genocidio potencial o la subyugaci6n.
Sfmbolos culturales y estereotipos refuerzan la identidad de grupo y la
solidaridad y claramente distinguen el ingroup del outgroup.
La importancia de simbolismo ayuda a explicar la naturaleza de los
conflictos en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec. Los sfmbolos crean el sentido de la
concordancia entre miembros de grupo y les ayudan a clasificar sus creencia
polfticas. Los grupos ethnoterritoriales a menudo promueven el prejuicio y la
creaci6n de los estereotipos invocando tradiciones de grupo para simbolizar
80. Vea, por ejemplo, JOHN PORTER, THE VERTICAL MOSAIC: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CLASS AND
POWER IN CANADA [EL MOSAIC VERTICAL: UN ANALYSIS DE CLASSES SOCIALES Y DE EL PODER EN CANADA]
(1965); Mathieu, Jacques and Jacques, 1991. Jacques Mathieu and Jacques Lacoursire, LES MP-MOIRES
QUtItCOISES [THE MEMOIRS OF THOSE FROM QUEBEC] (1991).
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cuestiones (por ejemplo la nacionalidad, la religi6n, y la identidad 6tnica) que
tiene ser resuelto todavRa.8  El conflicto del Norte Irland6s aparece insuperable
porque cuestiones econ6micas son complicadas por crisis de identidad
religiosas y nacionales encajadas en mentes de la gente de una temprana edad."2
Estas im<genes fisioculturales y polfticas son usadas para clasificar a la gente
de otra comunidad como un outgroup" El papel de Qu6bec en el debate
constitucional de Canadi se centra alrededor del estado de Quebec como una
sociedad distinta o como una de las diez provincias iguales.84 La naturaleza del
debate y la forma de dirijir el conflicto en estas dos regiones crea culturas
polfticas dnicas.
En Irlanda del Norte, los mitos de sitio, la victoria, la matanza y el martirio
permiten a dos tradiciones culturales distintas coexistir inquietamente en un
entorno sectario Los protestantes y Cat6licos usan estos acontecimientos
hist6ricos para promover la solidaridad de grupo, reduciendo asR el potencial
para la cooperaci6n de intergrupo. 86 Los Protestantes Irlandeses del Norte creen
que sus sfmbolos culturales, banderas y vacaciones son de importancia para sus
valores principales, costumbres culturales y estructuras de creencia. Las
marchas de naranja son percibidas como "una expresi6n tradicional de un
derecho legal" para mostrar valores Protestantes y sfmbolos.87 De la misma
manera, Cat6licos del Norte Irlandeses llevan lirios de Pascua para conmemorar
la Rebeli6n de Pascua de 1916. La existencia de estos sfmbolos culturales y
religiosos refuerza la solidaridad ingroup y la hostilidad outgroup.8 s
81. Vea, por ejemplo, KEVIN BOYLE & TOM HADDEN, NORTHERN IRELAND: A POSITIVE PROPOSAL
[IRLANDA DEL NORTE: UN PROPOSITO Posmvo] (1985); E.E. O'Donnell, Northern Irish Stereotypes
Estereotipos del norte irlandeses] (1978).
82. Vea ROSE, supra nota 37 en 60-127.
83. Vea, por ejemplo., John E. Greer, Viewing the Other Side in Northern Ireland: Openness and
Attitudes to Religion among Catholic and Protestant Adolescents, [Mirando al otro lado del Irlanda del
Norte: Actitudes abiertas hacia la religion de los Catolicos y Protestantes Adolesentes]. 24 J. FOR THE
SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION [PARA EL ESTUDIO SIENTIFICO DE RELIGION] 275-92 (1985); ROSEMARY
HARRIS, PREJUDICE AND TOLERANCE IN ULSTER: A STUDY OF NEIGHBOURS AND STRANGERS IN A BORDER
COMMUNITY [Prejuicio y toleransa en Ulster: Un estudio de vesinos y desconosidos en communidades
cercanas] 178 (1972).
84. Vea, por ejemplo, RONALD L. WAITS & DOUGLAS M. BROWN, OPTIONS FOR A NEW CANADA
[OPCIONFS PARA UNA NUEVA CANADA] (1991); CHARLES TAYLOR, RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES: ESSAYS ON
CANADIANFEDERALISM ANDNATIONALISM [RECONCILIANDOLASOLIDARIDAD: ESCRITOS SOBRE FEDERALISMO
Y NACIONALISMO EN CANADA] (1993); MONAHAN, supra nota 75.
85. STEWART, supra nota 51.
86. Vea MARl FTzDUFF, BEYOND VIOLENCE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND [MAS AYA DE LA VIOLENCIA: PROCESSO PARA RESOLVER CONFLICTOS EN IRLANDA DEL NORTE] (1996).
87. WALLIS ET AL., supra nota 43 en 1-20.
88. Byrne y Delman, supra nota 39; NORTHRUP, supra nota 50.
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Un eslab6n fuerte existe entre la violencia Republicana, el catolicismo y
una cultura pan-celta centrada alrededor de la naturaleza redentora de un
sacrificio de sangre. Los Cat6licos del Norte IrlandJs a menudo invocan la
importancia simb6lica "de mdrtires para la causa," o figuras parecidas a un
Cristo, mejor ejemplificadas por las muertes de Bobby Sands durante las
Huelgas de hambre 1981 y Patrick Pearse durante el Rebell6n 1916.89
Rituales Simb6licos tienden mds lejos a intensificar el conflicto por
mantener el crecimiento de estructuras de creencia sectarias. Los extremistas
representan el conflicto como una lucha entre el bien y mal.9° Los moderados,
sin embargo, perciben el conflicto como poliftico y econ6mico, mis bien que
como un t6rmino religioso.9' Como el debate se torn\ de asuntos econ6micos y
politicos a preguntas de identidad ethnoreligiosas la polarizaci6n se quita de la
mitad del terreno.92
Lipset reclama que Canadd es un pais de naciones derrotadas, y por lo
tanto su simbolismo a menudo refuerza las nociones del desaffo de
supervivencia para sociedades distintas en un clima inhospitalario, afrontado
con la amenaza omnipresente de asimilaci6n.93 Quebec tambi6n tiene algunos
h6roes que ejemplifican las dificultades de supervivencia franc6fona. Louis
Riel, un lider M6tis en el oeste, ejemplific6 las dificultades afrontadas por
Francophones fuera de Quebec. Riel fuJ ahorcado como un traidor por
conducir una rebeli6n contra la revocaci6n de protecci6n para M6tis
Franc6fono en Manitoba. Los nacionalistas usan su historia para ejemplificar
como hostil el resto de Canadd es a la igualdad franc6fona. Los politicos de
Quebec usan el simbolismo con eficacia, acentuando la tierra, la lengua, la fe
y familias. El banquete de San Juan el Bautista es sostenido como la fiesta
nacional de Qu6bec. Para intensificar el sentido de nacionalismo Quibdcois,
los activistas han usado lemas como "Maitres el chez-nous" (Maestros en su
propia casa) para representar un deseo de autodeterminaci6n y de
responsabilidad econ6mica. Con la atenci6n aumentada franc6fona al
simbolismo nacional, los Anglophones respondier6n con sfmbolos canadienses:
89. Vea, Conor Cruise O'Brien, Ireland: The Mirage of Peace, [Irlanda la imagen de paz] 33 THE
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 23-33 (Apr. 1986); JOHN M. FEEHAN, BOBBY SANDS AND THE TRAGEDY OF NORTHERN
IRELAND [JOHN M. FEEHAN, BOBBY SANDS Y LA TRAJEDIA DE IRLANDA DEL NORTE] (1986).
90. Vea, Jennifer Todd, Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture, [Dos tradiciones en Cultura
Politica Unionista] 2 ESTUDIOS POLITICOS DE IRLANDA 1-26 (1987). Vea tambien, WHYTE, supra nota 33.
91. Vea, Cathal McCall, Postmodern Europe and the Resources of Communal Identities in
Northern Ireland, [Premodema Europa y las identidades de recursos communal en Irlanda del Norte] 33
EuRo. J. OF POLIT. RESEARCH 389 (1998).
92. AGNEW, supra nota 76 en 41-53.
93. Vea generalmente, Seymor Martin ipset, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES AND
INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA [DIVISION CONTINENTAL: LOS VALORES Y INSTITUCIONES
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y CANADA] (1990).
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la Hoja de Arce ha sido la insignia de Canadi s6lo desde 1965: "o la que
Canadi, substituy6 el Dios Salva a la Reina" en 1967.
Durante el refer6ndum de 1995 a la soberanfa, los dos dieron el sf y ningdn
lado intent\ usar simbolos para representar sus lealtades. Mientras los
nacionalistas tendieron a dar prioridad a los simbolos de Qu~bicois, ellos
decidieron usar el d6lar canadiense como monJda en su simbolismo para
representar la continuada cooperaci6n econ6mica entre Quebec independiente
y el resto de Canadi. Los federalistas con frecuencia combinaban al
Canadiense y los sfmbolos Qubgcois en una tentativa de ilustrar la
coexistencia y complimentar la lealtad de ambas entidades.
El Simbolismo intensifica la violencia en Irlanda del Norte, donde la gente
puede ser aterrorizada por pertenecer a un grupo u otro; pero esto no ha
conducido al conflicto violento en Quebec. El conflicto del Norte Irland6s es
marcado por una intensa hostilidad e imaginacin que rechaza la cooperaci6n
con cualquier otra comunidad. En Canadi, sin embargo, el mito "de dos
carreras de fundaci6n" la forja de falsificaci6n de un compacto social indica la
conveniencia de alojamiento intercomunal a pesar de las diferencias
fundamentales.
Vi1. CONCLUSION
En general, Irlanda del Norte experimenta mis problemas con el
terrorismo y el conflicto de identidades nacionales que Quebec debido a la
inseguridad de cada grupo 6tnico sobre la pregunta nacional. La carencia de
control de la polftica, la sospecha mdtua hacia la traici6n, las historias de
violencia de intercomunidad y el simbolismo que promueve una mentalidad de
sitio todos reducen el potencial para Irlanda del Norte para crear el sentido de
la identidad compartida. Al contrario las ventajas de Quebec sobre la existencia
del federalismo, reduce ambos grupos al estado de minoria y tambi6n promueve
algdn reconocimiento mutuo basado en el mito de la creaci6n de Canadd por un
pacto entre dos "carreras que fundan." Sin embargo, el fracaso repetido en la
negociaci6n de asuntos constitucionales reduce la buena voluntad de ambos
lados del debate. A pesar del potencial para el alojamiento presentado por los
aspectos positivos de minorfas dobles, los problemas todavfa amenazan el
equilibrio.
Hemos identificado unos factores significativos interrelacionados que son
la parte de un anilisis multi-causal de conflicto en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec.
Estas seis facetas o las fuerzas sociales del cubo deben ser examinadas juntos
si debemos entender como los conflictos ethnoterritoriales pueden ser
mejorados o exacerbados. Los seis factores producen diferentes modelos, con
algunos factores que refuerzan el conflicto potencial y otros que mitigan las
diferencias. Lamentablemente, el cubo social no puede capturar la naturaleza
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dindmica de las polfticas y por lo tanto puede parecer dar demasiado poco peso
ha acontecimientos recientes en ambas regiones. Sin embargo, nuestro anilisis
indica las dificultades que deben ser vencidas si un establecimiento durable
Ilegase a ser alcanzado en Irlanda del Norte asf como los que enfrentan el
intento de los Quebecers para definir la naturaleza polftica de su provincia. La
naturaleza que se entrelaza del cubo tambi6n indica que dirijirse s6lo en una
dimensi6n es improbablemente proporcional para proveer un establecimiento,
pero tambi6n que las mejoras de un Area sola pueden mejorar otros tambi6n.
Lo que estd de pie en nuestro anlisis es la manera que el material y las
dimensiones sicol6gicas actdian recfprocamente para mantener o mitigar el
conflicto de intergrupo. Actitudes sectarias f'rmemente enraizadas resultan de
las instituciones polfticas y econ6micas, los estereotipos culturales que
refuerzan el fanatismo, la sospecha y la polarizaci6n. Un acercaniento del
cubismo social holfstico al conflicto de intergrupo debe ser considerado para
como mecanismos estructurales y fisicoculturales que actian recfprocamente
para exacerbar o, de verdad, mejorar conflictos ethnoterritoriales. La
investigaci6n futura deberfa dirigir la interrelaci6n de mecanismos materiales
y sicol6gicos que formen las polfticas ethnoterritoriales.
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C. Figura 3: Six Social Forces of the Complex Cube
CONFLICT FACTOR IRLANDA DEL NORTE QUBEC
FACTORES Ambos grupos apoyan el nepotismo. Anglophones tradicionalmente
ECONOMICOS La clase obrera se dividi6 a lo largo de dominaron la econonla. La
lineas 6tnicas. Las diferencias de clase modemizaci6n desde los afios
existen dentro de grupos, pero son 1960 aument6 la estaca
percibidos como menos importante que (ndmero) Franc6fona en el
diferencias de inter-grupo. negocio.
FACTORES Ambos grupos tienden a formar La religi6n era la base para
RELIGIOSOS enclaves. Legitimistas protestantes sistemas separados educativos.
siguen la doctrina de lealtad La iglesia cat6lica era la
condicional. instituci6n doninante social,
pero la religiosidad ha
disminuido desde los afilos 1960.
FACTORES El terrorismo usado para dirigir la La estructura federal permite el
POLITICOS partici6n e inculca el miedo dentro de y medio de grupos de
entre comunidades para mantener la representaci6n eficaz, legftima.
sociedad bipolar. La partici6n es El nacionalismo se concentra en
central a la identidad nacional. Mando papel de Quebec como el
directo del REINO UNIDO institufdo defensor de la cultura
en 1972 debido a carencia de franc6fona.
representaci6n Cat6lica.
FACTORES Las tradiciones, valores, vacaciones Francophones lengua
PSYCHO- y sinbolos refuerzan la identidad tradicionalmente usada, tierra,
CULTURAL gtnica y religiosa; el conflicto es raza(carrera), y religi6n para
acentuado en marchas simb6licas. promover su identidad. En los
Escuelas ga~licas han estado activas afios 1960, Francophones
en Areas de clase obrera Cat6licas simbolismo cada vez mis usado
nacionalistas, asi reforzando la nacionalista. El Ingls-
identidad ktnica y el miedo. Candians respondi6 con el
Acontecimientos culturales desarrollo de simbolismo
mantienen comunal divide, asi canadiense. Alguna mezcla de
dificultando la identidad sfmbolos canadienses y de
compartida. Quebec por los federalistas.
FACTORES El martirio y batallas son usados Ven el conflicto francds-inglis
HISTORICOS para reforzar el intergrupo esthn en como constitutivo de Canada.
desacuerdo y promueven enclaving. Qudb6cois a menudo se refieren
Las nuevas promulgaciones de "a la Conquista" y se refieren a
acontecimientos hist6ricos acentfian Anglophones como "el inglds".
el saiente de territorio y la cohesi6n Canadienses ingleses tienden a
_tnica. usar categorias regionales.
FACTORES El miedo de genocidio ayuda Anglophones son la parte del
DEMOGRAFICOS acentfian la identidad contexto mAs amplio
ethnoterritorial. "Minorias Dobles" canadiense. Francophones han
afectan percepciones cada grupo desarrollado una mentalidad de
sostiene del otro. Las posiciones son sitio para sostener una identidad
defendidas y un pequefio medio del regional y lingtifstica. Los
terreno no esti en una posici6n para cambios de fndices de natalidad
articular y acomodar intereses. y la inmigraci6n afectan la
I polftica Qudbec's cultural.
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D. Figura 4: Interaccidn de las Seis Fuerzas
CONFLCT IRLAND DEL NORTE QUtBEC
FACTORES Usado para apoyar las Principahnente usado para
ECON6MICOS redamaones de comparar Quebec y otras
discrimlnaci6n basada en provincias. De vez en cuando eran
religi6n. Potenclalmente Usado para comparar grupos
podria mitigar la hendidura lingilifsticos, sobre todo durante la
itnlca con desacuerdos de Revoluci6n Tranquila.
clase internos
FACTORES Usado como una etiqueta de Ha perdido algan saliente con la
RELIGIOSOS categorfa primaria, modernizaci6n, pero ha ayudado a
substituyendo identidad tnlica formar una tradici6n de aceptaci6n
y lengua. Disminuye el de jerarqufa y el compromiso entre
potencial para el compromiso, dos grupos principales lingifsticos,
como prestan simbolos y el modelo divergente econ6mico.
morales a partidos contrarios. Su saliente es ahora menos que la
de identidad 6tnica y engua.
FACTORES El terrorsmo refuerza la El terronsmo era una cu7sti6n
POLITICOS hendidura religlosa, reduce el menor, pero la matanza deliberada
sallente de factores durante finales polfticos consider6
econ6micos, y contribuye al inaceptable. Instituciones
apoyo hist6rico para el corrientes politicas, por su
conflicto continuado. La complejidad, reducen el saliente de
reducci6n de violenda puede hendiduras. Instituciones polfiticas
mitigar el conflicto. Estado tienen un efecto surtido(mixto)
constituclonal inaceptable a la sobre historias, como los
mayor parte cludadanos. nacionalistas y el federalista con
criterio selectivo pueden escoger
ejemplos.
FACTUROES SlI0- Generalmente estos factores Estos factores tienen un efecto
CULTURALES refuerzan un conflicto bipolar surtido(mixto) en Quebec. Unos
por acentuando la amenaza de promueven la lealtad de traslapo
destrucci6n mutua. Puede con Quebec y Canada, mientras
camblar con el alto el fuego y otros indican que la lealtad es
la conflanza que construye mutuamente exclusiva. Simbolos
medidas. ingleses canadienses son en gran
pane una reacci6n al nacionalismo
Franc6fono, y eran lentos para
distanciarse de simbolos
Britnicos.
FACTORES Historlas usadas para Historias surtidas(mixtas) entre
HISTORICOS promover una vista(opini6n) conflicto y compromiso. Tanbidn
de bleommunal de la regl6n pueden ver las figuras de
por el recontar de conflicto cooperaci6n como las figuras de
pasado co-optaci6n.
FACTORES E! hueco de poblad6n de La disminuci6n en indices de
DEMOGRAFICOS estrechamlento aumenta el natalidad Qu6bcois aumenta
Protestante teme de franc6fono teme de asimilaci6n y
asimilacl6n. Los aumentos de la demanda del control aumentado
proximidad tienen que de politica cultural. El predominio
mantener fronteras. franc6fono en Ia provincia mitiga
el nivel de hostilidad.
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E. Figure 5: Early Warning-Contingency "Social Cube" Escalators!
De-escalators
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1005
F. Resources for Further Reading
Bowyer-campana, J. 1974. El Ej6rcito Secreto: una Historia del IRA;
Cambridge, MAMA: MIT Prensa.
Boyle, Kevin, Tom Hadden y Patrick Hillyard, 1980. Diez Afios en
Irlanda del Norte: el Control Legal de Violencia Polftica. Londres: Pinguiino.
Buckland, Patrick, 1981. Una Historia de Irlanda del Norte. Dublin:
Papada y Macmillan.
Byrne, Se n, 1995. "Regulaci6n de Conflicto o Resoluci6n de Conflicto:
Intervenci6n de Tercero en Irlanda del Norte Perspectivas conflicto para Paz."
Terrorismo y Violencia Polftica, vol. 7 No 2, pp. 1-25.
Hume, Juan, 1996. Irlanda Nueva: Politica, Paz y Reconciliaci6n. Roca,
COMPAMiA: Roberts Rinehart.
O'Leary, Brendan, 1989. 'Consociationalism Coactivo en Irlanda del
Norte', Estudios Politicos 37 (4 y : 562-88).
O'Leary, Brendan y Juan McGarry, 1993. La Polftica de Antagonismo:
Entendimiento de Irlanda del Norte. Tierras altas Atld.nticas NJ: Athlone
Prensa.
O'Leary, Cornelius, Sydney Elliot y Almiar Wilford, 1988. Irlanda del
Norte Asamblea, 1982-86: un Experimento Constitucional. Londres:
Bosquete.
Cazador, Juan, 1988. Cazador. Londres: Harrap.
1036
CUBISMO INDUCTIVO SOCIAL INTEGRADO
Lana Russ-Trent*
1. INTRODUCCION ...................................... 1038
II. Los OR[GENES DE CUBISMO INDUCTIVO SOCIAL
INTEGRADO: CUBISMO SOCIAL POR BYRNE Y CARTER (1996) 1039
I. CUBISMO INDUCTIVO SOCIAL INTEGRADO ............... 1039
A. Cubismo Inductivo Social Integrado (Russ-Trent 2000) 1041
B. Las Influencias del Post-modernismo ............... 1043
IV. CUBO NUMERO I: EL CARACTER DISTINTIVO
DE ETAPA DELANTERO-EL CUBISMO SOCIAL DE BYRNE
Y CARTER (1996) .................................. 1044
V. CUBO NUMERO II: EL CARACTER DISTINTIVO
DE ETAPA TRASERO--CUBISMO INTEGRANTE-INDUCTIVO
SOCIAL .......................................... 1044
A. Proceso de Grupo .............................. 1045
B. El Proceso de Grupo Psychodynamic: Creando
Tiendas ttnicas o de Identidad ................... 1046
C. Comparando Unos a Otros ...................... 1049
D. Ritualizando el Trauma ......................... 1052
E. Ejemplo de Caso: Dindmicasfuera del Grupo y
dentro del Grupo, Alemania nazi, y el Tratado de
Versailles-dramaturgia, Interactionismo Simb6lico,
e Identidad Social .............................. 1056
V. CUBO NUMERO I: EL CARACTER DISTINTIVO DEL ACTOR-
CUBISMO INTEGRANTE-INDUCTIVO SOCIAL .............. 1057
A. Desarrollo de Nifiez Tierno de la Agencia Humana ... 1059
B. Estudio del Caso: Henreich Himmler,
Reichsfuherer, SS.: Influencias Tiernas de Nifiez:
La Agencia Humana Se desarrolla ................ 1060
C. Estudio del caso: Gerry Adams, Lider de Sinn Fein ... 1063
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................... 1065
VII. APENDfCES . ....................................... 1068
A. Figura (numero) 1: el Cubo Social (Byrne & Carter
1996) ....................................... 1068
* M.S. Ph.D. Candidate at Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Rubik's
Cube@ is a registered trademark of Seven Towns, Ltd.
** Este articulo fue traducido por S. Nicole Bates.
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1037
B. Figura (numero) 2: Cubismo Integrante Inductivo
Social (Russ-Trent 2000) ........................ 1069
C. Cubismo Integrante Inductivo Social de un Vistazo .... 1070
D. Recursos para Remota Lectura ................... 1071
I. INTRODUCCION
Sean guerras entre naciones o discusiones dentro de familias, el conflicto
es causado por muchos factores y fuerzas, e interno o externo, micro o macro.
Ademds, las tensiones de agencia/estructura son end6micas a cualquier andlisis
de conflicto en relaci6n con las decisiones de actuar, ajustar, o crfticamente
negociar contextos a menudo ambiguos y/o contextos relacionales que implican
contradicci6n, grandes y pequefios.2 Los factores hablados en Byrne's y Carter's
el Modelo de Cubismo Social sostienen una Have de una discusi6n mds honda
de la toma de decisiones y los estados dind.iicos en los que las 6 facetas de su
cubo rubics acttian recfprocamente con el uno al otro.3 Esta discusi6n sugiere
un andlisis hasta mis hondo, inductivo e integrante de conflicto que usa dos
llaves adicionales o cubos rubics.
Verdaderamente, mientras el Cubismo Social utiliza un cubo rubics con 6
facetas,4 el Cubismo Inductivo Social Integrado sugiere tres cubos con 18
facetas: un cubo, dentro de un cubo, dentro de otro cubo. El Cubismo Inductivo
Social Integrado sugiere que el discurso extenso y intrincado de
agencia/estructura es un baile emergente, infinito, y dindrmico entre los cubos
y sus facetas, contrario al dilema oposicionista silogistico de Cartesiano,
Manichean y el. El Cubismo Inductivo Social Integrado amplia ambos los
anilisis de conflicto y su dinamismo segiin el contexto conducido. Asf el
andlisis de conflicto es dialicticamente analizado del exterior Asia dentro y
luego al rev6s, mientras que las facetas se relacionan con el uno al otro y son re-
sintetizados. El modelo del Cubismo Inductivo Social Integrado por lo tanto,
propone dial6ctico, el posmodemista, la feminista, el andlisis heurfstico,
2. Vea generalmente W.JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY [PRINCIPIOS DE PSICOLOGIA]
(1890); G.H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST [LA MENTE,
SER, Y SOCIEDAD DESDE EL PUNTO DE VISTA DE UNO QUE ESTUDIA COMPORTAMIENTO]( 1934); GEORG SIMMEL,
CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS [CONFLICTO Y EL TFJIDO DE LAS AFILIACIONES DE
GRUPO](WoIff, trans. 1955).
3. Vea Sean Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics
in Northern Ireland and Quebec,[Cubismo Social: Seisfuerzas Sociales de las pollticas Etnoterritoriales de
Irlanda del None y Qudbec] J. OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUD. Vol. 3 No. 2, pp 52-7 1, December 1996.
4. Id.
1038
fenomenol6gico, y elicitivo te6rico - un mis integrante que oposicionista.5 Tal
andlisis requiere, pensamiento crftico integrante e inductivo.
II. Los ORiGENES DE CUBISMO INDUCTIVO SOCIAL INTEGRADO: CUBISMO
SOCIAL POR BYRNE Y CARTER (1996)
Byrne y Carter sugieren analizar conflictos ethnoterritorial y comunales
utilizando un cubo rubics para expresar la interrelacionalidad compleja de los
seis factores end6micos, sefialadamente, los datos demogrdficos, la economfa,
la religi6n, la polftica, la psycho-cultura, y la historia (Vea la Figura (nimero)
1).6 Sugiero que cada una de estas facetas esta relacionada directamente con
estructura, en efecto, cuestiones macro-sociales y contextos. Byrne y Carter
tambi6n postulan que su clasificaci6n de seis factores obscurece la diversidad
interna y sugieren que investigaci6n futura y mds profunda es necesario para
totalmente explicar las complejidades del conflicto en su debido contexto.7 El
Cubismo Inductivo Social Integrado procura seguir donde Byrne y Carter han
acabado.8 (Vea la Figura (nimero) 2).
I. CUBISMO INDUCTIVO SOCIAL INTEGRADO
El Cubismo Inductivo Social Integrado usa el mismo sistema general de
andlisis de Byrne y Carter.9 Sin embargo, esto sugiere inductivamente investigar
mds profundamente los sistemas, integrdndose por el camino, y re-
sintetizdndose usando un cubo, dentro de un cubo, dentro de otro cubo. Este
triple nivel de andlisis dialdctico emergente se relaciona con relaciones
5. Vea generalmente H. Blumer, Society as Symbolic Interaction, in SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
[SOCIEDAD COMO UNA INTERACCION SIMBOLICA] (H. Blumer, ed., 1969) (1962); P. FRIERE,
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED.[LA PEDAGOGfA DE LOS OPRIMINDOS] (1970); H.G. GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD [LA VERDAD Y EL METODO] (1975); H.G. GADAMER, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC; FIVE
HERMENEUTIC STUDIES [EL DIALECTO DE HEGEL; CINCO ESTUDIOS HERMENEUTICOS] (1976); J.
GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION [PAZ POR
MANERAS PACIFISTAS: PAZ Y CONFLICTO, DESARROLLO Y LA CIVILIZACION] (1996); E.
Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. [IDEAS: INTRODUCCI6N GENERAL A LA
FENOMENOLOGIA PURA] (D. Carr, trans., 1931); J.P. LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES [PREPARANDO PARA LA PAZ: TRANSFORMACION DE
CONFLICTO SOBRE CULTURA] (1995) [COMO SE VERA MAS ADELANTE PREPARING FOR PEACE]; J.P.
LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE; SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1997) [COMO SE VERA
MAS ADELANTE BUILDING PEACE]; G. RITZER, MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (4TH ED. 1996); A. SCHUTZ,
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (1932).
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poderosas complejas y discontinuidades profundas en fen6menos °
existenciales, ambos, latente y manifestdndose dentro y cruzindose, las toma de
decisiones negociaciones entre las facetas de los tres cubos. Por lo tanto, la
subjetividad es mas como una ventaj a que una deuda - la vista es decididamente
implicada y sin objetividad. Imagine los tres cubos como el escenario delantero,
entre bastidores, y el actor, respectivamente, el tema principal teatral del
Interaccfonista Simb6lico de Goffman "andlisis dramaturgical". " Las escenas,
los ajustes, actores y la audiencia estdn en un estado continuo de flujo,
desdobldndose y adaptdndose con cada interacci6n. 12 Ellos son uno, ain ellos
actian en desuni6n.
El an6lisis Social Cubista de un cubo plantea un rompecabezas de 6-
facetas. El andilisis del Cubismo Inductivo Social Integrado de los tres cubos
(vea la Figura (nimero) 2) propone que nosotros exploremos las relaciones
innatas e internamente tensas que se manifiestan en formas diferentes, durante
orientaciones de tiempo diferentes, contextos, y estados de asuntos triadas y
contextos nacientes. Analizamos el conflicto del nivel macro estructural social,
que penetra en el nivel micro donde la agencia humana y el potencial de
decisiones son desarrollados, comenzado de nuevo y re-sintetizando por el
camino. El conflicto no es dinicamente conducido por el actor, conducida por la
estructura, o conducido por el contexto. Es la suma total de un grupo de
interacciones en movimiento infinito y reajuste continuo que es complejo y
frecuentemente estrat6gico"3. Ademdis, la dindmica de poder relacionado 4 es
continuamente mediada y negociada por reglas y caracteres"5 socialmente
construidos, de los distritos electorales mis grandes a las experiencias
10. Vea generalmente Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistomology
(1998).
1I. E. GOFFMAN, PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) [como se vera mas adelante
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE]; E. GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974).
12. Vea tambiin B. Hooks, Let's Get It On, in PERFORMANCES PRACTICES AS A SITE OF OPPOSITION
210-221 (Catherine Ugwu, ed., 1995); J. DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX (1999) (discussing "performative
interpretation").
13. Lana Russ-Trent, Women Going Against the Grain: Female Political Militarism in Northern
Ireland: the Phenonmenon of Female Resistance: A Phenomenological Exploration of Women's "Strategic
Living;" Disertaci6n manuscrita (no publicado). Department of Humanities and Social Science, Nova
Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida (2001). Vea tambitn PRESENTATION OFSELF IN EVERYDAY
LIVE, supra nota 10; JAMES, supra nora 1; MEAD, supra nota I; SIMMEL, supra nota I.
14. Vea M. FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE OF LANGUAGE
(1969) [COMO SE VERA MAS ADELANTE THE ARCHELOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE]; M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF
THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF HUMAN SCIENCES (197 1) [como se vera mas adelante THE ORDER OF THINGS].
15. Vea generalmente J. LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER (1994) [como se vera mas adelante
PARADOXES OF GENDER]; THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER (Lorber & Farrell, eds., 1991).
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individuales existenciales mds pequefias,"6 los orfgenes y "asociados"."7 Las
relaciones de poder asf son encajadas, sumergidos, realmente dobladas en cada
conflicto y su andlisis de modo diversos. 
8
A. Cubismo Inductivo Social Integrado (Russ-Trent 2000)
Como se ha discutido, comenzamos con la premisa de las seis facetas o
fuerzas relacionadas de Byrne y Carter del Cubo exterior mis grande, que
constituye el escenario delantero.' 9 La historia, la religi6n, datos demogrd.ficos,
instituciones polfticas y el comportamiento institucional, la economfa, y factores
psfco-culturales son interpretadas como estructura y macro en cardcter. Sin
embargo, empotrado en el interior del Cubo (numero) I, reside el Cubo
(numero) II, el escenario oculto, las facetas (colectivas) basadas por grupo. La
categorfa "basada en grupo" deduce que nos ocupamos simultfneamente de la
agencia de individuos en relaci6n con las estructuras en las que ellos actian y
visa versa, sugiriendo la reciprocidad, el cambio, y la identidad "colectiva"
contextual social (micro y macro). Las facetas del Cubo (numero) II son: grupos
de identidad, la seguridad colectiva y la supervivencia del grupo, la tradici6n de
grupo, la historia existencial y las experiencias, relaciones de fuerzas ajuntadas
(intra/inter), psfco-"asociaciones",2° y el inter6s propio del grupo y el statu quo
de mantenimiento de poder. Finalmente, empotrado profundamente dentro del
Cubo (numero) I, (residiendo en el Cubo (numero) I), existe el Cubo 111, el
actor, cuyas acciones son implicadas mas fntimamente en la capacidad de crear
decisiones individuales, cognoscitiva y el desarrollo de crear decisiones, la auto-
eficacia y la autodeterminaci6n (el individuo intencionadamente
fenomenol6gico de hechos significado). El cubo (numero) II por lo tanto, se
relaciona mis directamente con la agencia del individuo y explora las facetas de
auto-identidad, la identidad de la composici6n de grupo individual entre
grupo/fuera de grupo, la sicologfa y el comportamiento, la sicologfa individual
de la identificaci6n individual social,2' el desarrollo historial existencial
16. The "things in themselves." Vea HUSSERL, supra nota 4; E. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON,
(Smith, trans.) (1781)(1929) (Macmillan).
17. Simmel, supra nota 1. Vea tambidn H. Arendt, The Human Condition (1958); H. Arendt, On
Revolution (1963); J. Derrida, The Ends of Man: Phenomenological Reasearch (1969)
18. Vea M. FOUCAULT, POWER AND KNOWLEDGE (1980).
19. Vea Byrne & Carter, supra nota 2.
20. Vea SIMMEL, supra nota 1; GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL (1950) [como
se vera mas adelante THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMEL].
21. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS: EUROPEAN STUDIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, eds. 1986); Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and Intergroup
Behavior, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. I. (197 1) [hereinafter Social Categorization and
Intergroup Behavior]; HENRI TAJFEL, DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL
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individual 22 - experiencias "posefdas" - y el inter6s propio contextual y
pragmitico2 3, todo micro en el carcter.
Es importante notar que estos tres cubos integrados, esta relaci6n
emergente pluralista y trfada, actian en relaci6n con el uno al otro,
simult6.neamente, y en grados variantes. Provienen del nivel macro al nivel
micro y, a menudo, para atrds de nuevo, re sintetizando y ajustando, afectando
cada uno en una tensi6n din mica de manera inmutable, creando el inter-cubo,
el intra-cubo, e inter faceta construcci6n social que debe ser negociado y\o
mediado - "la dinfmica compartida entrelazada. ' 24
Siguiendo la metdfora teatral de Goffman, 2 los actores en conjunto hacen
ajustes estrat6gicos durante el funcionamiento, a menudo dependiendo de la
26reacci6n de la audiencia, e individualmente y en conjunto desarrolla
"asociaciones" Simmelian necesarios para negociar dentro de un ambiente
contextual conflictivo. 27 Como Byrne y Carter sugieren, la interacci6n entre
estos factores existe. 2' Debemos por lo tanto, visualizar el Cubismo Integrante
Inductivo Social tres cubos rubics constantemente en el movimiento, que inter
juega con el uno al otro, las facetas que giran como los cubos relacionan
negociando con, y transformando el uno al otro con cada contexto nuevo.
Como el movimiento es constante y la interacci6n existe entre las 18
facetas de los tres cubos, y los cubos denotan: 1. estructura, 2. agencia /
estructura, y 3. agencia, en si no hay bifurcaci6n entre las fuerzas oposicionistas,
ningdn Manichean-nosotros contra ellos-dicot6mico o influencias dualistas
Cartesianos.29 Mds bien esto es "un baile negociado", mientras que los factores
se reflejan en cada contexto nuevo en un proceso de fragmentaci6n, decentando
y el poder de subjetividad colectiva y deconstructiva, incluyendo 6ticas
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS (1978) [hereinafter DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS].
22. Vea generalmente Blumer, supra nota 4; HUSSERL, supra nota 4; E. HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF
EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (1970) [como se vera mas adelante THE
CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY]; SMITH & SMITH, THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO HUSSERL (1996).
23. JAMES, supra nota 1; PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra nota 10; E. GOFFMAN,
BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES (1963) [como se vera mas adelante BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES]; MEAD, supra
nota 1; RITZER, supra nota 4, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL, supra nota 19; SIMMEL, supra nota 1.
24. See generally HAACK, supra nota 9.
25. Vea generalmente PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra nota 10.
26. JAMES, supra nota 1; MEAD, supra nota 1;
27. Vea SIMMEL, supra nota 1.
28. Vea BYRNE & CARTER, supra noa 2.
29. Vea R. Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for
Truth in the Sciences, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES (George Heffernan); HUSSERL, supra
nota 4.
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individuales y culturales, y premisas de heterogeneidad". Se propone no ser
iterativo. Ya que relaciones de muchas caras y contextuales no existen entre las
facetas, un acercamiento sin oposici6n, mis bien que una estructura bifurcada
vs. de acercamiento de agencia permanece estante, pero nunca estitico. Esto es
el objetivo de utilizar un sfmbolo infinito ondulante (vea la Figura (nimero) 2)
en el que colocamos la agencia y la estructura como el significador de las
posibilidades infinitas y los variables que ocurren en cualquier contexto de
conflicto. Colocamos la agencia y la estructura en el sitio de infinidad,
deduciendo una circularidad interminable expansiva, retractable, intrincada, e
integrante en vez de una linealidad oposicionista. El sfmbolo de infinito estA en
movimiento constante como su tamafio y potencial, ondulado y deformado con
cada contexto nuevo es revelado, mitigado, negociado, mediado o exacerbado.
La agencia y la estructura estdn raras veces en el mismo grado de tensi6n (la
negociaci6n) o la fuerza (poder). Esto es un empuje de Cubismo Integrante




B. Las Influencias del Post-modernismo
La teorfa postmoderna social ofrece un acercamiento mds integrante,
hermen6utico, y heurfstico al entendimiento de relaciones sociales, por lo tanto
el conflicto social. Dentro de la persuasi6n te6rica, estA la Interacci6n Integrante
Simb6lica, un critico acercamiento feminista, global y emparentado, mis bien
que oposicionista, ocupando en construcciones de comportamiento de conflicto
negociado y relaciones poderosas con varias modales y caras. 3 La
extrapolaci6n de Mead34, Blumer 35, y Ritzer 6 ha desarrollado las teorfas de
conflicto integrantes que exploran las complejidades de relaciones sociales en
mds sfntesis existencialmente "vividas" "y poseidas" y sitios. MdS bien que
doctrinare, ellos son consiguientes37, uniendo el conocimiento que ha sido
devaluado y a menudo silenciado. Ellos enfocan en relaciones "de poder" y la
agencia humana". Las "ejecuciones practican como [sitios] de oposici6n" son
30. Vea generalmente Haack supra nota 9.
31. See HUSSERL, supra nota 4.
32. See GALTUNG, supra nota 4, en 23. DERRIDA, supra nota 16; THE ORDER OFTHINGS, supra nota
13; THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE, supra nota 13; FOUCAULT, supra nota 17; THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG
SIMMEL, supra nota 19; SIMMEL, supra nota 1.
33. Vea Foucault, supra nota 17; RrrzER, supra nota 4.
34. MEAD, supra nota 1;
35. BLUMER, supra nota 4.
36. RITZER, supra nota 4.
37. Vea EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998).
38. Vea generalmente FOUCAULT, supra nota 17; SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1952);
BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM THE MARGIN TO THE CENTER (1984) (DE AHORA EN ADELANTE
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un ejemplo39. Las influencias incluyen todo los que hist6ricamente han sido
marginados, sus voces(votos), su habitus40, sus experiencias existenciales y
motivaciones, devaluados hist6ricamente dentro del andlisis de conflicto linear.
Sin embargo, hoy decidimos beneficiarnos de aquellas voces(votos) marginadas
para explorar heuristicamente los factores fenomenol6gicos que son inspirantes
mds bien que los escenarios lineares estructurales dichotomizado simplista
nosotros contra ellos 4t . Por lo tanto, las vueltas de retrocomunicaci6n estdn
permanentemente re sintetizando el andlisis contextual como los I-ISC's cubos
ondulan como el ritmo arm6nico o errdtico de un coraz6n y el esperado o
inesperado golpeado de cuarteto de jazz.
IV. CUBO NUMERO I: EL CARACTER DISTINTIVO DE ETAPA DELANTERO-EL
CUBISMO SOCIAL DE BYRNE Y CARTER (1996)
Tan hablado, este modelo de seis facetas surge como un macro uno
estructural, principalmente ocupdndose de la etapa delantera de cardcter
distintivo humano en forma de instituciones / estructuras, ambos grande y
pequefio, incluyendo naciones y estados naciones en los que entidades
poderosas y el poder crudo se han ocupado en el contexto. Esto incluye (1)
polftica, instituciones polfticas, grupos de inter6s, presionando y cuerpos
legislativos; (2) religi6n, incluyendo ideologfa y su social, a menudo autoritario,
e instituciones patriarcales; (3) historia, incluyendo institucional (nacional -
burocritico) construcciones basadas por trasatlintico; (4) psycho-cultura,
incluyendo las relaciones tensas y presiones para mantener estado de identidad
(poder) en la estructura - conocimiento colectivo nacionalista (identidad), y
asistente reglas prescribidas (leyes); (5) datos demogrdficos (cohortes
cuantificables, tendencias, presiones sociales), y finalmente; (6) economfa
(categorfa global: El poder instrumental, pone en venta e indicadores, sistemas
de asistencia social, la infraestructura (s) financiera).
V. CUBO NUMERO II: EL CARACTER DISTINTIVO DE ETAPA
TRASERO-CUBISMO INTEGRANTE-INDUCTIVO SOCIAL
El cubo II explora el comportamiento de grupo (de agencia / estructura)
que incluye la identidad social de grupo positivo y negativo (comportamiento
entre grupo y fuera de grupo)42, el comportaniento de familia extemo e interno,
FEMINIST THEORY), supra nota 11.
39. FEMINIST THEORY, supra nota 37; Hooks supra nota 11.
40. PIERRE BOURDEAU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (1980).
41. Vea par ejemplo, HUSSERL, supra nota 4; THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY, supra nota 21; SMITH & SMITH, supra nota 21.
42. Tajfel & Turner, supra nota 20; La Clasificaci6n Social y el Comportamiento entre grupos,
1044
el comportamiento individual dentro del grupo, la agencia en relaci6n con la
estructura de grupo (groupthink), la cognici6n y conscientization 41. Las facetas
de Cubo II incluyen, (1) la identidad del grupo social perteneciendo a
organizaciones, colectividades y comunidades grandes y pequefias, (2) grupo de
seguridad / colectivo, supervivencia-y acciones / comportamientos ofensivas y
defensivas, (3) las tradiciones del grupo incluyendo la historia "colectiva",
transmisiones de grupo transgeneracionales de narrativas de memoria
traumaticas y metam6rficas y de trauma de grupo.4; (4) Relaciones de poder
de grupo, incluyendo las cuestiones de g6nero, la raza(carrera), el modo de
vivir, la ideologfa, construcciones de papel sociales, la marginalizaci6n y el dis-
fortalecimiento, (5) psycho - "asociaciones" refiri6ndose a los "tejidos"
Simmelian de afiliaciones estrat6gicas, latente y manifiesto45 (relaciones
psicosociales polfticas) que es necesario para socios de grupo cohesivos, la
supervivencia, y la armonfa - la justicia comercial para la armonfa4 , y
finalmente; (6) inter6s propio de grupo por el mantenimiento de solidaridad
interna, la influencia interna y externa (el poder) es asegurada, incluyendo la
categorfa econ6mica, legitimidad de polftica y de grupo, los mimeros de
miembros estdn aumentando y el mantenimiento es asegurado. Por lo tanto, el
Cubo numero H se ocupa de los sitios (de grupo) emparentados en los que la
agencia y la dial6ctica de estructura (relaciones tensas) son las mas fntimas,
contradictorias y ambiguas.
A. Proceso de Grupo
Las relaciones tensas y emociones se intensifican durante el cambio social
o la crisis polftica percibida. La tendencia es que cada grupo, grande o pequefio,
represente el "otro" grupo contrario como un de-grupo. Esto a menudo es
logrado por atribuciones negativas conductuales y caracterizaciones negativas,
facilitado por la ret6rica infundida y la lengua47. Tales procesos retinen la
solidaridad de grupo, reforzando la diferenciaci6n de grupo, entre grupo y fuera
de grupo oposiciones creando identidades de grupo positivas y negativas, que
a su tumo, crean la marginalizaci6n para unos. Cada grupo intenta mantener una
supra nota 20; LA DIFERENCIAC1ON ENTRE GRUPOS SOCtAIES, supra nota 20; Tajfel (1982).
43. Conciencia critica y hurnanidad entera - autonomfa y determinaci6n propia. Vea generalmente
FRIERE, supra note 4.
44. Vea generalmente VAMIK D. VOLKAN, LINAJES SANGUINEOS: DESDE EL ORGULLO P-TNICO
HASTA EL TERRORISMO TNICO (1997).
45. Vea SIMMEL, supra nota 1
46. L. Nader, Trading Justice for Harmony, NIDR FORUM, en 12-14 (Winter 1992) (National
Institute for Dispute Resolution).
47. Taj fel & Turner, supra nota 20; Categorizaci6n Social y Comportariento entre Grupos, supra
nota 20; DIFERENCIACIONES ENTRE GRUPOS SCIALES, supra nota 20; "Tajfel (1982)," supra nota 41.
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identidad de grupo positiva por construyendo "el otro" como una identidad de
grupo percibida negativa, atribuyendo el comportamiento negativo, capital
cultural devaluada y la falta causal 48. Psuedospeciation es a menudo un
resultado49. Recuerde, el proceso de grupo ocurre dentro de y entre unidades de
familia, organizaciones y estados naciones.
B. El Proceso de Grupo Psychodynamic: Creando Tiendas ttnicas o de
Identidad
Cuando la identidad personal y de grupo es amenazada - Sea percibido o
verdadero - y\o cuando tal tensi6n es exacerbada por la persistencia de trauma
pasado - un deber impuesto de vengar segtin el acuerdo general - y\o cuando la
identidad personal y de grupo o nacional esta entrelazada, la memoria colectiva
a menudo sigue y la supervivencia del grupo se hace crftica. La violencia a
menudo resulta. La " identidad del grupo" supersede la identidad individual
mientras que se combinan en una identidad sdiper-ordenada. Identidades
mtiltiples contextuales, que pueden mediar el conflicto, no son reconocidas °.
Manichean distinciones dichotomizados se hacen la realidad percibida. El
proceso de grupo psychodynamico comienza a abrumar el conflicto. La
diferencia y el predominio se hacen claves.
Ponentes simb61icos se hacen indicadores y los marcadores de
diferencias. 51 Tales ponentes asisten y refuerzan la persistencia de diferencia.
Ellos exacerban relaciones tensas de grupo y causan comportamientos
problemdticos. Proyecciones conductuales y las articulaciones de batallas
simb61icas perdidas o ganadas, h6roes y herofnas, heridas de guerra, el trauma
y el abuso, crean y sostienen un contexto de nosotros contra ellos.
Frecuentemente, reglas que son presionadas por opini6n general de grupo son
emitidas para la supervivencia, la cara y la solidaridad. El predominio de un
grupo es mostrado.
Las atribuciones negativas del comportamiento y las motivaciones del
"otro" se desarrollan en los sitios Cartesianos de contaminaci6n para "ellos" y
los sitios de pureza para "nosotros". Tales sitios crean justificaciones y
48. BOURDIEU, supra nota 39; ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPCIONES Y PERCEPCIONES EQUIVOCADAS EN
POLITICA INTERNACIONAL (1976).
49. Seudoespeciacion es la manera de caracterizar un grupo como sub-humano, una subespecies,
perteneciendo a su propio grupo. Vea ERIC H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY [NFEZ Y SOCIEDAD] (2d
ed. 1963) [de aqui en adelante NfirEz Y SOCIEDAD]; ERIC H. ERIKSON, IDENTIDAD Y EL CICLO DE LA VIDA
(1980) [de aquf en adelante IDENTIDAD Y EL CICLO DE LA VIDA].
50. Tajfel & Turner, supra nota 20; Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior,
[Categorizaci6n Social y Comportamiento entre Grupo] supra nota 20; DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL
GROUPS [DIFERENCIACIONES ENTRE GRUPOS SOCIALES), supra nota 20; "Tajfel (1982)," supra note 41
51. VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
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racionalizaciones que entonces pueden ser las bases para las acciones percibidas
o verdaderas irracionales y la violencia contra el "otro". Estos sitios pueden
causar la violencia estructural, cultural, y\o ffsica52. Los marcos nuevos de
conflicto, metdforas nuevas contextuales, narrativas desarrolladas53, las
identidades transformadas de victima/heroe/heroinea/victor, objectification del
otro, la abstracci6n y la deshumanizaci6n son las dindmicas que pueden seguir.
Reification de "nuestra" cultura de grupo, lengua, y prdcticas no tiene rival
sobre el "suyo".
El narcisismo del ganador supremo o el perdedor / vfctima tiltimo y un
sentido reified de comunidad (tribalismo) pueden seguir. Se hace "la virtud
superior del oprimido."54 Un sentido estrechamente definido de quien "ellos"
son y quien somos "nosotros" resulta. Los ejemplos aturdidores de dindnica de
grupo tan conflictual pueden ser encontrados en las sociedades divididas de la
Irlanda del Norte, esto es, Cat6licos contra Protestantes, Republicanos contra
Legitimistas, el conflicto de intergrupo perpetuo. Otros ejemplos son el
Apartheid de la Suddfrica el pasado, Afrikdnderes contra pueblos indigenas. En
los Estados Unidos asf como en areas pequefias en del mundo, la Hermandad
aria " el poder blanco " el movimiento y su discriminaci6n contra
homosexuales, judios, los Cat6licos, y hombres de color articulan la dindmica
de deshumanizaci6n por el grupo psychodynamico. Esta dinrnica ha sido usada
y sigue siendo usada para justificar la esclavitud de Africanos, de mujeres
(Talaban), del chino, de judfos y del irland6s, entre otros. Y finalmente, la
discriminaci6n sexual y androcentrismo hegem6nico masculino - un universo
centrado alrededor del macho - han sido existentes.55 Sume a esto, los afectas
y efectos que nos rodean de tal comportamiento de grupo y las construcciones
estrat~gicas sociales basadas en esta dinmica que en iiltimamente forman
ambientes regeneradores y opresivos en la perpetuidad, antes de que el status
quo sea roto.
La narrativa 6 y la socializaci6n temprana de la nifiez generan las
expresiones inesperadas temiticas fenomenol6gicas y psycho-culturales
52. GALTUNG, supra nota 4.
53. VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
54. BERTRAND RUSSEL, UNPOPULAR ESSAYS: 12 ADvENTURE IN ARGUMENT BYTHE WINNER OFTHE
1950 NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR LITERATURE [ENSAYOS IMPOPULARES: DOCE AVENTURAS DE ARGUMENTOS
ESCRrTOs POR EL GANADOR DEL PREMIO DE PAZ NOBEL PARA LITERATURA] (1967). Vea tambign MICHAEL
LERNER & CORNEL WEST, JEWS AND BLACKS: A DIALOGUE ON RACE, RELIGION, AND CULTURE IN AMERICA
[JUDIOS Y NEGRO': UN DIALOGO SOBRE RAZA, RELIGION, Y CULTURA EN AMERICA] (1966); STEPHEN
STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH.: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CLASS IN AMERICA [EL MITO ITNICO: RAZA,
ETNICIDAD Y CLASE EN AMERICA] (1989).
55. Vea por ejemplo, DEBEAUVOiR, supra nota 37; THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE [LA
ARCEOLOGIA DE CONOCIMIENTO]; supra nota 13.
56. Vea VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
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subjetivas de odio, el resentimiento, y la enajenaci6n" Las expresiones de odio
y de marginalizaci6n son creadas por la transmisi6n transgenerational de
trauma" instrumentalizada por el folklore, y el mito (la adoraci6n de h6roe /
herofna) sobre todo encontrado dentro de sistemas cerrados sectarios o
conflictos bifurcados.59 Las percepciones de historia, reales o imaginadas son
reflejadas en historias y mitos que crean tropos donde los nihios reflejan
comportamientos adultos. ° La historia regenerada oral y escrita establece un
sentido mitificado de grandiosidad,6 1 la pureza del grupo, la solidaridad, la
creaci6n de no s6lo fronteras fisicas pero psicol6gicas, paredes de paz, enclaves
sectarios, el sentido del sitio y la separaci6n.62 En realidad, el poder de ret6rica
infundida, que a menudo crea el conocimiento social es un contexto profundo
en el que las consideraciones de agencia / estructura son negociadas.63
La obsesi6n con la diferencia y el predominio (la superioridad y la
inferioridad) puede ser remontada a la formaci6n de las identidades de grupo
negativas y positivas que autorizan y que no autorizan grupos e individuos. Ser
victima o Victor es un modo de vivir, el "trauma escogido" y el
"derrumbamiento de tiempo," gobiernan el proceso de toma de decisiones. 64
S61o los ganadores y perdedores pueden ser actores en tal drama. No hay ningin
espacio para la ambigiledad. 5 Se hace un drama de "nosotros contra ellos"de
grupo dindmico. La memoria de grupo, residiendo en el pasado, define el futuro.
ltnico, las tiendas de grupo e identidades de grupo a menudo crean
"comunidades imaginadas".' Tales tiendas de identidad son impregnadas con
un sentido real de memoria colectiva y\o metaf6rica que puede ser problemdtica.
Las narrativas que han sido contadas de nuevo, diferenciando percepciones y la
hermen6utica pueden conducir a la exageraci6n, errores basados en hechos, y
57. CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY [NIR'EZ Y SOCIEDAD], supra nota 48.
58. Vea VOLKAN, supra nota 47.
59. Vea, por ejemplo, PREPARING FOR PEACE [PREPARANDO PARA LA PAZ], supra nota 4; BUILDING
PEACE [CONSTUYENDO LA PAZ], supra nota 4; VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
60. JERVIS, supra nota 47.
61. Vea ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD: THE SEARCH FOR THE TRUE SELF [EL
DRAMA DEL NINO TALENTOSO: LA BUSCEDA DEL SER VERDADERO] 37-57 (Ruth Ward, trans. 1997).
62. Vea Byrne & Carter, supra nota 2.
63. Vea, por ejemplo, THE ORDER OFTHINGS [ELORDEN DE LAS COSAS], supra nota 13; FOUCAULT,
supra nota 17.
64. VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
65. Vea generalmente SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY [LAS ETICAS DE
AMBIGOEDAD] (1948).
66. Vea BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINEDCOMMUNITIES: REFLECTION ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM (COMUNIDADES IMAGINADAS: REFLECCIONES SOBRE LOS ORIGENES Y LA EXPANSION DEL
NACIONALISMO] (199 1).
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"transcripciones ocultadas" beneficiando a un lado contra el otro.67 Por la
narraci6n el grupo crea una historia colectiva, la cultura, artefactos, simbolos,
y rituales, que demuestran la unicidad del grupo y escogidos. Este dinkniico
estratifica los valores - lo "nuestro" es mis legitimo que "el suyo" y los
comportamientos legftimos que dominan.
Las dicotomfas entre grupo y fuera de grupo no tienen rival y son
reforzados por el acuerdo general comunal (la presi6n), construyendo papeles
conductuales y reglas para miembros de un grupo.68 Estos papeles conductuales
frecuentemente pueden crear la din~nica opresiva y relaciones tensas de intra-
grupo mds devastador que las relaciones tensas conflictual fuera del grupo. Se
Puede ver ejemplos de esto en la violencia y matanzas dentro de grupos in
sectarios en Irlanda del Norte (el conflicto dentro del grupo), el IRA Verdadero
contra el IRA Provisional sobre el lado Catolico/Republicano/Nacionalista. 69 A
la inversa, las matanzas y la violencia persisten entre el UDA Y EL UDF sobre
los lados de los Loyalistas/Protestantes/Unionistas del conflicto. Ellos se
vigilan. Dentro de estas cohortes sectarias, hay casos de "latidos de castigo" y
"quebrantamientos de rodillas" que alerta a los miembros de los grupos sobre
las reglas y las consecuencias si uno no cumple con estas reglas - la perdici6n
de la cara pdblica de la organizaci6n. Por lo tanto, las relaciones de poder dentro
del grupo son forzadas y delineados estructuralmente. En realidad, los grupos
pueden ser tan violentos a su propios como ellos son a su adversario.7°
Comparando unos a otros ocurre dentro de grupos, tambi6n. La diferencia
dentro del grupo trastorna los estados de asuntos existentes.
C. Comparando Unos a Otros
Erikson acufio el t6rmino "pseudospeciation", la tendencia de retratar la
tribu o grupo 6tnico de uno como humano, y al mismo tiempo describiendo
otros grupos como infrahumano, una subespecie.7l Comparando unos a otros
dentro de grupos y fuera de grupos puede ocurrir en relaci6n con la naci6n, la
raza, la cultura, la familia, la dinrnica sexual, la religi6n, el grupo social, etc.
67. JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS
[DOMINACION Y LAS ARTES DE RESISTENCIA: TRANSCRIPCIONES OCULTADASI 136-182 (1990). (comilla en
145).
68. Vea generalmente DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS [DIFERENCIACIONE ENTRE
GRUPOS SOCIALES], supra nota 20.
69. Russ-Trent, supra note 12.
70. Id.
71. Vea, por ejemplo, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIErY [LA NIEZ Y SOCIEDAD], supra nota 48; IDENTITY
AND THE LIFE CYCLE [LA IDENTIDAD Y EL CICLO DE VIDA], supra nota 48; ERIC H. ERIKSON, THE LIFE CYCLE
COMPLETED [EL CICLO DE VIDA COMPLETADO] 91997) [de ahora en adelante EL CICLO DE VIDA
COMPLETADO]
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Comparando unos a otros crea marcadores y caracteristicas de distinci6n y
ponentes simb6licos, esto es, caracterfsticas gen6ticas supuestas, colores de
cuadrilla, uniformes, simbolos de estado, pricticas, la lengua, la ropa, banderas,
y murales, que proyectan estereotipos - negativo para "ellos" y positivo para
"nosotros". El pensamiento dichotomizado, atribuciones silogfsticas y
percepciones atribuyen todo el comportamiento negativo al otro esto es,
homosexual contra heterosexual, Cat6lico contra el Protestante, el Republicano
contra el Dem6crata, el macho contra la hembra (essentialismo biol6gico),
Negro contra el hispano, el serbio contra el croata, etc. El otro es naturalmente
malo. La identidad de grupo y el comportamiento se hacen sin6nimos de la
auto-identidad.
El sentido de la identidad de grupo se hace inextricablemente unido para
la auto-identidad de uno (su identidad principal) de que hablaremos cuando nos
movemos del Cubo II al Cubo Ill. Esto hace una petici6n de principio, L Es
entonces nuestra auto-identidad singular y estitico? LO es la identidad
negociable? A menudo el trauma experimentado en Cubos ntimeros I y II
podrfan haber daflado la auto-eficacia de sentido, la dignidad humana y la
integridad del individuo, como un miembro de un grupo, hasta el punto el que
la agencia humana es apenas existente. La resistencia, " yendo contra el grano,
"es diffcil.72 Una amenaza al grupo es una amenaza al individuo. Volveremos
a esta cuesti6n mds tarde.
Cualquier amenaza hacia la identidad de grupo pone en peligro los estados
de asuntos existentes y amenaza la cohesi6n del grupo. El grupo se hace
hipervigilante, sumamente consciente de diferencias y tiende a concentrarse en
minucia, el que Freud llam6 "el narcisismo de diferencias menores." "
Groupthink toma control y el acuerdo general impuesto puede ritualizar y
mitificar el mando. Lfderes carismiticos asf son creados. El mando carismdtico
a su turno puede, usar la vulnerabilidad de sus socios, a menudo en la ausencia
de cualquier sentido de identidad individual. La represi6n dentro de grupo,
justificaciones para la violencia, acciones irracionales, el comportamiento
primitivo y el sentido de la ansiedad compartida pueden ser creada en nuestro
grupo y contra grupos que no nos pertenece. La reuni6n de miembros de grupo
busca protecci6n bajo su tienda colectiva, porque le falta su auto-identidad.74
Los miembros a menudo vuelven al simbolismo, los tropos de patria, la patria,
la lengua materna, la identidad dtnica, la familia y la memoria metaf6rica, que
entonces puede hacerse explotadora, si no es verificado.
72. Para discusi6n adicional, vea Russ-Trent, supra nota 12.
73. Vea SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO [TOTEM Y TABU] (1950) [De ahora en adelante
T6tem Y Tabu].
74. Vea VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
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Los lderes como Hitler, Chausescu, Malosovic, Pol el Pote, e Idi Amin,
saltaron a la brecha y explotaron a su gente de tal modo. Asimismo los lfderes
de ciertas organizaciones religiosas / ideol6gicas y cultos han explotado sus
socios. De otra parte, positivo (o ambiguo) el mando tambi6n puede explotar y
hacer propaganda la persecuci6n a grados diferentes. Los ejemplos incluyen el
ala Polftica del Ej6rcito Republicano Irland6s de lider de Sinn Fein, Gerry
Adams y el Protestante, el Reverendo Ian Paisley.75 La dindmica incluird la
ret6rica infundida, transcripciones ocultadas, la metdfora, la solidaridad grupo
inflexible y el poder sobre otros. Los grupos a menudo se hacen "atrapados" en
una deformaci6n del tiempo. Estas caracterizaciones dependen del cuyo lado el
que Ud. escoge.
Como hablado, el "derrumbamiento de tiempo", basado en el "trauma
escogido" por la narrativa generacional, el modelado, rituales, haciendo mdrtir,
siendo victima, el monumento y el ediflcio de memorial, la ret6rica pdblica, y
haciendo los tradiciones, continuamente toca de nuevo el trauma original. De
hecho, ellos a menudo exageran y lo regeneran. Las an6cdotas se hacen el mito.
Los mitos se hacen encajados en la vida diaria y el desarrollo de niiez, que
puede ser devastador.76
La nifhez tiema puede llenarse con el sentido de ser victima en un sentido
de grupo, asf como individual. Puede haber la gran presi6n y el deber de vengar
a antepasados para permanecer un miembro valorado y respetado dentro del
grupo. Rituales diarios y narrativas refuerzan este deber. La suspensi6n de
facultades crfticas en las que el presente se hace unido con el pasado de un
modo obsesivo, a menudo reforzado por el simbolismo, puede causar el
comportaniento disfuncional y la violencia.
Sfmbolos culturales, sfmbolos de parentesco , simb6licos de rituales, y
prdcticas, incluyendo diferenciando cada grupo de otro en patrones respetuosos,
son la dramaturgia general de comportaniento dentro del grupo y fuera del
grupo. El simbolismo de importancia material e inmaterial puede crear el
sentido de concordancia de intra-grupo. La conformidad puede promover el
prejuicio, invocando tradiciones de grupo encajadas en las mentes de miembros
de grupo y manifestar el comportamiento dentro del grupo.77 Como hemos
hablado, los ejemplos asombrosos de esto son la Resistencia aria y grupos Neo-
nazis en todas partes del globo quien muestra regalfas Nazis, uniformes y
esvdsticas, quienes marchan, rednen, y articulan la ret6rica odiosa mucho
despu6s del fallecimiento del Reich Tercio de hace 60 afios. El mensaje odioso
es afligido y perpetuado. Otro ejemplo es limpiezas tnicas vistas en el mundo
entero. En grupos ms pequefios, familias quizis disfuncionales, el drama puede
75. Russ-Trent, supra nota 12.
76. Vea SCOTr, supra nota 66
77. Vea Byrne & Cartner, supra nota 2.
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ser menos identificable, ain tal como dramdtico, traumditico y significativo para
sus miembros.
D. Ritualizando el Trauma
La lamentaci6n ritualizada, la identificaci6n con los muertos, lamentadores
perennes, la preocupaci6n por la emoci6n, objetos de uni6n, los sitios, y
personas con el difunto son una respuesta colectiva.78 En los Estados Unidos,
la generaci6n del "baby boomer", mi generaci6n, necesitamos s6lo visitar de
nuevo el cortejo flinebre del presidente John F. Kennedy. Todavfa puedo oft los
pasos del cortejo finebre, el tambor tocado terrible y los cascos del "Black
Jack", el caballo sin jinete, sus Maestros echan la vuelta hacia atrdis en su lado.
A Lee Harvey Oswald le dispararon en el tiempo real mientras yo miraba la
televisi6n, la inocencia perdida. LCudntas veces hemos visto tales imdgenes,
incluyendo las muertes de Martin Luther King, Robert Kennedy, y Gandhi,
cuales han sido articulados de nuevo una y otra vez en el conocimiento pdiblico,
en libros y las pelfculas?
En Irlanda del Norte, la huelga de hambre de 1981, la "protesta sucia" y
la muerte subsiguiente del prisionero Republicano polftico Bobby Sands,
mientras en la prisi6n de Long Kesh, aparece predominantemente en las
leyendas Republicanas, Cat6licas, en Irlanda y de verdad en el mundo entero
para los partidarios de "Irlanda Unida". Por un viaje de investigaci6n de agosto
del 2000 en Belfast, Irlanda del Norte, vi la imagen de Sand mostrada sobre
murales piiblicos, en publicaciones y restaurantes, centros municipales y en
casas. Yo era tambi6n privado a la profundidad de la desesperaci6n, la
humillaci6n, la lamentaci6n, y la venganza generacional en los ojos de los
miembros de familia quien perdieron miembros queridos durante los
"problemas". Las imigenes de los "cafdos" cuelgan con orgullo en casas de
familia, muchos alumbrados con velas como altares sacrificados. Lo mismo
sostiene verdadero dentro de los cuartos legitimistas.
Tan tambi~n, durante la era de la Guerra de Vietnam, en la cena cada tarde,
los noticieros mostraban bolsos de cuerpo tornados de transportes militares.
Estos han sido hombres y mujeres caidos de los Estados Unidos, quienes unos
creen, perdieron sus vidas en una guerra que nunca se declaro. Prometf
solemnemente, "nunca otra vez": no para mi hijo. Tales visuales permaneceran
para siempre con estas cohortes. De verdad, el metraje de Holocausto,
narrativas, libros y memorias congeladas traumiticas son visitados de nuevo y
a veces vividos de nuevo por sus vfctimas en memorias del cuerpo. 79 El trauma
de la familia tambi6n puede ser un sitio del proceso del grupo psychodynamico.
78. Vea VOLKAN, supra nota 43
79. JUDITH LEwis HERMAN, TRAUMA & RECOVERY [TRAUMA Y RECUPERACION] (1992).
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Memorias de la familia disfuncionales y traumdticas y sfmbolos pueden incluir,
joyerfia, estados, juguetes, objetos de inter6s, olores y sabores.80 En contextos
religiosos, el Crucifijo, la Estrella de David, la Biblia, el Torra, velos y trajes
religiosos, los banquetes de Pascua de los judfos, etc., impregnan el sentido de
pertinencia para un grupo, una identidad compartida y el derecho de lamentar,
a veces obsesivamente. Esta transmisi6n transgeneracional de trauma atribuye
un significado mds alto al trauma original y lo efecttia en todas partes de las
generaciones.81  Frecuentemente, los sentimientos de culpabilidad del
sobreviviente que proviene del trauma ayuda la narrativa a desarrollarse.82 Otras
veces, las "victimas" o los sentinientos de culpabilidad del sobreviviente
pueden dividir familias, grupos, comunidades, y naciones.
Los comportamientos asistentes del trauma del grupo y el Complejo Fijan
el Desorden de Tensi6n Traumitico (CPTSD) son comportanientos de
internaliciacion /extemaliciacion, positivos y negativos, que puede incluir:
proyecci6n, obligaci6n de repetici6n, grandiosidad, disfunci6n psicol6gica,
hipervigilencia, y obsesi6n, para mencionar unos cuantos.83 El grupo
psychodynamics, debajo "la tienda de victimas "define destinos, deforma o re
enciende memorias, reposta los incendios de odios antiguos y humillaciones de
grupo. 4 Siendo victima, uno experimenta con un cierto modo de vivir, un
habitus 8 creando perspectivas negativas durante para el futuro, uno mismo, la
familia, el grupo, o, el desarrollo nacional y la felicidad. Este habitus negativo
crea comportamientos negativos como expectativas fantaseadas bajas. El rev6s
tambi6n puede resultar, esto es, la grandiosidad y el derecho. Sin embargo,
habitus negativo por lo general permite la dinknica de grupo como los
sentimientos intensos de odio, el auto-aborrecimiento, la postura /
comportamiento defensiva u ofensiva. A menudo estos sentimientos son
considerados justificaciones para la venganza y el deber de vengar a los
antepasados, que conducen hacia la exterminaci6n, limpiezas 6tnicas, la
purificaci6n, la discriminaci6n, el abuso, y la violencia. El cfrculo de trauma
entonces crea otra generaci6n de "gente escogida" asf como el sfndrome del
"trauma escogido". Representaciones materiales se hacen marcadores
importantes y articuladores de trauma.
Objetos de transici6n se infunden con la memoria del trauma del
antepasado: fetiches, sfmbolos, signos, colores de grupo, atavfos, y accesorios
80. Id.
81. Vea VOLKAN, supra nota 43
82. Vea SCOTr, supra nota 66
83. Vea MILLER, supra nota 60. Vea tambijn HERMAN, supra nota78 (discutiendo CPTSD)
84. VOLAN, supra nota 43.
85. Vea BOURDIEU, supra nota 39.
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a rituales.86 Durante la esclavitud, cantando y bailando, manifestaba disidencia,
resistencia, y caricter distintivo existencial, aunque estaba ocultado latente y
estrat6gicamente de sus maestros. De verdad, las mujeres han "vivido
estrat6gicamente" desde el principio del tiempo. 87 En la religi6n Cat6lica, los
nifios se hacen metaf6ricos "los soldados de Cristo" sobre su confirmaci6n.
Durante la Pascua, el Lilly se hace un signo de resurrecci6n, el renacimiento, y
el martirio afirmando vida (la muerte trae la vida). Los Nazis tenfan sus
esvdsticas y uniformes designados.8 La lista es infinita. De la dramaturgia de
Goffman, 89 hasta el interactionismo simb6lico ° y el concepto del "otro
generalizado", a expectativas y percepciones, 9" todos se combinan en puntos
diferentes para articular el caricter distintivo de un grupo. Y el "otro" de
"nosotros" es formado.92
"Otro" no nos permite resolucionar el conflicto transformativo. Nosotros,
Judfo(s), Negro(s), femenina(d), macho(s), Blanco(s), Britdnico(s), Irland6s(es),
se hacen abstracciones, y creaciones imaginadas de lo que debe ser, no lo que
en realidad "es". 93 Una piedra se hace un sfmbolo profundo Palestino de
fortalecimiento, el cardcter distintivo de grupo y la determinaci6n grupo, sobre
todo para la juventud generacionalizada humillada. El esplendor Escogido, los
traumas pasados, la ret6rica infundida, y memorias metaf6ricas se convierten
dep6sitos compartidos de identidad y crear el sentido de la pertinencia que tiene
el poder de exacerbar, mediar o resolver el conflicto.94 Los niflos observan a los
adultos como ellos representan este drama. Ellos copian los comportamientos
de adultos.
El desarrollo cognoscitivo de nifios, observando comportanientos adultos,
forma auto-identidades de nifios positivamente, negativamente, o con
ambigtiedad. Las experiencias existenciales de un nifo informan su desarrollo
y forman su identidad principal.95 Identidades contextuales y mtiltiples asf son
86. VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
87. Russ-Trent, supra nota 12.
88. Vea DERRIDA, supra nota 11; PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE [LA PRESENTACION
DE UNO MISMO EN LA VIDA DIARIA], supra nota 10; Hooks, supra nota 11.
89. Vea, por ejemplo, PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE [LA PRESENTACION DE UNO EN
UNO MISMO EN LA VIDA DIARIA], supra nota 10; BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES [EL COMPARTAMIENTO EN
LUGARES PUBLICOS], supra nota 22.
90. MEAD, supra nota 1.
91. Vea JERVIS, supra nota 47.
92. Vea VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
93. ANDERSON, supra nota 65.
94. VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
95. CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY [LA NIrJEz Y SOCIEDAD], supra nota 48.
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formadas y desarrollan en un sentido idealizado de uno mismo9 como esto
relacionada con la identidad positiva dentro del grupo, o en la altemativa, el
odio de uno mismo y la enajenaci6n debido al trauma97 -un sentido negativo de
sf mismo, la identidad social de uno,98 la capital cultural, 99 y la vida del
mundo.'° Los resultados pueden incluir el desorden de identidad dissociativa
(DID), la represi6n, la proyecci6n, o cada de unas disfunciones psicol6gicas que
afectan el Cubo siguiente numero 111, el actor. El "narcisismo de las diferencias
menores" conduce a la toma de decisiones reductionistas, diferencias
psicologizadas, odio burocratizado, la malignidad, y los prejuicios, que come
al coraz6n mismo del individuo.'
El mito, sistemas de creencia, y memorias colectivas son legitimados por
la orientaci6n de predominio social, el favoritismo dentro del grupo y\o la
derogaci6n fuera del grupo °2 Tal legitimaci6n es experimentada por
organizaciones, culturas, relaciones de parentesco, asf como, relaciones
nacionales. Esto es la raz6n que las dieciocho facetas de los tres cubos del
Cubismo Integrante-inductivo Social se enfrentan continuamente en un baile
negociado e infinito. La transmisi6n transgenerational del trauma'03 y el
Desorden de Tensi6n Traumdtico entre otras realidades, estdn saliente en
contextos de grupo grandes y pequeflos.' ° Las memorias traumdticas de
acontecimientos horrendos o el trauma percibido basado en acontecimientos
percibidos ain "triviales", afectan la armonfa de grupo y la coherencia. Las
narrativas que articulan y enmarcan el trauma son los instrumentos que generan
memorias dolorosas o alegres, frecuentemente establecen memorias metaf6ricas
adicionales, crean a mdrtires, h6roes y herofnas. A menudo estas narrativas son
Manichean, por lo tanto, dicot6micos, segfin el disefio.
96. Vea, por ejemplo, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY [LA NI&EZ Y SOCIEDAD], supra nota 48; IDENTITY
AND THE LIFE CYCLE [LA IDENTIDAD Y EL SICLO DE VIDA], supra nota 48; SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND
MONOTHEISM [MOIStS Y MONOTEiSMO] (1939); TOTEM AND TABOO [TOTEM Y TABU], supra nota 72.
97. Vea HERMAN, supra nota 78.
98. SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP PSYCHOLOGY [LA IDENTIDAD SOCIAL Y LA PSICOLOGiA
ENTRE GRUPOS], supra nota 41.
99. Vea BOURDIEU, supra note 39.
100. THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCLOSURE OF MODERNITY: Two LECTURES [EL DESCUBRIMIENTO
FILOSOFICO DE MODERNIDAD: DOS LECTuRAS] (1987) [de ahora en adelante EL DISCURSO FILOSOFICO DE
MODERNIDAD]; J. HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION [LA CONCIENCIA
MORAL Y LA ACCION COMUNICATIVA] (1996).
101. Vea TOTEM Y TABU, supra nota 72.
102. Shana Levin & Jim Sedanius, Social Dominance and Social Identity in the United States and
Israel: Dentro del grupo Favortism or Fuera del grupo Derogation? [Dominaci6n Social e Identidad Social
dentro de los Estados Unidos e Israel: Favoritismo dentro del Grupo o Derogaci6n fuera del Grupo?
103. Vea VOLKAN, supra nota 43.
104. Vea HERMAN, supra nota 78 (discutiendo PTSD)
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Las creaciones dicotomiftas de conflicto "Nosotros contra ellos" conducen
a las luchas Manichean lucha para justificar lo correcto contra lo incorrecto,
bueno contra el mal - las fuerzas de luz contra las fuerzas de la oscuridad. El
cubismo Integrante-inductivo Social sugiere que las sombras ambiguas de color
gris est6n algunas veces existentes y por lo tanto deben ser incluidas en andlisis
de todo el conflicto, el contexto por el contexto. Objectificando y la
racionalizando un conflicto por la claridad, o una postura positivistica, s6lo
enreda las cosas y plantea una bifurcaci6n de sujeto / objeto, en la oposici6n,
que nunca solucionari los intereses subyacentes, cuestiones y las motivaciones
de uno y el otro. °5 Por lo tanto, deben ver Cubos nimeros 1, I, y I tienen que
ser vistos como relacionados con el uno al otro y dindmico. El andlisis es multi-
causal. Su resoluci6n y\o prevenci6n debe ser considerada multidimensional,
integrante, emparentado, por lo tanto, acomplej ado.
E. Ejemplo de Caso: Dindmicasfuera del Grupo y dentro del Grupo,
Alemania nazi, y el Tratado de Versailles-dramaturgia, Interactionismo
Simb6lico, e Identidad Social
Un ejemplo de esta interacci6n multidimensional es el caso de Alemania
nazi durante la isla post-mundial De guerra. El Tratado de paz de Versailles
represento un documento vivo de vergiienza para la gente alemana. Esto humill6
una naci6n, y por la extensi6n, cada ciudadano alemn. Esto creo, no s6lo una
identificaci6n negativa para su propio grupo (y cada miembro del grupo) pero
inspir6 una naci6n, y un hombre, Hitler, a recrear una identidad de en-grupo
positiva de estas circunstancias de humillaci6n. La gente alemana se recrearon,
actor por actor, como un en-grupo, en la solidaridad, con sfmbolos y los rituales
que reforzaron este en-grupo nuevo. Esto representa un ejemplo de la relaci6n
dial6ctica entre la estructura y la agencia, de la naci6n al grupo, del grupo al
individuo y de nuevo, que ocurre en contextos conflictuales. Una vez que
incluimos el Cubo numero III (para venir) - el desarrollo individual de agencia
humana - veremos como los tres cubos se relacionan expresamente en este
contexto. Nuestro ejemplo seri Heinrich Reichsfuherer Himmler. Lo que se
destaca es la manera que las dimensiones materiales y psicol6gicas [yo sumarfa,
el grupo conductual y el actor - conducido] las dimensiones acttian
recfprocamente para mantener o mitigar el conflicto de inter-grupo.' " Alemania
nazi ha sido creado sobre tiempo por una espiral de racionalizaciones
nacionales, colectivas e individuales. Ahora veremos como el actor, interfaces,
cruza e integra en este triddico y el andlisis infinitamente dindmico del Cubismo
Integrante- Inductivo Social.
105. Vea HUSSERL, supra nota 4.
106. Byrne & Cartner, supra nota 2 en 66.
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V. CUBO NUMERO H: EL CARACTER DISTINTIVO DEL ACTOR-CUBISMO
INTEGRANTE-INDUCTIVO SOCIAL
El cubo numero 11 determina donde el actor se sittia los sitios del actor en
relaci6n con la sociedad, ifos existenciales y el conflicto. Esto incluye el
pensamiento mental crftico de productos, la dialdctica, la agencia humana - en
la relaci6n al mundo material y la prdctica en ello.1 7 Esto es determinado en la
manera que uno se identifica y distingue a sf mismo durante las interacciones
de ideas y la polftica. Estas polfticas tambi~n pueden incluir la vida estratdgica
diaria)' El auto-estima, la auto-eficacia, la autodeterminaci6n, y el
conocimiento- La conscientizacion y humanidad Ilena de Freire"° - son
conceptos socializados que son integrados, encajados en la intencionalidad
consciente de cada individuo."' Estos incluyen esquemas mentales,
prescripciones normativas y el entendimiento compartido, habitus (el sentido
interior de perspectivas futuras), y la estructura interiorizada mental
cognoscitiva por la que la gente se ocupa del mundo social. Esto por lo general
es basado en la realidad existencial, que es producido por, y ellos mismos
producen la sociedad."' La historia del individuo es llevada a su fin en el
tiempo real, afectando su parentesco inmediato, organizaci6n, socios de grupo
o la naci6n. Te6ricos sociales han llamado esta construcci6n individual
conductual, "el funcionamiento social.... Yo lo llamo "viviendo
estrat6gicamente", 113
Interpretaciones realizadas" 4 e intenciones fenomenol6gicas" 5 sugieren
que como nosotros entendamos y venimos para sabernos, y otros, no puede ser
separado de como nos representamos y nos imaginamos - el nticleo de nosotros
107. Vea BOURDIEU, supra nota 39 (discutiendo "praxis"); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION [LA TEORIA DE ACCION COMUNICATIVA]. VOL. 2 LIFEWORLD SYSTEM: A
CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON [ EL SISTEMA DE LA LA VIDA DEL MUNDO: UNA CRITICA DE LA RAZON
FUNCTIONALISTA] (1987) [de ahora en adelante LA TEORIA DE ACCION COMUNWCATIVA]
108. Russ-Trent, supra nota 12.
109. Vea FREIRE, supra nota 4.
110. Vea HUSSERL, supra nota 4.
111. Vea, por ejemplo, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION [LA TEORIA DE ACCION
COMUNICATIVA], supra nota 106; BOURDIEU, supra nota 39.
112. Vea, por ejemplo, PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE [LA PRESENTACION DE UNO EN
LA VIDA DIARIA], supra nota 10; BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES [EL COMPARTAMIENTO EN LUGARES
PUBLICOS], supra nota 22.
113. Russ-Trent, supra nota 12.
114. Vea, por Ejemplo, PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE [LA PRESENTAC16N DE UNO EN
LA VIDA DIARIA], supra nota 10; BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES [EL COMPARTAMIENTO EN LUGARES
PUBLICOS], supra nota 22; DERRIDA, supra nota 11; Hooks, supra nota 11.
115. Vea HUSSERL, supra nota 4.
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mismos. Debemos reafirmar narrativas individuales como un componente
integral de trabajo de memoria y la necesidad de la gente para hablar
afirmativamente y crfticamente de sus propias historias, tradiciones, y
experiencias existenciales, para hacer visible y desafiar los , a menudo los
grotescos, desigualdades, patrones diferenciales y hegem6nicos, y las opresiones
intolerables del momento presente para prevenir aquellos momentos futuros.116
Ademds, las identidades estgn siempre en transici6n, mutaci6n, el cambio, y a
menudo se hacen mds complicadas a resultado de la posibilidad de encuentros,
acontecimientos traumiticos, o colisiones inesperadas existenciales.117 La
biograffa personal, el Cubo numero III, puede y se convierte en texto social.
El cubo numero m incluye (1) auto-identidad, (2) miembros dentro del
grupo / fuera del grupo socios en relaci6n a si mismos, (3) identidad social en
relaci6n a si mismo, (4) psicologia individual o patologia, (5) historia individual
existencial y experiencias, 818 y (6) interds propio y supervivencia. Cada una de
estas cuestiones de agencia pura individual debe ser integrado en relaci6n con -
no contra - la sociedad, el grupo, la familia o la naci6n. Esto sugiere la
integraci6n entre Cubos numero I y numero II y es el baile infinito
negociacionable que es presentado en el inicio de este andlisis.
De ahf, el Cubismo Integrante-inductivo Social no hace ningunas
distinciones hierarcales entre las dieciocho facetas de los tres cubos cuando
intenta entender y analizar la dininica conflictual conductual y social. La
subjetividad tinica, intra-subjetividad e inter-subjetividad-es la Have al modelo
total. Ademis, objectificacion es considerado un ejercicio peligroso - en este
caso, la excepci6n es la regla - la agencia excepcional individual puede y crea
el cambio y la transformaci6n. Somos ambos los objetos y los sujetos de nuestra
propia existencia." 9 De hecho, para los que cr&en que coacciones estructurales
conducen a la opresi6n y el conflicto, y la estructura nunca puede ser
controlada, yo sugiero que nosotros consideremos la agencia de los oprimidos,
los opresores, y el siempre existente "la hilera media " quien juega un lado
contra el otro. 2' El grupo y\o las estructuras existen por el permiso de y con la
116. Henry Giroux, CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AS PERFORMATIVE PRACTICE: MEMORIES OF WHITENESS,
IN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES [PEDAGOGfA CRmCA COMO PRACTICA REALIZADA:
MEMORIAS DE BLANCURA, EN LA SOCIOLOGfA DE EDUCACION: PERSPECTIVAS EMERGENTES] 147, (Carlos
Alberto Torres & Theodore R. Mitchell, eds., 1999).
117. Id. al 149.
118. Vea, por ejemplo, HUSSERL, supra nota 4; THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND
TRANCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY, [LA CRISIS DE LAS CIENCIAS EUROPEAS Y LA FENOMENOLOGIA
TRANSEDENTAL], supra nota 21; SMrrH & SMITH, supra nora 21; John-Paul Sartre, Conciousness and Society,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN-PAUL SARTRE [Conciencia y Sociedad, en LA FILOSOFIA DEJOHN-PAUL SARTRE]
255-260,415-423 (Random House, ed., 1965). Vea tambidn Blumer, supra nota 4; supra nora 37, al 78, 129.
119. THE ORDER OFTHINGS [LA ORDEN DE LAS COSAS], supra nota 13.
120. Vea BUILDING PEACE [CONSTRUYENDO LA PAZ], supra nota 4.
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concurrencia de individuos en ellos, a grados que varan, por la complicidad y\o
la colusi6n. El agente que concierne y resiste, que puede conducir al final de
la opresi6n o la violencia, no puede ser ignorado."' La ausencia de tal voz
permite que la violencia sea alimentada o sea ser mediado hacia la cesaci6n. Si
no, el concepto de transformaci6n es solamente una fantasia.
Si la estructura puede ser reemplazada a menudo es determinado por los
actores individuales de la estructura. Sin individuos como Gandhi, el Rey,
Maude Gonne, Steinem, Eleanor Roosevelt, de Beauvoir, la Casucha, Adams,
Paisley, Hitler, junto con herofnas desconocidas, heroes, herejes, y traficantes
de odio, el cambio social -mejor o peor - nunca hubiera ocurrido. Pensadores
crfticos, sitios / espacios crfticos y voces disonantes "yendo contra el grano"
pueden crear el cambio.'22 El "mundo de la vida" serfa desesperado y est~tico
sin voces resistentes.
El "mundo de la vida" es, sin embargo, un mundo social.'23 Hay una
naturaleza social al conocimiento.' 24 Hay una relaci6n entre la fenomenologfa,
los temas. 125 Patrones, y la esencia de vivir, la negociaci6n y el ajuste - lo que
piensan los individuos - que es integrado en etnometodologia de que individuos
en realidad hacen en su vida diaria, sobre todo en contextos conflictuales.'
2 6
Hay una relaci6n infinita dial6ctica entre el habitus y la especialidad de
experiencia individual y la realidad social.'27 Esto comienza en la nifiez.
A. Desarrollo de Nifiez Tierno de la Agencia Humana
El desarrollo cognoscitivo y la capacidad para el pensamiento critico son
el contexto del Cubo numero m1: el caricter distintivo del actor. Esto comienza
en el desarrollo tierno de la nifiez. Los ofrecimientos del trabajo de Piaget nos
demuestran que el desarrollo intelectual se desarrolla por etapas y los esquemas
de conocimiento. El desarrollo en curso es integrado y re sintetizado por una
etapa de pensamiento crftica. Estos esquemas son programas o estrategias que
121. Russ-Trent, supra nota 12.
122. Vea, por ejemplo, FEMINIST THEORY [LA TEORIA FEMINISTA], supra nota 37; Russ-Trent, supra
nota 12.
123. Vea The Theory of Communicative Action [La Teorfa de la Acci6n Comunicativa], supra nota
110; THE PHILOsopIncAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY [EL DiSCURSO FILosoFIco DE MODERNIDAD], supra
nota 99.
124. FOUCAULT, supra nota 17. Vea tambion JAMES, supra nota 1; PARADOXES OF GENDER
[PARADOJAS DEL GENERO], supra nota 14; DEBEAUVOIR, supra nota 37.
125. Vea HUSSERL, supra nota 4.
126. Vea HUSSERL, supra nota 4; THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRASCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY [LA CRISIS DE CIENCIA CIENTIFICA Y LA FENOMENOLOGIA TRANSEDENTAL], supra nota
2 1; SMITH & SMITH, supra nota 21; SCHUTZ, supra nota 4.
127. Vea BOURDIEU, supra nota 39.
20021 1059
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1037
usan los individuos mientras que ellos acttian recprocamente con el ambiente-
lo que yo he acufiado "viviendo estrat6gicamente.', 2 8 Con la experiencia, la
negociaci6n, la mediaci6n, y el pensamiento crftico, las decisiones son hechas.
La agencia humana es desarrollada y actores sociales acttian. Los actores
transforman sus Ifos existenciales (Aretxaga 1997).
Piaget mis lejos sugiere que el desarrollo de los esquemas mentales o
estructuras ocurra en la misma orden en todos nosotros y en una tarifa
relativamente predeterminada - una tarifa gobernada por nuestra maduraci6n
fisiol6gica. Antes de que estructuras precisas neurol6gicas sean desarrolladas,
estos esquemas no pueden aparecer. 29 De verdad, la inteligencia conceptual,
la "funci6n simb6lica", la imitaci6n, el juego, la intuici6n, la racionalidad,
transductiva, la actividad deductiva, e inductiva, pavimenta con hormig6n el
pensamiento operacional que permite uno integrarse con otras acciones,
relacionar y re sintetizar, reflejar, mostrar la empatfa, deducir, y negociar la
decisi6n siguiente "6ptima", son las complejidades que pueden ser
interrumpidas por el trauma, la negligencia, el abuso, o la apatfa en la temprana
nifiez y la adolescencia. 130 Ademds, estas funciones de cognici6n, la confianza,
la intenci6n,' 3' y el entendimiento son fundamentales para el desarrollo
intelectual, los niveles complejos de la soluci6n de problema y pensamiento.132
Los ambientes sociales en donde las complejidades constituyentes de
desarrollo intelectual ocurren son crfticos. La realidad es que, en muchos casos,
el desarrollo de nifiez no es nutrido. Es a menudo descuidado o traumatizado en
sociedades en las que consideraciones 6ticas, la dignidad humana, la igualdad
y la personalidad son devaluadas. La justicia es negada, y la esperanza a
menudo es basada en la acci6n de hacerse de su opresor. El ser por lo tanto, es
traumatizado, incluyendo las estructuras cognoscitivas de las que la agencia
humana y la toma de decisiones emanan. Los procesos de los grupos positivo
o negativo psychodynamicos son a menudo los tiradores que influyen el actor.
B. Estudio del Caso: Henreich Himmler, Reichsfuherer, SS.: Influencias
Tiernas de Nifiez: La Agencia Humana Se desarrolla
En la esquina de la mano derecha 61 ha puesto su nombre seguido por
su titulo. Heinreich Himmler, Reichsfuhrer, SS. No haga ninguna
128. Russ-Trent supra nota 12.
129. B. JOYCE & M. WEIL, MODELS OF TEACHING [MODELOS DE ENSEfANZA] 281-282 (5th ed.
1996).
130. Vea HERMAN, supra nota 78; CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY [LA NINEZ Y LA SOCIEDAD], supra nota
48; IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE [LA IDENTIDAD Y EL SICLO DE VIDA], supra nota 48.
131. Vea HUSSERL, supra nota 4.
132. JOYCE & WEIL, supra note 128, al 285.
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menci6n del tratamiento especial de losjudlos, L1 dice, emplea s6lo
las palabras, el Transporte de losjudfos Hacia el Este ruso. Unos
meses mds tarde, este hombre dard un discurso a una reuni6n secreta
que se encuentra en el distrito de Posen. Ahora Ud. sabe todo sobre
ello, [la soluci6n final] y Ud. se callard, l les dird. Ahora
compartimos un secreto y nosotros deberfamos tomarnuestro secreto
a nuestras tumbas.1
33
Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler fue influido profundamente por su padre,
Gebhard. Su padre "surgi6 grande a su hijo."' El padre, Gebhard, estrictamente
sigui6 estrictamente a los expertos de crianza del dia. "Aplasten la voluntad"
ellos escribieron. "Establezca el predominio. No permita a ninguna
desobediencia. Suprima todo en el nifio." Griffin pide, "Qu6 podrfa hacer a una
persona concebir el plan de gasear a millones de seres humanos a la muerte?"'3 5
LPodrfa ser la respuesta el desarrollo de nifiez?
Como un hombre quien hizo la historia, Heinrich Himnmler form6
muchas nifieces ... Y una historia ms temprana, una historia de
gobiernos, de guerras, de aduana social, y las ideas de g6nero, la
historia de un prestar de religi6n a la idea de pecado original, formo
la nifiez de Heinrich Himmler tan seguramente como cualquier
filosoffa de cultivo infantil. Uno puede tomar por ejemplo cualquier
condici6n formativa de su vida privada, el hecho que 61 era un nifio
frigil, por ejemplo, favorecido por su madre, quien no podia
encontrar normas masculinas, y mostrar que esta circunstancia sac6
su significado verdadero de un sistema nmAs grande social que dio la
importancia excesiva a la masculinidad' 36
En una cierta etapa comenzamos a defimirnos, escoger una imagen de quien
somos. A tiempo olvidamos nuestras personalidades ms tempranas y
sustituimos aquella memoria por la imagen la que hemos construido en las
ordenes de otros.137 LC6mo podemos comprender el "estado interior" del ser de
Himmler, su fenomenol6gico Cubo numero III de intencionalidad? 38 En la
estaci6n del tren, el joven Heinrich oye el canto y ve a hombres valientes en
133. S. GRIFFIN, A CHORUS OF STONES: THE PRIVATE LIFE OF WAR [UN CORO DE PIEDRAS: LA VIDA




137. Id. al 122. Vea tambiin IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE (LA IDENTIDAD Y EL CICLO DE LA
VIDA], supra nota 48; THE LIFE CYCLE COMPLETED [EL CICLO DE LA VIDA COMPLETADA], supra nota 70;
JAMES, supra nota 1; SIMMEL, supra nota 1.
138. Vea generalmente HUSSERL, supra nota 4.
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uniformes finos. ti quiere ser un soldado. Mis que nada, 61 quiere un uniforme.
Heinrich tambi6n quiere control. E1 tiene que controlar, como 61 ha sido
controlado por su padre. La meticulosidad del control que el padre Gebhard
tuvo sobre su familia era evidente por sus procedimientos diarios: cada paquete,
o carta postal que paso por la puerta era, por el orden de Gebhard, tenia que ser
debidamente registrado. Y su hijo sigui6 el pleito.
Cada hoja de papel publicada con respeto a la oficina... [El SS]
pasard por el escritorio de Heinrich Himmler, y a cada pigina 61
agregari sus propios iniciales. Ningfin detalle evitari su conjetura o
no lograri ser registradoY.9
De verdad, Himmler sinti6, que Alemania necesitaba un "hombre de
hierro," un hombre como su padre. El Tratado de Versailles ha sido tornado
como una humillaci6n. Una debilidad imperdonable, 61 discuti6, se ha permitido
invadir la naci6n. Un hombre deberfa ser a un hombre y una mujer una mujer.'40
Un hombre verdadero deberfa amar a una mujer como un nifio quien
debe ser amonestado quizis hasta castigado, cuando ella es tonta,
aunque ella tambi6n debe ser protegida y cuidada porque ella es tan
d6bil. 141
Mds lejos los signos de la disfunci6n del desarrollo de Himmler y la
agencia que eman6 de ello, pueden ser evidenciados. Una vez que 61 es
Reichsfuherer, 61 pondrd ciertas normas para la superioridad la que, no importa
como heroicos sus esfuerzos, 61 nunca serA capaz de lograrlos. Un signo del
Ubermensch, 61 dice, es ser rubio. Pero 61 mismo es oscuro. tl dice que 61 se
cuida de arrancar a cualquier aspirante del SS quien muestra los rastros de un
linaje "mongol." Pero 61 mismo tiene los ojos estrechos los que 61 toma como
un signo de tal descendencia. "He rechazado aceptar a cualquier hombre el cuyo
tamafio es debajo de seis pies porque se que s6lo los hombres de un cierto
tamahio tienen la calidad necesaria de la sangre," 61 declara, estando de pie
solamente cinco pies y siete pulgadas detris del podio 42 De verdad, sus vistas
de denigraci6n sobre la homosexualidad son evidenciadas cuando 61 declara "los
antepasados de la Alemania sabfan que hacer con homosexuales. Ellos los
ahogaron en la atolla." Esto no era el castigo, 61 discutfa, pero " la
139. Griffin, supra nota 132, al 133.
140. Vea generalmente Griffin, supra nota 132 (presentando excerptas del diario de Himmler).
141. Id. al 134 (citando del diario de Himmler, 1920-1923).
142. Id. al 141-142
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exterminaci6n de la existencia que no es natural."' 4 3 Sin embargo, uno de sus
h6roes, Henry el Grande, era un homosexual.'"
En el sentido mds grande, Alemania nazi y las cuentas emparentadas que
se cruzan de la primera guerra mundial y la segunda guerra mundial son los
ejemplos principales de como la toma de decisiones de unos individuos choc6
las vidas de millones. Mds interesantemente, las decisiones hechas estaban, en
parte o en todo, basados en historias tan personales como el de Himmler. Si
nosotros explorarfamos las vidas personales de los actores de la segunda guerra
mundial, como Roosevelt, Mussolini, Toynbee, el Ed6n, Churchill, el
Chambeldn y Hitler, nosotros descubririamos incidentes criticos, historias
existenciales y "experiencias vividas" que influyeron en decisiones que mis
tarde llegaron a la etapa mundial.'45 Asf, los Cubos mimeros I, HI, II se relaciona
entre ellos en contextos dindmicos integrantes. Sobre Presidente Wilson:
Esto no le ocurri6 [al Presidente Wilson] que las preguntas de
propiedad y la paz podrfan ser subordinadas a los de orgullo nacional
y resentimiento; que los pudieran haber sido forzados a restaurar su
honor y el poder para recuperarlo, por cualquier medio necesario.'4
Soluciones maquiav6licas eran defendibles, por lo tanto. Hitler, un
individuo, fue capaz de seguir su reinado de terror, por los esfuerzos / acciones
individuales, el racionamiento individual, la dichotomizacion subjetiva y
objetiva, y la agencia intencionada humana, por la extensi6n, la aprobaci6n
colectiva de la ciudadanfa alemana - un actor a la vez. Por lo tanto el estudio del
caso precedente, expone las fuerzas de las dieciocho facetas de I-ISC que
motivaron una naci6n (el Cubo numero I); un grupo /naci6n / estado, el Partido
Nazi (Cubo numero II); y cada ciudadano / actor alemin (Cubo numero III),
para cometer las atrocidades del Holocausto.
C. Estudio del caso: Gerry Adams, Lider de Sinn Fein
En veces recientes, podemos aprender del desarrollo psycho-cultural y
psicosocial de Gerry Adams, el lfder de Sinn Fein, el ala polftica del Ej6rcito
Republicano Irland6s (el IRA). La investigaci6n reciente ha establecido que el
desarrollo de la personalidad de uno e individuos influye el comportamiento
negociador.'47
143. Id. al 141-142.
144. Id. al 142-143.
145. JERVIS, supra nota 47.
146. DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR [SOBRE LOS ORIGENES DE GUERRA] 376 (1995).
147. Vea , por ejemplo, Elena Mastors, Gerry Adams and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: A
Research Note, [Gerry Adams y el Proceso de Paz de Irlanda del Norte, Una Nota de Investigaci6n,. POL.
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Un perfil conductual ha sido hecho sobre Adams por un an6lisis de
contenido de sus entrevistas espontdneas, ofreciendo una conexi6n entre
caracterfsticas individuales y el comportamiento esperado. Algunos temas y
patrones citado eran que 61 no cederfa, cueste lo que cueste, creyendo que su
posici6n es la correcta. Su complejidad puede mediar estos rasgos dominantes,
haci6ndolo mIs receptivo a las opiniones de otros.14 8 Adams tambi6n tiene una
necesidad alta de afiliarse, mientras se preocupa como otros lo ven. Esto, a su
turno, le conducirfa a buscar relaciones normalizadas con la oposici6n. 149 En un
ambiente tenso de Acuerdo de Paz despu6s del Viernes Santo (1998), Adams
sigue contratando en la polftica del proceso, queriendo ser visto como un
hombre de paz. A pesar de haber firmado el acuerdo de paz, Adams realmente
no concedi6 mucho, y 61 sigue teniendo un impacto sobre el futuro de las
disposiciones gobernantes de la regi6n.1"
Leyendo el libro de Addn la Jaula Once proporciona la perspicacia en sus
acciones intencionadas. I'5 Y durante mi investigaci6n de archivos agosto del
ano dos mil en Belfast, Irlanda del Norte, entrevistando prisioneros antiguos
politicos y sus familias Republicanos machos y hembras (el Ej6rcito
Republicano Irland6s, o el IRA), atestigii6 las atestiguaciones del carisma
personal de Adam. Unos habfan pasado el tiempo con 61 en la prisi6n Long
Kesh. Ellos literalmente morirfan por 61, hombres y mujeres igualmente, como
ellos creen que 61 para ellos. Esto muestra una influencia fuerte personal,
demostrando el poder del actor individual en contextos (de grupo) sectarios, si
Ud. estt de acuerdo con la polftica de Adam o no. Esto tambi6n da testimonio
a las influencias, positivas o negativas, el que lfderes carismiticos (actores
individuales) tienen sobre la resoluci6n de conflicto o el proceso de
exacerbaci6n.
PSICOL.., Vol. 21, No. 4, 839-846 (2000); M.G. Hermann & T. Preston, Presidents, Advisors, and Foreign
Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements [Presidentes, Consejeros, y P61iza
Extranjero: El Efecto del Estilo de Mando en Arreglos Ejecutivos], POL. PSICOL, 15, 75-96 (1994).
148. Vea DONALD A. SYLAN 7 STEVE CHAN, FOREIGN POLICY DECISI6N MAKING: PERCEPTION,
COGNITION, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [HACIENDO DECISIONES PARA LA POLIZA EXTRANJERA:
PERCEPCION, COGNICION, E INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL] (1984).
149. M.G. HERMANN, A HANDBOOK FOR ASSESSING PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FOREIGN
POLICY ORIENTATIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERS. (UN MANUAL PARA DETERMINAR CARACTERISTICAS
PERSONALES Y ORIENTACIONES DE POLIZAS EXTRANJEROS Y LIDERES POLITICOS]. Ohio State University
mimeo. (1987).
150. Mastors, supra nora 146, al 844.




El cubismo Integrante-inductivo Social (I-ISC) intenta proporcionar un
andlisis integrante y complejo de conflicto de los niveles micro a los niveles
macro, que se cruzan a lo largo del camino, en un dindmico y un afecto y efecto
sin lineal. I-ISC se estd sintetizando constantemente. En el Cubo numero I, el
nivel estructural, las exigencias anafticas est6.n enfocadas en macro-facetas, el
Modelo de Cubismo Social de Byrne y Carter."' En el Cubo numero II, el nivel
de estructura / agencia, las exigencias analfticas son enfocadas en las relaciones
de conflicto en el grupo "inter" y el grupo "intra". En el Cubo numeran HIl, el
nivel de agencia / actor, los intereses de andlisis de conflicto son enfocadas a la
capacidad de tomar decisiones individuales y de e intencionalidad, y el
desarrollo de la agencia individual humana.
Debemos ser conscientes de las dieciocho facetas de este modelo, Cubos
numero I, f y I, (Vea la Figura nilmero 2) en negociaci6n dindniica con el uno
al otro en orientaciones de tiempo diferentes, contextos diferentes, y el poder de
diferente relaciones / construcciones. Los tres cubos son separados y al mismo
tiempo, ellos son uno. La naturaleza simb6lica de internalizacion y la
integraci6n, Los tres cubos rubics, y el signo para el infinito en el disefio de este
modelo inductivo, se proponen para ser simplemente compleja y en dltima
instancia, fitil. El conflicto estd lleno de la ambigiiedad, la contradicci6n, y la
sorpresa. Requieren el pensamiento complejo crftico y procesos para manejarlo,
mediarlo, negociarlo, o exacerbarlo. El conflicto tambi6n puede ser
productivo"' Nunca debemos perder la vista de esto. Si no fuera por el
conflicto, la justicia social serfa un oxfmoron. Sin embargo, siempre deben ver
el conflicto como complejo, dindmico, y transformable.
"Conflict=attitudes/assumptions+behavior+contradiction/content.' ' 54 En
el conflicto de Cubismo Integrante Inductivo Social es articulado como un
constructo triddico dindnico. Como Galtung sugiere, no podemos asumir que
un g6nero, una generaci6n, una raza, un mundo, un estado, o s-iper-estado, tiene
"objetivos", en sf.I5 Estos son simplemente abstracciones. Sin embargo, ciertas
elites, funcionarios con poder de decisi6n, y lfderes carismdticos pueden tener
objetivos, a menudo claramente formulados, que tienen el poder "sobre" el
modelo. Teniendo conocimiento de la realidad de tales agentes de poder, el
152. Vea generalmente, Byrne & Carter, supra nota 2.
153. Vea, por ejemplo, Louis KRIESBERG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT: FROM ESCALATION TO
RESOLUTION [CONFLICTO CONSTRUCTIVO: DE ESCALACION A RESOLUCION] (1998); Vea tambign GALTUNG,
supra nota 4; JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT IN NATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
COMMUNITIES [RESOLVIENDO CONFLICTO BASADO EN LA IDENTIDAD EN NACIONES, ORGANIZACIONES, Y
COMUNIDADES] (1997); SIMMEL, supra nota 1.
154. GALTUNG, supra nota 4, al 72.
155. Vea GALTUNG, supra nota 4.
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andlisis de conflicto debe ser complejo mis bien que diidico, Manichean,
silogfstico, y Cartesiano. "El conflicto es sobre la vida, sefialando directamente
a contradicciones como creando la vida y destruyendo vida."' 56 Por lo tanto, una
teorfa de conflicto que funciona tendri que ser localizada y articulada en el nivel
fenomenol6gico, que es la esencia del Acercamiento de Cubista Integrante
Inductivo Social. Haciendo significado es la Have a las dieciocho facetas como
se relacionan con el uno al otro. Ademds, hay un lado de conflicto manifiesto
y latente, para el lado de manifestaci6n es identificado con el comportamiento,
y el aspecto latente con la actitud y la contradicci6n.' 57
En parte, esto sugiere que los trabajadores culturales desarrollen proyectos
colectivos en los que las bifurcaciones tradicionales de margen / centro, la
unidad / diferencia, local / nacional, pdiblica / privada pueden ser reconstituidas
por la representaci6n mds compleja de identificaci6n, la pertinencia, y la
comunidad. Esto implica una nueva definici6n fundamental del significado de
soci6logo y el te6rico como el artista y el intelectual pdiblico. Como
intelectuales ptiblicos, debemos definirnos no simplemente como figuras
marginales, de vanguardia, profesionales, o acaddmicos que interpretan solos,
pero como trabajadores culturales el cuyo conocimiento colectivo y acciones
presuponen las visiones insurgentes de vida ptiblica, la comunidad, y la
responsabilidad moral. Lo que es crucial es un concepto del politico que es
abierto ain comprometido, respeta la especificidad sin borrar consideraciones
globales, y proporciona espacios nuevos para el trabajo de colaboraci6n
ocupado en el cambio productivo social."' Debemos crear una "lengua
integrante crftica" por valores, 6tica, y la responsabilidad social.' 59 El tiempo
ha venido para artistas, educadores, y otros trabajadores culturales para unirse
juntos para defender y construir aquellos sitios culturales y las esferas pfiblicas
que son esenciales para una democracia viable y un proyecto de
emancipatoria. "
No hay duda en mi mente que esta teorfa puede y seri sintetizada de
nuevo, deconstruida, y\o ampliada de un modo nuevo y vital. El proceso de
dial6ctica s6lo no debe seguir. Esto nunca debe terminarse. Tal como he
agregado Byrne y Carter,"' espero que alguien construiri mis sobre mi
156. Id. a] 71; ROBERTON MERTON, Manifest and Latent Functions, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCtAL
STRUCTURE [ Funciones Manifestaos y Latentes, en TEORIA SOCIAL Y ESTRUCTIRA SOCIAL] (FREE Press
3d ed. 1968) (1949).
157. GALTUNG, supra nota4, al 71.
158. Giroux, supranota 115, al 152
159. Id. al 152; SUZANNE LAcY, MAPPING THE TERRAIN: NEw GENRE PUBLIC ART [HACIENDO UN
MAPA DEL TERRENO: UN GENERO NUEVO DE ARTE PUBLICO] 20 (Suzanne Lacy, ed., 1995).
160. Vea Giroux, supra nota 115, al 152; Lacy, supra nora 158, al 43.
161. Vea generalmente Byme & Canner, supra now 2.
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construcci6n. La articulaci6n de un "empirismo emancipatorio" es el proyecto
que yo estoy sugiriendo.
62
La ilusi6n mIs ingenua en esta especialidad (de investigaci6n de paz) no
es s6lo para creer en la arquitectura global, que la estructura puede ser
construida y llenada con cualquier clase de actores; igualmente es ingenua creer
aquella estructura es independiente de cultura. Yo sumarfa, que esto es
igualmente ingenuo para ignorar a la agencia individual humana y su individuo
desarrollo-como sugerirfan, " la intersecci6n del personal y el sist~mico."'163
De verdad, "El recurso mis grande para el sostenimiento de la paz en el
largo plazo siempre es arraigado en los habitantes del lugar y su cultura
... emergiendo a menudo de su propia experiencia de dolor."'" Finalmente, las
palabras de Gandhi son, en efecto, la esencia fenomenol6gica de este proyecto
de resoluci6n de conflicto transformable llamado el Cubismo Integrante
Inductivo Social:
El sufrimiento es infinitamente mfs poderoso que la ley de la selva
para convertir al opositor y abriendo sus ofdos, que si no son
cerrados, a la voz de raz6n. Nadie probablemente ha preparado rmts
peticiones o ha apoyado causas rns desesperadas que yo, y he venido
a estas conclusiones fundamentales que si Ud. quiere algo realmente
importante de ser hecho Ud. simplemente no debe satisfacer la raz6n,
Ud. debe mover el coraz6n, tambidn. "'65
162. Vea H.R. ALKER, REDISCOVERIES AND REFORMULATIONS [RE-DESCUBRIMIENTOS Y RE-
FORMULACIONES] 338 (1996); Ho-Won Jeong, THE NEW AGENDA FOR PEACE RESEARCH [LA AGENDA NUEVA
PARA LA INVESTIGACI6N DE LA PAZ] 3-12, 233 (Institute for Conflict Andlisis and Resolution, George Mason
University, USA, ed., 1999).
163. PREPARING FOR PEACE [PREPARANDO PARA LA PAZ], supra nota 4, al 21.
164. BUILDING PEACE [CONSTRUYENDO LA PAZ], supra nota 4, al 94.
165. MAHATMA GANDHI, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI [Los TRABAjos
COLLECIONADOS DE MAHATMA GANDHI] (Publications Divisi6n, Govt. Of India, 1958).
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C. Cubismo Integrante Inductivo Social de un Vistazo
El cubismo Integrante Inductivo Social es basado en trabajo original de
Byrne y el Cubismo Social de Carter."6 El cubismo Integrante Inductivo Social
es basado en asunciones siguientes:
1. Hay un interconectado, o en el mfnimo, un interrelacionado entre
seres humanos, y entre el ser, la familia, niveles locales, nacionales,
y globales. Por lo tanto, este andlisis es basado en un emparentado, el
posmodernista y la fundaci6n feminista.
2. La unidad de andlisis en esta teoria estd mtltiple basada y simultdnea,
moviendo adentro y afuera del cubo al cubo al cubo, del individuo a
grupos, estructuras entonces sociales, luego en otra vez. Fuerzas
conflictuales estSn en un estado de movimiento constante, la presi6n
y la ondulaci6n. Esto incluye (la agencia) psicol6gica, (la agencia /
estructura) psicosocial y contextos psycho-culturales (estructurales /
politicos): la agencia humana del individuo estd en la tensi6n
constante con las estructuras extemas sociales alrededor de ella y
puede ser, (y manifiesto((manifestaci6n)) sutil (latente) y profunda.167
3. Un continuo de fortalecimiento y el dis-fortalecimiento existe, en los
ifmites del control autoritario (Machiavellianism, el nacionalismo, la
dictadura), el colonialismo, el patriarcado, la dominaci6n (a veces
segtin el acuerdo general disfuncional), la opresi6n, la explotaci6n, la
violencia estructural - cultural, familiar, 68 comunal, la insinuaci6n -
dentro del grupo / fuera del grupo la creaci6n de los estereotipos /
discriminaci6n, incongruencia, e individual en mente conexiones de
/ cuerpo (Gandhi, 1970/76 satygraha). Psycho-cultural, psicosocial y
psycho-politico / cultural los factores afectan, y polftica baja y alta,
y la toma de decisiones en colectividades e individuos.
4. Tal como descubrimos las maravillas de ADN en la biologfa, el ADN
las basadas en las computadoras y el "String Theory" en la ffsica
cudntica, descubriendo sus estructuras complejas emparentadas que
trabajan y componentes, en la esperanza que el mundo sera' mejor si
esto estd mejor entendido, tan tambi6n, en el andlisis de conflicto,
podemos atomizar el andlisis abajo a sus componentes mds pequefios
para fenomenol6gicamente entender las complejidades emparentadas
y contextuales e intersecciones existentes en ello, micro a macro, en
166. Vea Byrne & Carter, supra nota 2.
167. GALTUNG, supra nota 4, al 71; MERTON, supra nota 155 al 73-138.
168. Vea GALTUNG, supra nota 4.
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el global (estructural) asf como el medio gama (sitios de agencia /
estructura ambiguos) y niveles (de agencia) individuales.
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I. EXTRACTO
Uno de los temas en el estudio de teorfa social, en todas partes de su
historia, ha sido el examen de las fuerzas sociales de agencia y la estructura.
Esto ha sido verdadero ambos de los niveles micro y macro de interacci6n social
* S. Michael Hare es un estudiante de Doctor en Filosoffa en el AMnlisis de Conflicto y la
Resoluci6n en la Universidad Nova del Sudeste en ]a Fortaleza Lauderdale, Florida. !l ha servido como el
Pastor Mayor de unas iglesias durante los veinte dos pasados afios y tambidn ha enseflado cursos en ]a
Filosoffa, ]a Religi6n y en las Ciencias Sociales en varios Colegios de la comunidad y Universidades. tl ha
servido como un mediador de voluntario para la Mejor Oficina De negocio, el Sistema de Tribunal y para
varias Organizaciones No lucrativas. Este capftulo ha sido desarrollado de un papel de pensamiento sometido
para una clase en las Teorfas de Conflicto y la Resoluci6n de Conflicto ensefiada por el Doctor Sefin Byrne
y era bajo la inflluencia de Byrne y Carter (1996) "el Cubismo Social" el argumento.
** Este articulo fue traducido por Carlos Jiminez.
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y tambirn ha sido hablado en unos usos de diferir a problemas sociales en
contextos locales, nacionales e internacionales. Aunque los te6ricos clisicos
sociales ofrecieran el nfasis que varfa en ambos finales del espectro, ellos
tambirn parecieron claramente afectados (preocupados) con el entendimiento
de los acoplamientos que los unieron (conectaron) juntos. Mds recientemente,
algunos te6ricos han enfocado ms sobre las posiciones extremas de paradigmas
contrarios en una bdisqueda evidente de pureza te6rica. Sin embargo, allf ahora
aparece ser un interrs renovado a la integraci6n y el sintetizar de teorias sociales
hacia un paradigma mins holfstico y equilibrado. Este articulo brevemente
repasari unas estas consideraciones e intentari animar la remota investigaci6n
y el desarrollo de modelo de teorfa adecuado social, sobre todo como ellos se
relacionan con el conflicto y con su resoluci6n en usos locales, nacionales, e
internacionales. Expresamente, propondrdn a tres conceptos como pasos
progresivos hacia este objetivo. El primer paso se relaciona con un
ensanchamiento te6rico de perspectiva en la luz del concepto de C. Wright Mills
de Imaginaci6n Sociol6gica.' El segundo el paso recomendado es inspirado por
el interrs de George Ritzer a meta-teorfas y examina la integraci6n de ideas de
sus Niveles Principales de modelo de An6.lisis Social.2 La sugerencia final
concierne la exploraci6n de dimensiones nuevas y considera la dinimica del
modelo de Cubismo Social por Sean Byrne y Neal Carter.3
Hl. INTRODUCCION
Una de las mas raras comodidades en esta vida parece ser el encontrar el
equilibro adecuado. Arist6teles procur6 encontrar un feliz medio en el Medio
Dorado.4 Los fil6sofos hace mucho han discutido si cada persona individual es
un agente libre o si cada uno es totalmente y desvilidamente es cerrado en una
cadena infinita de causas y efectos deterministas. La variaci6n de conjeturas
filos6ficas coloca "las respuestas" a estas preguntas en ambos extremos y en
varios sitios en medio.5 Los bi6logos disefian experimentos para intentar y
averiguar si la naturaleza o la nutrici6n manejan las mas fuertes influencias en
la direcci6n del comportaniento humano y ambas posibilidades encuentran
1. Vea CHARLES LEMERT, SOCIAL THEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS, 348
(2000).
2. Vea GEORGE RrrzER, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (4th ed., 1996).
3. Vea SEAN BYRNE Y NEAL CARTER, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces Of Ethnoterritorial Politics
In Northern Ireland And Quebec, 3(2) PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, en 52-71 (1996).
4. Vea 0. JOHNSON, ETHICS: SELECTIONS FROM CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY WRITERS, 67-
77(1989).
5. Vea R. SOLOMON, INTRODUCING PHILOSOPHY: A TEXT WITH INTEGRATED READINGS 495-537
(4th ed. 1989).
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fuertes partidarios.6 Los te6logos han abogado por siglos sobre si el destino
humano de cada persona es divinamente y absolutamente desigrado antes del
nacimiento o si las decisiones que tomamos en esta vida representan los actos
genuinos de libertad. De la misma manera, denominaciones enteras religiosas
han alrededor exactamente como uno podrfa pensar que esta pregunta contestar.7
Parece que el conocimiento incompleto o parcial ficilmente puede conducir
hacia la aceptaci6n de una posici6n extrema en cualquier nfimero de Areas. Por
ejemplo, abrazando un final u el otro de extremos opuestos enfrente sobre
cualquier continuo a menudo parece representar un desequilibrio en el
racionamiento lo que en tiltima instancia conduce al aislamiento y a la desuni6n.
Ain, la opci6n para aceptar tal posici6n parece comtin en casi cada disciplina.
Entonces, en la tentativa de contestar las preguntas de estructura y la agencia en
la teorfa social, si en el nivel local, nacional, o internacional, los te6ricos
sociales siguen una larga lfnea de pregunta similar en muchas otras disciplinas.
Los cientfficos sociales tambi6n, como ellos estudian las estructuras y las
instituciones de alguna sociedad dada, y las acciones del individuo dentro de
ellos, son contratados en una bfisqueda muy verdadera para entender donde los
factores de la agencia acaban y donde los estructurales comienzan' A menudo,
esos de nosotros que teorizan sobre estas cuestiones al principio s6lo encuentran
respuestas parciales a nuestras preguntas. Por lo tanto, en general, cualquier
teorfa a menudo s6lo puede proporcionar una muy pequefia parte de la
explicaci6n a los que preguntan bastante y complejo. La bdisqueda por el
equilibrio por lo general puede ser satisfecha s6lo por la comparaci6n, el
contraste y ha sintetizacRion de ideas y conceptos buscando un bien redondeado
e integrado. 9 En ninguna parte esti esto mds evidente que en el anilisis del
conflicto social y en la bfisqueda para su resoluci6n en todos los niveles y a
trav6s de todas las culturas. I0
Aunque el estudio de conflicto y la teoria de resoluci6n de conflicto, estd
al alcance de necesidad multidisciplinaria" esto tambi6n esta claramente
conectado en las ciencias sociales.12 Por esto y debido a la complejidad de la
materia en sR, la conexi6n entre la teorfa social y la necesidad de modelos
simples y prictico se hace obvia.13 El conflicto parece ser tan complicado coma
6. Vea JOHN J. MACIONIS, SOCIETY: THE BASICS 124-125 (4th ed. 1997).
7. Vea SPERRY LEWIS CHAFER, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 183-198 (1974).
8. Cf. RITZER, supra nota 2, en 531.
9. Id. en 633.
10. Cf Byrne & Carter, supra nota 3.
11. Vea J. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL, 5-6 (1992).
12. Vea L COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT, 5 (1956).
13. Vea C. COSTANTINO & C. MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE
TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS xiii (1996).
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frecuente lo 6s. 4 Las fuentes de conflicto a veces parecen casi infinitas y las
consecuencias, cuando no son suficientemente manejados o resueltos, pueden
ser horrorosas.1 Los ejemplos como el genocidio practicado en Bosnia y
Rwanda ilustran solamente como profundamente arraigadas estas fuentes de
conflicto pueden ser experimentadas en situaciones prolongadas en contextos
locales, nacionales, e internacionales. El conflicto ocurre en todos los niveles
de interacci6n social, del mIs grande de las estructuras de la sociedad al mds
pequeflo de los grupos humanos 6 Con estas cosas en mente, un mejor
entendimiento de las teorfas micro y macro sociol6gicas, con mds profundas
ideas en la agencia y relaciones de la estructura, puede ofrecer mucho hacia un
entendimiento integrante de conflicto y hacia el desarrollo de m<s modelos
holfsticos para el encuentro de la resoluci6n.17
Como en el caso de los micro-y macro-sociol6gica, tenRa las preguntas de
estructura y la agencia a veces son vistas como contraposiciones polares, y hasta
pueden ser vistas como conceptos exclusivos mutuamente.18 Aunque haya
ciertas distinciones vdlidas, esto a veces tiene que ser hecho para diferenciar las
cuestiones macro de las estructurales y las cuestiones micro de los de la
agencia,'9 a veces sus semejanzas generales se ofrecen juntos aquf para los
objetivos de simplificaci6n. Esto es mi contenci6n que un acercamiento
equilibrado y holistico te6rico requiere una visi6n integrada sociol6gica del
mundo. Esta perspectiva necesita ser una en el cual la estructura, la agencia, las
cuestiones micro y macro sociol6gicas puedan todas ser consideradas como
conceptos interrelacionados mantenidos unidas por una tensi6n natural que
podria mejor ser conceptuada como un diseflo integrado multidimensional. En
otras palabras, para hacer un entendimiento comprensivo de tales
acontecimientos como las recientes protestas en las reuniones de la
Organizaci6n Mundial Comercial (WTO), las relaciones tensas entre la
estructura y la agencia deben ser tomadas en cuenta. Esto llega hacer
especialmente evidente en la consideraci6n de differentes opiniones que
crudamente contrastan que existen como las polizas econ6mica de una naci6n
pueden autorizar o desautorizar indivRduos y naciones en el mundo entero.
Mucho como el diagrama de Ritzer de andlisis social (visto en la figura
(nimero) 1 debajo) del micro/cuestiones de macro-nivel incluye, los dos ojos
verticales y horizontales, con multi-direccional y la interacci6n de multi-nivel
14. Vea D. WEEKS, THE EIGHT ESSENTIAL STEPS To CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PRESERVING
RELATIONSHIPS AT WORK, AT HOME, AND IN THE COMMUNITY ix (1994).
15. Cf LEMERT, supra nota 1, en 148.
16. Vea W. WILMOT & J. HOCKER, INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT, 33 (1998).
17. Cf COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra nota 13, en 22.
18. Vea G. MARSHALL, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY, 10-11 (1994).
19. Cf RrrZER, supra nota 2, en 522.
entre continuos objetivos/subjetivos y micro/macro, entonces tambi~n la
estructura y las cuestiones de agencia requieren marcos similares para una
evaluaci6n comprensiva.2 ° Y, tal como el modelo de cubo social de Carter
demuestra la importancia de ver las interconecciones, relaciones y la interacci6n
entre muchas variables sociales (visto en la figura (ndmero) 2 debajo)21,
entonces tambi6n, este artfculo ilustrard la complejidad, acentuari la necesidad
y animard el desarrollo de mejorar el angdisis de conflicto a uno mds
comprensivo y el modelo de resoluci6n. Los disefios de sistemas de intervenci6n
de conflicto realmente provechosos requieren la capacidad de analizar
interacciones complejas sociales y de ofrecer la clarificaci6n de las dos
influencias sociolgicas en la teoria social (y en la teorfa de resoluci6n de
conflicto) y estructural/agencia y micro/macro. Pero el los tambi6n tienen que
proporcionar la simplicidad por cual ofrecer la ayuda verdadera a los m6dicos
de resoluci6n de conflicto quien procura6n aplicarlos a casos ordinarios en el
internacional, asf como a local y a ajustes nacionales.
Il. PERSPECTIVAS ENSANCHADORAS
Por las limitaciones inherentes en una persona que tiene s6lo informaci6n
y perspectiva, la esperanza para el progreso hacia disefios mds integrantes nos
desaffan para ensanchar nuestros campos de (opini6n). El interfaz entre la
agencia, la estructura, los factores micro y macro en la determinaci6n de las
tiltimas causas de conflicto es complicado en parte debido a "la naturaleza
invisible" de influencias de nivel macro-estructurales sobre indivRduos y sobre
grupos. Por ejemplo, el principio universal internacional de la ley de derechos
humanos no es percibido culturalmente en la misma luz en China que en las
democracias del Oeste. Esta divergencia de valores culturales contribuye a la
escalada de conflicto entre pafses a nivel internacional. Ademis, hay la remota
complejidad adicional debido alas consideraciones multidimensionales de cada
uno.
Por ejemplo, Martin Luther King, Junior demostro, en sus escrituras y en
su vida, el potencial de cambio de la sociedad de resistencia no violente.22 zPero
c6mo podrfa mejor analizar y explicar solamente como acciones tanto
individuales como corporativas chocan positivamente una sociedad? De otra
manera, cada acto individual de resistencia podria ser "la agencia" considerada
en su nivel mds bdsico. El Doctor King ilustra esto maravillosamente cuando 61
cita a Henry David Thoreau sobre la cuesti6n de esclavitud, "...aye, si un
20. Id.
21. Cf. Byme & Carter, supra nota 3.
22. Vea J. FAHEY & R. ARMSTRONG, A PEACE READER: ESSENTIAL READINGS ON WAR, JUSTICE,
NON-VIOLENCE AND WORLD ORDER, 113-128 (1992).
Hare 107720021
1078 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1073
hombre honesto, en el estado de Massachusetts, cesando de sostener a esclavos,
debiera en realidad retirarse de la coparticipaci6n, y ser encerrado en la cd.rcel
comarcal por lo tanto, esto seria la abolici6n de la esclavitud en Am~rica. ' 23 De
verdad, la historia nos proporciona con una pl6tora de ejemplos en los que las
acciones de indivRduos han tenido una profunda importaci6n social. Pero
entonces, al contrario el Doctor King tambi6n reconoce la necesidad de una
agencia mds grande cuando 61 declara que el 6xito de protesta no violente
depende "de un movimiento de masas" para lograr sus objetivos.24 1l mds lejos
amplia la importancia de acoplamiento entre los dos cuando 61 escribe que
"...no es una lucha entre la gente en absoluto, pero una tensi6n entre justicia e
injusticia. ,25
Aunque agentes individuales participen (y son vitales para este
movimiento) un entendimiento completo de que es realmente en el trabajo de
extiender el marco mi.s grande de analizar las estructuras y los sistemas de valor
de la sociedad en total. La filosoffa del Doctor King claramente integra la
participaci6n de individuos con grupos para mover la conciencia de la sociedad
mds grande y hasta del mundo. Aunque es posible aislar y categorizar sus
declaraciones individuales y conceptos de modo en que ellos podrfan ser
clasificados como ya s6a micro o macro en la naturaleza, la descripci6n se
marcha con un sentido de necesidad de ver el todo como una gama
interconectada de ideas sobre un continuo entre dos.
Asimismo las preguntas de estructura y la agencia son de la misma manera
26dificiles de separarse. LEn que coyuntura la agencia del final individual y a la
influencia del grupo se hace primaria? Un modelo con la capacidad para
grdficamente ilustrar y traer el significado a estas relaciones podrfa ser el mis
provechoso para econstruir perspectivas nuevas holfsticas y equilibradas. Un
ejemplo relativamente reciente del interfaz entre la agencia y cuestiones de
estructura, causando una direcci6n positiva del conflicto y la resoluci6n, es
encontrado en el impacto de multinivel de la Verdad y el Comit6 de
Reconciliaci6n (TRC) y sus esfuerzos entre 1994-1996 para curar el conflicto
inter-grupo entre Negros y Blancos en Suddfrica. Este esfuerzo representa una
intervenci6n estructural dentro de una sociedad con un objetivo de transformar
relaciones entre grupos 6tnicos abajo al nivel micro de interacci6n individual y
la cooperaci6n.
No hay duda que la dindimica de acciones no violentes tomadas por muchas
personas durante la campahia por los derechos civRles en este pals impact6 a
Am6ica en cada nivel. IndivRduos y familias han sido cambiados para
23. Cf LEMERT, supra nota 1, en 347.
24. Id. en 345.
25. Id.
26. Cf RrrZER, supra nota 2, en 521.
siempre.27 Entonces fueran ciudades enteras y eventualmente nuestra naci6n
entera y el mundo z8 Pero los cambios fueron imperfectos e incompletos. Y
conflictos nuevos han substituido los viejos. Y las preguntas nuevas se
originaron, y no han ain sido contestadas manteniendo un remoto estudio y el
andlisis. iQu6 realmente causo los conflictos en primer lugar? iLas respuestas
ser<n encontradas en nuestra historia? ZEn nuestra religi6n? ,Son estas la causa
de este origen en indivRduos o en grupos? ZQu6 estructuras sociales
contribuyeron y facilitaron estos problemas? ZQu6 factores culturales y
psicol6gicos aceleraron los actos de violencia y que factores contribuyeron
inhibindolos? iPor qu6 acciones similares no tienen el mismo efecto en otros
ajustes? ZPor qu6 estrategias diferentes parecen trabajar mds con eficacia en una
cultura que en la otro?
IV. EVrrANDO LOS EXTREMOS
Evitando el extremismo causado por la (concentraci6n) de un s6lo campo
extrecho de informaci6n parcial no es siempre un asunto simple. En la tentativa
de negociar fuerzas parad6jicas en relaciones sociales, unos han tendido hacia
la polarizaci6n te6rica por la retirada a un final del continuo o el otro. Un
ejemplo claro puede ser encontrado en el trabajo de David Riesman como 61
intenta explicar por qu6 los indivRduos acttian en la sociedad de modos
especfficos. tl (cita) de Erich Fronm en cuanto a las conexiones entre
estructuras sociales y el desarrollo de cardcter del individual humano. tl
concluye que los deseos mismos y las motivaciones de los individuos parecen
estar totalmente y absolutamente decididos en el nivel macro-estructural por el
adoctrinamiento de la sociedad puesto en prictica por el proceso de
socializaci6n. Il va mas lejos cuando amplia esta idea, de influencia social
sobre indivRduos, incluir todos " ... los modos [S] de conformidad-aun siendo
esto, hasta ser ello una de rebeli6n. '' 9
Si es aplicado uniformemente y mundialmente, sus inferencias parecerfan
ampliar en el concepto aun hasta los movimientos de resistencia no violenta de
lideres como Vaclay Havel, Nelson Mandela, Coraz6n Aquino, Shimon Peres,
Mohandas Gandhi y Martin Luther King, junior. Si uno acepta esta premisa, uno
parecerfa ser obligado para a concluir que hasta los individuos podrfan decidir
rebelarse, en una forma o otra desde la cultura dominante, las influencias
formando cardcter de aquella cultura hacen que los actores individuales
"quieran" rebelarse. Toda agencia individual humana parece haber sido asf
27. Vea M. EDELMAN, LATERNS: A MEMOIR OF MENTORS (1999).
28. Vea e.g. JESSICA SENEHI, VIOLENCE PREVENTION (2000) available en
http://webct.nova.edu/adrd6l70senehi/syllabus.htm.
29. Cf LEMERT, supra nota 1, en 322.
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negado y cada individuo por consiguiente reducido a un mero recepticulo
pasivo de las fuerzas mis grandes estructurales. ,C6mo es esto actualmente
logrado segiin Riesman? Su teorfa parece implicar una capacidad de una
sociedad dada para predeterminar que es necesario para sus propios intereses
mejores y causar los resultados deseados.3° Esto es logrado por la formaci6n del
cardcter de indivRduos dentro de ello por las instituciones sociales de familia,
las escuelas, y el gobierno. La persona individual por lo tanto parece pasiva. El
o ella parecen simplemente ser un conducto de estas fuerzas y luego en iiltima
instancia legar a hacer un vehfculo para apoyarlos y reproducirlos. Otros
te6ricos sociales parecen sacar conclusi6nes similar es, aceptando al
determinismo macro-sociol6gico, en t6rminos aun mis concisos. Bruce
Mayhew, por ejemplo, "En la sociologia estructural, la unidad de andlisis es
siempre la red social, nunca el individuo."' 1 La naturaleza del sistema de
apartheid en Suddfrica ilustra como la violencia estructural del estado hacia
Negros, Asiiticos, Colorados y Blancos puede ser institucionalizada dentro de
una sociedad y interiorizada dentro de indivRduos. Pero otra vez, la pregunta
surge, d6nde recide la responsabilidad de este mal? ZEsto puede ser totalmente
el resultado de las fuerzas estructurales solamente... or los individuos comparten
la culpa? Mayhew, y otros como 61, parecerfa concluir en dltima instancia que
la opci6n de un indivRduo no puede ser separada de las macro-fuerzas de la
sociedad a la que este pertenece.
Del otro lado de esta cuesti6n existe (estd) otro polo te6rico. Unos
neo-Marxistas los te6ricos claramente rechazaron el concepto paralelo del
"determinism mecdnico" que pareci6 ser implicado por escritores como Engels
en la oratoria de "la disminuci6n inevitable de capitalismo. '' 12 MIS bien que la
consideraci6n de influencias estructurales como alguna fuerza irresistible en la
historia, los te6ricos como Georg Lukacs y Antonio Gramsci propusieron "una
orientaci6n subjetiva" para compensar "el temprano Marxista en el objetivo, el
nivel material. 33 La Escuela de Teoria Critica, en total, mds lejos critic6 el
positivismo de sociologfa para permitir al m6todo cientffico legitimar el status
quo.34 Si uno rechaza estos principios a fondo lo suficiente, no puede haber
ninguna cadena de causa y efecto y asf ningunas posibles fuerzas determinantes
estructurales, s6lo subjetivos.
ZPor qu6 tal extremismo? Lewis discute que la resistencia a un paradigma
mis integrado no es tanto como te6rica que polftica porque la oposici6n para la
teoria existente es a menudo la inspiraci6n de la que muchos accesos te6ricos
30. Id. en 321.
31. Cf. RriZER, supra nota 2, en 494.
32. Id. en 272.
33. Id.
34. Id. en 277.
dibujan. En otras palabras, un marco integrado te6rico amenaza a sus accesos
mds independientes y extremos.35 Quizis esto estd de verdad correcto en algunos
casos. Pero otro posible, mds fundamental, defecto en el racionamiento podria
venir de la tendencia en todos de nosotros para querer alcanzar la comprensi6n
total de cualquier materia en consideraci6n. Esto proviene de las tendencias
bisicas reduccionistas que acompafian nuestra condici6n humana de este deseo
de entender y explicar la realidad en una manera absoluta a pesar de nuestra
propia experiencia limitada, conocimiento, y perspectiva. Por ejemplo,
buscando entender el conflicto Israelf-Palestino en el aislamiento es un ejercicio
en de la inutilidad. Uno necesita considerar el contexto mis amplio regional del
conflicto Arabe-Israelf. Asimismo un estudio de la polftica de guerra frfa
multifacetica de las rivalidades Norteamericanas-U.S.S.R seguramente sirve
para ilustrar la necesidad de entendimiento y el desenredo de las capas
complejas e interrelacionadas de contextos de los conflictos locales, regionales
e internacionales. La simplificaci6n excesiva, a lo mis , s6lo pospone el trabajo
verdadero de andlisis y el logro de entendimiento mutuo.
Con las limitaciones de nuestras propias capacidades individuales y
experiencias, podemos sufrir las tendencias intelectuales hacia el estrechamiento
del campo a una gama manejable, sobre todo con respecto a problemas
parad6jicos. De modo bastante interesante, la sabidurRa literarea antigua dirige
estas preocupaciones con una perspicacia asombrosa. En la filosoffa, la
definici6n de paradoj< Ileva la idea de una contradicci6n implfcita.36 Pero en la
teologfa de Judeo-Cristiano, una paradoja es definida como una condici6n en la
que hay s6lo una contradicci6n evidente.37 En otras palabras, solamente porque
uno totalmente no puede comprender la anchura, la altura o la profundidad de
una cuesti6n, esto no necesariamente requiere que esto sea en sf mismo
contradictorio. Mds lejos, el elogio de un proverbio viejo hebreo anima bastante
a una persona para aceptar ambos lados de la paradoja aun sin una comprensi6n
total de la cuesti6n. Expresamente en este contexto, dirigiendo unas complejas
preguntas relacionadas con la existencia del bien y del mal, esto declara: " Es
bueno que Ud (comprenda) una cosa, y tambi6n no deje ir el otro ...38 Para
parafrasear, esto estd aceptable en la btisqueda del entendimiento mis grande
para una persona permitir a una evidente contradicci6n para mantenerse
mientras uno sigue persiguiendo la sabidurfa y el conocimiento necesario de
(comprender) ambos al mismo tiempo. Entonces, para aplicar estas perspicacias
a la teorfa social, quizds nosotros deberfamos estar mds dispuestos, que a
menudo nosotros estamos para alguna disonancia cognoscitiva hace mucho para
35. Id. en 228-229.
36. Cf. SOLOMAN, supra nota 5, en 40.
37. Vea W. ELWELL, EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY, 826 (1984).
38. Vea ECCLESIASTES 7:18.
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seguir la btisqueda por el equilibrio y la terminaci6n en lugar de sucumbir a la
tentaci6n para conformarse con un extremo o el otro. Las ocasiones de ejercer
esta clase de preocupaci6n abierta hacia puntos de vista diversos estdn
abundantes en tales acontecimientos tales como las guerras religiosas de nuestro
propio dfas. Los Fundamentalistas IslImicos e Israelfes se interesan a menudo
y parecen ser mutuamente exclusivos. Las posiciones pol6micas que han sido
frecuentemente presentadas para "justificar" limpiezas tnicas en tales sitios que
Balcanes y Rwanda ilustran la necesidad de paradigmas nuevos de andlisis y un
estiramiento de perspectivas paracomprenderracionamientos. Seguramente esto
no es querido para sugerir que el alojamiento al por mayor de tales
racionamientos necesariamente fuera apropiado, pero bastante que un
movimiento hacia la creaci6n de mejores marcos en los que podemos analizar,
comprender y adecuadamente se dirigen como conflictos serian mds
constructivos y animarfan mis soluciones de colaboraci6n.
V. ARMONIZACION DE CONCEPTOS
Escritores como C. Wright Molinos tambi~n parecen ofrecer los conceptos
que potencialmente podrfan ayudar acortar el abismo entre posiciones de
extremos o conceptos. Su idea de "la imaginaci6n sociol6gica" proporciona
una descripci6n te6rica de como una persona quizds podrfa desenredarse de la
corriente estructural bastante para ganar alguna objetividad y elevarse encima
de las fuerzas invisibles de adoctrinamiento y la paradoja cultura. " Esto le
permite [al poseedor] tener en cuenta a individuos, en la mezcla confusa de su
experiencia diaria, a menudo hecha falsamente consciente de sus posiciones
sociales" " asf la clarificaci6n de la visi6n y la permisi6n esa persona ganar una
perspectiva nueva no obscurecida por la miopia cultural. Mills sugirio que esos
que han estado exitosamente acertados en hacer esto hayan hecho atrav6s del
cuestionamiento de varias claves e investigaci6n de preguntas. Su material es
citado aquf en detalles debido a su importancia directa en cuanto a la necesidad
de un modelo complejo para el andlisis del conflicto y porque esto serA usado
mis tarde en este artfculo para ilustrar el valor significativo que Byrne y el
modelo de Carter proveen a esta discusi6n:4
Primero, Lcudl es la estructura de esta sociedad particular en total? ZCuf.les
son sus componentes esenciales, y como ellos son relacionados el uno con el
otro? ,C6mo esto se diferencia de otras variedades de orden social? LDentro de
ello, cudl es el significado de algdin rasgo particular para su continuaci6n y para
su cambio?
39. Cf. LEMERT, supra nota 1, en 348.
40. Cf Byrne & Carter, supra nota 3.
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Segundo, Zd6nde esta sociedad esti de pie en la historia humana? ZCudl
son las mecdnicas por las que esta se cambiando? i, Cud1 es su lugar dentro y su
significado para el desarrollo de la humanidad en general? jC6mo algfin rasgo
particular que examinamos afectan, y como es afectado por, el perfodo hist6rico
en el que se mueve? LY este perfodo---cudles son los rasgos esenciales? iC6mo
este periodo se diferencia de otros perfodos? LCu6les son las formas
caracterfsticas de la fabricaci6n de la historia?
Tercero, Lqu6 variedades de hombres y mujeres prevalecen en esta
sociedad y en este perfodo? y LQu6 las variedades vienen para prevalecer? iEn
que (maneras) son ellos seleccionados, formados, liberadas y reprimidas,
hechos sensibles y embotadas? LQu6 clases de 'naturaleza humana' son
reveladas en la conducta y el caicter nosotros que observamos en esta sociedad
en este perfodo? Y cual es el significado para 'la naturaleza humana' de cada
uno y cada rasgo de la sociedad que examinamos.4'
Note la forma en que las preguntas de Mills conducen a un observador a
analizar los niveles diferentes de interacci6n social y la naturaleza recfproca de
como ellos se interrelacionan. Note tambi6n la contextualizaci6n de colocar la
solicitud de su ajuste tinico hist6rico y cultural y las exigencias reflectivas y
reflexivas de respuestas completas prohibidas. iAsumiendo que podemos estar
bastante acertados en hacer esto para comenzar el andlisis de la estructura de la
agencia/y la integraci6n micro/macro y cuestiones de acoplamiento, qu6 los
tipos de modelo permiten a un acercamiento multidimensional, multi-acodado
y multi-faceted que serfa bastante comprensivo para ocuparse de todas estas
preguntas y afin bastante simple de ofrecer ayuda prictica a los intervinientes
de conflictos? Quizis una consideraci6n breve de algunas ideas del pasado
puede ayudar en la ilustraci6n de las capacidades fue estos nuevas modelos
podrfan requerir.
VI. APRENDIENDO DEL PASADO
Mirar las teorfas clisicas sociales del pasado potencialmente puede ser de
ayudarnos en al menos dos temas. Primero, podemos claramente reconocer las
perspicacias(ideas) provechosas ganadas por estos te6ricos sociales hacia un
mejor entendimiento del acoplamiento entre los inter6ses de la agencia
micro/macro estructurales. En segundo lugar, tambi6n potencialmente podemos
descubrir aquellos factores que ya seriamente han sido considerados en el
andlisis de lateorfa social y, por la omisi6n, los que claramente no. Aunque
algunos soci6logos y te6ricos de conflicto hayan tendido a caracterizar a los
te6ricos cldsicos sociales resideniendo principalmente sobre un lado u otro en
este debate, Jorge Ritzer nota que ellos generalmente demostraban una
41. Cf. LEMERT, supra nota 1, en 349.
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preocupaci6n por ganar un mejor entendimiento de acoplamientos micro-
macro.42 Las secciones siguientes intentardn resumir las partes representativas
de algunas de sus escrituras para ayudar ilustrar este punto. Siendo asf, podemos
aprender como estos pensadores sociales contribuyeron a la integraci6n de estos
conceptos, de un lado, y ain no lograron pensar bastante comprensivamente
sobre el otro. Quizdis por reconociendo unos de los defectos de sus propias
esfuerzos para considerar todos los factores sociales relevantes, podemos evitar
hacer errores similares nosotros mismos y asf agregar perspectivas nuevas a
estas contribuciones pasadas.
A. Karl Marx
Comenzamos con Karl a Marx con precisi6n porque al macro-sociol6gico
y el 6nfasis de conflicto 61 pareci6 colocar sobre un campo relativamente
estrecho de factores causales, especificamente econ6micos. Su acercamiento
dial6ctico fu6 en muchos sentidos revolucionario en su potencial para el
vencimiento de unas las barreras el pensamiento linear de otros te6ricos. El
demostr6 una integraci6n de factores hist6ricos y subjetivos en sus escrituras
que fueron eran excepcionales. Sin embargo, en sus desacuerdos de las clases
sociales y en su anmlisis de conflicto social, 61 pareci6 considerar factores
econ6micos como casi particularmente responsable de los males de la sociedad
asf como potencialmente de lo mejor en cual encontrar soluciones. Entonces, a
pesar de las opportunidades presentadas por este acercamiento dial6ctico, Marx
sin embargo pareci6 conceder a factores econ6micos la mayor parte de valor
comparando con todas otras consideraciones sociales y categorias. En segundo
lugar, parece que el disminuyo la importancia de otras fuerzas sociales, por
ejemplo, factores religiosos en el conflicto que se intensifica. El reconoci6 la
realidad de influencias religiosas en la sociedad, pero pareci6 redujo al minimo
su importancia sobre todo hacia el encuentro de soluciones positivas.
Por esta dindriica, Marx a menudo ha sido interpretado como un
estructuralista extremo.4a Esta realidad ilustra m6s lejos la necesidad de modelos
que puedan ofrecer accesos dial6cticos y multidimensionales te6ricos. Aunque
el argumento de Marx sobre el conflicto de clase indica la importancia de
cuestiones econ6micas en la intensificaci6n de conflictos internacionales, alli
permanece una necesidad de tener un valor mds equilibrado en cuento a ser
asignado a una variedad de factores relevantes sociales, y a la interacci6n que
ellos tienen en los niveles miltiples de sociedad. Un ejemplo moderno de esta
complejidad puede ser visto en los conflictos crfticos entre el Grupo de
Naciones G-7 y el grupo de setenta y siete. Seguramente la econornfa es central
42. Cf RrIZER, supra nota 2, en 494.
43. ld. en 271.
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a muchas relaciones tensas que existen entre el mas rico de desarrollado y el
mas pobre de naciones en desarrollo. Pero al mismo tiempo, las complejidades
de sistemas de valor enormemente divergentes mds lejos componen y complican
el encuentro de la paridad y la justicia en una manera que pueda ser entendida
como igualmente satisfactorio para todos. Consideraciones econ6micas son
claramente la clave a los conflictos, pero no son ficilmente interpretados en el
vacfo del mono-culturalismo. Mis bien mucho puede ser aprendido mirarando
perspectivas culturales por unas lentillas antes del dibujo de evaluaciones
finales.
B. Emile Durkheim
Emile Durkheim claramente se precup6 asRmismo con cuestiones macro-
sociol6gicas y temas estructurales y con los efectos que esas fuerzas sociales
ejercieron sobre los indivRduos en una sociedad. De hecho, sus crfticas de la
sociologfa de su propio dfa relacionado a su fracaso, en varios niveles, para
considerablemente diferenciarse de otras disciplinas acad6micas, sobre todo
psicologfa. Esto remoto revel6 su inter6s en el reino macro/estructural y al
cuidado de sociedad junto por normas culturales y legales. Uno de sus puntos
primarios relacionados a la inhabilidad evidente de la sociologfa de identificar
un dominio que podrfa Ilamarse asRmismo. En Sociologla y Hechos Sociales
6l escribe, " el m6todo Sociol6gico como el que practicamos ello descansa
totalmente sobre el principio bisico que hechos sociales deben ser estudiados
como cosas, es decir como la realidad externa al individual.., no puede haber
ninguna sociologfa amenos que las sociedades existan, y ... las sociedades no
pueden existir si hay s61o individuos. "44
En la comparaci6n de la sociologfa con la psicologfa en este contexto, 61
claramente demarcaba la materia del anterior como esto expresamente se
relacion6 con objetos totalmente se separados existencia de meros indivRduos
en la sociedad y la indicaci6n que la psicologia deberfa ser la disciplina de
ciencia social que reclama al indivRduo, en la manera parecida, como asR
mismo. bl por lo tanto, en un sentido, coloca la sociologfa directamente en el
dominio de teorfa macro/estructural. Pero aun mientras haciendo esto, Durkheim
no es te6ricamente categ6ricamente separando micro de macro, la estructura y
la escencia son preocupaciones del del uno al otro. En cambio, 61 continda
ofrececiendo ideas significativas relacionadas a su acoplamiento. Esto es
demostrado en sus trabajos sobre anomie y el suicidio. Por ejemplo, en su
Anomie y la Divisi6n Moderna de Trabajo, 61 expresa la preocupaci6n en el
macro-nivel sobre una influencia que se disminuye de refrenamiento moral y la
guia direcci6n en la sociedad moderna. Entonces esta el ocupando las fuerzas
44. Cf. LEMERT, supra nota 1, en 73.
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subjetivas macro-sociales y estructurales en el desarrollo de normas y valores
en la sociedad moderna. Y ain, en el mismo contexto, 61 une(conecta) este
fen6meno particular social -.de conciencia colectiva - a la agencia de la persona
individual como teniendo un efecto verdadero sobre la sociedad.45
Entonces, a pesar de la realidad macro del objetivos y estructuras
subjetivas sociales, en el nivel micro, la libertad individual, claramente segtin
Durkheim, maneja consecuencias muy verdaderas en su acoplamiento a los
problemas m6.s grandes estructurales de una sociedad. Ademds, el modelo
functionalista de Durkheim modela mds tarde llego a ser hicieron el marco
filos6fico para el desarrollo en 1948 de la Comunidad europea De carb6n y De
acero (ECSC). Este movimiento, reuniendo las industrias de carb6n y de acero
de Alemania y Francia, demostr6 existosamente a taves de la prevenci6n de
ellos de ir a la guerra entre eflos mismos. La cooperaci6n cientffica y econ6mica
cre6 las normas de interdependencia que se ha desbordado en el reino politico
por los socios dilatados de la Comunidad Econ6mica Europea (la CEE). Esta
integraci6n de fuerzas, y en los niveles macro y micro, caus6 una relaci6n que
trabaja y el sistema de paz que tambi6n ha causado una superpotencia poiftica
y econ6mica regional, la Uni6n europea (EU).
ZPero cuales son las conexiones entre estos niveles variantes? En el
Suicidio y la Modernidad, el coraz6n mismo de la tesis de Durkheim se
relaciona con la identificaci6n de los factores sociales, mds all, del individuo,
aquella gente de influencia en la sociedad para tomar sus propias vidas. En esta
conexi6n, la correlaci6n de tarifas de suicidio a factores extemos sociales hace
necesario la consideraci6n de dindimica macro-estructural en la relaci6n a esta
cuesti6n. Durkheim hace esto en parte correlacionando las varias tarifas de
suicidio de naciones diferentes por categorfas ocupacionales.' bL lo hace en
principio por (conectando) la determinaci6n de factores " a alguna fuerza
exterior" al individuo.47 Pero en iltima instancia, la agencia para el suicidio es
sumamente reconocida en el micro-nivel de opci6n individual y el
comportamiento como normas sociales se rompen estropean y causa el aumento
de suicidio. Durkheim seguramente parece reconocer esto cuando 61 habla de los
"libres combinaciones de la voluntad del hombre.. ."48
Por lo tanto otra vez, tanto como las fuerzas macro/estructural y
micro/agencia existen . . . ZPero c6mo exactamente estas interrelacionan?
Durkheim hace que nosotros preguntemos las preguntas cometas, pero no logra
integrarlos de tal modo para ayudarnos a entender acoplamientos. Modelos mds
complejos, con la capacidad para ayudar a establecer estas relaciones es
45. Id. en 70.
46. Id. en 81.
47. Id. en 75.
48. Id. en 74.
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necesario para la remota clarificaci6n de todas las variables en la sociedad y
como ellos actdan reciprocamente entre ellos a diferentes niveles.
C. Max Weber
Max Weber es tambi6n conocido principalmente por sus magnifficas
narrativas en cuanto a la burocracia creciente de la edad moderna.49 La
naturaleza misma del sujeto en sR tiene un componente intrinseco, colectivo que
depende de la masa de individuos para su muy existencia y funci6n. " La
burocracia es el medio de Ilevar ' la acci6n de comunidad ' un orden racional
' la acci6n social' . . . "Y el bur6crata individual "es unicamente un diente solo
en un mecanismo alguna vez movido... "50 Atin, Weber es tambidn al parecer
agudamente consciente de la importancia de la agencia individual, hasta en la
burocracia mds grande. Como 61 discute el mando y la autoridad, 61 se dirige,
a macro-estructural y en la micro-agencia como tipos de autoridad legftima en
la sociedad. Las formas Racionales y Tradicionales de mando encuentran su
poder en las instituciones estructurales de autoridad racional-legal y tradiciones
sagradas sociales. Sin embargo, cuando 61 viene a su tipo pasado, la Autoridad
Carismdtica, 61 declara que su base reside sobre "devocion a la santidad
excepcional, el herofsmo o caricter ejemplar de una persona individual... ,5"
Asf, sus teorfas revelan una creencia que la burocracia imaginable mds grande
todavfa puede ser afectada por la agencia de una persona, pero tambi6n que las
individuos viva en" una jaula de hierro ". Sin embargo, los conflictos entre la
burocracia e individuos parecen claramente preocupar a Weber.5 2 Otros factores
deben ser implicados. ZPero cuales son ellos y como son ellos
interrelacionados? Las teorfas de Weber parecen inadecuadas de contestar
muchas estas preguntas, pero, al mismo tiempo, sirven para ilustrar la carencia
de pensamiento crftico en nuestro mundo.
Hoy, relaciones tensas similares parecerfan existir con tales
acontecimientos como la explosi6n de la Internet y el comercio electr6nic. Las
comunicaciones globales han sido aceleradas, asf disolviendo las fronteras
geogrdficas en un pueblo global de clases. Sin embargo, la tecnologfa racional
parece tener no s6lo ventajas proporcionadas innegables al g6nero humano, pero
tambi6n ha causado una erradicaci6n de las diferencias de culturas, una
inhibici6n de pensamiento crftico y una efectuaci6n que se han llamado el "La
49. Id. en 199-124.
50. Id en 109.
51. Id. en 115.
52. Id. en 100-104.
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McDonaldization de la sociedad"'53 o, tomado prestado de la terminologfa de
Weber, la creaci6n de un globo "jaula de hierro."
VII. SINTETIZACION DE IDEAS
La realidad de esta interacci6n compleja de indivRduos y grupos ha
inspirado esfuerzos de desarrollar modelo de interacci6n social que quizds
podrfa deshacerse en la luz nueva sobre como estos elementos diferentes se
interrelacionan. Lo que aparece carecer, sin embargo, son el modelo de andlisis
de conflicto que proporciona marcos adecuados capaces de demostrar los
paradigmas holfsticos y equilibrados de la interacci6n social, sobre todo como
relacionado a las complejidades de conflicto social entre indivRduos y grupos,
a escala nacional yen la arena global. Un acercamiento ha sido desarrollado por
la prfctica de compararse teorfas sociales entre ellos en un campo nuevo
llamada andlisis meta-te6rico.54 Esta integraci6n de teorfas ha proporcionado
a cientfficos sociales por marcos nuevos con cual descubrir y considerar
relaciones antes no exploradas.
Jorge Ritzer ofrece un diagrama de los Niveles Principales de Andlisis
Social disefilado para integrar los aspectos micro y macro de interacci6n. 55 Esta
carta de dos-dimensiones muestra dos ejes, uno vertical y el otro horizontal. El
eje vertical proporciona una continuidad de macrosc6pico a microsc6pico. El
eje horizontal ofrece un continuo similar del objetivo a subjetivo. Esto divide
el grifico total sobre cuatro cuadrantes con las categorfas siguientes: Macro-
objetivo, macro-subjetivo, micro-objetivo y micro-subjetivo. Las flechas que
sefialan ambas direcciones conectan cada uno de los cuadrantes a todos los otros
indicando el acoplamiento multidireccional que interconecta cada parte del
diagrama en relaciones dial6cticas. Esto asegura una gama sobre el eje
horizontal" ...de fen6menos materiales como la acci6n individual y estructuras
burocriticas a fen6menos no materiales como conocimiento, normas, y valores
"Y sobre el eje vertical" ...del pensamiento del individuo pens6 y la acci6n
a los sistemas mundiales".56 Este modelo anima al investigador a considerar el
marco mds grande en total m6s bien que cualquier componente solo en el
aislamiento. Esto m s lejos grgficamente coloca cada uno de los cuatro
cuadrantes en la relaci6n igual e implica la equidad de importancia a cada
dindmiico.
La utilizaci6n el diagrama de Ritzer para analizar el movimiento de
desobediencia no violente de Gandhi Mohandas podria colocar, por ejemplo, los
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. en 497.
56. Id. en 496-499.
propios valores personales de Gandhi de justicia e la injusticia en la categora
micro-subjetiva. Sus actividades de protesta reales personales podrfan ser
consideradas en el cuadrante micro-objetivo te6rico. La aceptaci6n de la
sociedad mds grande de unos estos valores podrfa ser considerada una parte de
los fen6menos macro-subjetivos y cualquier legislaci6n de derechos civiles de
pasar real que ha sido promulgada por el poder Britdnico colonial, en el macro -
la categorfa objetiva. Entonces, en la consideraci6n a indivRduos y grupos, sus
creencia y acciones, su impacto sobre valores culturales y la promulgaci6n
legislativa, podemos movernos por todos los cuatro marcos analfticos
manteniendo una continuo e interconectada te6ria de interacci6n. Este modelo
proporciona un gran paso hacia una perspectiva mds holfstica capaz de dibujar
a multiples sobre los niveles sociol6gicos de andlisis.
VIII. EXPLORANDO DIMENSIONES NUEVAS
Otro modelo que ofrece el potencial para un andlisis hasta mis
comprensivo es Byrne y el Cubo Social de Carter, 7 que tiene seis facetas
comparadas a las cuatro de Ritzer. Esto proporciona potencialmente mds
din<micas dial~cticas manteniendo la simplicidad relativa de disefho. Esto
grfficamente es presentado como un cubo simple con cada uno de sus seis lados
que representan caras diferentes o las facetas de realidad social. Esto incluye
datos demogr.ficos, la religi6n, la historia, factores econ6micos, factores
polfticos y factores psycho-culturales. Su disefio es adaptado a la consideraci6n
de ethno-politicos territorial es con un objetivo indicado de proporcionar mi.s
una vista completa de fen6menos sociales. "S61o cuando uno considera que las
interrelaciones entre las caras del rompecabezas pueden progresar hacia una
soluci6n mds holistica." S Una clave remota a su utilidad es encontrada en un
6nfasis, no sobre categorfas rfgidas, pero sobre entierran - relaciones. Su foco
intencionadamente es dirigido lejos de concentrarse en cualquier categorfa
exclusivamente, y hacia la ganancia de(adelantamiento) un entendimiento mds
gran de la interacci6n existente entre ellos.59 El modelo de cubo social es
aplicado a los dos, a Irlanda del Norte y conflictos de Quebec que ilustran el
juego complejo de relaciones entre Protestantes y Cat6licos en Irlanda del
Norte, y Anglosajones y Franco-sajones en Quebec.
IX. CUBO SOCIAL DE BYRNE & CARTER
Regresando otra vez, para la ilustraci6n, a la consideraci6n general de
Gandhi Mohandas y su participaci6n en los derechos humanos el movimiento
57. Cf Byrne & Carter, supra nota 3.
58. Id. en !.
59. Id. en 2.
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de protesta no violente en India, podemos comparar sus caracterfsticas a los
criterios del cubo social. La dindmica ahora ofrecida movimiento de las cuatro
categorfas encontradas en el modelo de dos dimensiones de Ritzer a las seis
categorfas encontradas en Byrne y el modelo tridimensional de Carter. Pero algo
mis parece tambien desarrollarse. Por escrito sobre conflictos ethno-territoriales
en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec, Byrne y Carter notan la tendencia de unos para
concentrarse en una categorfa u otro ms bien que la consideraci6n de
combinaciones o hasta competencias entre los varios factores."' La gente que
se concentra en s6lo un aspecto, o al lado del rompecabezas, es improbable que
produzcan una soluci6n completa o la im<gen del problema. En la utilizaci6n
del modelo tridimensional, esto se hace mucho mis claro solamente como
dial6ctico en la naturaleza la teorfa de conflicto social debe ser para analizar
suficientemente los niveles diferentes y las categorfas de factores descubiertos,
sobre todo en el conflicto social. Por ejemplo, mis bien que el simplemente
intento siempre de colocar los niveles diferentes de realidad social en uno u otro
de las cuatro categorfas del modelo de Ritzer y luego la tentativa de visualizar
algtin acoplamiento abstracto entre ellos, Byrne y el andiisis de Carter se mueve
a un ex<men mds complejo de las relaciones entre los aspectos que se
diferencian de un conflicto mils bien que enfocar simplemente a la cual se
sostienen el modelo.
Por ejemplo, el modelo de cubo social ficilmente podrfa animar a
considerar no s6lo, en este caso, el subjetivo, las consideraciones de micro-nivel
de las creencia personales, normas y los valores de Gandhi Mohandas, pero
tambi6n mis lejos analizarlos en el marco de otras facetas del cubo como
aplicable. Ritzer reconoce que su modelo, en general, provee s6lo una "'Foto'
a tiempo. El cubo tridimensional social parece hacer mis de que esto.
Mientras seguramente, el modelo puede representar un solo momento a tiempo,
su disefho y objetivo es animar un andlisis mils contRnuo y dindmico de
desdoblamiento de acontecimientos mientras considera las fluctuaciones y la
interacci6n entre aquellos factores. Por ejemplo, usando s6lo tres de los seis
factores (por simplificaci6n) en Byrne y el Cubismo Social de Carter: Seis
Fuerzas Sociales de Politica Ethnoterritorial en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec
para ilustrar el punto, un anilisis comparativo de los aspectos hist6ricos de
ambos de los conflictos en la consideraci6n tambi6n pueden ser correlacionadas
a los aspectos religiosos de estos conflictos y mds lejos correlacionadas a
factores psycho-culturales. En este ejemplo estos tres factores-la historia, la
religi6n y las consideraciones psycho-culturales cuando son combinados
contraste resultados marco exterior de la ventana las dos culturas debido a las
diferencias creadas por sus combinaciones respectivas (para una modificaci6n
60. Id. en 1.
61. Cf. RrrZER, supra nota 1, en 638.
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ampliada de este modelo vea tanbi6n Russ-Trent, en esta cuesti6n especial).
Las partes siguientes del papel son (citadas) para simplemente ilustrar como
estos factores son entrelazados y en realidad fluctuando a traves del tiempo y el
espacio para crear un ambiente din6.mico, en curso, y alguna vez cambiando
social provecho en el estudio de los conflictos, en Irlanda del Norte y en
Quebec: "La Historia, relatada por los que complicados en conflictos, ponen el
contexto para la corriente la polftica ethno-territorial."62 "Hoy, la religi6n tiene
ms saliente como una categorfa social en Irlanda del Norte que en Quebec."63
"Las relaciones tensas y emociones a menudo se intensificaban durante el
cambio social o se perciben la crisis politica entre Protestantes y Cat6licos en
Irlanda del Norte y entre Anglephones y Francophones en Quebec."'
En estas observaciones de la muestra, la importancia de contexto hist6rico,
los cambios de factores religiosos y los impactos psicol6gicos de relaciones
tensas sociales son todos notados. La dinniica de pasar de los conflictos en
estas dos confrontaciones aparentemente similares culturales toma
caracterfsticas notablemente diferentes debido a las diferencias de la historia y
la religi6n en cada cultura. Y aunque la tercera declaraci6n parece indicar que
el resultado de estas relaciones tensas sobre factores psycho-culturales es el
mismo, uno tiene s6lo que mirar como esta manifiesto (manifestaci6n) de
relaciones tensas ellos mismos de manera diferente en cada ajuste 6tnico para
realizar que estas consideraciones son diferentes tambi6n. La secci6n sobre el
terrorismo, bajo Factores Politicos, en Byrne y el articulo de Carter clarifica este
punto. Las diferencias de la frecuencia y la intensidad de los actos terroristas de
violencia encontrada y en Irlanda del Norte y Quebec, por ejemplo, encuentran
sus orfgenes en la interacci6n entre unos los factores que incluyen los niveles
que se diferencian de acceso a instituciones politicas hist6ricamente. 65 (Para
(espenol) adicionales en el andlisis de culturas similares para descubrir las
variables sutiles que dramIticamente pueden cambiar los resultados, ven el
Arrendajo MacLeod no Es Ningfin Makin Ello).'
Otro aspecto impresionante del modelo de Cubismo Social es encontrado
en su potencial para alcanzar que la C. Wright la cita del Mills indicando que
debe pasar para estudiar objetivamente de aguien propia cultura por el empleo
de imaginacidn sociol6gica67 Note su 6nfasis sobre el estudio de relaciones
(visto la cita encima). En la primera pregunta 61 ofreci6 un ingrediente
62. Cf. BYRNE y CARTER, supra nota 3, en 4.
63. Id. en 7.
64. Id. en 12.
65. Id. en 10-11.
66. Vea J. MACLEOD, AIN'T No MAKIN' IT: ASPIRATIONS AND ATrAINMENT IN A LOW-INCOME
NEIGHBORHOOD (1995).
67. Cf LEMERT, supra nota 1, en 348-352.
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necesario, para un de ganar perspicacias (espenol) en las estructuras de una
sociedad, el encuentro" de los componentes esenciales "de aquellas estructuras
y la informaci6n requerida para entender... LEllos son relacionados con el uno
al otro? ''68 Segundo, Mills dirige la pregunta de historia y su importancia en la
relaci6n de las dos, la cultura en si y otras culturas. Tercero, Mills incluye
preguntas sobre "la naturaleza humana" como lo relaciona a la cultura de modo
igual como Byrne y Carter dirigen "los factores psycho-culturales" en su
modelo de cubismo social. Finalmente, 61 se refiere la palabra "el cambio" en
todas partes de sus preguntas demostrando la necesidad, en cada una de las dreas
de la pregunta, para seguir las dinimica alguna vez cambiados del flujo de
acontecimientos sociales en el estudio cultural.
La utilizaci6n del modelo de cubismo social para considerar otra vez el
ejemplo no violente de Gandhi parecerfa estimular a un anfitri6n entero de
preguntas adicionales para el andlisis, de los dos el micro y los niveles macro.
ZCuil era la historia de este conflicto en India? ZCuil es la relaci6n entre este
conflicto y la historia de colonialismo Britinico? LC6mo esto se relaciona con
las historias de otros movimientos de protesta no violentos? LC6mo las
estructuras rodean estos acontecimientos? iCudles son los factores religiosos?
ZCudles son los factores polfticos? ZCudl es la relaci6n de estos factores a la
gente del otro lado de este conflicto? ZEn que acerca de historias personales de
los lfderes individuales a ambos lados de la protesta? iC6mo los lfderes han
influfdo en otros manifestantes y la sociedad y por que medio? iC6mo los
factores econ6micos se relacionan con la sociedad, los subgrupos y los
indivRduos complicados? ,Qu6 est< cambiando y que no es? ZQu6 conecta
todos estos acontecimientos juntos y en que modelo social?
X. CONCLUSION
El modelo te6rico nos ayuda a organizar la informaci6n y mejor relacionar
conceptos e ideas juntos. Las teorfas de conflicto sociales estdn siempre finitas,
y parciales en la naturaleza, debido alas limitaciones de las propias capacidades
de los te6ricos, experiencias y perspectivas. El modelo de teorfa de conflicto
social que inspira la integraci6n y la sfntesis de puntos de vista aparentemente
opuestos puede provocar (ideas) en las concordancias y compatibilidades entre
ellos y ayudar a cientfficos sociales prever el modelo nuevos y mejores modelos
y teorfas. El modelo hablado en este artfculo nos ayuda a preguntar mds
preguntas de sondeo en las relaciones mutuas entre las estructuras sociales
alrededor de nosotros y los indivRduos que creen y los comprenden. Por
perspectivas ensanchadoras, sintetizando ideas y explorando dimensiones
nuevas, podemos construir sobre los trabajos del pasado y con esperanza
68. Id. en 349.
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descubrir las relaciones que pueden potencialmente revelar soluciones mds
holfsticas con problemas sociales en la zona, a escala nacional y a escala
mundial. El conflicto social plant6a uno de los problemas sociales mis
complejos y diffciles sociales de todos para te6ricos sociales para analizarse,
entenderse y resolverse. Quizdis unas las perspicacias (espenol) ganadas por la
discusi6n y la utilizaci6n de este modelo multidimensional resultar< hasta en el
desarrollo de instrumentos mds prdcticos para el futuro en el campo de la teorfa
de conflicto social y en su aplicaci6n al conflicto social y la resoluci6n de
conflicto.
XI. APPENDICES
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B. Figure 2. Early Warning-Contingency "Social Cube" Escalators/De-
escalators (Byrne & Carter 1996, Byrne & Keashley 2000)
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I. INTRODUCCION
La violencia es una cuesti6n que a menudo es reportada en la cr6nica en
todo el mundo, con historias en medios de comunicaci6n sobre la violencia en
los hogares, calles, escuelas y los centros de trabajo. Aunque ningfin sector de
sociedad es inmune a la violencia, "las historias sobre la violencia en los centros
de trabajo han inundado la prensa... shock ha sobrepasado el histerismo sobre
el crimen en las calles."' Un informe publicado en el aflo 2000 por la Tercera
Encuesta Europea sobre las Condiciones de trabajo indica que mds de 15
millones de personas reportaron violencia, hostigamiento sexual, o intimidaci6n
en los centros de trabajo en Europa con el mayor numero de las quejas siendo
* Candidato de Doctor de Filosoffa en Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
En el reconocimiento del apoyo, el pensamiento creativo y la ayuda editorial del Doctor Sean Byrne quien
proporcion6 el fmpetu y el apoyo para desarrollar y completar este papel.
** Este articulo fue traducido por Javier Talamo.
I. G.R.VANDENBOS Y E.Q. BULATAO. (Editores).. VIOLENCIA SOBRE EL TRABAJO 1, Asociaci6n
Americana Psicol6gica 1996.
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sobre la tensi6n en el trabajo. 2 De los quince millones de incidentes reportados,
trece millones fueron informes de intimidaci6n y acoso y dos millones fueron
informes de trabajadores sujetos a la violencia ffsica por personas que
comparten centro de trabajo.3 Datos de 1993 por la compafifa de seguros
Northwest National Life Insurance4 indican que la violencia y el hostigamiento
en los centros de trabajo estadounidenses son tambi6n comunes, mdis de dos
millones de Americanos son vfctimas de ataques ffsicos en el lugar de trabajo,
seis millones son amenazados, y dieciseis millones son acosados. El problema
de la violencia en el trabajo es claramente global, "cruza las fronteras, lugares
de trabajo y grupos ocupacionales." El informe de 1999 del Ministerio de
Trabajo de los Estados Unidos (DOL) Futurework Report6 indica que 50,000
trabajadores estadounidenses mueren cada afio de enfermedades ocupacionales.
Estos nimeros son asombrosos, pero son s6lo una parte del problema.
Claramente, la violencia afecta directamente la moral del trabajador, la
productividad y en iltima instancia, los recursos econ6micos de la organizaci6n
y la rentabilidad. Sin embargo, la violencia indirecta estructural tambi6n debe
ser considerada cuando uno mira el origen de violencia en los centros de trabajo.
"El origen de la violencia puede ser descrito a lo largo de un continuo que
a menudo comienza como el descontento latente y se intensifica en el conflicto
abierto y en iiltima instancia la violencia. La violencia a lo largo de un continuo
podrfa abarcar" presiones competitivas, la p6rdida de autonomfa personal, la
vigilancia, reacciones acumulativas ffsicas y mentales, la fatiga y cambios en los
datos demogrdficos del lugar de trabajo 7. Estas cuestiones organizativas crean
un entorno cultural que impregna el lugar de trabajo, socializa la mano de obra
en un paradigma de pensamiento y comportaniento que puede conducir a
escalar la violencia dentro del continuo de violencia.
2. La Fundaci6n europea para la Mejora de Vida y el Boletfn de prensa de Condiciones de trabajo,
Condiciones de trabajo en Europa no que mejora, segdn la revisi6n el 14 de diciembre de 2000 disponible en
http://www.eurofound.ie/newsroom/press3.htm (dura 8/28/01 visitado).
3. La Fundaci6n europea para la Mejora de Vida y Condiciones de trabajo, el Hostigamiento y la
violencia disponible en http://ww.eurofound.ie/working/harassment.htm (dura 8/28/01 visitado).
4. Empresa de Seguro de vida Nacional De noroeste. Miedo y violencia en el lugar de trabajo,
1993.
5. Duncan Chappell y Vittorio Di Martino, el Boletin de noticias Asi~tico-pacffico, la Violencia
en el Trabajo, 1999, disponible en http://www.occuphealth.fie/info/asian/ap 199/violence04.htm (dura 2/8/02
visitado).
6. Ministerio de Trabajo estadounidense Futurework Informe: Tendencias y desaffos para trabajo
en el siglo veintiuno, octubre, 1999 disponible en http://www.dol.gov/dollasp /public/ Futurework/execsum.
htm. (Dure 3/13/00 visitado).
7. M. Carroll (1999, el 15 de diciembre). El lugar de trabajo propenso violencia: A acercamiento
nuevo a ocuparse de hostil, amenazas, y comporramiento descorts. 96 (8), EL BOOKLIST, el 15 de
diciembre de 1999 en 743, 743.
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En el andlisis de la amplia gama de las acciones que abarcan la violencia,
uno puede comenzar por definir los factores que contribuyen a las acciones
violentas. Byrne y Carter? identificaron seis fuerzas sociales, descritas como el
cubismo social Ila letras cursivas adicional} que interacttian para crear un
clima de violencia. Aunque el modelo de cubismo social de Byrne y Carter ha
sido aplicado a conflictos etno-politicos, el modelo multifacetico, conrelacion
tambi6n puede ser utilizados para desarrollar un marco conceptual para analizar
las fuerzas sociales que crean el conflicto en el lugar de trabajo. Estas fuerzas
sociales que se interrelacionan en el lugar de trabajo pueden ser analizadas
usando las siguientes seis perspectivas: datos demogrdficos, hist6ricos, psycho-
culturales, equilibrio de poder, (figura 1) polftico y econ6mico. Para en tiltima
instancia aplicar estas fuerzas causativas a la intervenci6n de conflicto, tambi6n
hay que considerar la coneci6n micro-macro a trav6s de los niveles mtltiples de
andlisis utilizado por Byrne y Keashly9, que en este anilisis considerari al
individuo, la organizaci6n y la sociedad en general.
Id. VIOLENCIA EN EL LUGAR DE TRABAJO DEFINIDA
No hay "ningdin acuerdo sobre lo que constituye la violencia en los centros
de trabajo.' 0" La violencia dentro de los centros de trabajo puede ser vista desde
perspectivas mdltiples, con la definici6n mds amplia que incluye todos los actos
de agresi6n contra un individuo dentro del ambiente de su centro de trabajo.
Esta definici6n incluirfa "cualquier forma de comportarniento por los individuos
que son queridos para dafiar a colegas corrientes o anteriores o su
organizaci6n."" Esta definici6n incluye todas las formas de agresi6n,
incluyendo, actos violentos y no violentos como robos, la descortesfa o la
promoci6n de rumores. Ademis, uno podrfa considerar la violencia desde la
perspectiva de los actos que son generados directamente dentro del ambiente de
trabajo asf como los que son secundarios a la organizaci6n, por ejemplo: las
disputas familiares que podrfan ocurrir en el lugar de trabajo que no son
relacionadas con el centro de trabajo.
Para los objetivos de este an6.lisis, la violencia en el centro de trabajo seri
vista como una continuedad de los comportamientos que surgen directamente
del ambiente de trabajo. El andlisis de multifacetico seri basado en la
descripci6n de Galtung de la violencia como un tridngulo de conflicto que
8. Sean Byrne y Neal Carter, cubismo Social: Seisfuerzas sociales de politica ethnoterritorial en
Irlanda del Norte y Quebec, 3 (2), DIARIO DE PAZ Y ESTUDIOS DE CONFLICTO, diciembre, 1996 en 52.
9. Sean Byrne y Loraleigh Keashly, (Trabajando con ethno - conflicto politico: un multi-modal,
el multinivel se acerca para estar en desacuerdo la intervencidn), 7 (I), la Pacificaci6n Internacional, matzo,
2000 en 97.
10. VANDENBOS Y BULATAO, supra nota 1, en 1.
It. Id. en 2.
2002] Litwin 1097
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1095
incluye la violencia directa, estructural (indirecta) y cultural. Segfin Galtung, la
violencia directa incluirfa la herida infligida o dirigida por un individuo hacia
otro, tal como la herida fisica, sanciones y o la detenci6n. 2 La violencia
estructural es la que viene de la estructura misma e incluye aquellas acciones
que intentan dafiar al trabajador o la organizaci6n por m6todos no ffsicos, por
ejemplo: la explotaci6n, la marginalizaci6n, la coacci6n , daflo emocional. El
uso del poder de la organizaci6n sobre su mano de obra para obtener el
cumplimiento del trabajador, comdinmente se manifiesta en la desigualdad
sexual dentro del los ajustes tradicionalmente patriarcales de la organizaci6n.
Una tercera forma de violencia, la violencia cultural, incluye "aquellos aspectos
de la cultura.. .que pueden ser utilizados para justificar o legitimar la violencia
directa o estructural. 3 '" Segdn Galtung, la violencia cultural permite que los
actos de violencia sean aceptados como la norma, que racionaliza la aprobaci6n
latente de la violencia sea directa o sea estructural. Estas formas de violencia
tienen diferentes relaciones de tiempo; "la violencia directa es un
acontecimiento, la violencia estructural es un proceso con altibajos y la
violencia cultural es un invariante, que se mantiene esencialmente igual durante
largos perfodos."' 4
La violencia en sus varias formas puede ser vista como un proceso
dindntico que tiene que ser analizado desde varias perspectivas y niveles de
andlisis. Tal an~lisis de varios niveles proporciona un marco para desarrollar las
intervenciones apropiadas que son necesarias para efectuar un clima en el lugar
de trabajo de paz positiva, defmida por Galtung 5 como la reducci6n o ausencia
de violencia de todo tipo.
Ill. VIOLENCIA EN EL TRABAJO- TENDENCIAS Y OCURRENCIA
La violencia en el centro de trabajo no es un fen6meno tnico en ningtin
pals particular o cultura. Segtin la Organizaci6n Intemacional del Trabajo (ILO)
los informes de violencia en los centros de trabajo y el hostigamiento emanan
de todas las regiones del planeta, con la violencia siendo una realidad diaria para
muchos trabajadores. Segfin el informe de la Organizaci6n Internacional del
Trabajo 6, "el entendimiento ha crecido que la violencia en el trabajo no es
solamente un problema epis6dico, individual, si no una cuesti6n estructural,
12. J. GALTUNG, PAZ POR MEDIO PACfFICO; PAZ Y CONFLICTO, DEVELOOPMENT Y CIVILIZACION.
Publicaciones de SABIO, 1996.
13. Id. en 197.
14. Id. en 199.
15. Id.
16. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safetwork/violence/violwkviolwk.htm Duncan
Chappell y Vittorio Di Martino, Safework la Violencia en el Trabajo, la Organizaci6n internacional de trabajo,
disponible en) (dura 8/28/01 visitado).
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estratdgica arraigada en factores mds amplios sociales econ6micos, de
organizaci6n y culturales."' 17 Aunque las percepciones y la sensibilidad de la
violencia puedan variar enormemente de pals a pafs, esto sin embargo se
encuentra pafses en desarrollo y en naciones industrializadas. 8
La violencia de lugar de trabajo fue descrita en 1984 por el General de
Cirujano estadounidense C. Everett Kropp como un problema de salud ptiblica
de proporci6n significativa, que verdaderamente ha "asumido la proporci6n de
una epidemia.' 9" Desde entonces se han generados datos considerables acerca
de la violencia directa en el lugar de trabajo, con tendencias que muestran
aumentos y disminuciones a trav6s de los afios. Aunque tendencias recientes
muestren una disminuci6n en el numero de homicidios en el lugar de trabajo en
Estados Unidos, hay un aumento en reportes de intimidaci6n y acoso dentro de
la comunidad europea, aunque existen variaciones entre sectores de trabajo y
naciones individuales. Los aumentos de la violencia en el lugar de trabajo y el
hostigamiento tambidn pueden ser una reflexi6n del reconocimiento ptiblico y
la preocupaci6n en todo el mundo sobre los peligros verdaderos y potenciales
de la violencia en los centros de trabajo. Aunque sea real o un producto del
aumento de los casos reportados, esta nueva conciencia ha aumentado los
esfuerzos para identificar el origien y las estrategias posibles para confrontar el
conflicto organizacional.
Segidn el informe de la ORGANIZACION INTERNACIONAL DE
TRABAJO SafeWork, hay varios ejemplos que ilustran "el alcance, la
dimensi6n y los tipos de violencia asociadO con los lugares de trabajo en
muchas partes del mundo"2° incluyendo:
En Sudifrica, algunas encuestas relatan que cuatro de cada cinco
trabajadores han sufrido el tratamiento hostil en el lugar de trabajo.
En el Reino Unido, una encuesta en ano 1994-95 encontr6 que mis de
11,000 trabajadores de venta al ptiblico habian sido victimas de la
violencia fisica y ms de 350,000 habian sido sujetas a amenazas y a
abuso verbal.
En Francia, mis de 2,000 ataques han sido reportados sobre el
personal del sistema parisiense de transporte en 1998.
17. Id. en 8
18. Harassment & Violence (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living Working
conditions) en http://www.eurofound.ie/working/harassment.htm (last visited Feb 8, 2002)
19. M.D. SOUTHERLAND, M.D., P. A. COLLINs Y K.D. SCARBOROUGH, VIOLENCIA DE LUGAR DE
TRABAJO: CONTINUO DE A DE AMENAZA A MUERTE. Anderson Publishing Compafifa 1997, 1.
20. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safetwork/violence/violwkviolwk.htm Duncan
Chappell y Vittorio Di Martino, Safework la Violencia en el Trabajo, la Organizaci6n internacional de trabajo,
disponible en (dura 8/28/02 visitado).
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En Jap6n, un teldfono directo de intinidaci6n recibi6 ms de 1,700
solicitudes de consulta durante dos periodos cortos enjunio y octubre,
del ano 1996.
En Alemania, una encuesta en 1991 encontr6 que el noventa y tres
por ciento de la mujeres encuestadas habian sido acosadas en el
centro de trabajo.2"
Un informe reciente del Ministerio de Justicia estadounidense indica que;
"aproximadamente mil empleados son asesinados (en Estados Unidos) cada afio
mientras realizan su labores de trabajo existen mas de dos millones de
incidentes de violencia en el trabajo que han sido reportados, incluyendo un
mill6n de asaltos simples y 400,000 asaltos con agravantes...la vasta mayorfa no
son reportados. 22,' Los nimeros son asombrosos y requieren una respuesta.
Una conspiraci6n de silencio rodea la violencia en los centros de trabajo,
los trabajadores a menudo ignoran los riesgos y aceptan la violencia como la
parte del trabajo. 23 Un estudio por la Sociedad para la Direcci6n de Recursos
Humano encontr6 que "el cuarenta y ocho por ciento de los empleados
inspeccionados experimentaron un incidente violento en trabajo.. .incluyendo
amenazas verbales (el trenta y nueve por ciento), empujes (el ventidos por
ciento) y peleas (el catorce por ciento). ' 24  Las mujeres parecen ser
particularmente vulnerables a la violencia en el lugar de trabajo, teniendo el
trenta y nueve por ciento mis probabilidad que los hombres a ser vfctimas de
honicidio en el lugar de trabajo 25. La Encuesta Internacional de las Victimas de
Crimen (ICVS)26, que primero relat6 la persecuci6n en el lugar de trabajo en ano
1996, revelo que las mujeres en todos los continentes relataron una incidencia
mis alta de asalto dirigido contra ellas en comparaci6n con aquellos relatados
por los hombres, al mismo tiempo las mujeres en EE UU relataron una
incidencia mds alta de hostigamiento que los hombres en un ventitres por ciento
a un dieciseis por ciento27. Con un estimado de diciseis millones de casos de
21. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safework/violence/eusurvey/eusurvey.htm Pascal
Paoli, el Jefe del proyecto, SafeWork ia Violencia en el Trabajo en la Uni6n europea hallazgos Recientes, la
Organizaci6n internacional de trabajo disponible en (dura 8/28/02 visitado).
22. Violencia de Lugar de trabajo 1992-1996, revisado; el 18 de julio, el informe de Ministerio de
Justicia estadounidense, 1998 disponible en http://www.osha-slc.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/ (dura 8/18/01
23. Frema Engel, Violencia, crimen y trauma en trabajo: un problema pasado por alto. EAP
RESUMEN. Julio / agosto 1987, en 29.
24. William Atkinson, la cara diaria de violencia de lugar de trabajo. 47 (2), MANEJO
ARRIESGADO, febrero, 2000, en 12, 12.
25. SOUTHERLAND, COLLINS y. SCARBOROUGH, supra nota 19.
26. http://www.ilo.orp/public/english/protection/safework/violence/intro. htm SafeWork la
Introducci6n a la Violencia en el Trabajo, la Organizaci6n internacional de trabajo, disponible en (dura
8/28/01 visitado)
27. La empresa de Seguro de vida Nacional De noroeste, supra nota 4 en 2.
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hostigamiento solamente en los Estados Unidos 2s, la profundidad y la amplitud
de la situaci6n es evidente. Hay que preguntarse si la enorme mayorfa de la
violencia que no es reportada es una consecuencia de violencia latente
estructural, que suprime a las vfctimas quien temen la p~rdida de sus empleos
si el hostigamiento sexual es relatado.
El impacto directo de incidentes en el lugar de trabajo mis all de el dafho
directo ffsico no puede ser ignorado. El efecto sobre la salud de trabajador,
manifestada por quejas causadas por el estr~s y los gastos asociados con el
ausentismo tambi~n deben ser considerado. La Tercera Encuesta Europea sobre
Condiciones de trabajo 29 reporto que el cuarenta por ciento de los trabajadores
europeos fueron expuestos a la violencia ffsica, la tensi6n, el cuarentaisiete por
ciento, expuesto a la intimidaci6n de y a la tensi6n y el cuarentaisiete por ciento
expuesto al hostigamiento sexual y la tensi6n. Ademds, el trenta y cinco por
ciento de trabajadores expuestos a la violencia ffsica, intimidaci6n y el
hostigamiento sexual reportaron un ausentismo del trenta y cinco por ciento, el
trenta y cuatro por ciento y el trenta y uno por ciento respectivamente durante
perfodo de previo de doce meses.3° Los gastos de tales incidentes han sido
estimados por varios estudios en parses del mundo entero, las reclamaciones de
perdida de salarios debidos a los actos de violencia por trabajadores
hospitalarios en Canadd aumentaron en un ochenta y ocho por ciento desde el
afto 1985 y los gastos directos de la violencia psicol6gica en una empresa
alemana fueron estimados en $112,000 (EE.UU.) y los gastos indirectos de
$56,000. 3'
Verdaderamente, el problema es mds grande en naciones en desarrollo,
donde los informes sobre las condiciones de los centros de trabajo comienzan
a surgir y no se ha oido la voz coherentemente de la clase obrera que surge.
Segtin l Qinglian, el autor de las Trampas del Desarrollo de la China, la clase
obrera de China ha sido marginada "y por ahora, la desigualdad sigue subiendo
rdpidamente, yen los afios venideros mientras China abre sus mercados bajo las
reglas de la Organizaci6n Mundial del Comercio, las luchas laborales y las
preguntas desde el extranjero sobre las prdcticas laborales probablemente
aumentaran."32
28. ATKINSON, supra nota 12.
29. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safework/violence/eusurvey/eusurvey.htm Pascal
Paoli, el Jefe del proyecto, SafeWork la Violencia en el Trabajo en la Uni6n europea hallazgos Recientes, la
Organizaci6n internacional de trabajo disponible en (dura 8/28/01 visitado).
30. Id.
31. http://www.ilo.or/public/english/protection/safetwork/violence/violwk/violwk.htm Duncan
Chappell y Vittorio Di Martino, Safework la Violencia en el Trabajo, la Organizaci6n internacional de trabajo,
disponible en (dura 8/28/01 visitado).
32. Erik Eckholm, los Derechos de los Trabajadores Sufriendo como China Va Capitalista, veces
de NUEVA YORK 8/24/01 available en www.NYTimes.com.
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El mercado estadounidense no es ningidn extrahio a los gastos de violencia
en el lugar de trabajo. El informe de NWNL nota que las vfctimas
estadounidenses de violencia o el hostigamiento "han experimentado dos veces
la tasa de condiciones causadas por el estr6s, incluyendo la depresi6n, la c6lera,
el insomnio, dolores de cabeza y ulceras ... y eran vente veces mas probable que
dijeran que su productividad ha sido reducida.33" Se ha estimado que la
violencia en el lugar de trabajo estadounidense ha causado $55 millones en
salarios perdidos cada afio, no incluyendo dfas cubiertos por enfermedad y el
permiso anual. 34 " Los gastos relacionados a la perdida de la productividad,
establecimientos de responsabilidad y gastos de seguridad no son ficilmente
cuantificables, pero sin embargo, tienen que ser considerados como
consecuencia de la violencia en el lugar de trabajo.
Los datos relacionados a la incidencia de violencia estructural en el lugar
de trabajo son principalmente de naturaleza cuantitativa, en particular desde la
perspectiva de cuestiones de igualdad en el lugar de trabajo, prdcticas de empleo
injustas o inseguras, la explotaci6n y\o comportamientos culturales de la
organizaci6n, muchos de los cuales son basados en cuestiones de minorfa y de
g6nero. Aunque las mujeres han logrados algunas ganancias en termino de la
igualdad en el lugar de trabajo tales como lograr que la desigualdad de salario
haiga disminuido, hay evidencia considerable de que la discriminaci6n persiste.
Un andlisis comprensivo global de segregaci6n ocupacional por el sexo nota que
la segregaci6n ocupacional es extensa en todo el mundo, con ocupaciones
dominadas por hombres sobrepasando las dominadas por mujeres. Esto es de
particular preocupaci6n, ya que las ocupaciones femeninas tienden a ser menos
renumeradas, tienen un estado inferior, y menos oportunidades para el avance.
Basado en la encuesta, ha sido concluido que la situaci6n del mercado de trabajo
corriente no es el ideal para las mujeres.35 Segain el informe DOL Futurework36
las mujeres estadounidenses y las minorfas siguen ganando menos que sus
colegas blancos masculinos. El informe de DOL tambi6n nota que los ingresos
de las mujeres Afro americanas e hispanas ganan el sesenta y cinco y el
cincuenta y cinco por ciento, respectivamente, de los ingresos de los
trabajadores blancos y las mujeres blancas ganan aproximadamente el setenta
y cinco por ciento de cada d6lar ganado por hombres blancos.
Aunque algunas injusticias de salario puedan ser explicadas por diferencias
de la educaci6n, la experiencia o habilidades, las diferencias "parecen ser en
33. LA EMPRESA DE SEGURO DE VIDA NACIONAL DE NOROESTE, supra nota 4, en 6.
34. VABDENBOS Y BULATAO, supra nota 10 en 14.
35. Richard Anker, Gdnero y empleos: segregaci6n sexual de ocupaciones en el mundo.
Repasado por: Jennifer Tikka, Mujeres y empleos, 122 (10), MENSUALMENTE TRABAJA REVISION,
Octubre, 1998.
36. EL SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO
estadounidense, supra nota 6.
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gran parte el producto de discriminaci6n obstinada."37 La nueva mano de obra,
que incluye mds minorfas y mujeres, ha cambiado la dinimica de el lugar de
trabajo y ha creado conflictos, mientras las necesidades psycho-culturales de los
trabajadores han cambiado y el equilibrio de poder ha evolucionado. Como una
organizaci6n responde a las necesidades individuales y colectivas de su mano
de obra puede ser considerado un precursor al desarrollo de conflicto dentro del
ambiente de la organizaci6n. Es este comportamiento de la organizaci6n (la
cultura) mostrada a travis del tiempo lo que en tiltima instancia determinard el
nivel de violencia cultural dentro de la organizaci6n. Para unir los factores
micro y macro que crean la violencia directa, estructural y cultural, es necesario
explorar el origen y la naturaleza del conflicto que produce fuerzas y examinar
sus interrelaciones a trav6s de los niveles multiples de andlisis mds
directamente.
Aunque el andlisis siguiente principalmente sea dirigido hacia una historia
de caso basada en datos compilados dentro de Estados Unidos, el uso del
andlisis transciende las fronteras geogrdficas de Estados Unidos, con el uso del
andlisis global en la naturaleza tal como es reflejado por la universalidad de los
orfgenes de la violencia en el lugar de trabajo.
V. FUERZAS DEMOGRAFICAS
Las poblaciones de una organizaci6n tienden a ser un microcosmo de la
sociedad, a menudo reflejando la mezcla de diversidad racial, 6tnica, sexual y
cultural evidente dentro de la sociedad en general. Tendencias demogrdficas, en
particular en Estados Unidos, estiman mas diversidad dentro de la mafio de
obra lo cual es compatible con una poblaci6n cada vez mis diversa. Aunque esta
presunci6n sea algo especffica por industrias, con la educaci6n, habilidades y
la experiencia que a menudo estin creando oportunidades de trabajo dentro de
trabajo especfficos, uno no puede negar que la mahio de obra global esta
cambiando. Las organizaciones que son esencialmente una reflexi6n de su
ambiente social deben responder a aquellos cambios. "Uno de los aspectos mis
cruciales de cualquier organizaci6n independientemente del tamafio o el disefto
es el fnter conectividad de las partes humanas de toda su partes.'3
Para entender la dinimica del comportamiento una organizaci6n, tanto
funcional como disfuncional, hay que comenzar por mirar la composici6n de la
mafio de obra de la organizaci6n. Segtin el informe de DOL de ano 1999'9, las
tendencias recientes de la mafio de obra estadounidenses reflejan lo siguiente:
37. Id. en 9.
38. C.D. MARR6N y C. SNEDEKER editores. ESTt EN DESACUERDO Y LA DIVERSIDAD, Hampton la
Prensa, la sociedad an6nima. 1997 en 140.
39. EL SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO
estadounidense, supra nota 6.
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Tres de cuatro mujeres con nifios y seis de diez mujeres estin
ahora en la mafho de obra.
La proporci6n de las familias de padre solteros se ha ms que
duplicado durante los (iltimos trenta afilos, de el once por ciento en
1970 al venticiente por ciento de casas de familia con niflos hoy.
En 1996, vente por ciento de la poblaci6n proporcion6 el
cuidado informal a un pariente o un amigo de mas de cincuenta afios
de edad. Se espera que esto se eleve cuando los "baby boomers"
alcancen sesenta y cinco afhos de edad.
Las tendencias migratorias proyectan que dos de cada tres del
los 820,000 inmigrantes que entran en EE UU cada aflo entrarin a la
mafho de obra a su Ilegada.
Para el ano 2006, casi la mitad de todos los trabajadores
estadounidenses serin empleado en industrias lo que producen o usan
intensamente la tecnologfa de informaci6n, productos, y servicios.
Los anglosajones serdn una parte menor de la poblaci6n total y
las minorfas son proyectadas a elevarse de uno de cada cuatro
Americafios a casi uno de cada dos. En el ano 2010, los Hispafios
serdn el grupo de minorfa mdis grande.
Habri una incidencia mas alta de "trabajo en casa", creando el
potencial para el abuso de las horas de trabajo normales, deberes y
beneficios.
Los baby boomers actualmente son el cuarenta y siete por
ciento de la fuerza obrera, lo que aumentard la categorfa de edad cin-
cunta y cinco + en la mano de obra durante los pr6ximos vente afios.
Uno de cada cinco Americafios trabaja cuarenta y nueve por
semana (o mis) y de los trabajadores relatan mas tensi6n en el
trabajo que la generaci6n previa.
El informe de D6L 40 demuestra una poblaci6n nacional que seri cada vez
mds diversa con una concomitante necesidad de promover educaci6n equitativa,
oportunidades de entrenamiento para mujeres y minorfas mientras ellos
aumentan su presencia en la mafio de obra. Los datos del informe de D6L notan
que el logro educativo varfa a travds de lfneas raciales y 6tnicas, con tarifas de
graduaci6n de secundaria mds bajas para el extranjero comparado con los
norteamericafios (el 65 por ciento al 84 por ciento). Para satisfacer las
exigencias de trabajos cada vez mds menos industriales y mds de servicio, y una
economfa tecnol6gicamente orientada, estos nuevos trabajadores necesitardn el
acceso igual a oportunidades de entrenamiento y educaci6n.
Las provisiones para el cuidado infantil y de los mayores tambidn serdn
necesarias para satisfacer las necesidades de cuidado de familia relacionadas a
40. Id.
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los ntimeros crecientes de mujeres en la mano de obra. Considerando la cara del
trabajador Americafio esta cambiando, las organizaciones tienen que reconciliar
la diversidad creciente y las necesidades asociadas de su mafio de obra con
expectativas de trabajo. Las exigencias sobre los trabajadores para que
respondan a las obligaciones dela casa y de la familia y a sus obligaciones de
trabajo, crean el potencial para el aumento de la tensi6n y el descontento. El
impacto de un ntimero creciente de mujeres en la mano de obra no es tinico a
Estados Unidos. Segfin un estudio Britdnico,41 "madres que trabajan eran el
grupo mds descontento en la sociedad, debido a la presi6n de controlar una
familia moderna."
Segfin un estudio de el Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Ocupacional y la
Salud en Estados Unidos, "la tensi6n de trabajo puede ser definida como las
respuestas dafiosas ffsicas y emocionales que ocurren cuando las exigencias del
trabajo no emparejan las capacidades, recursos, o las necesidades del trabajador.
La tensi6n de trabajo puede causar mala salud y hasta dafios ffsicos., 42 Hay
considerable documentaci6n sobre la relaci6n entre la tensi6n en el trabajo y el
comportaniento contra productivo y el descontento del trabajador. El
descontento en iltima instancia ha sido relacionado a el funcionamiento de
trabajo y su efecto macro sobre los resultados de organizaci6n y relaciones.43
El conflicto tambi6n proviene de diferencias demogrAficas relacionadas a
identidades sociales, 6tnicas y culturales con las costumbres valores, la lengua
y creencia que nos crean en-grupos y de-grupos, descritos por Simmel como
una fuente de conflicto. "Exigencias de grupos de acci6n minoritarios, mandatos
de gobierno, y la inmigraci6n (legal e ilegal) significa que aquellos que estin
disponibles y entrenados para el empleo vienen de una mirfada de fondos
lingiifsticos y culturales. ' '45  Estas diferencias tienen el potencial para crear
41. 41.inchar, las madres realmente pueden tener una carrera ? Si Ud piensa que las cosas se han
mejorado para madres que trabajan, piensan otra vez. Como Finola Linchan descubre, muchos patrones
todavi'a creen que las mujeres deberfan escoger entre el trabajo o nifios. EL PER1ODICO DE GUARDA, el 24 de
enero de 2000, Manchester, el REINO UNIDO.
42. J. Marra, 2000, febrero. Perfil: empleados copiadores y evaluaci6n del potencial para violencia,
82 (2), DIRECcION PIJBLICA en 25.
43. R.A. GIACALONE y J. GREENBERG, COMPORTAMIENTO ANTISOCIAL EN ORGANIZACIONES, 1997,
Publicaciones de SABIO.
44. GEORG SIMMEL, EL FORASTERO. En C. Lemert editor, teorfa Social: las lecturas multiculturales
y clAsicas, 1999, en 184, Westview Prensa.
45. C.D. MARR6N Y C. SYKES editores., CONFLICTO Y DIVERSIDAD, 1997, Hampton Prensa,
sociedad an6nima. En 139.
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barreras46 de comunicaci6n socioculturales, que pueden desfavorablemente
"afectar la calidad y la cantidad de productividad de el trabajador., 47
V. EQUILIBRIO DE FUERZAS DE PODER: GtNERO Y MINORiAS
La cuesti6n de poder, tanto verdadero como percibido, tambi6n debe ser
considerada cuando se mira el conflicto potencial. Por ejemplo: las influencias
de identidad socioculturales del individuo como ellos interpretaran, concebirdn
y utilizardn el poder en relaci6n con la organizaci6n y la sociedad en general.48
Para minorfas y trabajadores en economfas en desarrollo donde "el suministro
de trabajo infinitamente excede la demanda, ' '49 el lugar de trabajo a menudo
refleja perspectivas sociales y estereotipos, que colocan lfmites y animan los
sentimientos de amor propio bajo, la ineficacia y la enajenaci6n. Como el
individuo es excluido y mantenido fuera de la estructura de poder establecida,
la oportunidad para otros de explotar, excluir y suprimir su inclusi6n es
reforzada. Bennett propone que la ineficacia percibida y la carencia de control
sobre su propio ambiente actian como un agente de violencia directa que se
manifiesta como la desviaci6n del empleado y resulta en esfuerzos "tentativos
para recuperar el control (la funci6n correctiva) ° y en la agresi6n hostil (la
funci6n vengativa)." Volkan nota que la percepci6n de desequilibrios de poder
aumenta la probabilidad de comportamiento primitivos, que promueve el
conflicto de organizaci6n.
Los comportanientos que causan la desviaci6n de lugar de trabajo que
incluye comportamientos como el retraso, la tardanza, la descortesfa y el
socavar de la empresa, asf como actos ffsicamente dafiosos, que son un
problema costoso y penetrante.52 Considerable atenci6n se le ha dado, en
particular en el Reino Unido, a la cuesti6n de intimidaci6n en el lugar de
trabajo, que ha sido definida por la Uni6n de Fabricaci6n, la Ciencia y la
Finanzas como "el comportamiento persistente, ofensivo, abusivo, de
intimidaci6n, mal6volo o insultante, el abuso de poder... el cual hace que el
46. R. COHEN, QUE NEGOCIA A TRAV9S DE CULTURAS: 6BICES DE COMUNICACI6N EN DIPLOMACIA
INTERNACIONAL, 1991, Instituto de los Estados Unidos de Paz.
47. MARR6N Y SYKES, supra nota 45, en 140.
48. COHEN, supra nota 46.
49. CHAPPELL Y Di MARTINO, supra nota 5.
50. R.J. BENNETT, INEFICACIA PERCIBIDA COMO UNA CAUSA DE DESvIACION DE EMPLEADO. En
R. W.Griffin, A. OT7eary - Kelly y J. M. Collins, editores. 1998. Comportamiento disfuncional en
organizaciones: el comportamiento violento y afiormal (el Volumen 23, Sepkrese A) JAI Presiona la sociedad
an6nima. En 221.
51. See Vamik Volkan, Blood Lines, From Ethnic Pride to Emic Terrorism (Farrar, Straus and
Giroux 1997).
52. BENNETT, supra nota 50.
1106
recipiente, se sienta amenazado, humillado o vulnerable y... lo cual puede
hacer que ellos sufran la tensi6n."53 Un estudio en ano 1994 conducido por la
Escuela del negocio de Universidad Staffordshire not6 que uno de cada dos
empleados del Reino Unido habfan sido intimidado en su trabajo durante su vida
laboral, lo que causa la angustia al individuo asf como a la organizaci6n 4 Los
des6rdenes secundarios relacionados a la tensi6n han sido relacionados con
problemas cardfacos, el alcoholismo, asf como perturbaciones mentales y
emocionales, con el venticinco por ciento de los accidentes en el trabajo en el
Reino Unido implicando a trabajadores bajo la influencia de alcohol. Aunque
la intimidaci6n en el lugar de trabajo pueda tomar muchas formas como el
hostigamiento sexual, la intimidaci6n en el lugar de trabajo es un ejemplo claro
del abuso de poder que se deriva de un desequilibrio de poder entre dos
individuos 5
Cambios demogrdficos acenttian la necesidad de enfrentar la desigualdad
en el lugar de trabajo expresamente en relaci6n con la cara cambiante del
trabajador, que refleja un crecimiento en particular en el ntimero de mujeres,
minorfas y personas mds de cincuenta y cinco en la mano de obra
estadounidense 6 Como la mafio de obra sigue reflejando la poblaci6n general,
y las mujeres y las minorfas aumentan su visibilidad, se puede esperar que los
conflictos raciales y de g6nero se intensifiquen. En su esfuerzo de buscar el
reconocimiento, las mujeres se han convertido tanto en agentes como en
recipientes del comportamiento hostil y disfuncional. El advenimiento del
movimiento masculino ha reflej ado una necesidad por los hombres de ocuparse
de los cambios percibidos de una sociedad patriarcal en respuesta a la mayor
visibilidad de las mujeres y las minorfas en todas partes de la sociedad.57
Como el nimero de mujeres en el lugar de trabajo esta aumentando, el
potencial para el conflicto relacionado a el g6nero tambi6n aumenta. Los
informes de incidentes sexuales en el lugar de trabajo por mujeres atraviesan
todos los continentes; notable como el 5.4 por ciento en Europa Occidental, el
7.5 por ciento en el Mundo Nuevo, el 5.2 por ciento en Am6rica Latina, y el 3.7
por ciento en Africa.58 Un informe sobre el aumento de la vulnerabilidad de las
53. Andy Ellis, la Intimidaci6n de Lugar de trabajo, Ruskin el Colegio, Oxford, el REINO UNIDO
tuvo acceso sobre 8/28/01 http://www.stress.org.ukbullying.htm (8/28/01 pasado visitado).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. EL SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO
estadounidense, supra nota 6.
57. M. MESSNER, HOMBRES Y MASCUUNIDAD, En polftica de masculinidad: Hombres en
movimientos, 1998, Publicaciones de SABIO.
58. Duncan Chappell y Vittorio Di Martino, Safework la Violencia en el Trabajo, la Organizaci6n
internacional de trabaj o, disponible en
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ptrotection/safetwork/violence/intro.htm (dura 8/28/01 visitado).
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mujeres en la mafho de obra estadounidense conducida por la Sociedad para la
Gesti6n de recursos humafios, indica que el cuarenta y cinco por ciento de
vfctimas en el lugar de trabajo eran mujeres en 1999 comparado con el cuarenta
y uno por ciento en ano 1996.' 9 La raza y la identidad 6tnica aumentan la
vulnerabilidad de un individuo al hostigamiento, con las mujeres de minorfa
quizds las mds vulnerables. El impacto de las percepciones culturales y la
voluntad de relatar el asalto y el hostigamiento se reflejan en el bajo numero de
reportes de tales incidentes por trabajadores Asidticos con el cuatro por ciento
de los hombres y el 1 por ciento de las mujeres que relatan asaltos, y s6lo el 1.3
por ciento de las mujeres Asiiticas que relatan incidentes sexuales.6°
Claramente, el efecto de cambios verdaderos o percibidos del poder, siendo el
resultado de los cambios demogrdficos de el lugar de trabajo puede ser una
fuente de conflicto ya que la dindmica del sistema establecido es desafiada.
La incidencia de segregaci6n en el trabajo segtin el g6nero refleja las
limitaciones patriarcales establecidas por creencia sociales y estereotipos. La
segregaci6n ocupacional por el sexo sobre una base global es extensa segtin
Richard Anker, quien nota que las ganancias en el mundo en total no han sido
observadas en el Asia Oriental, la mayorfa del Medio Oriente y los pafses de
Africa de Norte y algunos paises con una economfa en transici6n.6 1 Segun un
estudio Britinico, la igualdad en el salario y en las oportunidad han sido
obtenidas principalmente por una elite de mujeres instruidas, mientras que los
que laboran en las ocupaciones de bajo salario han recibido un impacto minimo
de las iniciativas de igualdad de salario basado en el genero. 62 De modo similar
las mujeres estadounidenses han aumentado su visibilidad y sus nimeros en el
lugar de trabajo, aunque ellos no hayan aumentado su igualdad.63
Independientemente de las ganancias hechas en el lugar de trabajo, las mujeres
siguen siendo descritas en t6rminos de su modo de vestir y no sobre lo que ellas
logran. 64 La influencia de las creencias patriarcales, sociales y de organizaci6n
son inherentes en la desigualdad de grupo oprimida sobre una base global y asf
tienen que ser considerada en las fuerzas demogrdficas que crean el conflicto en
el lugar de trabajo por la segregaci6n de trabajo, las carencias de inclusi6n y las
59. Veces de NUEVA YORK, 12/15/99.
60. CHAPPELL Y DI MARTINO, supra nota 59.
61. ANKER, supra nota 35.
62. B REZO JOSHI Y PIERELLA PACI, PAGA DESIGuAL PARA MUJERES Y HOMBRES: EVIDENCIA DE LOS
ESTUDIOS DE COHORTE DE NACIMIENTO BRITANICOS, MIT PRENSA, 1998. Revisi6n por Alexander Kronemer,
Estrechando el Hueco de Salario, 112, (11) Revisi6n Mensualmente De trabajo, noviembre, 1999.
63. BREZO JOSH1 Y PIERELLA PACI, PAGA DESIGUAL PARA MUJERES Y HOMBRES: EVIDENCIA DE LOS
ESTUDIOS DE COHORTE DE NACIMIENTO BRITANICOS, MIT PRENSA, 1998. Revisi6n por Alexander Kronemer,
Estrechando el Hueco de Salario, 112, (11) Revisi6n Mensualmente De trabajo, noviembre, 1999.
64. C. Kramer, Asediado Mattel el PRESIDENTE dimite como fregaderos de beneficio. La Empresa
de Espejo de Veces, febrero. 4, 2000, Los Angeles. B-6.
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oportunidades ofrecidas basadas en la clasificaci6n demogrdfica del individuo
mis bien que en sus capacidades.
Un equilibrio adicional del factor de poder proviene de las cuestiones de
relaciones inherentes en la integraci6n de las culturas, lenguas y las creencias
religiosas que son asociadas con el crecimiento corriente y las proyecciones del
numero de inmigrantes y minorfas en la mahios de obra global. Mientras que las
economfas se hacen mis interrelacionadas sobre una perspectiva global, la
integraci6n de las mafios de obra que pueden ser cada vez mds culturalmente
diversas, con creencia que se diferencian acerca de la afiliaci6n de grupo, el
respeto para la autoridad, normas y las costumbres, asf como los niveles que
varfan de habilidades de comunicaci6n seguirdn desafiando ambientes de
trabajo. El desaffo presentado es crear un ambiente sensible a esto cambios
dindnicos y evitar el potencial para el conflicto que proviene de la desconfianza
y la ignorancia de otros y sus culturas respectivas.
La diferenciaci6n de clase dentro de una estructura jerdrquica de
organizaci6n puede crear la animosidad, la desconfianza y un ambiente
adversarial. La capacidad de la organizaci6n para dirigir y reconocer la auto-
valoraci6n inherente del individuo y proveer las ocasiones para la inclusi6n en
pricticas de la organizaci6n tienen el potencial para mitigar o intensificar el
conflicto. Con el compromiso a una estructura participante, transformacional de
organizaci6n, las diferencias que existen dentro de la comunidad de
organizaci6n pueden ser utilizadas para solidificar y desarrollar el acuerdo
general de grupo a diferencia de la creaci6n del desacuerdo de grupo y la
enajenaci6n.
VI. FUERZAS HISTORICAS
Las fuerzas hist6ricas que contribuyen al conflicto de organizaci6n tienen
que ser analizadas desde la perspectiva individual y de organizaci6n con las
experiencias pasadas que crean un cima dentro de el que el individuo y la
organizaci6n forman una relaci6n y desarrollan una identidad mutua. El
individuo asf trae su historia individual a la organizaci6n, que es un producto
biol6gico, cultural y social.65 A su tumo, los comportanientos individuales se
hacen una funci6n de las perspectivas tinicas individuales bajo la influencia de
las perspectivas de la organizaci6n. La uni6n de la identidad individual y de
organizaci6n forma la cultura de la organizaci6n que ha sido definida como
"probada, adaptable, compartiendo deliberadamente y inconscientemente el
conocimiento compartido y los valores que dirigen normalmente el desarrollado
de la cima hacia abajo, la cultura informal de la organizaci6n que es a menudo
un producto de las prdcticas y las creencia que se han desarrollado como normas
65. E. Goffman, 1955. Sobre trabajo cara. En C. Lemert editor. Teorfa social: las Lecturas
Multiculturales y Cldsicas Westview Prensa, 1999.
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con el tiempo. La percepci6n de organizaci6n, pensamiento, y sentimiento."'
Aunque la estructura formal de una organizaci6n desarrolla asf una historia
dnica, sobre la cual una cultura corporativa forma unas normas establecidas de
comportamientos de organizaci6n, incluyendo normas, valores y creencias.67
Han propuesto a un paradigma basado en valores que sugieren que las
estructuras, normas y la cultura de una organizaci6n afecte el comportamiento
6tico dentro de aquella organizaci6n. Los valores establecidos por la gerencia
de la organizaci6n influyen el comportamiento de toda la organizaci6n por
ejemplo: esto es la adhesi6n a un modo verfdico.68 Uno tambi6n podrfa proponer
que la carencia de valores en una organizaci6n o la adhesi6n a normas sociales,
tales como pricticas poco 6ticas/inseguras, influyen en comportamientos de sus
trabajadores hacia la organizaci6n en general. La relaci6n entre los
departamentos de la organizaci6n es la influenciada por la disparidad o la
concordancia de la cultura dentro de la organizaci6n asi como por las creencias
individuales y sociales que el individuo trae a aquella organizaci6n.69 La
identidad de la organizaci6n sirve como un marco dentro de el cual se espera
que la mafho de obra funcione, con la estructura de la organizaci6n colocando
lfmites sobre el trabajador con sus procesos burocrdticos que crean una
autoridad legal sobre el trabajador y sus actividades.7 ° Robinson y Kraatz
opinan que "la cultura de la organizaci6n a menudo puede servir la misma
funci6n que la estructura formal, generando presiones informales para el
cumplimiento de sus normas... o de manera informal sancionando las
desviaciones."7 La estructura formal de una organizaci6n tales como su modo
de manejar agravios, el comportamiento disfuncional, y la descortesfa, influyen
en el nivel de conflicto y de violencia dentro de la organizaci6n." Los
empleados quien dijeron sus empleadores tienen agravio, hostigamiento y bajos
niveles de seguridad relataron niveles mas bajos de violencia el lugar de trabajo
... [Asf como] niveles mas bajos de descontento con sus empleos y niveles mas
66. S. ALLCORN, ENFADE EN EL LUGAR DETRABAJO: ENTENDIMIENTO DE LAS CAUSAS DE AGRESION
Y VIOLENCIA. Libros de Qu6rum, 1994 en 102.
67. MAXIMOWEBER,LAMAQUINABUROCRATICA, (1909-1920). En C. Lemert editor. Teorfa social:
las lecturas multiculturales y cldsicas, Westview Prensa, 1999.
68. GIACALONE Y GREENBERG, supra nota 43.
69. W. L. URY, J.M. BRETT Y S.B. GOLDBERG, CONSIGUIENDO DISCUSIONES RESUELTAS: DISERANDO
SISTEMAS PARA REDUCIR GASTOS DE CONFLICTO, Industria editorial de Josey-bajo, 1988.
70. WEBER, supra nota 67.
71. S.L. ROBINSON Y M.s. KRAATZ, CONSTRUYENDO LA REALIDAD DE COMPORTAMIENTO
NORMATIVO: EL EMPLEO DE ESTRATEGIAS DE NEUTRALIZACION POR EXTRAVAGANTES DE ORGANIZACION.
En R. W.Griffin, A. O'Leary - Kelly y J. M. Collins, editores. (1998). Comportamiento disfuncional en
organizaciones: el comportaniento violento y afiormal (el Volumen 23, Sepdrese A) JAI Presiona la sociedad
an6nima., 1998, en 204.
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bajos de enfermedades causadas por el estr~s. 72 Las pricticas de la empresa en
cuanto al uso de la mediaci6n, grupos consultivos, mediadores o m6todos
similares para reparar los descontentos o las discusiones, pueden contribuir
decisivamente en prevenir que pequefios agravios se conviertan en conflictos
mis graves o violentos.73
La relaci6n hist6rica que una organizaci6n tiene con su ambiente extemo
es a menudo un indicio de lo que comparten internamente. La polftica y
pricticas que una organizaci6n emplea internamente asf como extemamente son
una reflexi6n de las creencias de la organizaci6n y la cultura establecida, por
ejemplo: lajusticia social y la sensibilidad ecol6gica. La organizaci6n, asf como
el trabajador individual, tienen la posibilidad de aceptar o rechazar las
costumbres sociales y las normas como ellos las interrelacionen dentro de su
propia organizaci6n asf como la relacionen a la comunidad extema.
Estableciendo y manteniendo una polftica 6tica, de confianza, considerada y
prictica, la organizaci6n proporciona un modelo que anima al individuo
desalentado a apoyar un ambiente de trabajo civil y cooperativo. La
organizaci6n asf tiene la capacidad de servir como un modelo a imitar por los
trabajadores, con el comportamiento disfuncional a menudo siendo una
reflexi6n del comportamientos destructivos expuestos aquellos que estd.n en el
poder.
La relaci6n hist6rica y las creencia culturales de una organizaci6n a
menudo reflejan las de la sociedad en general, creando una atm6sfera dentro de
la cual la violencia cultural surge. Asf, la organizaci6n alienta el
comportamiento y\o las creencia de la organizaci6n que potencialmente pueden
contribuir a la violencia estructural y\o directa. Para aquellas organizaciones que
escogen, sea por ignorancia, o porque se niegan, a atender las necesidades de
su mafio de obra, el potencial existe para crear disparidades y desigualdades
estructurales que crean el conflicto dentro de la organizaci6n. Estas pricticas a
su tumo crean un ambiente propicio para la violencia directa y estructural ya
que los trabajadores son negados el reconocimiento de sus capacidades
individuales y sus meritos.
El estilo y la estructura de la gerencia, sus creencias comunes, mitos y
rituales asf como el compromiso de organizaci6n a la verdad, la honestidad y el
respeto hacia otros crean un ambiente que anima o desanima el conflicto. En
nivel de claridad de estas creencias y con que vigor son compartidas influyen
la armonfa y la estabilidad de la organizaci6n.74 Basado en el trabajo hecho por
Secord y Backman (1964) y Sherif (1969), Robinson y Kraatz proponen que en
72. La empresa de Seguro de vida Nacional De noroeste, supra nota 4 en 12.
73. C.A. CONSTANTINO Y C.S. COMERCIANTE, DISE&4ANDO SISTEMAS DE DIRECCION DE CONFLICTO:
UNA GUfA A CREACION DE ORGANIZACIONES PRODUCTIVAS Y SANAS, Industria editorial de Josey-bajo. 1996.
74. ROBINSON Y Kraatz, supra nota 71.
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ambientes ambiguos es menos probable que el individuo confi6 en normas
objetivas. Consecuentemente, los individuos aceptardn "acciones y sefiales de
otros empleados... con aquellos que no conforman teniendo mds probabilidad
de emplear estrategias desafiantes."75  No especfficamente, sin embargo,
poderosas influencias agresivas negativas de la organizaci6n conducen a la
enajenaci6n del empleado.76 Claramente el individuo y la organizaci6n no
pueden ignorar el pasado hist6rico, que es en tiltima instancia influencia de la
cultura y la sociedad.
VII. FUERZAS ECONOMICAS
La realidad econ6mica en una economfa competitiva, global requiere que
las organizaciones mantengan su viabilidad financiera, a menudo confiando en
la productividad del trabajador para mantener una ventaja competitiva.
Independientemente del producto especffico de una organizaci6n, en tiltima
instancia todas las organizaciones son imputadas con la responsabilidad de su
efectividad y eficacia. Como una organizaci6n obtiene y mantiene la
efectividad y la eficacia es basado en la adquisici6n y la distribuci6n de sus
recursos. La poliftica y pricticas con las cuales los objetivos econ6micos son
logrados pueden tener un efecto profundo sobre los que son afectados por la
adquisici6n y la distribuci6n de recursos, en particular los trabaj adores. Aunque
el impacto cuantitativo y cualitativo financiero de violencia y el conflicto sobre
organizaciones haya sido notado previamente, la exploraci6n de la relaci6n entre
el individuo, la organizaci6n y la sociedad es necesaria para establecer una
perspectiva mis amplia de como las fuerzas econ6micas dan lugar al conflicto
en el lugar de trabajo.
Gastos econ6micos directos relacionados al conflicto en el lugar de trabajo
han sido documentados en los numerosos estudios que cuantifican la
productividad disminuida, la prevenci6n y estrategias de la intervenci6n, el
litigio, salarios perdidos, la salud y los beneficios por enfermedad. El informe
del DOL une los gastos econ6micos debidos a los conflictos con la salud y los
agravios de los trabajadores estadounidenses. Por ejemplo: uno de cada cinco
Americanos trabaj an cuarentainueve horas o mds semanalmente con la privaci6n
del suefio siendo asociada a la perdida de productividad, el ausentismo, la
enfermedad, estos gastos suman 18 mil millones al aflo. Los informes del DOL
continian relatando que 50,000 trabajadores estadounidenses mueren cada aiio
de enfermedades ocupacionales, el treinta y ocho por ciento de las enfermeras
sufren problemas el la columna durante su carrera y los trabaj adores de la salud
sufren 600,000 heridas con agujas cada afio, con algunos de estos incidentes
siendo la causa de enfermedades y en algunos casos la muerte. Los mineros de
75. Id. en 213.
76. ALLCORN, supra nota 66.
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carb6n con la enfermedad del pulm6n negro cuestan mil millones de d6lares a
la economfa estadounidense cada aflo. Los dfas de trabajo perdidos cuestan a los
patrones estadounidenses $15-20 mil millones cada afio en gastos de
compensaci6n a los trabajadores.77 El Instituto Nacional de Seguridad en el
Trabajo ha estimado que los gastos causados por la violencia en el trabajo puede
ser tan alto como cuarentaidos mil millones de d6lares. Buss, (1993) y Camara
y Schneider, (1994) notan un costo por robo y malversaci6n de cuarenta a 120
mil millones de d6lares y Murphy, (1993) ha estimado los gastos debidos a la
delincuencia entre seis y 200 mil millones de d6lares.78 Los gastos en otros
parses son tan asombrosos como los de Estados Unidos, se estima que los gastos
debido al alcoholismo y las enfermedades relacionadas cuestan
aproximadamente 1.7 mil millones de libras y 8 millones de dfas de trabajo
perdidos a la economfa del Reino Unido. Un estudio en el Reino Unido el
estudio not6 que 1 de cada 8 (alrededor de 3 millones) habfan sido intimidados
en el trabajo en los iiltimos cinco afios, conduciendo a des6rdenes de ansiedad
y consecuentemente a los costos relacionados con estos los des6rdenes. 1/3 a /2
de toda la tensi6n se relacion6 a enfermedades directamente atribuible a la
intimidaci6n en el lugar de trabajo, lo que a su turno ha sido relacionado a la
incidencia de problemas cardfacos, el alcoholismo, problemas mentales, el
descontento en el trabajo, accidentes, problemas de familia y a ciertas formas
de cdncer.79
Una mayor dependencia en la tecnologfa para mejorar la eficacia y la
productividad tambi6n ha sido relacionada a altos niveles de tensi6n. Esto es
relacionado a la p6rdida de la privacidad y el aislamiento creado por el trabajo
en casa lo cual crea el potencial para la explotaci6n y el abuso asf como
mayores exigencias de productividad. 80 La influencia de la tecnologfa sobre los
niveles de tensi6n del trabajador no es especffica a Estados Unidos. La
Organizaci6n intemacional de trabajo informa que " la Automatizaci6n, la
subcontrataci6n, la interconexi6n 'y el nuevo' empleo por cuenta propia
conduce a un aumento en el mundo de el ntimero de personas que trabajan
solas,81 creando un potencial similar para la explotaci6n del trabajador y el
aislamiento como ha sido identificado en Estados Unidos por el informe de
DOL.
77. EL SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO
estadounidense, supra nota 6.
78. ROBINSON y KRAATZ, supra nota 71.
79. ELLIS, supra nota 53. 8/28/01 http://www.stress.org.uk/bullying.htm tenido acceso.
80. EL SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE SUMARIO DE EJECUTIVO DE MINISTERIO DE TRABAJo
estadounidense, supra nota 6.
81. CHAPPELL Y Di MARTINO, supra nota 5 en 4.
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Aunque los gastos indirectos asociados con el descontento del trabajador,
la hostilidad, la tensi6n, la enfermedad y la c6lera asf como la desigualdad en
el lugar de trabajo, injusticias, pricticas ilegales bien sean menos cuantificadas,
cualitativas, la investigaci6n experimental ha justificado el impacto econ6mico
del empleado y los comportamientos disfuncionales de la organizaci6n. Kacmar
y Carlson han notado la relaci6n entre comportamientos percibidos como
disfuncional (la violencia estructural sobre el trabajador) y los resultados de
aquel comportamiento sobre el trabajador (el actor) y la organizaci6n.
Comportamientos politicos relacionados al uso ineficaz de los recursos como
por ejemplo: el emplear, el despido, asignaciones, degradaciones, y aumentos
han sido asociados a la pobre moral asf como las percepciones negativas
externas de las organizaciones estudiadas, con la ineficiencia y la baja moral
responsable por el noventa por ciento de los resultados disfuncionales dentro de
la organizaci6n.8 2
Como los recursos son adquiridos y distribuidos por una organizaci6n tiene
que ser estrechamente examinado como un factor en el conflicto de la
organizaci6n. Las organizaciones miran cada vez mds las fusiones y las
adquisiciones como un m6todo para aumentar los recursos disponibles y
asegurar la estabilidad financiera. Aunque a menudo esto es una ventaja a la
viabilidad a largo plazo de una organizaci6n, el duro trabajo emocional por
parte de todos los participantes, representa "un evento significativo y un
acontecimiento potencialmente agotador."83 El efecto emocional se expresa a
menudo en c6lera, la hostilidad y la enajenaci6n que causa la desmoralizacion,
el descontento y disminuci6n de la productividad. El impacto y al individuo y
la organizaci6n esta inextricablemente unido, con el potencial para
desigualdades estructurales que pueden conducir a la violencia que afecta las
ventajas econ6micas alcanzadas por la fusi6n y la adquisici6n. Las cuestiones
relacionadas a la combinaci6n de culturas corporativas y globales, la p6rdida de
empleos, el cambio de estado y relaciones del grupo de trabajo sirven como una
fuente de c6lera para el empleado y pueden causar la violencia. La necesidad de
alcanzar la ventaja econ6mica tambi6n conduce a la reducci6n del numero de
empleados de y la asimilaci6n de trabajadores y de funciones de trabajo. En un
estudio conducido en Finlandia se demostro que la asociaci6n entre la reducci6n
del tamafio de una empresa y las baj as por enfermedad m6dicamente certificadas
son significativas. La reducci6n del tamafio de la empresa asociada con altos
niveles de inseguridad laboral, lo cual aumenta las exigencias psicol6gicas y
82. K.M. KACMAR Y D.S. CARLSON, UN ANALISIS CUALITATIVO DE APSECTS DISFUNCIONAL DE
COMPORTAMIENTO POLfTICO EN ORGANIZACIONES. En R. W.Griffin, A. O'Leary - Kelly y J. M. Collins,
editores. Comportamiento disfuncional en organizaciones: el comportamiento violento y afiormal (el Volumen
23, Sepirese B) JAI Presiona la sociedad an6nima. 1998.
83. S. CARRETERO Y C.L. TONELERO, FUSIONES Y ADQUISICIoNES: EL FACTOR HUMANO,
Butterworth - Heinemann, Ltd. 1992 en 35.
1114
ffsicas del trabajo, las disminuciones en los aspectos de control del trabajo y
perjudica las relaciones con colegas.8 4 Como una organizaci6n y el individuo
responden a estas cuestiones es a menudo una reflexi6n de sus creencias y
sistemas, y son sujetas a presiones externas tales como las de las fusiones, o las
regulaciones gubernamentales.
Hay considerable documentaci6n sobre la relaci6n entre la tensi6n en el
trabajo y el comportamiento anti-productivo y el descontento del trabajador.85
El descontento en tiltima instancia ha sido relacionado por Gruenberg con el
funcionamiento del trabajo 86 y con el efecto macro sobre los resultados de la
organizaci6n y sus relaciones. Ciertamente, las condiciones de trabajo en
Europa no mejoran, y muchos trabaj adores en Europa trabajan en circunstancias
diffciles, quizis esto es un reflejo de las exigencias globales para la
productividad y la competencia que refleja la intensificaci6n del trabajo que ha
ocurrido durante la ulltima decada8 7
Como los recursos son distribuidos tambi6n influye en el conflicto del
lugar de trabajo. La violencia estructural demostrada por la distribuci6n injusta
de recursos, de salarios, de beneficios y de oportunidades puede crear una mano
de obra frustrada, hostil, agresiva que muestra comportamientos antisociales y
que conduce al sabotaje de la organizaci6n. Si los trabajadores se perciben a si
mismos como las vfctimas del sistema, con una p6rdida simultdnea de poder y
de identidad, ellos se convierten en empleados cada vez mds hostiles y
alienados. 88 Tales comportamientos pueden ser demostrados por el robo, el dafio
a la propiedad y el chisme que es provocado por la prdcticas de la gerencia 89 y
que en su filtima instancia chocard con los recursos econ6micos de la
organizaci6n. Seg-in Volkan, cuando los individuo se enfrenta con la inhabilidad
de soportar el conflicto, ellos experimentardn la desesperaci6n, el miedo y la
humillaci6n. 90  El efecto neto a la organizaci6n es el desacuerdo, la
productividad disminuida y en tiltima instancia la p6rdida de la ventaja
competitiva en el mercado.
84. MIKA KIVIMAKI, JUSSI VAHTERA Y JAANA PENTTI, Los MEDIADORES DE LA RELACiON ENTRE LA
REDUCCION DEL TAMARO DE Y LA SALUD, el Instituto finlandds de Salud Ocupacional, disponible en
http://www.apa.ori/pi/wpo/niosh/abstractl 2.html (dura 8/28/01 visitado).
85. GIACALONE Y GREENBERG, supra nota 43.
86. M. CAmaras, la Satisfaccidn de Trabajo de Mujeres Directivas y Ejecutivas: Revisar de las
asunciones. 75 (2) DiARIo DE EDUCACI6N PARA NEGOCIo, noviembre, 1999, en 69.
87. La Fundaci6n europea para la Mejora de Vida y Condiciones de trabajo, el Boletin de prensa,
supra nota 2.
88. PABLO FREIRE, PEDAGOGfA DEL LOS OPRIMIDO, la Industria editorial Compafifa (publicando
Compafifa) de Continuo, 1999.
89. VOLKAN, supra nota 51.
90. Id.
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El compromiso de una organizaci6n al bienestar de sus trabajadores y
como distribuye sus recursos econ6micos tienen el potencial para crear el
conflicto por prdcticas relacionadas al salario y los beneficios, contratas y
despidos, promociones y pricticas de comunicaci6n. Como trabajadores
compiten por recursos limitados y su propio espacio, la competencia y el
desequilibrio de poder se desarrollan y las lealtades cambian del grupo al
individuo. La polftica de personal es una reflexi6n de como la organizaci6n
percibe el valor de su mafio de obra y como tal, puede crear una
deshumanizaci6n, un ambiente injusto, maduro para el descontento de los
empleados y el conflicto. Este conflicto puede ser manifiesto o latente, que
ocurre en el intra-grupo o un conflicto de Inter.-grupo, asf como entre la
direcci6n y trabajadores. Aunque estos comportamientos pueden ser una
manifestaci6n de comportamientos sociales, asi como de procesos individuales
cognoscitivos, uno no puede ignorar el acoplamiento entre las pricticas de la
organizaci6n y la acciones individuales y comportamientos.
La influencia de otros individuos quienes tienen un inter~s econ6mico en
el individuo o la organizaci6n tambidn tienen el potencial para contribuir al
conflicto dentro de la organizaci6n. La intervenci6n de la uni6n en el conflicto
entre la direcci6n y el trabajador puede servir mds bien para enturbiar los
asuntos y alentar el conflicto que servir para mediar una resoluci6n pacffica de
los problemas. La intervenci6n gubernamental por cuerpos reguladores tambi~n
puede contribuir a la creaci6n de una orientaci6n "de un nosotros" contra "ellos"
dentro de una organizaci6n tales como una la polftica en Estados Unidos de
relatar abusos al Medicare que animan la mano de obra a identificar fechorfas
de las organizaci6nes. Para los que procuran crear el cambio o corregir los
males percibidos, el relator quien estS dispuesto de hablar claro y romper el
c6digo de silencio es visto a menudo como desleal y condenado al ostracismo
del grupo. Las facciones a favor y contra una causa crean un ambiente de
hostilidad y de lucha. Aunque establecido como un mecanismo protector,
intervenciones reguladoras a menudo sirven como un conducto para el conflicto
y el aumento de la disfunci6n dentro de la organizaci6n.
VI. FUERZAS PSYCHO-CULTURALES
Hay una miriada de asuntos que son abarcados dentro del contexto de las
fuerzas psycho-culturales ejercidas dentro de una organizaci6n. Estas cuestiones
incluyen aquellos que son generados por la conducta social, y el entomo
psicol6gico dentro del cual un individuo se relaciona en el Inter.-grupo y el
intra-grupo a nivel de la organizaci6n.9' Como el individuo responde a una
situaci6n dentro del contexto de su ambiente particular es a menudo un factor
91. La isla JANIS, EL GRUPO PIENSA: LOS ESTUDIOS PSICOL6GICOS DE DECISIN DE POLTICA Y
FIASCOS, Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
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de las fuerzas psycho-culturales que determinan las relaciones de impacto y el
comportamiento. 92 Aunque los factores psycho-culturales sean respondidos a
menudo desde la perspectiva individual, el acoplaniento a la cultura hist6rica
de la organizaci6n debe ser considerado como una suma de sus partes. Sin
embargo, para el objetivo de este anilisis, las fuerzas psycho-culturales ser.n
vistas principalmente en el nivel del individuo y su relaci6n al grupo. Factores
individuales psycho-culturales, como el gdnero, la raza, la identidad 6tnica, la
cooperaci6n, el control, estereotipos y los procesos del grupo influyen en las
percepciones individuales de la realidad, que a su turno establece la base para
el comportamiento humano.
La teorfa de la construcci6n social propone que un individuo responde a
una situaci6n dada y toma decisiones sobre sus acciones, basado en influencias
ejercidas por su ambiente social. Lederach, agregando a el trabajo hecho por
Schulz y Blumer, nota que "el conflicto social surge y se desarrolla sobre la base
del significado y la interpretaci6n que la gente de atan a las acciones y
eventos.. .el conflicto es conectado al significado, el significado al
conocimiento, y el conocimiento es arraigado en la cultura. ,93 Los Ejemplos de
comunidades con bajo nivel de conflicto demuestran "[factores] distintivos
psycho-culturales que producen las interpretaciones compartidas del mundo y
facilitan el manejo de las diferencias sin recurrir a la violencia."94 Lo que somos
es una reflexi6n de nuestras experiencias sociales, las normas y las expectativas
de la sociedad y como hemos sido condicionados a responder. Nuestras
experiencias influyen en nuestras acciones presentes, que son de modo similar
influenciadas por el grupo social con quien nos relacionamos en la organizaci6n.
Mirando el comportamiento, hay tambi6n que considerar la influencia
inconsciente de las emociones humanas que provienen del id, el Ego y el Super
ego, sobre el que, segtin Freud, el hombre tiene poco control. La teorfa de Freud
del aparato psfquico describe los comportamientos de adaptaci6n tales como la
hostilidad, la agresi6n, la retirada y el desaliento, que a menudo son utilizados
para ocuparse de la confusi6n intema y externa.95 Aunque "grandes fuerzas
sociales como el sexismo, el racismo, y la desigualdad de clase formen nuestras
biograffas, es como individuos que experimentamos y tenemos sentido de
92. Jervis, R. (1976). Percepciones y percepciones malas en politica internacional. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Prensa de Universidad.
93. J.P. LEDERACH, PREPARANDO PARA RESOLUCI6N DE CONFLICTO DE PAZ A TRAVIS DE
CULTURAS, En Preparaci6n para paz, transformaci6n de conflicto a travds de culturas. Syracuse Prensa de
Universidad 1998 en 8.
94. M.H. Ross, LA CULTURA DE DIRECCION DE CONFLICTO CONSTRUCTIVA EN CONFLICrO BAJO
SOCIEITES en ]a Direcci6n de Conflicto: Interpretaciones e Intereses a Perspectiva Comparativa, Allyn y
Tocino 1993 en 35, 36.
95. SIGMUND FREUND, EL APARATO PSfQUICO Y LA TEORfA DE INSTINTOS (1900-1939). En C.
Lemert editor. Teorfa social: las lecturas multiculturales y cldsicas, Westview Presionan 1999.
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nuestras vidas. '9 6 En tiltima instancia, cada individuo desarrolla la relaci6n
desde su perspectiva dinica, con la concordancia de su historia, y las agrupa por
lIfneas raciales, 6tnicas, sexuales, y la edad que influye en la solidaridad dentro
de un grupo. Asf, el individuo y su ambiente social son inextricablemente
unidos, con comportanientos individuales formados por expectativas sociales
y clasificaciones asf como por fuerzas inconscientes.
La capacidad de una organizaci6n de competir en el mercado, en un nivel
local o global, es a menudo una reflexi6n del compromiso de la organizaci6n y
el sentido de objetivo comtin. Durkheim describe la p6rdida de equilibrio
(afiomia) que ocurre cuando las creencias establecidas de los grupos y los
valores son desafiados.97 El conflicto surge y la solidaridad de grupo y la
identidad son puestas en peligro. Te6ricos recientes, como Vanik Volkan,98
proponen que la cohesi6n del grupo y la estabilidad son atadas a una cultura
comtin, con la identidad de grupo basada en una visi6n compartida. Volkan ha
propuesto que los grupos retroceden cuando estdn bajo tensi6n y regresan a las
formas primitivas de comportamiento, en particular cuando la existencia de un
desequilibrio de poder es percibido. Considerando que la organizaci6n es un
microcosmo de la sociedad, las fuerzas sociales impactan el acuerdo general del
grupo o el desacuerdo dentro de la organizaci6n. Las designaciones de grupos
crean desequilibrios de poder y la competencia), que si no es controlada, puede
conducir a una escalada de conflicto y afectara los objetivos de la organizaci6n;
por ejemplo: la violencia estructural dirigida hacia la organizaci6n. Las
percepciones verdaderas o imaginadas de desigualdad aumentan los desacuerdos
y limitan la capacidad de los varios grupos para trabajar en equipo y en un
ambiente de cooperaci6n. Las percepciones de ineficacia entre grupos
oprimidos pueden animar la politica de organizaci6n y prdcticas que afectan
desproporcionadamente minorfas, los anciafios y las por ejemplo: desigualdad
en el salario, oportunidades, y el hostigamiento sexual. Tales percepciones de
ineficacia a menudo crean desacuerdos entre grupos de trabajo "con la
percepci6n de perdida de control sobre el ambiente de trabajo... propuesto
como una causa de desviaci6n en lugar de trabajo."99 El "locus de control"
(LOC), las creencias de una persona sobre el control de los acontecimientos de
la vida, tienen una relaci6n directa con la satisfacci6n del trabajador y la
predicci6n de su comportamiento dentro de la organizaci6n." Las personas con
96. Judith Lorber, " Noche a su dia: " la construccidn social de ginero. En L. Richardson, V.
Taylor, y N. Whittier editores. Fronteras Feministas IV. 33-47 McGraw 1997 en 33, 1.
97. Emile Durkheim, Ahomie y la Divisi6n Moderna de Trabajo (1902) En C. Lemert editor (teorfa
Social: las lecturas multiculturales y cldsicas, Westview Presionan 1999.
98. VOLKAN, supra nota 51.
99. BENNETT, supra nota 50, en 221.
100. M. Riipinen, necesidades Extrfnsecas ocupacionales y la relaci6n entre necesidad de logro y
locus de control, 128, (5) el Diario de Psicologfa, 1994 en 577.
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un LOC interno sienten que ellos son responsables de lo que les pasa, mientras
los que los que tienen un LOC externo, sienten que ellos no tienen ningtin
control sobre lo que pasa. El LOC, es uno de tres indicadores psicol6gicos que
son usados para mostrar el potencial para el comportamiento violento en el
trabajo. La carencia de control de un individuo sobre sus circunstancias puede
crear altos niveles de tensi6n, y en iiltima instancia puede conducir a la acci6n
irracional o la violenta contra otros. La tensi6n del trabajo y la actitud negativa
son identificadas como otros indicadores de comportaniento disfuncional en el
trabajo. Los, " delincuentes, y los criminales violentos tienen un mucho menos
necesidad de afiliaci6n que los no son delincuentes los cuales no necesariamente
ven interacciones con otros como experiencias positivas y es menos probable
que se preocupen si sus acciones pueden hacerle dafho a otras personas."o'
Asf, que para aquellos que estdn enojados dentro de la organizaci6n y
hostiles a un procesos de grupo, el potencial para el comportamiento
disfuncional y violento puede ser exacerbado por la percepci6n de un LOC
disminuido o la tensi6n del trabajo.
El abuso de drogas asf como el comportamiento agresivo pueden ser
considerado los factores psycho-culturales que han sido asociados con la
violencia en el lugar de trabajo.'02 Estos comportamientos en el lugar de trabajo
son a menudo las manifestaciones de comportanientos agresivos ejercidos fuera
del ambiente de trabajo, por ejemplo: La violencia domestica. Bennett y
Lehman l03relatan un acoplamiento entre las drogas y el uso de alcohol en el
trabajo y la baja afinidad para la cohesi6n de grupo, alto niveles de
antagonismo y la violencia en el lugar de trabajo. "El abuso de drogas ha sido
asociado con malas relaciones con los supervisores y los colegas... que puede
conducir a la violencia en el lugar de trabajo y a los actos peligrosos que pueden
poner en peligro a colegas. 't10
4
IX. FUERZAS POLiTICAS
En el siglo ventiuno, la presi6n sobre las organizaciones para permanecer
competitivas en un ambiente global cada vez mds tecnol6gico sigue
intensificdndose. En tiltima instancia, las organizaciones deben confiar en la
naturaleza de las relaciones que existen entre sus varios accionistas, incluyendo
101. M.S. O'Connell, Perfil: empleados copiadores y evaluaci6n del potencialpara violencia, 82 (2).
Direcci6n Pblica, febrero, 2000 en 25, 25.
102. VABDENBOS Y BULATAO, supra nota 10.
103. J.B. BENNETY W.E.K. LEHMAN, ALCOHOL, ANTAGONISMO,YVIOLENCIAQUEATESTIGUAEN
EL LUGAR DE TRABAJO: BEBIDA DE CLIMAS E INTEGRACI6N ENAJENAC16N SOCIAL.. En G.R. VandenBos, E.Q.
y Bulatao, editores. Violencia sobre el trabajo, Asociaci6n Americana Psicol6gica 1996.
104. EL INFORME DE MINMSTERIO DE TRABAJO estadounidense, el Capftulo 5, 1999 en 7 disponible
en http'/www.dol.gov/dol/asp/public/futurework/reportchapter5/main.htm (Dura 3/13/00 visitado).
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a miembros del consejo de trabajadores, clientes, agencias reguladoras y el
piiblico, para obtener los resultados deseados por la organizaci6n y mantener la
viabilidad econ6mica. La naturaleza de estas relaciones requiere que las alianzas
y los procesos de grupo sean establecidos y nutrido, lo que a su turno dicta
como la organizaci6n estard puede lograr sus metas y cumplir con las
necesidades de sus varios accionistas. Las acciones tomadas por los accionistas
de la organizaci6n para satisfacer estas exigencias, pueden ser consideradas de
naturaleza politica en lo que se refiriere a aquellos comportamientos que podrfan
ser considerados inteligentes o prudentes.
Las organizaciones conffan en procesos politicos para alcanzar sus
objetivos, los que pueden ser funcionales o disfuncionales. La polftica funcional
de una organizaci6n es lo que apoya a la organizaci6n en el alcance de sus
objetivos, no a el individuo que hace la decisi6n. La politica disfuncional de la
organizaci6n es para los que son egoistas y no sancionados por la organizaci6n.
El uso del poder y el control de otros para lograr sus objetivos al costo de otros,
se considera un empleo negativo de comportaniento politico.I15
La interacci6n de los varios actores y como los grupos son formados dentro
del ambiente del lugar de trabajo prepara el escenario para el comportamientos
politicos dentro de la organizaci6n. A menudo estas interacciones serdn
determinadas por el poder y las acciones de los varios grupos establecidos. El
proceso de grupo en tiltima instancia diferencia a los que tienen el poder de los
que tienen menos poder para efectuar los cambios dentro de la organizaci6n,
mientras que el mdximo poder a menudo que queda con un grupo definido y
selecto. Como los que estdn en el poder utilizan su poder y ejercen la influencia
polftica afecta la agenda de la organizaci6n a trav6s de sus acciones y el
comportamiento de los que tienen poder politico. Estas acciones en tiltima
instancia crean o al menos influyen la cultura, la visi6n y la misi6n de la
organizaci6n. El potencial para la disfunci6n surge debido a las alianzas y los
comportamientos politicos expuestos por los que tienen el poder de formular y
hacer cumplir la politica. Esto puede ser percibido como injusto por aquellos
menos poderosos. La injusticia y a menudo la duplicidad de acci6n de aquellos
con el poder puede conducir a un ambiente de desconfianza, de sospecha y
puede causar la rebeli6n entre la mafio de obra, por ejemplo: huelgas, la baja
moral, y la hostilidad.
La presi6n para alcanzar los objetivos de la organizaci6n puede conducir
a una cultura que es reflejada en una mentalidad de guerrero donde el ganador
gana todo, lo que promueve una estrategia competitiva de triunfo que promueve
la ganancia cueste lo que cueste.' ° La competencia es un fen6meno aprendido
y la cooperaci6n es al menos tan integral a la naturaleza humana como es la
105. KACMAR Y CARLSON, supra nota 81, en 82.
106. CONSTANTINO Y EL COMERCIANTE, supra nota 72, en 7.
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competencia. La competencia en su estado crudo a menudo requiere que alguien
pierda para que el otro pueda ganar.'0° Tal competencia puede ser un signo de
conflicto que surge, en particular "cuando generado por la competencia
incontrolada, agresiva entre unidades de trabajo o colegas."'' °8 La cultura
polftica de tales organizaciones de guerrero "es a menudo reflejada tambi6n en
los m6todos empleados para controlar y combatir la amenaza de conflicto." 1
Tal ambiente promueve la disensi6n en todas partes de la organizaci6n,
conduciendo en el desacuerdo entre la direcci6n y su mafio de obra. En i1tima
instancia, la agenda es controlada por los que tienen el poder, con la fuente del
poder siendo derivada por aquellos que estdn menos dependiente de los
dems."0
Simmel ha dicho que la cohesi6n de grupo proviene, tanto de la armonia
como del desacuerdo dentro de un grupo, con el conflicto visto como una
dualidad de prop6sito y la unidad siendo alcanzada cuando la armonia y el
desacuerdo existen. Sin embargo, desequilibrios de poder y las agendas polfticas
individuales que interfieren con la cohesi6n de grupo en filtima instancia
interrumpen la estabilidad de la organizaci6n. Si los individuos pierden su
sentido de cohesi6n, es mds probable que confundan la raz6n con la emoci6n,
lo que los hace mds propenso a actos irracionales basados en aquella emoci6n. "'
Kacmar y Carlson han estudiado la relaci6n entre comportamientos politicos y
resultados de organizaci6n, mirando comportamientos como el favoritismo, el
nepotismo, la discriminaci6n sexual, el empleo del poder y el comportaniento
egoista. Los comportanientos politicos identificados en el estudio de Kacmar
y Carlson demostraron un cuarenta por ciento de descontento y un trentaiuno
por ciento de cambio de personal entre los que encuestados con resultados de
la organizaci6n siendo afectados por el descontento, la desconfianza y la baja
productividad. Segdn Kacmar y Carlson, estos comportamientos todos afectan
directamente la rentabilidad de una organizaci6n, lo cual se complica si el
tratamiento injusto es documentado y se toman acciones legales." 2
La sensibilidad de la organizaci6n a su ambiente extemo tiene el potencial
para aumentar el conflicto entre la organizaci6n y sus accionistas externos por
ejemplo: agencias reguladoras y de consumidores. Cuando los objetivos
financieros de una organizaci6n son colocados por encima de los de su ambiente
y su mano de obra, ganancias a corto plazo pueden ser realizadas pero a costa
107. A. KOHN, EL NOMERO UNA OBSESION. En Ninguna competici6n: el caso contra competici6n
(competencia), Houghton Mifflin 1986.
108. CONSTANT1NO Y EL COMERCIANTE, supra nota 72, en 6.
109. Id. en 7.
110. URY, BRET-r Y GOLDBERG, supra notan 68.
111. SIMMEL, supra nota 43.
112. KACMAR Y CARLSON, supra nota 81.
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del alcance de las estrategias a largo plazo. El 6nfasis sobre el instinto de
conservaci6n individual anima la competencia destructiva en lugar de la
colaboraci6n mds productiva a largo plazo.
Hay una necesidad clara al comportaniento de la organizaci6n que aplica
un proceso politico justo y equitativos. Alexis Herman, Secretario
estadounidense de Trabajo, nota que:
En esta economfa nueva, tenemos que pensar en polfticas amistosas
familiares de un modo nuevo. No como beneficios complementarios.
No como beneficios. Pero para buenas ideas son buenas para
trabajadores y buenas para el negocio. No haga ningtin error. Las
empresas tienen 6xito en el mercado global cuando los trabajadores
tienen 6xito alrededor de la mesa de la cocina. 3
X. CONCLUSIONES, SfITESIS Y IMPLICACIONES DE POLTICA
El lugar de trabajo global se ha convertido en una entidad cada vez mis
compleja, reflejando no s6lo los sistemas de una organizaci6n y sus creencias,
pero tambidn los de su mano de obra y de la sociedad en general. Como un
microcosmo de la sociedad, las organizaciones son expuestas a una mirfada de
fuerzas, que influye en sus relaciones, intemamente y externamente. Estas
fuerzas, que tienen el potencial para crear un clima de conflicto y
comportamientos violentos, han sido identificadas como demogr.fico, hist6rico,
equilibrio de poder, econ6mico, politico y psycho-cultural. Cada una de estas
fuerzas interrelacionadas con un nivel sist6mico de la organizaci6n asi como con
en el nivel del trabajador individual quien es de modo similar un producto de y
un agente de las fuerzas identificadas. En iiltima instancia, como parte de la
sociedad en general, tanto el individuo y la organizaci6n son partes del sistema
mds grande social que a su turno, afecta el ambiente de la organizaci6n.
Considerando la naturaleza dinimica de las relaciones mutuas establecidas
dentro de un ambiente de la organizaci6n y los factores mtltiples que desaffan
aquel ambiente, hay que reconocer y entender como estos factores pueden crear
el potencial para el conflicto destructivo. Es a trav6s de la conciencia y la
aceptaci6n de estos factores que la organizaci6n puede comenzar a identificar
y desarrollar estrategias para responder a los conflicto de modo positivo, y de
manera no adversaria. Un sistema multi-modal, y de mtiltiple niveles debe ser
aplicado al disefio de los sistemas de discusi6n que son requeridos para la
organizaci6n, el trabajador y la sociedad para responder productivamente a la
mirfada de conflictos presentados.
113. EL INFORME DE MINIsTERIO DE TRABAJO estadounidense, el Capftulo 8, 1999 en 4 disponible
en http;/www.dol.gov/dol/asp/public/futurework/reportchapter8/main.htm (Dura 3/13/00 visitado).
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La estrategias del disefio de sistemas de disputas apropiados son basadas
en un anilisis cuidadoso de la organizaci6n, identificando su estructuras y las
fuentes de conflicto y los factores, que afectan la capacidad de la organizaci6n
de alcanzar sus objetivos indicados. Sandole recomienda un m6todo de tres
pilares que es usado comprensivamente para trazar un mapa del conflicto. Asf,
uno puede identificar si el conflicto es latente o la manifiesto e identificar los
participes, las cuestiones y los objetivos usados para alcanzar objetivos asf como
la orientaci6n ambiental al conflicto. La identificaci6n de los actores en el
conflicto, incluyendo los accionistas internos y externos, permiten determinar
las fuerzas que influyen en la dindnica de las relaciones y las fuentes de
conflicto. El trazar un mapa de el conflicto tambi6n permite definir el nivel del
conflicto, si es individual, de organizaci6n o social en la naturaleza y si el
conflicto es basado en la estructura de la organizaci6n o dentro de las relaciones
interpersonales. El enlace entre las cuestiones estructurales y no estructurales
debe ser notado, particularmente los que estdn relacionados a la relaciones,
creencias, valores y el control de los recursos. Las cuestiones no estructurales
a menudo son manifestadas dentro del marco de la cultura de la organizaci6n y
el equilibrio de poder, requiriendo al disefiador del sistema que identifique el las
fuerzas que son la fuente de conflicto" 4 . Se puede ver la complejidad de las
fuentes que se identifican el conflicto en cuestiones tan estructurales como las
lineas ambiguas de autoridad, que parad6jicamente pueden ser la fuente, asf
como el resultado, de cuestiones de relaciones basadas en desequilibrios de
poder jer~rquicos. Una vez que las cuestiones han sido identificadas, es
igualmente importante informar a todos los niveles de la organizaci6n cuando
se esta disefiando los sistemas. Lederach (1998) propone que los objetivos de
la organizaci6n y el cambio puedan ser logrados mejor por los actores
implicando en todos los niveles, incluyendo niveles superiores, medias e
inferiores.
La gama de estrategias potenciales puede ser vista a lo largo de un
continuo, que incluye m6todos preventivos, facilitados, investigativos,
consultivos o impositivos. Las estrategias de prevenci6n pueden ser aplicadas
en conflictos tan profundos como los de las minorfas y los de g6nero. Tales
estrategias deberfan ser enfocadas hacia el desarrollo de un anbiente de
colaboraci6n, que transforme la politica de recursos humanos y que acentie
procesos tales como el trabajo en equipo y entrenamiento cultural. El desarrollo
del empleado puede ser dirigido por los talleres que se ocupan de las relaciones
interpersonales, la educaci6n asertiva, relaciones con los invitados, manejo de
la tensi6n, habilidades de comunicaci6n, y programas de prevenci6n de
violencia, que apoyan el desarrollo de comportamientos positivos y la acci6n
114. D.J.D. Sandole, un trazar un mapa de comprensivo de conflicto y resolucin de conflicto: un
acercamiento de tres pilares. 5, (2). Paz y Estudios de Conflicto, 1998 en 1.
2002] Litwin 1123
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1095
entre aquellos que sufren injusticias y perdida de voto. Tales estrategias de
prevenci6n son titiles en el aumento de la capacidad los accionistas para obtener
control sobre las fuentes de conflicto sobre una base intema, mientras que los
trabajadores aumentan sus habilidades individuales los que les permite hacer
impactar las fuerzas negativas. Estas estrategias son disefiadas para crear
procesos de equipo y a autorizar a los que son privados del sus derecho al voto
por el desequilibrios de poder. '15 Los programas que identifican la intolerancia,
los actos violentos y agresivos y el comportamiento potencial violento pueden
ser puestos en prictica para mediar el comportamiento disfuncional. Tales
programas deberfan ser una reflexi6n de la creencia de organizaci6n y la cultura
y ser comunicado claramente a todos dentro de la organizaci6n. La politica que
hace cumplir el comportamiento aceptable deberfa ser iniciada a trav6s de todos
los niveles de las organizaciones, incluyendo la direcci6n superior y deberfa
estipular las consecuencias para los que no las cumplen." 6 Los programas de
ayuda a los empleados deberfan estar disponibles para asistir en el manejo de
problemas que requieren consejos, tales como el abuso de sustancias o los
conflictos de familia. VanDer Wall ha sugerido siete puntos para prevenir el
conflicto en el lugar de trabajo que incluyen; obtener apoyo de la gerencia,
realizar una revisi6n de los ntimeros de casos de violencia en el lugar de trabajo,
desarrollar polfticas y procedimientos, conducir entrenamiento sobre la polftica
y los procedimientos, asegurar acceso fdcil a programas de ayuda de empleado,
incluyendo a profesionales de salud mental, y tener una polftica clara, y
procedimientos de sentido comdin para terminaciones y despidos." 7
No todas las fuerzas ejercidas sobre una organizaci6n pueden ser resueltas
por estrategias preventivas. Las intervenciones como la mediaci6n, y la
negociaci6n proporcionan ocasiones para resolver muchos de los conflictos que
puede estar encajados profundamente dentro de las fuerzas sociales ejercidas
sobre la organizaci6n. Las estrategias desarrolladas por la organizaci6n para
ocuparse de estas fuerzas deben ser reflexivas de las fuentes del conflicto
identificado en todos los niveles por la evaluaci6n cuidadosa y el andlisis. Estas
estrategias tambi6n deben ser compatibles con los recursos de la organizaci6n
y la filosoffa. El disefio de un sistema comprensivo de disputa que incluye, tanto
cuestiones estructurales y de relaci6n permitiri el uso de estrategias apropiadas
que encajen con las necesidades individuales de la organizaci6n.
Considerando la complejidad de las fuerzas que crean el conflicto dentro
de una organizaci6n, los m6todos de mtiltiples niveles , y los de mfiltiples
modales son necesarios para identificar las fuentes de conflicto y desarrollar las
115. CONSTANTINO Y EL COMERCIANTE, supra nota 72.
116. ATKINSON, supra nota 12.
117. S. VanDer Pared, Prevenci6n de violencia de lugar de trabajo: una gufa para patrones y medicos.
Febrero, 2000, 45 (2) HR REVISTA, en 152.
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intervenciones apropiadas para promover un estado de armonfa dentro de la
organizaci6n (Figura 2). Tal m6todo puede crear un organismo synergistico,
capaz de responder dindmicamente a los conflictos que son "una parte necesaria
de vida, (creando las intervenciones que) no necesitan ser emprendidas de
manera destructiva. ' 1 8  Asi, una organizaci6n tiene la oportunidad y la
capacidad de ser a un agente positivo de cambio, el que puede crear un ambiente
transformable de paz positiva, capaza de satisfacer las necesidades del individuo
de la organizaci6n y de la sociedad. "9
118. L. KRIESBERG, CONFLICTOS CONSTRUCTIVOS: DEESCALADAA RESOLUCI6N, (1988). Rowman
y Editores Littlefield, Inc. 1988 en 1.
119. ELISE BOULDING, CONSTRUYENDO UNA CULTURA GLOBAL CfVICA; EDUCACION PARA UN
MUNDO INTERDEPENDIDO. Syracuse Prensa de Universidad 1990.
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XI.APPENDICES
A. Higo 1: Los Origenes de Violencia en el Lugar de Trabajo
FACTOR DE VIOLENCIA VIOLENCIA VIOLENCIA
CONFLICTO DIRECTA (fisica) ESTRUCTURAL CULTURAL
DEMOGRAFICO La diversidad Cultural, sexual, La polftica
cultural, sexual, envejezca la institucional y las
dtnica, impulse discriminaci6n y pricticas que no
desequilibrios, y la desigualdades. Las hacen caso a las
tensi6n que conduce barreras de identidades
al abuso / dafio comunicaci6n, culturales, sexuales,
ffsico. estereotipos basados en 6micas de mafio de
"la identidad", de casa I obra prdcticas de
familia presionan. exclusi6n.
HIST6RICO Las costumbres El individuo, la La polftica
individuales que organizaci6n, valores de institucional y las
utilizan la violencia sociedad, creencia, pr.cticas que
fisica como el medio costumbres en el perdonan (hacen
de lograr "finales". El desacuerdo o ambiguo cumplir) poco 6tico,
descontento, la que crea la tensi6n, el inseguro, malsafio,
tensi6n, impulsa descontento, la descort6s,
desequilibrios; la hostilidad, el deshumanizando
incertidumbre sobre comportamiento condiciones;
normas conductuales disfuncional esto es el estructura de
conduce al abuso / robo, el ausentismo; organizaci6n
dafio fisico, la procedimientos de jerdrquica, patriarcal.
agresi6n. agravio; hostigamiento
ECONOMICO La distribuci6n Adquisici6n injusta / Las prActicas
injusta / desigual de desigual y distribuci6n de institucionales que
recursos que crean el prdcticas poco dicas de hacen cumplir la
descontento, la recursos, injustas que adquisici6n ineficaz,
c6lera, la frustraci6n conducen a productividad desigual / insegura y
conduce a abuse/ disminuida, ausentismo, la distribuci6n de
harm/aggression tensi6n, tarifas / de salud recursos. Costumbres
ffsico. Intervenci6n / heridaVentajas; fusiones individuales,
de tercero que / Adquisiciones- sociales, creencia
abastece de reduction/changes en acerca de igualdad /
combustible maflo de obra; sabotaje justicia de otros.
conflicto. Sabotaje no ffsico de organizaci6n.
ffsico de
organizaci6n.
EQUILIBRIO DE Violencia ffsica, Carencia de ocasiones; La politica y las
PODER hostigamiento injusticias de paga prdcticas que no
sexual; abuso verbal; basadas en gdnero, estado hacen caso y\o
tensi6n de trabajo; de minorfa; prlcticas de castigan la
horas extra(abuso); discriminaci6n. diversidad; prActicas
temas de salud; de exclusi6n
volumen de ventas
alto; huelgas
continued on next page
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FACTOR DE VIOLENCIA VIOLENCIA VIOLENCIA
CONFLICTO DIRECTA (fisica) ESTRUCTURAL CULTURAL
POLiTICO Agendas Desacuerdo entre Duplicidad
individuales; la tenedores de apuestas; comportamiento de
negaci6n de carencia de misi6n clara direcci6n;
trabajador tiene que de organizaci6n; agendas desacuerdo de
encontrar surtidas(mixtas) creencia, cultura ser /
necesidades de t trabajadores y
organizaci6n; abuso direcci6n
de ambiente
PSYCHO- Desequilibrios de Las exigencias de Social construyen de
CULTURAL poder (LOC), tecnologfa crean el organizaci6n, el
conflicto de aislamiento, psych, el comportamiento
inter/intra-grupo, abuso de sustancia; individual; las
comportamientos comunicaci6n pobre; la expectativas de
disfuncionales, abuso carencia de procesos de comportamiento, la
de sustancia, tensi6n agravio, demogrdficos, la carencia de creencia
de trabajo, afinidad clase, el gdnero, la comunes, respetan
negativa conducida a raza(carrera), la identidad para la autoridad, el
los actos de violencia 6tnica "desconffa" la / respeto para otros.
/ agresi6n dirigida animosidad
hacia otros.
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B. Higo 2: Estrategias para Violencia en el Lugar de Trabajo
INTERVENCIONES
FACTOR DE PREVENTIVO ADR NEGOCIADO ADR
CONFLICTO FACILITADO
DEMO-GRAFICO Acompafiando; Negociaciones de uni6n; Ombudsperson;
equipo de edificio; procesos de recurso reuni6n de reflexi6n;
educaci6n de humafios; alquiler de mediaci6n por 3r
(entrenamiento) de prdcticas; salario y partido; planificaci6n
comunicaci6n; polftica / p icticas de estrat~gica; edificio
Relaciones de hora; 6rgafio. Polftica y de acuerdo general;
invitado; acci6n procedimientos; polftica empleado grupos
afirmativa; enfade y de permiso de familia. consultivos;







HISTORICO Educaci6n Prdcticas relacionadas a Inclusi6n de
(entrenamiento) y las cultural / familia trabajador en misi6n
desarrollo en cultura necesidades de mafio de org. y pricticas;
org. y prActicas y obra; feria y prActicas de procedimiento de
exigencias de trabajo; trabajo equitativas; agravio, procesos de
org. compromiso a inclusi6n de planificaci6n cumplimiento
justicia ambiental / estratdgica de todos los
social; apoyo de niveles en y fuera el
costumbres / organizaci6n.
prdcticas sociales;
lugar de trabajo civil
ECONOMICO Feria y distribuci6n La uni6n negoci6 y\o la Cuerpo gobernante,
equitativa de entrada de grupos de comunidad,
recursos; pricticas trabajo de empleado en la responsabilidad de
claramente indicadas feria y prdcticas organizaci6n a
fiscales; medidas de equitativas HR y consumidores
productividad ventajas, medidas de intemos y externos,
cuantitativas y resultado; entrada de registro, leyes;
cualitativas; destacamento de fuerzas ombudsperson
retenci6n de feria y en de organizaci6n programas; 3a
prdcticas de financiero, objetivos de mediaci6n de partido
reclutamiento; productividad, para discusiones;
educaci6n planificaci6n estrat~gica; combinaci6n
(entrenaniento) de el consumidor introduce mediada cultural con
tecnologfa, apoyo; en la polftica establecida adquisiciones /
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INTERVENCIONES
FACTOR DE PREVENTIVO ADR NEGOCIADO ADR
CONFLICTO FACILITADO
EQUILIBRIO DE Feria y polftica de Programas de prevenci6n Revisi6n Mediada de
PODER recursos equitativa de violencia; par pricticas org.,
humana y prdcticas; revisi6n; proceso procesos;
desarrollo de negociado para revisi6n procedimientos de
empleado y de agravios y agravio; apoyo de
programas de apreciaciones de polirica de soplador
adiestramiento; funcionamiento de de silbido;
equipo de edificio / trabajo disputadas ombudsperson;







POLITICO Alineaci6n de Prdcticas de recursos 3a mediaci6n de
objetivos org., negociadas humanas, partido para agravio
prActicas con ocasiones de avance; de lugar de trabajo
creencia de tenedores iguale y prActicas de esto es igualdad
de apuestas intemas trabajo de feria sexual; avance con





PSYCHO- Programas de ayuda Procedimientos de Programas de
CULTURAL de empleado (EAP) agravio; la uni6n / sugerencia de
programas; subsidios empleado trabaja la empleado;
por enfermedad; entrada de grupos en ombudsperson I
equipo de edificio; prncticas de trabajo work la entrada de
asertivo, la c6lera, destacamento de
acentgia la educaci6n fuerzas en org.
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EXTRACTO
En los tiltimos afios, ha habido una corriente continua de preocupaci6n e
inter6s creciente en las naciones del mundo sobre el empleo por parte de las
autoridades de fuerza excesiva y brutal, a veces mortal donde las circumstancias
no garantizan tales acciones. En los Estados Unidos, mucha de estas
preocupaciones han provenido de una conciencia que surge de un modelo de
violencia excesiva por parte de la policfa, dirigida a los miembros de grupos de
minorfa raciales y 6tnicos-incluyendo Indios Americano, Americanos
Africanos, Americanos Asiiticos y Americanos Hispanos.
Una cantidad significativa de la literatura sobre el conflicto entre la policia
y los grupos de la minoria en las areas centrales de los Estados Unidos
analisando que el racismo occupa el enfoque en casos de empleo de fuerza
excesiva. Sin embargo, hay una consecuencia negativa asociada con la
limitaci6n del andlisis del conflicto entre la policia y grupos de minorfa a la
dinamica racial. Ya que cuando lente esta estrecho de analisis es usado, esto
cede poca informaci6n viable y sustancial para apoyar un entendimiento
adecuado del conflicto y su resoluci6n. Esto no sefiala adecuadamente las
cuentas internacionales de violencia policfal contra la ciudadania en aquellas
naciones donde el racismo es menos dinimico y donde la policfa y ciudadanos
a menudo comparten una herencia racial, por ejemplo, Jamaica, Ciudad de
M6xico y Brasil.
* K. Michelle Scott es una estudiante doctoral en Escuela de Estudios Sociales y Sist6micos en
la Universidad Nova del Sudeste y una instructora en la Universidad Atlanta Clark. Ella tiene un B.A. en
Artes de Comunicaci6n y un M.A. en la Comunicaci6n de Discurso. Este papel esta dedicado a todas las
cuyas vidas han sido extinguidos y el cuyo spirito ha sido dado a las profundidades m.s bajas - Ud no son
olvidado.
** Este articulo fue traducido por Karen Montas-Coleman y Cindy Olea.
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Para animar un anlisis mis comprensivo de muchos factores que se
forman para producir el conflicto entre estos grupos prolongado en el nivel
internacional, Byrne y Carter (1996) proponen un marco te6rico etiquetado:
"cubismo social." La perspectiva del cubismo social trata el conflicto entre la
policia y los grupos de la minoria como un rompecabezas complejo de dindmica
social que se combina como una unidad integrada para sostener los
comportamientos de conflicto. Este papel utiliza el paradigma del cubismo
social para estender nuestro andlisis del conflicto complejo y prolongado entre
funcionarios policiales y grupos de minorfa en Amdrica. Ultimamente, deberfa
hacerse evidente como este paradigma analftico puede ser aplicado a cualquier
conflicto entre grupos prolongado que implica la violencia patrocinada por
estado, independientemente de donde resida.
Ya sea en Ciudad de Mdxico, Sao Paolo, Los Angeles o Jamaica, se ha
hecho evidente que los policias en todo el mundo buscan modos nuevos de
legitimar su poder e influencia realizando actos arbitrarios de violencia similar
al vigilantismo "o lajusticia popular."' En muchos casos, la violencia policfal
es infligida a una ciudadanfa implicitamente designada, a menudo distinguible
por su pobreza, clase, raza, afiliaciones religiosas y/o creencia polfticas. A
menudo ticitas hist6rias institucionales y culturales, de violencia es
sancionadas por estado y ha sido comparada con el barbarismo y el terrorismo
donde las cuentas globales de abusos de derechos humanos comparten una
dindmica: hay una violencia prolongada y el conflicto es a veces mortal entre
la policia y la ciudadanfa, los que ellos han sido designados para proteger.
En los afios pasados, grupos de supervision internacionales y agencias de
prensa han pintado una imagen horrible de abusos policfal sobre casi cada
frente nacional. Sus informes incluyen las cuentas siguientes:
" El 25 de julio del 2000 la policia de Kenya rode6 un autobdis y
orden6 a siete pasajeros quienes eran sospechados como
ladrones que se pongan sobre la tierra; cada uno de los siete
entonces fueron asesinados con un tiro en la espalda 2
" En Enero del 2001 la policia en Tanzania usaron gas y
municiones para romper una demostraci6n polftica y mataron al
menos 37 personas. Este incidente vino sobre reportes sobre
abuso de parte de la policia e la Isla dePemba.3
1. Paul Chevigny, Derecho(ley) y Orden(pedido) Vigilando en Ciudad de M6xico y Kingston,
Jamaica, NACLA Informe sobre las Ameiricas, 44 (1996), pp. 24-30.
2. Amnistfa Intemacional, Kenia: la Policfa ejecuta a siete personas a sangre frfa, (2001).
Disponible en: http://web.anmesty.org/8O2568F7O05C4453/O... 19B!
3. Amnistfa Internacional, Zanzibar Dar es Zalema: la Amnistfa Intemacional llamadas(llama)
sobre las autoridades a respetar la libertad de asamblea, (2001). Disponible en:
htp:/Aveb.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/O...95B!
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" En Abril del 1999 la B.B.C. fimaron las fuerzas de seguridad de
Sud African quienes usaron fuerza mortal contra los individuos
quien se habian rendido. La policfa infligi6 palizas, quemaduras
de cigarrillo, choques el6ctricos y la asfixia sobre los
sospechados y restringi6 su acceso a la atenci6n medica '
" En Marzo del 1997 la policfa Australiana fue filmada rnientra
brutalmente golpeaba y daba patadas a los Aborfgenes mientras
ellos estaban dominados por otro official.'
" En Junio del 1995 la violencia estallo cuando policfas
Mexicanos fueron detenidos en la conexi6n con la matanza de
17 personas mientras caminaban a una protesta politica 6
* "Entre 1983 y 1993, la policfa mat6 un promedio de 182
personas cada afio en Jamaica; de hecho, la policfa mat6 a mds
personas que los que hirieron. "'
Y la lista de indiscreciones de polica contintia ... La policfa Britdnica
recientemente ha sido cargada por el abuso racial contra su ciudadanos
Negros 8; la Policfa Nacional de Israel constantemente esta bajo ataque por su
empleo de fuerza fisica excesiva9 ; los miembros de la fuerza Guatemalteca de
policfa ha sido acusada con la tortura y la matanza de cinco nifios en un caso
trafdo antes el comit6 Inter-Americano Derechos Humano °, y la policfa
Brasilefia tiene una muy larga asociaci6n con cuentas que proliferan e implican
la imposici6n de violencia mortal sobre Afro-Brazileros 11. Por consiguiente, la
majoria de los casos de violencia contra los derechos humanos en el mundo son
aquellos abusos que implican oficiales de la policfa.
Los informes extendidos de las atrocidades patrocinadas por los estados
obligan nuestro anilisis de la motivacion para tales actos. Seguramente ellos
sugieren un conflicto implacable, complejo y end6mico, dindmico entre la
4. Amnistfa Intemacional, Suddfrica: la Tortura y el mal uso de fuerza mortal por fuerzas de
seguridad deben terminarse, (2001). Disponible en: http://web.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/O... C07!
5. Amnistfa Intemacional, Australia: empleo de policla fuerza excesiva contra Aborigenes ningin
incidente aislado, (2001). Disponible en: http:/web.amnesy.org/802568F7005C4453/O... DE9!
6. Kevin A. Obrien, Notaciones Nacionales: Mdxico(Mdjico), Relaciones Pacificadoras e
Internacionales, 24 (1995), p. 11-17.
7. Chevigny, (1996), supra nota 1, en 27.
8. Darcus Howe, Como la policfa Britinica se hizo brutos, el Hombre de Estado Nuevo, 130
(1996), p. 22.
9. Sergio Herzog, LEst allf un perfil distinto de acusado de policias de violencia? El caso israeli,
Diario de Justicia criminal, 28:6, (2000), pp. 457-71.
10. Ana Birch(anuncio Birch), Guatemala enjuiciada para tortura, asesinato de nifios, NACLA
Informe sobre las Amturicas, 32:5, (1999), p. 4.
11. Michael J. Mitchell y Carlos H. Madera, las Ironfas de ciudadania: Color de la piel, brutalidad
por parte de la policfa y el desaflo a democracia en Brasil, Fuerzas Sociales, 77 (1999), pp. 1001-20.
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instituci6n de vigilancia y seleccionan los grupos de la gente. En consecuencia
esto nos conviene, en la consideraci6n del conflicto de grupo de policfa-minoria
en Am6rica, para examinar la magnitud de las fuerzas sociales que sirven para
abastecer de combustible y mantener tales conflictos al grado que ellos son
manifestados en todo el mundo. Asf, la belleza del marco social cubista
descansa en sus concesiones para el examen cercano de estas fuerzas.
"Especificamente, en este tiempo presente, el derecho de usar la fuerza
ffsica es atribufdo a otras instituciones o a individuos s6lo al grado al cual
El estado lo permite. "- Max Weber, 1918
" En noviembre de11998 seis policfas de Ciudad de Kansas le
pegaron un tiro fatal a Timothy L Wilson, un joven Afro-
Americano de 13 afios quien conducfa un cami6n de recogida
que le prestaron.
" En abril del 1999 un policia de Hartford pego un tiro fatal en
la espalda a Aquan Salmon; Aquan era un joven desarmado de
14 afios Afro-Americano sospechoso de un intento de robo en
la calle.
" En junio del 1999, LaTanya Haggerty, una joven de 19 afios
Afro-Americana, fue matada por la pohcfa de Chicago despuds
de una parada de trfico; los oficiales divulgaron que ellos
confundieron su telfono de celular con arma de mano. 12
En los iiltimos afios, ha habido una corriente estable de inter6s entres las
naciones del mundo sobre el empleo por los policias fuerza excesiva y brutal,
erza a veces mortal donde las circunstancias no garantizan tales acciones. En
los Estados Unidos, tal preocupaciones han provenido de una conciencia que
surge de un modelo de violencia excesiva de la policfa dirigida a los miembros
de grupos de minoria raciales y 6tnicos - incluyendo Indios Americano, Afro-
Americanos, Americanos Asidticos y Americanos Hispanos.
Para muchos Americanos, es embarazoso el concepto que dentro de sus
fronteras, gente de color rutinariamente es sujetado a una forma de opresi6n
legitimada infligida por algunos policfas. En una tierra que hace mucho se ha
jactado "de una moralidad consciente" el pensamiento es que para elevar la
sociedad Americana encima de la lucha de naciones donde los derechos
humanos parecen siempre en un premio, hemos venido para comprender que la
sociedad Americana no es completamente diferente de otros donde la represi6n
sancionada por estado de ciudadania seleccionada existe. Pero en verdad, es del
estado que estimula la violencia excesiva y brutal de policfa contra minorfas.
12. Amnistfa Intemacional, de los Estados Unidos de America: Raza(carrera), Derechos y
Brutalidad por parte de Ia policfa, septiembre 1999. Disponible en:
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1999AMR125114799.htm.
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Como el concepto de Myrdal "del problema Negro,"' 3  violencia
injustificada de policfa dirigida a minorfas raciales y 6tnicas en Am6rica causa
una inquietud moral que representauna de muchas paradojas en nuestro sistema
"democritico". En uno de sus informes recientes de brutalidad por parte de la
policfa en Am6rica, titulada: los Estados Unidos de Am6rica: Raza, Derechos
y Brutalidad por parte de la policia, Amnistia Internacional destaca que:
"Siguen los informes frecuentes e inquietantes de tiroteos
injustificados de parte de la policfa, con el tiroteo de oficiales sobre
sospechosos desarmados, escenas de escapes de crimenes no
violentos, durante paradas de tr~fico, en el final de persecuci6nes en
circunstancias cuestionables. En algunos casos sospechantes han sido
golpeados con fuego mtiltiple de parte de la policfa. En la mayor parte
de los casos, las vfctimas eran Afro-Americanas, otra minoria, y unos
eran nifios." '14
Varios meses antes de la salida de este informe, el ministro de la Justicia
estadounidense Janet Reno habl6 en un Almuerzo de Club de Prensa Nacional
sobre la brutalidad por parte de la policfa dirigida hacia minorfas en Am6rica,
ella dijo:
"La situacion es nacional en el alcance y alcanza a la toda la gente a
trav6s de este pais. Para demasiadas personas, sobre todo en
comunidades de minorfa, la confianza que es tan esencial a la
vigilancia eficaz no existe porque los residentes creen que aquella
policfa ha usado la fuerza excesiva, aquella aplicaci6n de la ley es
demasiado agresiva, aquella aplicaci6n de la ley es influfda,
irrespetuosa, e injusta. "15
Skolnick y Fyfe observan que, "cada orden social est, en alglin nivel
mantenido por la amenaza de algun castigo ... pero en alguinos sitios
profundamente en la experiencia Americana es la idea que el orden legal y su
sistema de castigo son inadecuados para enfrentarse con el problema, si
definido como el crimen, como inmigrantes o como grupos de minorfa. " 6 De
hecho," la evidencia de tratamiento discriminatorio y la tendencia en contactos
13. Gunnar Myrdal, el problema Negro como una cuesti6n moral, (1944) en Teoria Social: las
Lecturas Multiculturales y Cldsicas, Carlos Lemert, editor, pp. 245-247. Roca, Compafifa: Westview Prensa,
1999.
14. Amnistfa Intemacional, supra nota 12.
15. Id, en 2.
16. J. Skolnick y J. Fyfe, Encima del Derecho(ley): Policla y el Empleo Excesivo de Fuerza, Nueva
York, NUEVA YORK: la Prensa Libre(gratis), 1994.
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de policfa con los miembros della communidad Negra, los Latinoamericanos
y las comunidades Asiiticas extensamente es documentada por organizaciones
no gubernamentales, las comisiones de encuesta, en casos de tribunal y pleitos
... Tal tratamiento es contrario no s6lo a la Constituci6n estadounidense, pero
tambi6n a las obligaciones estadounidenses bajo la ley internacional para
eliminar todas las formas de discriminaci6n racial."' 7 Por consiguiente, las
discrepancias entre las protecciones de derechos humanos explicadas en las
leyes de los Estados Unidos y los abusos de derechos humanos cometidos por
algunos policfas abastece de combustible la hostilidad creciente entre minorfas
y la policfa. De verdad, "la brutalidad por parte de la policfa, en particular
contra minorfas, es una del las mds seria violaciones de derechos humanos
duraderas y divisivas en los Estados Unidos."' 8
En Am6drica, como en la mayor parte otros estados y naciones del mundo,
la policfa y los militares son los dnicos grupos confiados con la autoridad y la
capacidad para usar la violencia para la protecci6n o la destrucci6n de vida.
Pero a diferencia de los militares, "la policia no se encuentran en bases - ellos
estdn extendidos en todas partes de la comunidad."' 9 Equipado con uniformes,
insignias, armas, municiones, rocfos qufmicos, el gas lacrim6geno, perros,
armas de electrochoque y clubs - algunos policfas patrullan las calles no s6lo
"para proteger y servir," pero frecuentemente infligir la tiranfa y la represi6n.
No sorprendentemente, la gran mayorfa de encuentros entre ciudadano-
policfa ocurren donde el policfa estd en una capacidad oficial y raras veces son
libre del matiz de conflicto. Desde el principio, dos fuentes de conflicto son
inherentes en cada uno de estos encuentros: el primero implica la circunstancia
que trajo a los grupos juntos, y el segundo implica las disparidades de poder
significativas entre el oficial y el ciudadano. Agregue a este micro-conflicto
existente un encuentro que junta al policfa y el problema (el ciudadano de
minorfa) en un entorno social donde los estereotipos, percepciones negativas,
la desconfianza y el miedo actdian recfprocamente en medio de la opresi6n
estructural, y se hace evidente por qu6 las hostilidades entre los miembros de
la fuerza de policfa y grupos de minoria siguen existiendo. Pero de todos
modos, esto no contesta claramente: LQu6 conduce al abuso de policfa de poder,
en particular contra ciudadanos de minoria, y en particular en Am6rica, donde
las virtudes de igualdad y la libertad son promulgadas en casi cada sfmbolo
nacional?
17. Amnistfa Internacional, supra nota 12, en 6.
18. Jim Lobe, Brutalidad por parte de la polica encontrada para ser institucionalizado. Reloj de
Derechos humanos, (1998) disponible en: http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/ju198/21_21_070.htmL
19. Jorge Kelling, ventanas Rotas ydiscreci6n depolicfa. El Instituto Nacional de Justicia, Oficina
de Programas de Justicia, Ministerio de Justicia estadounidense, (1999), p. 5.
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EL MARCO DEL CUBISMO SOCIAL
Una cantidad significante de la consideraci6nes dada a los grupos
minoritario de ]a policfa en conflcito en los Estados Unidos tiene como tema
principal el racismo como la causa del uso de fuerza exesiva de parte de la
policia.
De hecho, la Uni6n de Libertades Civiles Americana recientemente
declar6 que, "el abuso de la policfa, sobre todo contra la gente de color, estd
profundamente enraizado mas que nunca, y parece imperativo reformarlo."2 °
Sin embargo, "mientras la raza es un factor clave en la brutalidad policfal, esto
no es el problema exclusivo. El empleo por policfa de fuerza excesiva y tiroteos
cuestionables es reportado con alarmante regularidad en variadas situaciones,
que a veces cruzan la lineas raciales."'2
Ciertamente, "existe una division racial entre Anglo-Americanos y Afro-
Americanos en los Estados Unidos - una division tan pronunciada que
aparentemente trasciende las fuerte politicas que existen sobre el tema."22 Sin
embargo, hay una negativa consecuencia asociada con la limitaci6n del andlisis
del conflicto entre-grupo de la policia y grupos de la dinamica racial. Ya que
cuando este lente estrecho de andlisis es usado, esto permite muy poca
informaci6n viable y sustancial para apoyar un entendimiento adecuado del
fen6meno. Esto no intenta sugerir que el racismo no es un factor principal en
el conflicto entre la policia y los grupos minorftario; pero en cambio, esto
sugiere que un estrecho enfoque del racismo en el andlisis de la majoria de este
conflicto amenaza con obscurecer en nuestra conciencia las formas complejas
en la cual otras fuerzas sociales se combinan para manifestar este conflicto.
Para ejemplificar la idea que el racismo, en si mismo, es simplemente un
instrumento - y no necesariamente una causa - de opresi6n, Steinberg23
acertadamente destaca esta observacion en el cardcter de Tshembe en la obra
"Les Blanc" de Lorena Hansberry.
"La raza - el racismo - es un dispositivo. No m.s. No Menos. Esto no
explica nada del todo ... Dije que el racismo es un dispositivo que, en si mismo,
no explica nada. Esto es simplemente un medio. Un invento para justificar el
control de algunos hombres sobre los demas."24
20. Uni6n de Libertades civiles Americana, Acci6n: el antfdotoparadesesperame. Justicia criminal:
Enfoque Encuentros De policfa, 1, (pasado visitado el 4 de octubre de 2000). Disponible en:
http://www.aclu.org/issues/criminals/police.htmi.
21. Amnistia Internacional, supra nota 12, en 6.
22. David Weisburd y Rosann Greenspan, actitudes De policfa hacia alcaldada: Conclusiones de
un estudio nacional, Ministerio de Justicia estadounidense, Instituto Nacional de Justicia (2000), p. 6.
23. Steven Steinberg, el Mito tnico: Raza(carrera), Identidad tnica y Clase en Amdrica, Boston,
MAMA: Prensa de Faro, (1989).
24. Id. en 170.
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Posteriormente, "lo que a menudo parece ser una erupci6n de los odios
tradicionales [como los asociados con la raza] en examen detallado termina
involviendo lo politico y lo econ6mico como los elementos reales e
inmediatos.2" Por esta raz6n, no podemos permitirnos, en el examen de conflicto
inter-grupo, ignorar las maneras en la cual la variedad de temas sociales se
combinan para influenciar el conflicto. Cuando los conflictos inter-grupo son
la consecuencia de numerosas prdcticas sist6micas reflejadas en desigualdades
sociales, las soluciones propuestas al conflicto deben implicar una
consideraci6n adecuada de aquellas prdcticas.
Ademis, una concentraci6n sobre el racismo no toma en cuenta los grupos
de minorftarios como participantes (pasivos y\o activos) en el conflicto de inter-
grupo. Despu6s de todo, la c6lera acumulada, el cinismo, la rabia y la alienacion
sentida por grupos minoritarios en respuesta a las tendencias percibidas en la
conducta de la policia "da lugar a los testigos quienes fallan en cooperar con la
policia, los ciudadanos quien ven a acusadores como el enemigo, los abogados
que desprecian las reglas las que ellos han jurado mantener, y a los jurados
quien anhelan 'vengarse' con un sistema que tiene antes sus ojos,
consistentemente los ha maltratado ... ". Asf, el conflicto es intensificado por
los sentimientos y las hostilidades de miembros que representan ambos grupos.
Finalmente, una concentraci6n sobre diferencias raciales y 6tnicas como
el impetu para la brutalidad por parte de la policia no representa de manera
adecuada aquellas occurencias del abuso policial donde el oficial y el ciudadano
comparten la misma herencia racial y 6tnica. Ya que aunque la gran mayorfa de
informes de violencia excesiva de policia en Am6rica haya sido asociada con
encuentros entre oficiales blancos y los ciudadanos quienes son los miembros
de grupos de minorfa, hubo los casos donde las minorias han sentido igualmente
temerosas de abuso durante encuentros con los policias quien son tambi6n los
miembros de grupos de minorfa. En muchos de estos casos, el abuso ha venido
en forma del apoyo de un oficial "al c6digo de silencio" mediante "el
pensamiento azul" y el mirar de hacia el otro lado cuando sus parejas realizan
abusos. Posteriormente, el miedo que hace mucho tiempo existe sobre la
brutalidad policial ha resultado en una ansiedad generalizada donde las
minorfas esta preocupadas sobre los abusos de cualquier oficial policia,
independientemente de la raza del oficial. La evidencia sobre esta dindmica ha
sido presentada a la Asociaci6n de Los Estudiantes de Derecho (ley) Negros de
Nueva Jersey donde Delacy Davis, un veterano Afro-Americano con 10 afios
en la policia de Nueva Jersey, reporto una carta que 61 habfa recibido de un
companero Afro-Americano en respuesta al activismo de 61 [Delacy' s] para el
beneficio de ciudadanos de la minorfa. Segoin Delacy, la carta estaba " llenada
25. Randall Kennedy, politica de Sospechoso,/a Repdblica Nueva, 11/12, (1999). Disponible en:
http://ww.trnr.com/archive/0999/091399/coverstory091300.html.
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de obscenidades que le sugerian que 'pensara azul' °,26 Durante su presentaci6n
a los estudiantes de la ley, Davis, quien fund6 Policias Negros Contra la
Brutalidad Policial, reconoce que hay algunos oficiales de minorfa quien no les
importan los ciudadanos de la minorfa.2
Para animar un andlisis mis profundo de muchos factores institucionales
lo que se forman para producir el conflicto de inter-grupo prolongado, Byrne
y Carter proponen un marco te6rico etiquetado: "cubismo social' 28 y aunque el
marco cubismo social no supone cubrir el espectro entero de factores
relacionados con la manifestaci6n de un conflicto de inter-grupo, efectivamente
"senala algunas de las cuestiones mis salientes de estos conflictos complej OS. ' 29
El modelo de el cubismo social senala el conflicto de inter-grupo como un
complejo rompecabezas de la dindniica social que se combina como una unidad
integrada para sostener los comportamientos de conflicto de inter-grupo. La seis
dindmica (o los pedazos del rompecabezas) son: factores hist6ricos, religiosos,
demogrificos, politicos, econ6micos y psychocultural. Donde el cubo social de
conflicto es aplicado, cada din~nica es separada y analizada para producir un
cuadro holistico del conflicto. Una vez que tal cuadro existe, se hace mis ficil
percibir la complejidad del conflicto, y posiblemente, menos dificil identificar
su resoluci6n. Asi, considerando la naturaleza compleja del conflicto
prolongado entre la policfa y los miembros de grupos de minorfa en Am6rica,
el paradigma cubismo social seri usado para ensanchar nuestro andlisis de este
conflicto.
" En Julio del 1998 un mexicano nacional que estaba desarmado,
Pedro Oregon, fue fatalmente tiroteado - seis veces en la
espalda, dos veces en la cabeza y una vez en su mano - por seis
policias de Houston quien entraron a su casa durante una
incursi6n de droga.
" En Octubre del 1998 Donta Dawson, de 19 aios, unjoven Afro-
Americano que estaba desarmado fue fatalmente tiroteado por
un policfa de Filadelfia quien se acerc6 al juven mientras 61
estaba sentad6 en un carro estacionado con el motor encendido.
" En Mayo del 1999 la policia de Ciudad de Nueva York hirio
crfticamente a Dante Johnson, un joven negor de 16 afilos, que
estaba desarmado, mientra el joven corrio cuando tres policias
lo pararon para hacerles preguntas.
26. J. Johnson, el policfa del Nueva Jersey habla sobre la brutalidad por parte de la policfa, la
violencia, el Caballero Diariamente(a diario), (1995), p. 2.
27. Id.
28. Sen Byrne y Neal Carter, Cubismo Social: Seis fuerzas sociales de polftica ethnoterritorial en
Irlanda del Norte y Quebec, Diario de Paz y Estudios de Conflicto, 3, (1996), pp. 52-71.
29. Id. en 52.
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Fuente: Amnistia International 31
Desde que el primer servicio de vigilancia de noche fue establecido en
Boston en 1631,31 cientos de libros, estudios, artfculos, eruditos y m6dicos han
discutido la relaci6n hist6rica entre la policfa Americana y su ciudadanfa.
Hist6ricamente, la policfa en Am6rica ha representado una jerarqufa (aunque
no son ningunajerarqufa), establecidos y apoyados por la opini6n pdiblica para
el refrenamiento social de poder y el mantenimiento de disciplina social y
orden. Sin embargo, tal refrenamiento y la disciplina tienen el potencial de ser
abusadores 32 ya que son disefiados para controlar el acceso al poder social y
econ6mico para mantener el status quo de las distinciones de clase social.33
La historia del conflicto entre los grupos de policfa-minoria en Am6rica
claramente refleja los desacuerdos de clase promulgados por el pensamiento de
"fuera del grupo/ dentro del grupo" - el idealismo de grupo y las teorfas de el
predominio social. Lobe observa que cuando la Comisi6n Nacional Consultiva
sobre Des6rdenes Civiles estudi6 los disturbios de las razas de los afilos 1960,
encontr6 que la policfa simbolizaba "el poder blanco, el racismo blanco y la
represi6n blanca," (los simbolos de la dominaci6n del grupo de estado
privilegiada) a muchas las minorfas de la nacion.34 Pero la desconfianza de los
grupos minorftario y el desd6n contra la policfa en Am6rica no es arraigado en
los ahios 1960; tampoco es la desconfianza de la policfa y el desd6n contra las
minorfas de la Am6rica. Las hostilidades entre estos grupos comenzaron mds
de dos siglos antes; sus raices se ponen en las herencias de colonialismo,
vigilantismo y la esclavitud.
"En Amdrica, el apuntamiento de la policfa de la gente negra para la
btisqueda excesiva y desproporcionada y el asimiento es una prdctica mis
antigua que la misma Repiblica."35 De hecho, uno podrfa decir que la historia
de vigilancia en Am6rica ha sido fundada sobre la vigilancia de minorfas
raciales y tnicas. Skolnick y Fyfe observan:
"Indios Americanos fueron sin cuestion el primer grupo "ajenos" que
sintio el asalto y la violencia por parte de grupos privados y la
30. Id. Amnistfa Internacional, supra nota 12.
31. Bryan Vila y Cynthia Morris, el papel de policta en sociedad Americana: una historia
documental, Westport, CT: Prensa de Selva frondosa, (1999).
32. Emile Durkheim, Suicidio y modemidad, (1897) en Teorfa Social: las Lecturas Multiculturales
y Cldsicas, Carlos Lemert, editor, pp 74-82, Roca, COMPAMA: Westview Prensa (1999).
33. Kelling, Id.
34. Lobe, Id.




violencia oficialmente sancionada. Considerado como amenazas y
erradicable, la poblaci6n natal de que debfa hacerse los Estados
Unidos ha sido sujetado a la violencia masiva y sostenida por grupos
privados y soldados de el govierno. '36
En el aflo 1704, despu6s de la designaci6n formal de la fuerza de policfa,
las patrullas de los esclavo fue formada como uno de los primeros deberes
oficiales de la policfa en Amdrica; estas patrullas eran un precursor a la policfa
moderna Estas patrullas de la policfa estaban autorizada para arbitrariamente
buscar los cuartos de los esclavos, al azar detener a Negros en las calles, "y
entrar a la casa de cualquier persona Negra quien mantuvo sus luces prendidas
despu6s de la 9 de la noche. 38 Maclin observa que las pricticas de las patrullas
de esclavo no son completamente diferente a la prdctica de hoy de policfa.3 9
Al principio de los ahios 1900, la policia con frecuencia era participante y/o
observadores aprobantes de el linchamiento de los Negro del Sur.4" Mas tarde,
en los afios 1960, los Americanos alrededor del Pais fueron testigo (a travez de
la television) de la brutalidad y la violencia infligida sobre los Negros durante
la campafia por los derechos civiles. No es sorprendente que las comisiones
investigando los disturbios y los desordenes civiles de los anos 1970
encontraron que la policia usaba la fuerza excesiva con rutina sorbe todo contra
los Negros.4 Los descubrimientos de las comisiones sin embargo, no eran
noticias para los cuidadanos Negros quienes ya reconocian que ellos sentirian
la ira de la ejecucion de la ley con mas probabilidad que los Blancos.
Un sondeo Gallup en aflo 1965 revel6 que el 35 por ciento de los hombres
Afro-Americanos cuestionados cree que la brutalidad por parte de la policfa
ocurre en sus comunidades, mientras s6lo el 7 por ciento de hombres blancos
cree que hay brutalidad por parte de la policfa en su communities.42 Solo dos
afhos despues de el estudio de Detriot en el afio 1967- el estudio conducido por
la Liga Urbana revelaro que el 82 por ciento de los residentes creen que habfa
alguna forma de brutalidad por parte de la policfa en su comunidades.43
Aproximadamente 24 afios despu6s de el estudio de Detriot, una encuesta en el
aflo 1991 conducida por Los Angeles Times revelo que el 33 por ciento de
Latinoamericanos y el 44 por ciento de Afro-Americanos piensan que la
36. Skolnick y Fyfe, Id. en 26.
37. Vila y Morris, Id.
38. Maclin, Id. en 34.
39. Id.
40. Skolnick y Fyfe, Id.
41. Id.
42. Uni6n de Libertades civiles Americana, Id.
43. Id.
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brutalidad dada contra Rodney King por la policia de Los Angeles es una
conducta muy comtin por parte de la policia, mientras s6lo el 19 por ciento de
Angloamericanos piensan que el comportamiento es comun." Estas
conclusiones subrayan las creencias de la minorfa que es considerado para
muchos la angustia del grupo y la rabia relacionado con la brutalidad. Las
imigenes de los medios de comunicaci6n rutinariamente reforzan estas
creencia. De hecho, las imigenes de ataques conducidos por la policfa sobre
protestadores pasivos siguen siendojugadas de nuevo en las mentes de muchos
Americanos. Sume a estos cuadros las imigenes del disturbio dell ano 1980 en
Liberty City de Miami luego de la absoluci6n de la policfa quenes golpearon
fatalmente an un ejecutivo Afro-Americano de seguros Arthur McDuffie, y en
Los Angeles en el ano 1992 los disturbios que siguieron la absoluci6n de los
policfas acusados con el ataque al motorista Rodney King, y es fdcil de
entender como entre el grupo minorftario "la desconfianza y la hostilidad se
predice siguiri al abuso y la represi6n."45
La contribuci6n a la grieta hist6rica entre grupos de la minorfa y la policfa
son estereotipos profundamente encajados en los miembros de ambos grupos
y mantenida por el discurso transgeneracional. Por ejemplo, una guia de
entrenamiento para la policfa distribufda durante los afios 1940 por el Estado
del Ministerio de Justicia de California not6 lo siguiente:
"Los policfas notarfn ciertos rasgos de comportamiento distintivos
de Negros como un grupo, y de otros grupos de minorfa ... Los
miembros de grupos de minoria son mds de lo comtin sensible y
defensivo ... ellos se hacen aprensivos y continuamente temeroso de
insulto o discriminaci6n ... Los negros y la juventud Mejicana-
Americana, como grupos, parecen mis inclinados a reaccionar
agresivamente a la discriminaci6n ... El Negro del Sur es mas
subordinado al blanco de todos los modo. En su deseo de desechar
este htbito de servilismo de toda la vida, es probable que la persona
aparezca ser grosero y arrogante, o al menos mal educado." 4
Treinta y tres afilos mds tarde, el estudio de Bayley y Mendelsohn 47 sobre
la policia de Denver, apoyaron el estereotipos de minorfa beligerante. Su
estudio revel6 que aunque la policia "entienda que las minorfas no han recibido
44. Skolnick y Fyfe, Id.
45. Id. en 16.
46. Davis McEntire & Robert B. Powers, A Guide To Race Relations For Police Officers, in THE
URBAN POLICEMAN: APSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICALVIEW 74,74-82 (John R. Snibbe & Homa Snibbe,
eds., 1973).
47. David Bayley y Harold Mendelsohn, Minorias y la Policia: Confrontacidn en Amdrica, Nueva
York, NUEVA YORK: la Prensa Libre(gratis) (1969).
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trato justo en la sociedad Americana ... Ellos [la policfa] sin embargo son
ofendidos por la militancia y asertivo de ellos [minorias]."4 Bayley y
Mendelsohn observaron:
"Puede haber poca duda que los policfas son sensibilizados a la gente
de minoria... [La policia] cree que la participaci6n de minorias en el
crimen es m.s grande que en otros grupos dtnicos; aquellas minorfas
implican a policias en mediar de situaciones muy ambiguas y muy
emocionales, y frecuentemente implican crimenes contra personas;
aquella hostilidad hacia policfas es mts grande entre la gente de
minoria, en particular en forma de resistencia a los arrestos, y que
ataques fisico a oficiales esti mdis comdin en estas Areas que en otro
sitio ... 41
Esto sugiere que algun policia pueda entrar en encuentro con una minorfa
con una expectativa de confrontaci6n; los estereotipos que apoyan estas
nociones se han cambiado poco durante los aftos.
Como el discurso hist6rico entre la policfa sobre minorias, los miembros
de grupo de minorfa tambi6n han mantenido un discurso hist6rico sobre la
policfa. Por los afios, tal discurso ha servido para transmitir verdades, mitos y
los estereotipos "del otro", asi exacerbando el conflicto entre los dos grupos.
Por ejemplo, mis de 50 aflos McEntire y Powers citaron a un representante de
la oficina del ministro de la Justicia de Richmond quien observ6: "el Negro
promedio cree que si es detenido, 61 inmediatamente serd golpeado en la
cabeza con una macana(baston). Demasiado Negros creen que a ellos les ird
peor siempre los detienen., 50 Posteriormente, cada historia nueva de abuso de
policia refuerza "la creencia por minorfas que ellos son objetos de abuso - una
creencia que hist6ricamente ha provocado los arrebatos principales de
violencia contra la policfa. '"
La creencia de que grupos de minorfa creen ser los objetos de violencia de
policia han sido documentados en todas partes a trav6s de la historia
Americana. De hecho, sus quejas de abuso han sido fuera de proporci6n en
relaci6n a su representaci6n en la poblaci6n.5 2  Y seguramente, las
conclusiones sobre el modelo de brutalidad por parte de la policia sugieren que
las preocupaciones de grupo de minorfa seanjustificadas. Hace mis de 30 aftos
Bayley y Mendelsohn divulgaron que, "el abuso Ffsico [en manos de policia]
48. Id. en 150.
49. Id. en 97.
50. McEntire y Poderes, Id.,en 322.
51. Lobe, Id., p. 2.
52. Id.
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cominmente es mis experimentado por minorfas; '5 3 y todavia hoy, hay" la
evidencia que minorfas raciales y 6tnicas [son] desproporcionadamente las
vfctimas de mala conducta de policfa, incluyendo el arresto ilegal y el
hostigamiento asi como el abuso verbal y ffsico."54 Sin embargo, s6lo un
pequefio ndmero de oficiales blancos recientemente preguntados, creen que
aquellos ciudadanos de minorfa son tratados peores que ciudadanos blancos.55
Las discrepancias en percepciones de grupo son reforzadas y legitimados
basado recuentos hist6ricos grupos opuestoe.56 Por consiguiente, la realidad de
cada experiencia individual seri subjetiva, a un grado, basado en nociones
preconcebidas de la constancia perceptual colectiva. En diltima instancia, esto
significa que cada grupo se agarrard a sus historias y percepciones, ya que ello
por estos relatos cada uno refuerza la legitimidad de su posici6n. La
consecuencia es que los dos grupos se han hecho mds y mds polarizados.
En diciembre de 1998 Tyisha el Molinero, una Afro Americana
de 19 afios fue baleada 12 veces por cuatro policias blancas de
Riverside (California) despuds de que ellos la encontraron
inconsciente en su coche cerrado, con un arma sobre sus
piemas(regazo).
En junio de 1999 policias de Nueva Jersey dispararon 27 tiros
a un vehiculo conducido por Stanton Crew, un muchacho Afro
Americano, desarmado, cuando 6l intent6 maniobrar alrededor
de dos coches de policia que habian bloqueado su vehiculo en
una persecuci6n de policfa; Crew muri6 en el tiroteo.
En agosto de 1999 un equipo SWAT de California en medio
de una incursi6n anti droga entr6 en la casa de una familia de
inmigrante Mexicanos e hirieron fatalmente a Mario Paz, un
hombre anciano y desarmado, por la espalda.
Fuente: Amnistfa International "
Schribner y Fusarelli notan que el grado al que la religi6n hace impacta
la sociedad y forma la cultura polftica es confusa y abierta a discusi6n.5 8 Esta
discusi6n es complicada basada en el concepto evasivo de la religi6n, y la
dificultad en la determinaci6n de su impacto exacto sobre la polftica ptiblica.
53. Bayley y Mendelsohn, supra nota 48, en 127.
54. Amnistfa Internacional, supra nota 12, en 3.
55. Weisburd et al., supra nota 22.
56. Byrne & Carter, supra nota 29.
57. Amnistla Internacional, supra nota 12, en 3.
58. Jay Schribner y Lance Fusarelli, Rethingking the Nexus between Religion and Politica Culture:
Inplications for Educational Policy [Reconsiderando la Conexi6n entre Religi6n y Cultura Politica:
lmplicaciones para la Polftica Educativa] 28 EDUC. URB. SOC'Y 279, 279 (1996).
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Afin y de todos modos, instituciones sociales y polfticas unen a la religi6n en
la creaci6n de sociedades bipolares y en la conservaci6nde un estilo de vida.59
En el siglo 19, Durkheim propuso que las pasiones de los individuaos
debe ser regulada por una fuerza estema.6" De lo contrario, 61 concluye que los
deseos insaciables e ilimitados del individuo conducirfan a la interrupci6n
social. Para mucha la historia de humanidad, la religi6n y el estado ban servido
como la regulaci6n de las fuerzas de comportamiento humano. Posteriormente,
la ley del Dios y la ley del hombre trabajan simultdneamente para mantener la
disciplina social y el orden. La iglesia y el estado ambos tienen una tolerancia
baja por la desviaci6n. Ademis, ellos tradicionalmente han competido o han
trabajado enfrentados par el acceso al poder, por privilegios y las personas.
Cada instituci6n trata de producir la sociedad ideal, basada en mantenimiento
del orden social establecido.
Los principios que manifiestan valores autoritarios son tambi6n inherentes
en lo religioso y declaran los ideales de preeminencia, la supremacia y la regla.
Por consiguiente, la ideologfa religiosa fortifica muchas de las sanciones
represivas evidentes en la sociedad. De hecho, esto es basado en doctrina
religiosa y mitos de que muchas sociedades primero concedieron al concepto
de relaciones j erdrquicas que implican seres subordinados y super-ordenados.
En cuanto a esto, los principios religiosos de obediencia, sobre como ellos
pueden ser aplicados al subordinado en la sociedad, estdn relacionados con la
instituci6n social y politica de orden ptiblico. Los principios de seres
superiores y subordinados estdn evidentes en el tratamiento dispar de la
aplicaci6n de la ley de ciudadanos. Por ejemplo, Chevigny observa que:
Toda la brutalidad por parte de la policfa, incluyendo la famosa paliza
con macanas a Rodney King en Los Angeles, comparten [una]
relaci6n [a] subordinaci6n; es aparente en la pr~ctica de policia de
obligar a las personas a acostarse sobre la tierra... El empleo de
fuerza mortal, excepto cuando el oficial actdia en defensa del mismo
u otro, es un caso restrictivo, como la tortura - el oficial no obtiene
nada de la victima 61 mata. 1l dice a la sociedad por los disparos que
la vida de la victima merezca menos que la aserci6n de autoridad y
Control."6'
Aunque los cientfficos sociales no siempre puedan estar de acuerdo sobre
el valor de la religi6n, la mayoria estA de acuerdo que las instituciones
religiosas sirven para beneficiar "individuos, la sociedad en total o algtin grupo
59. Byrne & Carter, supra nota 29.
60. Durkheim, supra nota 33.
61. PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS [LA PUNTA DE EL
CUCHILLO:VIOLENCIA DE PARTE DE LA POUCIA EN AMERICA] 12 (1995).
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social dentro de una sociedad."62 Gamarra propone que, "la religi6n estd unida
al poder como un orden disciplinario y un sistema de 6tica ... Esto es
interiorizado por la gente [y] institucionalizado en las mentes de los
individuos.' 63
Este concepto es compatible con la ideologia del estado policiaco que
existe en la sociedad Americana. Despu6s de todo, nuestros lfderes saben que
"si el estado debe existir, el dominado debe obedecer la autoridad reclamada
por los poderes que existen, ' - un concepto compatible con la ideologfa
religiosa.
" En diciembre de 1998 Franklyn Reid, un inmigrante Jamaiquiho
desarmado, buscado por la violaci6n de libertad condicional,
fu6 perseguido y fatal baleado detrds del cuello, a poca distancia
por un policfa del Connecticut. Reid estaba sobre sus rodillas
cuando le pegaron el tiro.
" En abril de 1999 policias de Nueva York pegaron 12 tiros a
Gidone Bush, un hombre psfquicamente enfermo sin hogar,
cuando 61 los amenazaba a ellos con un martillo.
" En Mayo de 1999 Margaret Mitchell, una mujer de 54 aflos,
sin hogar, que empuja un carro que hace compras, fue
fatalmenta herida a tiros por policfas de Los Angeles cuando
los oficiales pensaron que ella intentaba atacarlos con un
destomillador.'
Como se ha notado antes, hay argumentos vilidos para contestar sobre las
reclamaciones que el racismo es el factor exclusivo en el conflicto de grupo de
minorfa y la policia en Am6rica. El argumento cubismo social, por un lado,
podria proponer que el racismo manifestado en este conflicto (y en otros) es un
sfntoma profundo, son conflictos mds end6micos. De todos modos no se puede
negar que la persistencia de ideologfa racista en Am6rica es saliente a la
naturaleza prolongada del conflicto de grupo de minorfa y de policfa.
Un examen de los datos demogrdficos raciales y socioecon6micos
asociados con los informes de violencia de policia, claramente demuestra el
papel de estas variables en la subyugaci6n de policfa y el maltrato de minorias.
62. JAMES PEOPLES & GARRICK BAILEY, HUMMANiTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY [HUMANIDAD: UNA INTRODUCCION A LA ANTROPOLOGIA CULTURAL], 223 (2000).
63. Jefrey Gamarra, Conflict, Post-Conflict and Religion: Andean Responses To New Religious
Movements [Conflicto, Despues de el Conflicto y la Religi6n: Andean Respuestas a Los Nuevos Movimientos
Religiosos] , J. OF S. AFR. STUD. 271, 272 (2000).
64. Max Weber, What is Politics?, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSICAL
READINGS 110, 110-15 (Charles Lemert, ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999) (1918).
65. Annistia Internacional, supra nota 12.
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Se podrfa discutir que la tendencia de policfa basada en la dindmica racial y
socioecon6mica de los ciudadanos de la Am6rica esti escrita entre lIfneas de
historia Americana con el objetivo de mantener un sistema de castas. Esta lIfnea
de pensamiento es compatible con la teorfa de conflicto, que segdin Cureton,
"... Implica que el uso discriminatorio de la ley contra subordinados refleja la
percepci6n de las reglas, percepci6n de amenaza (por subordinados) a su poder,
recursos e intereses. ' 66
Un andlisis del tratamiento hist6rico de minorfas raciales y 6tnicas en los
Estados Unidos no podia soportar el escrutinio de teorfa de conflicto, que se
supone que el mantenimiento de la distribuci6n dispar de poder estd en la rafz
de mucho conflicto "racial". Hasta despuds de que los Americanos Africanos
oficialmente habian sido liberados de las obligaciones de esclavitud y los Indios
Americanos le habfan repartido tierra para reservaciones, enormes distorsiones
basadas en las teorfas de superioridad racial habian sido usado para justificar
el tratamiento discriminatorio de minorfas raciales y mantener su subordinaci6n
en el sistema.6 1 Como el Africano - e lindios Americano, otros grupos raciales
tambi6n han sufrido mucho basado en el sistema Americano de castas. Por
ejemplo, Skolnick y Fyfe observan que durante el siglo 19, las leyes
sancionadas de los Estados Unidos Occidentales han sido usadas para abastecer
de combustible el grupo vigilante para terrorizar personas Mexicanas y
Chinas.68 Los autores concluyen que, "la btisqueda 'de orden ptiblico' en el
Oeste citado - como esto a veces se hace hoy - un esfuerzo especial contra
grupos de minorfa considerado peligroso a disposiciones constituidas, valores
morales y el predominio racial."69 Asi, la teorfa de conflicto sostiene que"
porque los oficiales de aplicaci6n de la ley son una extensi6n de las reglas del
poder, el trabajo de la policfa es suprimir o contener la amenaza percibida que
los subordinados representan."7 ° Mds alld de la teorfa, esta es la experiencia
vivida por las minorfas en Amdrica.
Se deberfa notar en este punto que preocupaci6n sobre el uso por la
policfa de fuerza excesiva es menos profunda que la fuerza considerada
necesaria para realizar los deberes de trabajo de un oficial y mds en el grado de
tendencia a la que tal fuerza es aplicada. Seguramente, "mientras algunos
miembros de sociedad no cumplan la ley y se resistan a la policia, la fuerza
66. Steven Cureton, Justifiable Arrests or Discretionary Justice: Predictors of Racial Arrest
Differentials [Detenciones Justificables o Justicia Discrecional: Profecias de Clculos Diferenciales de
Detenci6n Raciales], 30 J. OF BLACK STUD. 703, 704 (2000).
67. SKOLNICK & FRYE, supra nota 16.
68. Id.
69. Id. en 27.
70. Cureton, supra nota 67, en 704.
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permanecerd una parte inevitable de controlar";7' sobre esto hay poco
desacuerdo. Sin embargo, "la Investigaci6n que muestra que la detenci6n de
Blancos por parte de los negros [o el encarcelamiento, el abuso, y la fatalidad]
son diferentes y son asociados con caracterfsticas de grupo como la raza, la
edad, el bajo estado socioecon6mico, los porcentajes de grandes
concentraciones de negros, y el desempleo pueden ser considerado la evidencia
de prdcticas discrecionales discriminatorias."72 De hecho, hay evidencia
significativa de tales disparidades en el tratamiento. Estadisticas reportadas por
el Instituto sobre la Raza y la pobreza73 claramente revela una tendencia racial
en el uso de polftica de aplicaci6n de la ley. Segtin las conclusiones del
Instituto:
" En el estado de Minnesota, un hombre negro tiene 27 veces mds
probabilidad de ser encarcerlado que un hombre blanco.
" Aunque automovilistas Afro Americanos constuven el 16.9 por
ciento de los conductores en la 1-95, en el estado de Maryland,
ellos constuyen casi el 73 por ciento de los que son detenidos y
perseguidos por la policia de Maryland, y
* Aunque los Afro Americanos constituyan s6lo el 13 por ciento
de los usuarios de drogadel pais, ellos representan el 37 por
ciento de los detenidos, 55 por ciento de los condenados y el 74
por ciento de los que estan en la prisi6n por ofensas
relacionadas a las drogas.
Estos son solamente unos ejemplos de las disparidades en el tratamiento
de la aplicaci6n de la ley de minorias en los Estados Unidos. El establecimiento
de tendencias estadisticas para reflejar un modelo de tratamiento dispar es una
tarea para desalentar, sin embargo, porque no cada caso de maltrato recibido es
reportado. Aiin y de todo modo, "hay evidencia que sugerir que los Africanos
Americanos son discriminados por la policia quienes usan su discreci6n
personal mds bien que responder a la conducta criminal real....".
Probablemente no hay prictica reconocida recientemente de la policfa que
demuestra el papel de los datos demogrnficos raciales en este conflicto de inter-
grupo sea mayor que la prdctica que por muchos ahios ha dicho que "la acci6n
iniciada por policfa es basada en la raza, la identidad dtnica o el origen nacional
71. SKOLNICK& FRYE, supra nota 16, en 37.
72. Cureton, supra nota 67, en 704.
73. Institute on Race and Poverty, Racial Profiling Data Collection Status Report [Instituto sobre
la Raza y la Pobreza, Informe de Estado de Colecci6n de datos Racial] (2000) at http: //
wwwl .umn.edu/irp/ARB%20.html.
74. Cureton, supra nota 67, en 705.
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de un individuo mdts que en el comportamiento de aquel individuo", 5 Y
aunque numerosos analistas hayan conclufdo que el estilo racial es un
subproducto de la guerra contrta la droga iniciada en los afilos 1980s, hay la
evidencia hist6rica que las minorias en Am6rica han sido tenidas como
sospechosaa, (y asf "identificadas"), mucho antes de que la naci6n reconociera
que habfa un problema de drogas. Como la historia Americana lo demuestra, los
datos demogrdficos raciales y 6tnicos tradicionalmente han sido suficiente para
sospechar, detener y condenar a gente de color.
En otras consideraci6nes de como las fuerzas demogrdficas afectan este
conflicto de inter-grupo prolongado, hay que tener en cuenta el papel de la
cambianta estructura demogrdfica de America. Usando datos del afio 1999
obtenidos del Censo Demogrifica de los Estados Unidos, Pollard concluye que,
"minorfas Raciales y 6tnicas ahora consideradas como un-cuarto (25%) de la
poblaci6n de Estados Unidos. Para el ano 2015, las proyecciones indican que
las minorfas serdn un-tercio (33%) de todos los Americanos. ' '76 Estos ntimeros
reflejan un aumento dramitico en la poblaci6n de minorfa nacional. Sin
embargo, esta informaci6n concluye que mas que aumento del nimero de
minorfas, esto tambi6n supone un aumento en la percepci6n de amenaza de
estas minorfas a la clase dominante. Por consiguiente, sanciones sociales -
como aquellas asociadas con la ley - serdn aplicadas mis severamente sobre los
que representan la amenaza. Con el aumentos del ndimero de minorfas en los
Estados Unidos, no serd sorprendente encontrar aumentos paralelos del nimero
de los casos de abuso de minorfa reportados a las manos de la policia - la
instituci6n mds evidente de control social.
Mirando por el lente de datos demogrificos para examinar el conflicto de
grupo de minorfa y la policfa, sera provechoso confirmar el porcentaje de
policias de minorfas en la fuerza policial nacional basada en la representaci6n
de grupos raciales y 6tnicos en estas comunidades. ZPor ejemplo, en que grado
esti la representaci6n de minorfa en los rangos (jerarquia) de la policfa en
proporcion a la representaci6n de esta minorfa en la sociedad Americana?
Seguramente, un examen de este nimero serfa crftico al avance o el retraso de
la noci6n de teorfa de conflicto explicado por Cureton," y el andlisis de su
importancia al conflicto de grupo de minorfa de policia.
Utilizando datos obtenidos por el Ministerio de Justicia Estadounidense,
Lott78 condujo un estudio extenso de la composici6n racial y sexual de los
75. Institute on Race and Poverty, supra nota 74, en 1.
76. Kelvin Pollard & William P. O'Hare, America's Racial and Ethnic Minorities, [ Las Minorias
Raciales y Etnicas en America], 54 Population Bull. 1, 7 (1999).
77. Cureton, supra nota 67.
78. John Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others At Risk? Affirmative Action Police
Departments and Crime [Una Mano Ayudante Pone A Otros en Peligro? Acci6n Afirmativa, Entre los
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datos demogrdficos de departamento de policfa en 189 ciudades. t1 concluy6
que aunque "...los departamentos de policfa municipal varfan enormemente en
su composici6n racial y sexual, y hubo aumentos grandes de la proporci6n de
Negrosos y de mujeres oficiales.. .la mayor parte de los departamentos no
tienen ningunos Negros, Hispanos, o Asiiticos...".79
Hay poca duda que una representaci6n proporcionalmente equivalente de
minorfas en la vigilancia, en la sociedad Americana, podrfa tener un impacto
crftico sobre el grado de violencia de policia contra las minorfas. Lott observa:
"Las ventajas potenciales para la aplicaci6n de la ley de oficiales
multiraciales o femeninos parecen obvias. Los policfas de minorfa
pueden ser mIds eficaces en dreas de minoria simplemente porque los
residentes podrian facilitar mas la informaci6n que conducirA a
detenciones y convicciones ... La Confianza es tambi6n importante
para otros motivos, como los informes de disturbios que estallan
despu6s de que policfas blancos han disparado a un hombre negro
puede testificar."8'
La estadfstica disponible de la Oficina de Censo Estadistico
Estadounidense del ahio 1999 indica que en 1998, oficiales Negros formaban el
19.4 por ciento del servicio ptiblico de policias y detectives de la naci6n,
mientras que los oiciales hispanos erdn el 8.8 por ciento.81 Sin embargo, esta
estadfstica puede engafiar en cualquier esfuerzo por distinguir la representaci6n
de minorfas sobre las fuerzas de policfa de ciudades individuales. Esto podrfa
ser por ejemplo, que un ndimero mds grande de oficiales de minorfa es empleado
en s6lo unas ciudades y estados mientras una escasez relativa de oficiales de
minorfa es empleada en la gran mayorfa de ciudades y estados. Un ejemplo
principal de como el porcentaje de oficiales de minorfa podrfa influir en
conflicto de grupo de minorfa de policia es el Estado Nueva Jersey, que
recientemente ha recibido a un cantidad de publicidad negativa relacionada a
sus prdcticas dispares raciales dirigidas hacia conductores de minorfa. Zolper
informa que en 1998, s6lo el 14 por ciento de policfas del Nueva Jersey eran
minorfas, comparado con una poblaci6n de minorfa del 26 por ciento.82 Este
Departamentos de Policia y Crimen], 38 ECON. INQUIRY 239, 239-77 (2000).
79. Id. en 241.
80. Id. en 239.
81. UNITES STATES CENSUS BuREAu, EMPLOYED CIVILIANS BY OCCUPATION, SEX, RACE AND
HIsPANIc ORiGIN [Oficina de Censo de los Estados Unidos, Extracto Estadistico de los Estados Unidos
Empleados Civiles por la Ocupaci6n, el Sexo, Raza y Origen Hispana] (1999).
82. T. Zolper, 5,000 Applying for State Police , TRENTON BUREAU, [Solicitaci6n de la Policfa,
Oficina de Trenton] at: http://www.bergen.com/news/poice07199912077.html.
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tipo de discrepancia enorme anima la mentalidad de los grupos que entran /
grupos que salen basados dinicamente en la raza.
" Enjunio de 1998 a Antoine Reid, un desarmado "trabajador de
la calle" le fue pegado un tiro en el pecho por un policia de la
Ciudad de Nueva York quien no trabajaba ese dia, cuando Reid
insisti6 en lavar el parabrisas del coche del oficial.
" En enero de 1999 Luis Enrique Hernandez murio despu6s de
haber sido maniatado por tres oficiales del Departamento de
policfa de Fort Worth.
" En Mayo de 1999 Lewis Rivera, un hombre sin hogar, fue
detenido por los policfas quien lo rociaron con pimienta, le
dieron patadas, ataron sus manos y pies y lo arratraron en un
coche de policfa. En menos de una hora despu6s del asalto 61
fue encontrado muerto en una celda para detenidos.
FUENTE: AMNISTfA INTERNATIONAL 83
Estrechamente alineado con factores demogrdficos es la influencia
economfa sobre este conflicto de inter-grupo, que es estimulado por las
percepciones de favoritismo institucional y disparidades en la distribuci6n de
recursos econ6micos. Disparidades econ6micas inherentes en el sistema
Americano de castas que reproduce la dominante y subordinada estructura de
clases. Y ya que el papel de aplicaci6n de la ley es construfdo para mantener un
orden social deliberado, la policfa es vista por clases subordinadas como
ejecutores de designaciones de clases.
Donde un sistema de castas existe, la calidad de la existencia de una
persona es basada en su posici6n en el ciclo de producci6n de esa sociedad; esto
determinard su poder polftico. Por consiguiente, donde las minorfas son
relegadas por la discriminaci6n institucionalizada a la escala de producci6n
inferior de sociedad, el valor asignado a la condici6n de su existencia estd
subordinado al colocado sobre la existencia de los miembros de la clase
dominante. Esto produce un ciclo de opresi6n que se manifiesta como el
maltrato justificable sobre los que percibidos como menos productivos, y
posteriormente, de menos de valor para la sociedad. La enajenaci6n
experimentada por la clase subordinada y la superioridad sentida por la clase
dominante que enciende el conflicto polariza las posiciones de los grupo. Esta
83. Amnistfa Internacional, supra nota 12.
84. Karl Marx, The Two Factors of a Commodity: Use-Value and Value, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE
MULTICULTURAL AND CLAssic READINGS, [los Dos Factores de Una Materia: Valor de Uso y Valor, En
Teorfa Social: las Lecturas Multiculturales y Clisicas], (Charles Lemert, ed., Westview Press,2d ed. 1999)
(1867).
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polarizaci6n tiene correlaci6n fuerte en el conflicto de grupo de minorfa de
policfa.
Donde las clases subordinadas estdn preocupadas, Travis observa que "los
grupos raciales, 6tnicos y socioecon6micos se diferencian considerablemente
en sus creencia sobre la legitimidad de ley; la mayor proporci6n de Negros (el
29 por ciento) y Latinoamericanos (el 31 por ciento) que Blancos (el 19 por
ciento) ven que las normas legales no ayudan a unificar."85 Ademds, Travis
nota esto, "los residentes cuyo SES (el estado socioecon6mico) es bajo, son dos
veces mas probable que aquellos cuyas SES es alto, a reportar niveles altos de
'cinismo legal."'' 6  Esto sugiere que el cinismo sentido por las minorfas
econ6micamente subordinadas de Am6rica, sobre el papel de aplicaci6n de la
ley sea en gran parte un subproducto de su resentimiento sobre las disparidades
sociales extendidas. Lipschutz apunta:
"Esto no es sobre el tamafho del pedazo del pastel de alguien... Es
sobre quien tiene derecho bajo los t~rminoe del contrato [social], para
participar en divisi6n del pastel. Y esto no es principalmente sobre
minorfas 6tnicas que exigen mayores derechos o beneficios; esto es
mayormente sobre los elementos de la mayorfa blanca temerosa de
perder lo que ellos yen cada vez mis como unjuego de suma-cero." 87
Basado en los comentarios de Lipschutz, cuando el grupo de estado
privilegiado percibe sus perspectivas econ6micas y sociales bajo el desaffo por
el grupo subordinado, un conflicto de inter-grupo surgiri . 8' El conflicto de
inter-grupo entre la policfa y minorfas entonces, es una representaci6n
microc6smica de un conflicto mds extendido, sist6mico en la sociedad
Americana.
La manifestaci6n de este conflicto tambi6n estd evidente en el modelo de
presencia de policfa en comunidades. Cureton observa que, "...Hay evidencia
que las operaciones de vigilancia y los servicios de la policia son concentrados
en ciertas areas de personas de bajos-ingresos, generalmente de no-Blancos
...[Y], la concentraci6n de policfa en estas areas de bajos-ingresos y
socialmente desorganizadas pueden aumentar la probabilidad de detenciones
85. JEREMY TRAVIS, Attitudes Toward Crime, Police and the Law: Individual and Neighborhood
Differences [Actitudes hacia crimen, la policia y la ley: Diferencias enter Individuos y Vecindades] NAT'L
INST. OFJUST. (1999), at: http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesl/fsOO0240.tx
86. Id. en 3.
87. Ronnie Lipschutz, From "Culture Wars" to Shooting Wars: Culture Conflict in the United
States [De las guerras de cultura a guerras punzantes: conflicto de cultura en los Estados Unidos], at
http://escholarship.cdlib.org/ias/crawford/crawfordl .html. (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
88. Id.
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para residentes en aquellas dreas.' 89  Por consiguiente, la concentraci6n
aumentada de policfa en dreas de ses inferiores, aumentard la probabilidad que
la violencia discrecional serd infligida a residentes de minorfa.
Desde luego, uno de los argumentos primarios para una presencia mds
grande de policia en vecindades de ingreso inferiores implica los informes de
conducta criminal mis alta en esos dreas. De hecho, Rand nota que, "las
Personas de casas con ingresos inferiores [son] ms vulnerables al crimen
violento que las casas de ingreso mds altas." 90 Sin embargo, hay una incidencia
mds alta de crimen violento en vecindades mal pagadas, y asf, una demanda
explicita de la presencia mayor de policfa en estas comunidades, lo que tambi6n
podria reflejar las disparidades econ6micas de sociedad Americana. Merton
hipotiz6 que, "el comportamiento aberrante puede ser considerado
sociol6gicamente como un sfntoma de disociaci6n entre aspiraciones
culturalmente prescribidas y avenidas socialmente estructuradas para la
realizaci6n de estas aspiraciones."'
La pregunta siguiente, conmovedoramente planteada por Merton, apunta
a considerar mds fuerte la influencia la que una estructura econ6mica dispar
tiene sobre la conducta criminal. Merton pregunta:
"i Qu6, en breve, son las consecuencias del comportamiento de la
gente situada diferente en una estructura social de una cultura en la
que el 6nfasis sobre objetivos de 6xitos se ha hecho cada vez mIs
separado de un nfasis equivalente sobre procedimientos
institucionalizados para la busca de estos objetivos?" 92
Las opiniones de Merton no son ofrecidas como excusas para la conducta
criminal; pero en cambio, como una posible teorfa para las causas de tal
comportaniento cuando esto es obviamente asociado con las disparidades
econ6micas entre grupos. En efecto, sus conclusiones no son distintas a los
estudios mis tempranos de poblaciones de empobrecidos, inmigrantes
conducidas por Thomas y Znaniecki, quienes encontraron que la conducta
criminal "de campesinos" puede ser "la soluci6n trgica de una diffcil situaci6n
social que implica poderosas tendencias individuales."93 Consecuentemente,
89. Cureton, supra nota 67, en 704.
90. Michael Rand, Criminal Victimization in the United States, [Persecuci6n criminal en los
Estados Unidos] 1994, UNrrED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (1997).
91. Robert K Merton, Social Structure andAnomie, IN SOcIALTHEROY: THE MULTICULTURAL ANC
CLASSIC READINGS [Estructura Social y Anomie, En Teorfa Social: las Lecturas Multiculturales y ClAsicas],
(Charles Lemert, ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999) (1938).
92. Id. en 235.
93. Thomas y Znaniecki, Disorganization and the Polish Immigrant, IN SOCIAL THEROY: THE
MULTICULTURAL ANC CLASSIC READINGS [Desorganizaci6n y el inmigrante Polaco En Teorfa Social: las
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puede haber una presi6n inherente hacia la desviaci6n entre los estratos
econ6micos inferiores.94
" En el afio 1997, Ana de Frankie Perkins, una mujer Afro
Arnericano, murio despus de que la policia la ahog6 y golpe6
con la rodilla en el pecho.
" En Septiembre del afio 1997, Jeremiah Mearday, un Afro
Americano de 18 afios, sufri6 una mandibula rota despu6s de ser
golpeado en la cara con una linterna por un policia de Chicago.
" En el afio 1994 Shirley Alejos, una mujer hispana, fue esposada
y golpeada por la policfa de Chicago al grado que su cara estaba
irreconocible en fotos tomadas despu6s.
" En Junio del afio 999 Gregorio Riley, murio despus ser
colocado en un asimiento por la policfa de Chicago.95
Amnistia International informa que hay un modelo de abuso de policfa
cometido por los miembros de las fuerzas nacionales de policfa. Por ej emplo,
en Octubre del afio 1999 en el informe que enfoc6 a la ciudad de Chicago,
funcionarios de Amnistfa revelaron las conclusiones de un estudio del perfodo
de viente afios entre los afios de 1972 y 1992.96 Segoin este estudio, la policfa
de Chicago durante interrogaciones rutinarias participavan en la tortura
sistemitica de los sospechosos. El estudio revel6 que los oficiales abusaban a
los suspechosos mentalmente y ffsicamente, implicdndose en juegos dolorosos
como la Ruleta Rusa, y el asfixiar, el ahogamiento, pufietazos, y choques-
el6ctricos. Amnistia informa que, "la Mayor parte de las victimas fueron Afro
Americanos o minorfas y los oficiales implicados eran blancos. ' 97
Es interesante que los casos "de la brutalidad por parte de la policfa a
menudo nos dan la impresi6n que la policfa estd 'fuera de control' que ellos no
obedecen las normas burocriticas-legales del estado ...- cuando ellos muy
bien pueden etar obedeciendo normas estatales. Seguramente, las alegaciones
repetidas de brutalidad por parte de la policia y los millones de d6lares gastado
cada afio por los que ejecucian la ley, para arreglar reclamaciones por dafios
y la recompensa por el dafio excesivo infligido por oficiales, sugiere la
institucionalizaci6n de normas relacionadas a la fuerza excesiva.
Lecturas Multiculturales y Clisicas] (Charles Lemert, ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999) (1918).
94. Merton, supra nota 92.
95. Amnesty International, Summary of Amnesty International's Concerns on Police Abuse in
Chicago [Sumaria de las preocupaciones Sobre Abuso de Policda en Chicago], 1999 at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1999/AMR/25116899.htm.
96. Id.
97. Id. en 1.
98. Chevigny, supra nota 62 en 28.
1154
Chevigny observa que" ... La policia son los jugadores principales en el
drama politico que es siempre tenso para nosotros en democracias liberales: el
equilibrio entre la violencia y el orden."99  l agrega:
"Sin embargo, se reconoce que la violencia es usada directamente
para controlar a la gente e imponer la orden... Desafiar la policia ...
Es equivalente al desaffo del orden. Pero el nivel de violencia que la
policfa usa varfa de manera, desde simplemente detener a una persona
desafiante, hasta dispararle o torturarle[a 61] ... ". 10
No hay duda que la vigilancia de Am6rica representa una instituci6n
politica. De hecho, "el t6rmino 'la policia' era al principio sin6nimo de toda la
gobemaci6n interna del estado, incluyendo mantener el orden."'' Sin
embargo, la autoridad para mantener el estado sanci6n al orden social rara
veces es aplicado a todos los ciudadanos sobre una base igual, desde "... que
es raro y riesgoso para la policia intentar subordinar los que no son
subordinados, [o] usar la violencia de degradaci6n contra la gente quien es
clase media o superior o quien no son de la minoria. ' "02 Por consiguiente, la
vigilancia es una instituci6n que sus operaciones son legitimadas por el
gobierno al grado que esto realiza su autoridad para regular el comportamiento
y mantener el control social de las clases inferiores. "El policia es, en naturaleza
de su vocaci6, un defensor del status quo."'0 3 Por lo tanto, es segtin el disefto
que la autoridad ha dado a la policia para hacer cumplir la ley, que
inmediatamente los distingue de los ciudadanos "ordinarios" los que est6n
obligados a obedecer la ley. Este fortalecimiento conduce a identidades
distintas y separadas entre los grupos que hacen cumplir la ley y los que deben
obedecer la ley. LLa pregunta entonces se hace, a que grado el poder concedido
a aquellos para hacer cumplir la ley desarrollan en ellos las actitudes elitista de
la clase dominante?
Una actitud elitista de policia estaba mds evidente entre aquellos Oficiales
en la famosa Unidad de Crimenes de la Calle de la Ciudad de Nueva York
(SCU) quien ha sido asociado con el fatal tiroteo al inmigrante Afro-Americano
Amadou Diallo en 1999. En este caso, el lema del SCU's, Nosotros Poseemos
la Noche, s6lo no podriamos dar "la policfa la actitud de un soldado, quien no
pasa mucho tiempo pensando en los derechos de su enemigo,"'' 4 pero tambi6n
99. Id. en 11.
100. Id. en 11.
101. Id. en 10.
102. Id. en 12.
103. BAYLEY & MENDELSOHN, supra nota 48 en 28.
104. Anonymous, United States: The Thin Blue Line, THE ECONOMIST [La Lnea Fina Azul El
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sugiere su actitud superior. Este lema refleja una cultura de policia claramente
alienada de valores democriticos °5 y una instituci6n donde la tolerancia por el
abuso es reforzada por una asociaci6n con los valores de la clase dominante.
Chevigny observa que, "el control del nivel de violencia es el problema
esencial de derechos humanos con el trabajo ordinario de policia."'°6 Esto cada
vez se convierte en un complicado reto a la carga dada a oficiales de la ley por
la instituci6n Americana polftica. Por un lado, "los ciudadanos, politicos y
grupos de inter6s personal siempre han presionado la policia para 'hacer que
tiene que ser hecho' 07 para hacer cumplir la orden, mientras por otro lado la
sociedad America se jacta de ser una naci6n donde los derechos humanos son
supremos. Por consiguiente, las fronteras entre la autoridad y el refrenamiento
podrfan ser percibidas como relativamente ambiguo, excepto a los que
intencionadamente afirman su autoridad con la tendencia y la maldad.
" En Marzo del afio1991, el motorista Rodney King fue
brutalmente golpeado - recibiendo ms de 56 golpes en las
manos de policfas de Los Angeles - por no pararse durante una
bdsqueda de policfa.
* En Agosto del ano 1997 Abmer Louima, un inmigrante haitiano,
fue golpeado y sodomizado con un palo de uno cepillo despuds
de su detenci6n por la policfa de la Ciudad de Nueva York.
En Febrero del afto 1999 un inmigrante Africano, desarmado,
Amadou Diallo, fue fatalmente baleado por la policfas de la
Ciudad de Nueva York quienes dispararon 41 tiros y perforaron
su cuerpo con 19 balas despuds de que ellos confundieron su
cartera con un arma.
Fuente: Skolnick y Fyfe, °s y New York Times"°
Probablemente mas que cualquier otro informe recientes, los casos
prominentes de Rodney King, un motorista Africano Americano; Abner
Louima, un Inmigrante haitiano, y Amadou Diallo, un inmigrante Africano, mIs
sucintamente caracteriza las preocupaciones aplastantes sobre la brutalidad por
parte de la policia y la fuerza excesiva derigida a minorias en Am6rica. En cada
caso, estos incidentes picaron la fuerza de policfa contra la poblaci6n de
minorfa, claramente reflejando las profundidades de distinciones de grupo.
Economista], May 6, 2000, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pdqwebTS=973030.
105. KELLING, supra nota 19.
106. CHEVIGNY, supra nota 62 en 11.
107. KELLING, supranota 19en 11.
108. SKOLNICK Y FYFE, supra nota 16.
109. Shaila K. Dewan, City andLouima Lawyers Continue Settlement Talks [La Ciudad y Abogados
Louima Siguen Conversaciones de Establecimiento], N. Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 2000, at B3.
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Skolnick y Fyfe observan que como un grupo, "... La policfa se identifica a
menudo como una fuerza moral, protegiendo a los miembros inocentes y
productivos del piblico contra los que hacen brutalidades y victimizaran a
ciudadanos ordinarios decentes."" y seguramente, hay miles de policfas
moralmente conscientes que se ponen en el camino de riesgo cada dfa para
proteger otros. Pero en las tragedias King, Louima y Diallo, las minorfas a
trav~s de Am6rica estdn un paso mIs cerca de identificarse como las vfctimas
"de una fuerza moral" salida mal."'
Boudreau observa que, "en esta edad de ambigtiedad, los individuos y
grupos a menudo buscan un refugio de seguridad en una identidad de grupo
tinico e hist6rico." '  Asf, identidades de grupos colectivos son creadas basadas
en experiencias compartidas hist6ricas de grupos. Estas identidades separadas
refuerzan las percepciones de frontera entre grupo-interno y grupo-externo por
el cual las hostilidades proporcionan a los grupos posiciones recfprocas para
conservar la cohesi6n de intra-grupo En este caso, la fuerza de la policfa y el
hallazgo de la comunidad de la minorfa es el sentido de la identidad, la fuerza
y el consuelo dentro de sus socios de grupo, subconscientemente usando tal
membresia para radicalmente distinguirse de el otro. Los factores sicoculturales
inherentes en el conflicto de grupo de minorfa de policfa son los mds evidentes
en las distinciones expresadas de cada grupo en relaci6n al otro.
Pero donde no hay ninguna igualdad en el estado de grupo, tales
distinciones amplifican el grado al qual los miembros de grupo privados del
derecho al voto y marginados son exclufdos de lograr el acceso del poder de la
sociedad y el privilegio. Ya que la policia esti autorizada a un grado inmenso,
y los grupos de minoria permanecen efectivamente des-autorizados, la policfa
hist6ricamente ha representado los intereses "de grupos de estado
privilegiados" mientras los grupos de minorfa hist6ricamente han representado
el problema de la sociedad. Consecuentemente, como un grupo compite para
controlar el otro y el otro luchas para resistirse ser controlado, un conflicto
surge entre el autorizado y el des-autorizado, el opresor y el oprimido, el
dominador y el dominado.
Si por la proyecci6n de un poder sobre el otro (como en el caso de la
policfa) o el reconocimiento de alguna existencia victimizada (como en el caso
de la comunidad de minorfa), la polarizaci6n entre los grupos se hace mis
110. SKOLNICK Y FYFE, supra nota 16 en 92.
111. Tom Boudreau, Intergroup Conflict Reduction Through Identity Affirmation: Overcoming the
Image of the Ethnic or Enemy "Other." [Reducci6n de el Conflicto de Intergrupo por Afirmaci6n de
Identidad: Vencimiento de la Imagen del los Etnicos o Enemigo 'Otro']. (unpublished) (on file with author).
112. Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, in ON INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL
NORMS [Conflicto y el Web de Afiliaciones de Grupo, En Sobre Individualidad y Normas Sociales], 70,70-
96. (University of Chicago Press, 1971) (1995).
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prominente cada vez, una controversia que implica la brutalidad o la fuerza
excesiva de parte de la policia estalla. La polarizaci6n se manifiesta a si
misma en forma de simbolos culturales y normas. Por ejemplo, el concpto de
la policia de "un c6digo de silencio," "pensandoo en azul," "la cortina azul," y
"la pared azul," representan un sistema de creencia compartido disefiado para
reforzar el lazos de grupo. Skolnick y Fyfe observan que, "la cultura
fundamental de vigilancia es en todas partes similar, lo cual es comprensible
desde que por todas partes los mismos rasgos del papel de policia -el peligro,
la autoridad y el mandato para usar la fuerza coactiva - est~n presente. Esta
combinaci6n genera y apoya las normas de solidaridad intema, o la
hermandad." 13
Asimismo el concepto de grupo de minorfa con una persecuci6n
compartida trae a los miembros juntos. De hecho, es la idea de una persecuci6n
compartida lo que nos permite hacer este andlisis del conflicto de grupo entre
policia-minorfa por el cual el grupo de minorfa es singular; si no, las
distinciones entre grupos de minorfa son tan prominentes que cualquier
tentativa de agruparlos juntos serfa estropeada.
Algunos cientfficos sociales han teorizado que la policfa es un ejemplo de
un grupo de minorfa. Por ejemplo, McEntire y Powers notan que porque "un
grupo de minorfa es cualquier grupo hacia el que otros tienen prejuicios,"' 14 la
policfa podrfa ser considerada un grupo de minorfa basado en prejuicios
asociados con la ocupaci6n. Tambi6n, Bayley y Mendelsohn concluyen que "...
Hay varios grupos de minorfa en Am6rica, y uno de ellos es la policia." ' 15 Estas
conclusiones sin embargo, son flojas ya que ellos ignoran que las distinciones
primarias entre la minorfa y otros grupos en Amdrica son la tradici6n de
dominaci6n compartida por los miembros del grupo de mayorfa y la tradici6n
de persecuci6n compartida por los miembros de grupos de minorfa. Como un
grupo, las minorfas en Am6rica representan a los miembros de un colectivo
tradicionalmente victimizado - es decir la gente de color quien constituye "los
segmentos sin el poder... La clase trabajadors y\o mds baj a, la pobreza stricken,
el semicalificado y\o inexperto, y el bajo e inculto." ' 6 Esta caracteristica de
persecuci6n es un concepto crucial asociado con las cuestiones de sicocultural
en el coraz6n del conflicto. Y como el concepto de policfa de pensar azul, el
sentido de grupo de minorfa de persecuci6n no puede ser ignorado, reducido
al minimo o compartido con el otro enemigo.
113. SKOLNICKYFYFE, supra nota 16, en 92.
114. MCENTRE Y PODERES, supra nota 47, en 316.
115. BAYLEY Y MENDELSOHN, supra nota 48, en 55.
116. Cureton, supra nota 67, en 705.
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"Las Relaciones de conflicto por si nismas
no producen una estructura social,
Pero s6lo en cooperaci6n con fuerzas unificantes." 7
En 1936 Karl Mannheim escribi6 que, "la tesis principal de la sociologfa
de conocimiento es que hay modos de pensamiento que no son suficientemente
entendido mientras sus orfgenes sociales sean obscurecidos.""
Consecuentemente, este andlisis del conflicto de inter-grupo entre la policfa de
Am6rica y comunidades de minorfa ha intentado ensanchar el lente por el cual
el conflicto de grupo de minorfa y la policfa es percibido para reducir tal
oscuridad.
Una sociedad que sanciona la dominaci6n de un hombre sobre otro es la
misma sociedad que sanciona la asignaci6n desigual de poder, la distribuci6n
desigual de riqueza y la confi-maci6n desigual de derechos humanos. Y
finalmente, esto es la misma sociedad en la cual existe un colectivo y
hegem6nico contrato social, dentro de el que sus ciudadanos acuerdan ser
dominados y controlado, ya que ellos son convencidos de la necesidad del
refrenamiento social. En este caso, el estado socialmente sancionado ejerce un
sistema de opresi6n donde la actividad humana es nunca realmente libre, pero
s6lo el pensamiento para ser asf; esto es un concepto en particular saliente para
la minorfa en Am6rica.
Este documento ha utilizado el paradigma social cubista para ensanchar
nuestro andlisis y entendimiento del conflicto complejo y prolongado entre la
instituci6n de aplicaci6n de la ley y grupos de minorfa en Am6rica. Tambi6n
deberfa estar claro a partir de este andlisis que el inter-grupo esti en
desacuerdo entre la policfa y la ciudadanfa en todo el mundo,
independientemente de la naci6n, nunca puede ser reducido a una o dos
dind.micas sociales. El uso del paradigma social cubista en cuanto a esto deberfa
apoyar esfuerzos de entender la naturaleza estructural de violencia de policfa
y con esperanza, producir una serie de disefios de pacificaci6n para
reestructurar el papel parad6jico de policfa en un mundo donde su presencia a
menudo se encuentra con el sentido de la necesidad y el sentido del miedo.
117. Simmel,supranota 113, en 77.
118. Karl Mannheim, The Sociology of Knowledge and Ideology, IN SOCIAL THEORY: THE
MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSICAL READINGS, [La Sociologfa De Conocimiento E Ideologfa. En Teorfa Social:
las Lecturas Multiculturales y Clisicas] (Charles Lemert, ed., Westview Press 2d ed. 1999) (1936).
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I. INTRODUCCION
La teorfa del Cubismo Social,2 una teoria originalmente disefiada para el
andlisis del conflicto etnoterritorial intemacional, puede ser usada en el anlisis
de micro-conflictos en otros escenarios tal como las comunidades americanas.
Muchas comunidades americanas son multi-etnicas y multi-culturales. Adem.s,
en algunas areas de los Estados Unidos, como en el sur de la Florida, las
comunidades suelen tener ms diversidad 6tnica que en otras partes del mundo.
Esto presenta una variedad de desaffos en el anAlisis de los asuntos que las
comunidades enfrentan.
En contraste con otras teorfas que solo yen un asunto de s6lo una o dos
perspectivas, el cubismo social gufa al investigador a ver un problema de varias
maneras y tambien a reconocer que en diferentes tiempos, bajo distintas
* Profesora Agregada Invitada de Resoluci6n de Conflicto y Estudios Comunitarios, Facultad de
An~lisis y Resoluci6n de Conflicto, Nova Southeastern University.
** Este articulo fue traducido por Ursula Wong.
2. Sean Byrne y Neil Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec [Cubismo Social: Seis Fuerzas Sociales de Politica Etnoterritorial en Irlanda
del Norte y Quebec, PERiODICO DE PAz Y EsTUDIos DE CONFLICTO] Vol. 3 No.2 J. OF PEACE & CONFLICT
STUD. 52-71 (1996).
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circunstancias y en varios escenarios, los factores se interrelacionar.n en
diferentes maneras. En una comunidad compuesta de varios grupos 6tnicos, el
Cubismo Social tiene la capacidad de influirse mutuamente y de considerar un
gran espectro de factores en una multiplicidad de circunstancias cambiantes.
La aplicaci6n del cubismo social en una comunidad local estadounidense es
tinica y llevara la delantera en los campos de resoluci6n de conflicto
etnoterritorial y la planificaci6n estrat6gica de comunidades. Los resultados de
tales investigaciones informardn a la comunidad y permitirdn que las agencias
juridicas, lideres polfticos, y proveedores de servicios educativos ayuden en el
desarrollo de un plan estrategico de comunidad.
Esto tambi6n permitiri que las comunidades analizen otros conflictos y
problemas mis all de aquellos relacionados tinicamente al conflicto 6tnico.
Asuntos tal como la prevenci6n e intervenci6n de violencia entre familias,
vecindades y escuelas serfan ejemplos apropiados para el empleo de este marco
analftico.3
Otras teorfas internacionales como la Teorfa Multi-modal de
Intervenci6n,2 la Paradigma Integrada de Anidar de Lederach,4 la vision de paz
compartida de Boulding,5 y Diplomacia de Multi-via de Diamond y McDonald,6
podrfan entonces contribuir considerablemente hacia la estructura de modelos
de resoluci6n y direcci6n de conflicto en comunidades estadounidenses.
Entonces la teorfa del mantenimiento de la paz internacional tendra
implicaciones mas amplias que lo antes previsto.
II. LA TEORIA DE CUBISMO SOCIAL
Muchas naciones luchan con dificultad continua contra la disensi6n
interna hasta la guerra, cuyos orfgenes pueden ser remontados al conflicto
6tnico. La disensi6n interna puede ser mfnima, sentida en un nivel casi inper-
ceptible. Otro conflicto interno puede surgir, pero serd dirigido, manteniendo
el problema a nivel de discusi6n, y asi nunca elevfindose a un conflicto.7 La
3. SeAn Byrne y Loreleigh Keashley, Working with Ethno-Political Conflict: A Multi-Modal
Approach in PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [en Trabajando con Etno-Conflicto Politico: un
Acercamiento Multi-modal. PACIFICACI6N Y RESOLUCI6N DE CONFLiCTo] (2000).
4. JOHN PAULLEDERACH, BUILDINGPEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES
[CONSTRUYENDO PAZ: RECONCILIACI6N SOSTENIBLE EN SOCiEDADES DIvlDIDAS] (1997).
5. ELISE BOULDING, BUILDING A GLOBAL CIVIc CULTURE: EDUCATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD. [CONSTRUYENDOUNACULTURAGLOBALCfVICA: EDUCACION PARAUN MUNDOINTERDEPENDIENTE.]
95-117 (1988).
6. LOUISE DIAMOND Y JOHN MCDONALD, MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
PEACE. [DIPLOMACIA DE MULTI-VIA: UN SISTEMA DE ACERCAMIENTO A LA PAZ] 11-25 (1996).
7. Los ejemplos han incluido: AfganistAn, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaydn, Bangladesh, B61gica,
Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Birmania, Burundi, Estonia, Etiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia,
Irak, Latvai, Labano, Liberia, Mall, Moldova, Niger, Irlanda del Norte, Paquistdn, las Phillippinas, Rumania,
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mayorfa de conflictos no se manifestan, y de aquellos que se presentan, por lo
general son resueltos a trav6s de recursos legftimos, respetados por los
interesados.' Esto puede ser a causa de un numero de factores, incluyendo
medios alternativos de adaptaci6n tal como: el consentimiento, la emigraci6n,
la resistencia menor, o un sentido fatalista que no se puede hacer nada.9
A pesar del sentido que la gran mayorfa de disputas no se manifiestan en
conflictos, muchos revientan a traves del mundo entero. Debido al ntimero de
tales conflictos, la tendencia de que son excesivamente prolongados, el fervor
particular que algunos son combatidos, el impacto a los participantes, y el
impacto a otros en la comunidad global, teorfas han sido desarrolladas justo
para examinar, analizar, manejar o resolver los conflictos internacionales
6tnicos.
Una tal teorfa es el Cubismo Social, disefiado como un marco analftico
para el estudio de conflicto etnoterritorial internacional.10 Mientras esta teorfa
fue disefiada para ser usada en el andlisis de conflicto internacional, a mejor
vista, su aplicaci6n puede ser vital al entendimiento de los micro-conflictos,
incluyendo aquellos dentro de las comunidades, organizaciones y hasta en las
familias de los Estados Unidos. Cuando uno considera el ntimero de grupos
6tnicos que componen las comunidades americanas, la noci6n se vuelve
fascinante, tan como l6gica. Muchas comunidades americanas estan compuestas
de varios grupos 6tnicos. Esto presenta asuntos de cultura y la manera en cual
diferentes grupos piensan, reaccionan y resuelven conflictos. Ademds, algunos
de estos grupos podrfan venir de regiones donde el conflicto etnoterritorial ha
jugado una parte significante en su socializaci6n. De modo que, cuando
emigraron a los Estados Unidos, las percepciones de grupos opuestos tambien
podrfan haber emigrado resultando en la continuaci6n del conflicto 6tnico en
comunidades americanas. Algunas de estas comunidades antes desconocfan
estos conflictos, y por lo tanto carecen de entendimiento en sus orfgenes.
Disefiado para el estudio de conflicto etnoterritorial, el Cubismo Social
propone un modelo para el andlisis de conflicto que acentfia la interacci6n de
varios factores, mds bien que el estudio simplemente de uno o varios factores.
Literalmente usando la imagen de un cubo Rubico la teorfa reconoce un cubo
social de conflicto que tiene seis aspectos interrelacionados: la historia, la
Rwanda, Sudfrica, Espafia, Shri-Lanka, Sudin, Tadzhikistfin y Turqufa. MICHAEL E. BROWN, Causas e
Implicaciones de Conflicto Atnico, See MICHAEL E. BROWN, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
SEcuRITY 3 (1993). [Vea MICHAEL E. BROWN, CONLICTO ITN]CO Y SEGURIDAD INTERNACIONAL 3]
8. Louis Kriesberg, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICTs: FROM ESCALATION TO RESOLUTION [CONFLICrOS
CONSTRUCTIVOS: DESDE ESCALADA A RESOLUCION] 52-53 (1998).
9. Byrne, supra nota 1.
10. Id.
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religi6n, los datos demogrficos, las instituciones polfticas y el comportamiento
no-institucional, la economifa y factores sicoculturales. "
A traves de asignar uno de estos factores a cada lado del cubo, y notando
que el cubo es dinamico, constantemente en moviniento a medida de que los
factores se influyen mutuamente, uno facilmente puede imaginar los lados del
cubo actuando recfprocamente a varios tiempos con fuerzas cambiantes. Como
el cubo Rubico, cada lado no s6lo esta en contacto y en relaci6n con los cuatro
otro lados simultneamente, pero mis bien, partes de cada lado pueden moverse
y servir como catalizadores para otros factores y sub-factores o facetas. Asi,
como el rompecabezas del cubo Rubico, el cubo social parece estar configurado
de muchas manerias segfin la interacci6n de cada situaci6n, circunstancia,
posici6n, participantes y el conflicto. 12
Este investigador ve el cubismo social como din~nico. Como tal, esto es
un marco vivo, que esti en movimiento constante. Esta es una de las fuerzas del
Cubismo Social. Uno puede tomar informaci6n nueva y agregirla a la faceta
apropiada, asi amplificando el marco analiftico y de paso haciendolo mas
actual. Asf, cuando fuerzas exteriores est6.n enjuego en este campo contextual,
el marco, que esta disefiado para ser dindniico, puede acomodar esta actividad
nueva. Esta flexibilidad se hizo mds aparente aun cuando este investigador
consider6 un nfimero de otras bases te6ricas.
Ademis, este investigador supone que el cubo puede ser utilizado en
andlisis de conflictos subnivel y subgrupo, porque es reproductivo. El cubo
puede ser usado para analizar conflicto en segmentos especfficos de una
comunidad o al nivel individual. Por ejemplo, como tema para estudio
continuado, se supone que una familia forma un cubo nuevo, utilizando el cubo
de cada lado de la familia y el cubo de la comunidad. Datos nuevos no s6lo
cambian el cubo, tambien pueden reproducir el cubo, resultando que cuando
una familia nueva es formada, el marco (el cubo) nuevo que cada familia trae
crea un cubo nuevo. Asi, tambi6n da impacto al cubo de cada punto de origen.
Por lo tanto, se puede usar el cubo social como un instrumento de anilisis para
el conflicto dentro de una familia en particular. Aquel concepto es sugerido
como tema para estudio futuro, y este investigador tiene la intenci6n de seguir
este tema despues de concluir este estudio.
Revisando sus fuerzas, la amplificaci6n y la adaptabilidad de la teora son
aparentes. Las teorias siguientes sirven como ejemplos de diferentes modos de
ver la capacidad dindmica del cubo. Por ejemplo, las principales crticas del
funcionalismo estructural incluyen su incapacidad de tener tratos con cambios,
conflictos"3 e historia 4 . El cubismo social, disefiado como un marco analftico
11. Id. en 52.
12. Id.
13. GEORGE RTZER, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY [Jonatdn Turner y A.Z. Maryanski, citado en Edici6n
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para el conflicto etniterritorial, se ocupa con todos los tres aspectos: 1) el
aspecto dindmico que permite que la informaci6n nueva sea agregada, asf
dirigiendose al factor de cambio; 2) es un marco para el conflicto, que es la base
para utilizarse como analisis; y 3) la historia es inclufda como uno de los seis
factores.
La teorfa de conflicto, como avanzada por Dahrendorf,15 dirige enormes
estructuras sociales y asuntos tal como intereses implfcitos y evidentes. Sin
embargo, igual al funcionalismo estructural, no toma en cuenta al individuo,
mas bien toma una vista macrosc6pica. 16 Este investigador cree que el cubismo
social, permite que un cubo pueda ser usado para un individuo.
De modo interesante, la teorfa de conflicto como avanzada por Collins,
incluye lo microsc6pico y es la contenci6n de Collins que la teorfa de conflicto
ve las estratificaciones de la sociedad, y mas ampliamente, los conflictos dentro
de grupos y organizaciones. 7 Este aspecto integrado puede contribuir al
cubismo social. Sin embargo, el cubismo social toma la teorfa de conflicto y le
da el marco analftico y la estructura que le faltaba. De una perspectiva
pragmitica, el cubo nos permite crear un anteproyecto para el andlisis de
conflicto que la teorfa de conflicto sugiere, pero no provee.
El Neo-marxismo, visto como la respuesta teor6tica a las deficiencias del
Marxismo, y la teorfa crftica modema ambos fallan a ver el conflicto de manera
comprensiva, los factores mds holfsticos del cubo. 8 Hasta la teorfa de sistemas,
captada como una de las teorfas mds significantes de hoy, trata principalmente
con el conflicto entre sistemas, y no necesariamente considera la interacci6n
entre los sfstemas y todas las facci6nes que contribuyen. El cubismo social, que
puede ser usado para dirigir sfstemas, no esta limitado a sfstemas de disefio
artificial, tampoco excluye el asunto de conflicto dentro de un sfstema o
subsfstema. Esto permite que sea usado para el an6lisis de conflicto de
intrasfstemas, que serfa especialmente titil entre comunidades y organizaciones.
III. APLICACION DE CUBISMO SOCIAL EN EL ANALISIS DE ASUNTOS
COMUNITARIOS
Ha sido propuesto que la teoria de cubismo social puede ser aplicada en
el andlisis de conflictos en comunidades estadounidenses, demostrarfa ditil
explorar brevemente como tal marco podrfa ser beneficioso. Un problema visto
de TEORfA SocIoLoGICA], 5th ed. 250-251 (2000) (citing Jonathan Turner and A.Z. Maryanski).
14. Id. en 250.
15. Id. en 259-263 (citando Ralf Dahrendorf).
16. Id. en 259-260.
17. Id. en 259-263, (citando Ralf Dahrendorf).
18. RITZER, supra, nota 12 en 284-287.
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en muchas comunidades es la cuesti6n de violencia. La violencia puede ser
clasificada en muchos niveles, puede originarse de varias maneras y puede
manifestarse en una variedad de contextos: familia, vecindad, lugar de empleo,
y mds all del escenario local, regional, nacional e intemacional. Si una
comunidad deseara dirigirse a la cuesti6n de violencia, el Cubismo Social
podrfa ser usado como el marco analftico y el investigador podria aplicarlo
usando varios procedimientos y contextos.
Para los objetivos de esta breve ilustraci6n, la cuesti6n social de violencia
serd usada y el micro-contexto de violencia familiar serd la unidad de anilisis.
El primer lado del cubo social que debe ser identificado es la historia.
Primer Lado: Fondo Hist6rico
Si una comunidad deseara analizar la cuesti6n social de violencia, la
prueba titil sera un entendimiento y estudio de la historia. iQud cuenta la
historia sobre la violencia familiar y como ha sido experimentada? "9
La pregunta es frecuentemente planteada en cuanto si la violencia de
familia es un producto de nuestra sociedad moderna. El aumento de violencia
reportada a trav6s de los medios de comunicaci6n puede conducir a la
suposici6n que la violencia familiar es el producto de peliculas, televisi6n,
crimenes de imitaci6n y acontecimientos contempordneos.2° Sin embargo, a
pesar de las tendencias recientemente ptiblicadas en la violencia familiar, esta
violencia no es nueva, ni tinicamente un producto de nuestra sociedad moderna.
De vista hist6rica, la violencia dentro de la familia contra las mujeres,
puede ser remontada a trav6s de los siglos y codificada en leyes seculares y
escrituras religiosas. 21 La hip6tesis de la relaci6n heredada de los siglos
antepasados era del poder desigual, sin duda. Los hombres, estaban supuestos
a hecer las reglas.. .y a gobemar como padres de familia en casa.22
La doctrina de la intimidad de familia, otra creaci6n de derecho comtin
ingl6s, estableci6 que el hogar era sujeto a la privacidad que no debia ser
interferida por el gobiemo. Esto y la doctrina de cobertura han sido
19. Id. en 317-336.
20. DEBORAH PROTHROW-STITH, DEADLY CONSEQUENCES: How VIOLENCE IS DESTROYING OUR
TEENAGE POPULATION AND A PLAN TO BEGIN SOLVING THE PROBLEM. [CONSECUENCIAS MORTALES: COMO
VIOLENCIA DESTRUYE NUESTRA POBLAC16N ADOLESCENTE Y UN PLAN PARA COMENZAR LA SOLUCIoN DEL
PROBLEMA]. 29-47 (1991).
21. Jerry Von Talge. Victimization dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family
Violence Directed Toward Women and The Impact on Child Witnesses. [Dindmica de persecuci6n: las
Implicaciones Psicosociales y Legales de Violencia Familiar Dirigida Hacia Mujeres y el Impacto en
Testigos Infantiles] 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 111-172 (2000).
22. MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS. [Mujeres Abogadas] 5 (1993).
23. SANDRA LIPSrIZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL
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importadas por los colonizadores y se hicieron parte de la tradici6n legal
americana y la polftica ptiblica.24
Los afios 1800 vieron el reconocimiento legal de la prerrogativa
masculina en los afios primitivos, y los principios de limitaciones en
el abuso cerca de los ahios 1870. Sin embargo, hacia el final de los
afios 1800, la cuesti6n de violencia familiar surgi6 nuevamente.
Algunos teorizan que condiciones econ6micas, seguidas por la
primera guerra mundial, incit6 que los americanos devolvieran sus
atenciones a otras partes.'
Asf, las autoridades han sido condicionadas a hacerse la vista gorda a la
violencia dom6stica asi como el abuso infantil. Tambi6n explica el anatema
sentido por oficiales de agencias jurfdicas siempre que tuvieron que responder
a las quejas de alborotos dom6sticos, y la demora en la promulgaci6n de las
leyes que protegen a mujeres y nifios.
Por to tanto, la historia detrds del g6nero y la violencia familiar apoya que
los hombres est6n a cargo de mujeres, con las mujeres y nifios teniendo menor
rango, sda en casa o fuera de las paredes de la casa.26 El factor hist6rico en el
cubo social puede ser visto como un elemento dinknico, tocando sobre todos
los otros factores que influyen la manera en cual la sociedad se ha
acostumbrado a ver, reaccionar, y responder a la violencia dom6stica. Esta
noci6n dominante en que las mujeres son vistas como menos que los hombres
ha cobrado forma en la manera que la comunidad piensa, plan6a, y actdia.27
Segundo Lado: Religi6n
Las escrituras religiosas recalcaron el concepto de dominaci6n masculina
y suministraron una base racional y justificaci6n para el sistema patriarcal:
Los dos Testamentos de la Biblia ven al hombre como creaci6n directa de
Dios, hecho en la propia imigen de Dios, mientras que la mujer, fuW creada
como una idea adicional, para asistir al hombre, y fue creada de su cuerpo.
Hasta en el Nuevo Testamento, la masculinidad de Jests ha sido interpretada
INEQUALITY [Los LENTES DE GtNERO: TRANSFORMACI6N DEL DEBATE SOBRE DESIGUALDAD SEXUAL], 63
(1993).
24. Id.
25. Kathleen O'Connell Corcoran y James C. Melamed, From Coercion to Empowerment: Spousal
Abuse and Meditation. [Desde Coacci6n a Fortalecimiento: Abuso Conyugal Y Mediaci6n]. Vol. 7 No. 1
MEDIATION QUARTERLY, 303, 304. (1989).
26. JUDITH LORBER Y SUSAN L. FARRELL, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER [LA
CONSTRUCCI6N SOCIAL DEL GtNERO] (1991).
27. Von Talge, supra nota 20.
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por muchos eriditos biblicos y te6logos para apoyar la autoridad masculina
sobre las mujeres 28 (Bem, 1993, pp. 4647).
Esta revelaci6n divina sirvi6 para explicar porqu6 las mujeres no estaban
al mismo nivel que el hombre y para desalentar a los discfpulos de manosear el
plan de Dios para la humanidad. Esta creencia fu6 apoyada en la mitologfa de
varias culturas, incluyendo mitologfa y filosoffa griega.29 Tal como en el Viejo
Testamento, la mitologfa griega representa a la mujer siendo creada despu6s del
hombre y como la causa de la muerte, la enfermedad y el caos en el mundo.3°
Los Estados Unidos era una naci6n fundada principalmente sobre los
principios de derecho comdin ingl6s, y fue muy influfda bajo el dominio de
conceptosjudeo-cristianos. Asf pues, se hace claro que lareligi6n ha tenido una
influencia en la creencia que las mujeres y los nifios deberfan estar bajo el
control y regla de los hombres. De la misma manera un ndmero de prdcticas
religiosas corrientes y creencias que apoyan la noci6n que los hombres deberfan
estar en el control de la casa.3'
Por lo tanto, cudndo uno mira al cubo social de g6nero y la violencia
familiar, el factor de religi6n presta apoyo y justificaci6n a la noci6n de
supremacfa masculina y el plan divino de Dios para los g6neros. Ya que la
religi6n influye la esencia fundamental del sfstema de valores de una persona,
la noci6n se hace m.s dificil de dirigir, enfrentar, y cambiar.
Tercer Lado: Psicocultural
La cultura juega un papel importante en la formaci6n del lente por el cual
los indivfduos y grupos perciben al mundo.32 La cultura es central para el modo
como los individuos y las familias organizan sus experiencias de vida,
psicol6gicamente y emocionalmente. Esto influye como buscan ayuda, como
caracterizan el problema, lo que ellos consideran las causas de dificultades
familiares, su experiencia subjetiva de conflicto y la violencia.3 3 El conflicto es
28. LnPsrrz BEM, supra nota 22 en 46-47.
29. Id. en 49-56.
30. Ver ld. en 46-56, la discusi6n de la representacion en pintura de Adin y Eva, con Eva comiendo
la manzana como la causa de que los seres humanos sean expulsados del Jardfn de Ed6n. Esto es en paralelo
con el cuento griego de Pandora, la primera mujer, quien abri6 la caja que liber6 la muerte, la enfermedad
y otros males sobre el mundo. En ambos, mujeres son vistas como la fuente de mal y el sufirmiento, asf
explicando porque deben ser controladas por hombres.
31. Id.
32. DAVIDW. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICTMEDIATIONACROSSCULTURES: PATHWAYS ANDPATrERNS
[MEDIACION DE CONFLICTO A TRAVtS DE CULTURAS: SENDEROS Y PAUTA FuA]. 21-23 (1992).
33. Id.
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universal pero distinto en cada cultura; esto es comdin a todos pero las
experiencias son uinicas para cada indivfduo.34
Del mismo modo, la manera en que cada cultura v6 alas mujeres, los nifios
y a la unidad de familia tendrl impacto en como perciben el conflicto en el
hogar, a quienes creen ser responsables de aquel conflicto, como el conflicto
puede ser resuelto y si es apropiado buscar o aceptar ayuda fuera de la familia.
La cultura influiri lo que es considerado como normal, contra el nivel de
conflicto atn la violencia familiar s6a vista como lo normal.35
Una manera normal de disminuir un conflicto en una sociedad es huir del
escenario de un accidente-esto constituye un delito serio en otras sociedades.
Las fronteras humanas son fronteras culturales de creaci6n social. Las fronteras
legales y fronteras emocionales son dibujadas segoin los valores culturales,
mitos y preferencias.36 Segdin Lederach, el sentido comin de cada persona, su
experiencia acumulada y el conocimiento son la base primordial de como crean,
entienden y responden al conflicto.37
Muchas comunidades en los EE.UU tienen residentes de varias culturas.
Un exrnen de las culturas representadas en una comunidad contribuirfa mucho
al entendimiento de la violencia familiar. No todos los residentes perciben el
problema de la misma manera, ni tienen la misma experiencia del problema, ni
desean intervenci6n de la misma manera. En consecuencia toda intervenci6n
deberfa ser disefiada considerando diferencias culturales.
Por ejemplo, en el condado de Broward, en el sudeste de la Florida, se
presenta una variedad de circunstancias socioecon6micas, culturales y otras
circunstancias demogrdficas que pueden contribuir a la violencia familiar. El
condado atrde a imigrantes reci6n llegados y turistas de todas partes de los
Estados Unidos y del mundo. Esto puede agregar a la tensi6n y estr6s, sobre
todo a familias j6venes que crfan sus hijos sin el apoyo emocional de sus
parientes y a veces hasta sin la ventaja de sus normas culturales. Adems,
algunas culturas ven el conflicto y la violencia dentro de la familia no s6lo
como un asunto privado, sino como un comportamiento aceptable.38
Ademis, el sur de la Florida presenta muchos otros factores que empeoran
las situaciones de violencia familiar, tal como: pocos recursos mds alli de sus
familias inmediatas para desahogar la rabia; una comunidad multi-cultural en
cual algunos miembros ni entienden, ni aprecian las cuestiones o las
necesidades de grupos culturales y 6tnicos de la vecindad; el ingreso bajo y la
34. Id. en 18.
35. JUAN PAULLEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES.
[PREPARANDO HACIA LA PAZ: TRANSFORMACION DE CONFtCTO A TRAVtS DE CULTURASJ. (1995).
36. AUGSBURGER, supra nota 31 en 23.
37. LEDERACH, supra nota 34 en 9.
38. AUGSBURGER, supra nota 31, en 130-142.
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pobreza. Estos son los factores que el Cubismo Social considera en su marco
dindmico.
Cuarto Lado: Instituciones Politicas y Comportamiento de Organizaciones
Particulares
La legislaci6n de violencia dom6stica siendo presentada, argumentada y
codificada en la ley de los Estados Unidos, es una sefial de los cambios en la
politica pdblica de los siglos pasados. Carl J. Friedrich, define la polftica como
"un curso propuesto de acci6n de una persona, grupo, o gobierno dentro de un
ambiente que proporciona los obstdculos y oportunidades que la polftica estaba
supuesta a vencer en un esfuerzo de alcanzar un objetivo o realizar una
oportunidad o meta.3 9 Anderson afirma que la polftica debe suponer un
comportamiento determinado en el tratamiento de una cuesti6n o un problema,
y 61 establece seis criterios en consideraci6n de las consecuencias de la polftica
ptiblica.4 °
Primero, que la polftica s6a prudente y ditil, no algo qu6 ha sido hecho al
azar o por casualidad. Segundo, las acciones deben ser tomadas a trav6s de
tiempo por funcionarios del gobierno. Tercero, la polftica piiblica surge como
una respuesta a las quejas, para acci6n o inacci6n, en cuanto a cuestiones
especfficas hechas por ciudadanos individuales, oficiales pdiblicos, legisladores,
grupos, etc., hacia funcionarios del gobiemo y agencias gubernamentales.
Cuarto, la polftica pdiblica negosea con acci6n, de lo que el gobierno de veras
hace, y no de puro prop6sito. Quinto, la poliftica piiblica debe dar acci6n
especffica, positiva o negativa, en vez de no hacer nada solo porque un asunto
todavfa no se ha convertido en problema pdiblico. Sexto, en forma positiva, la
polftica pdiblica es autoritaria, basada en la ley y lleva en ella la legitimidad, el
reconocimiento y las capacidades de ejecuci6n.41
En lo esencial, la politica ptiblica refleja una acci6n intencional
emprendida por el gobierno, generalmente en respuesta a cuestiones planteadas
por uno i varios grupos, como acci6n ciudadana, inter6s especial, etc. Esta
sujeto al cambio a medida que la percepci6n de los asuntos cambian. La opini6n
pdiblica por lo tanto puede convertirse en polftica pliblica, que a su turno efecttia
nuestras leyes y procesos judiciales 2 Esto apoya la contenci6n de Sharp, que
el poder polftico fluye de la interacci6n entre todas o algunas de las fuentes
siguientes: 1) la autoridad; 2) los recursos humanos; 3) las habilidades y
39. JAMES E. ANDERSON, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING [P(IBLICO POLICYMAKING] en 9 (1997).
40. Id. en 10-12.
41. Id. en 12.
42. Id. en 10-12.
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conocimiento; 4) losfactores intangibles; 5) los recursos materiales; y 6) las
sanciones.43
El movimiento femenino corriente que comenz6 en los afios 1960 tambi6n
desafi6 el paradigma antiguo.44 Entendiendo el poder del voto, se formaron
grupos de mujeres para ejercer su derecho de votar. Primero concertaron
esfuerzos para elegir a mujeres o a hombres que apoyaran los inter6ses de las
mujeres. Por lo tanto, la percepci6n de los oficiales elegidos comenz6 a
cambiar a causa del poder de estos bloques de votaci6n.45 En la misma 6poca,
las universidades comenzaron a ofrecer cursos y eventualmente tftulos en
estudios de mujeres. Esto impact6 a la nueva generaci6n de mujeres quienes
entraban a la edad adulta con expectativas infinitamente diferentes que las de
sus madres, abuelas, o cualquier generaci6n anterior en la historia americana.
Esto tambi6n tuvo impacto con la generaci6n nueva de hombres, cuyas propias
autopercepciones y expectativas comenzaron a cambiar.
46
En reacci6n, la legislaci6n de violencia dom6stica entr6 en vanguardia en
muchos estados a mediados y hasta el fin de los afios 1970 y al comienzo de los
afios 1980. Esto codific6 el reconocimiento que la violencia dentro de la casa
no serfa tolerada y que constituye un comportamiento ilegal. Posteriormente,
la mayor parte de los estados ampliaron sus leyes de violencia domdstica
agregando la violencia de una naturaleza emocional y psicol6gica.47
La manera que nuestro gobierno y otras instituciones perciben la violencia
familiar es una consideraci6n importante en el andlisis de violencia. A la luz de
la acci6n legislativa y judicial, un nimero de instituciones apolfticas, tal como
organizaciones no lucrativas, comenzaron a dedicarse a tratar esta cuesti6n, y
nuevas agencias y centros fueron iniciados especialmente en esta trea."
Quinto Lado: Datos demogrdficos
Los Estados Unidos estd viviendo una epidemia de violencia familiar (los
t6rminos violencia familiar y violencia domdstica son usados de manera
intercambiable aquf) en comunidades y vecindades en cada regi6n de nuestro
pais. Segfin Herzberger, ni las dltimas estadfsticas reflejan el ritmo de suceso
43. GENE SHARP, THE POLITICS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION: PART ONE POWER AND STRUGGLE [LA
POLTICA DE ACCION SIN VIOLENCfA: PARTE PRUIERA PODER Y LuCHA] 11-12 (1973).
44. HARRINGTON, supra nota 21 en 3-12.
45. Id.
46. LIPsrrz BEM, supra nota 22 en 39-42.
47. VonTalge, supra nota 2Oen 111-130.
48. SHARON HERZBERGER, VIOLENCE WITHIN THE FAMILY [VIOLENCIA DENTRO DE LA FAMILIA],
188-208 (1996).
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con exactitud y ...ellos dramidticamente subestiman la verdadera incidencia de
maltrato.49
La violencia en el hogar ha causado que miles de mujeres y nifios escapen
de sus casas atemorizados por su seguridad, y por sus propias vidas. Esta fuga
resulta en el desplazamiento y contribuye considerablemente al nivel de
personas sin hogar.
El efecto de violencia familiar en la sociedad aparece en incidentes de
violencia en el lugar de trabajo. Partidos abusivos a veces vienen al lugar de
empleo para acosar y amenazar a vfctimas en persona, o sea por Ilamadas
telef6nicas, faxes o el Internet. Estas mujeres pueden perder sus empleos o
creen que renunciando es la ginica manera de cortar otro punto de contacto.
Probablemente, tendrdn que solicitar subsidios de desempleo o ayuda ptiblica.5°
La violencia familiar no s6lo abarca la noci6n tradicional de violencia
dom6stica entre esposos o compafieros, sino tambi6n el abuso de cualquier
miembro de familia contra otro, como el abuso de padres por sus hijos o
hermanos y hermanas, uno contra otro. Mientras las tendencias en violencia
familiar indican al aumento del abuso conyugal, la estadfstica mis alarmante se
relaciona con el abusojuvenfl." La violencia literalmente puede ser engendrada
dentro de casa a trav6s de las generaciones sucesivas. 52
Entendiendo la composici6n de una comunidad, demogrdficamente, se
puede ver el ndimero de familias nuevas, grupos de edades, y culturas
diferentes; lo que nos permite un mejor analisis de los problemas y el disefio
de intervenciones.
Sexto Lado: Economia
A trav6s de la historia de la cultura occidental, han prevalecido tres
creencias acerca de las mujeres y los hombres: que tienen naturalezas
psicol6gicas y sexuales fundamentalmente diferentes, que los hombres son
intrinsicamente el sexo dominante o superior, y que las diferencias de macho-
hembra y el predominio masculino son naturales.54 Como tal, sus creencias se
adaptan como la norma no s6lo por hombres, sino tambi6n, al menos por fuera,
por mujeres.
49. Id. en 5.
50. JERRY LEE BRINEGAR, BREAKING FREE FROM DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE [LIBERACI6N DEVIOLENCIA
DOM STCAj 1-11 (1992).
51. R. EMERSON DOBASH Y RussELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES, [VIOLENCIA CONTRA
EsPOsAs] 233-243 (1979).
52. HERZBERGER, supra nota 47 en 5-17.
53. Id.
54. LPsrrz BEM, supra nota 22 en 1.
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Debido a las limitaciones puestas hacia las mujeres, las mujeres estaban
econ6micamente en una categorfa diferente que los hombres. Esto es una
consideraci6n importante en el andlisis de violencia familiar, en muchos casos
los ingresos desproporcionados de mujeres, y como tal, la relaci6n entre los
poderes en la relaci6n, asf como el acceso a alternativas en tratar la violencia
familiar.5 Si las mujeres no tienen tal acceso, ellas no tienen el poder
econ6mico, a pesar de la apariencia de tener riqueza. ZPero c6mo podrfan
producir, controlar y tener acceso a los excesos de recursos cuando las reglas
de la sociedad, creadas por y para hombres, perpettian una discriminaci6n de
hecho contra las mujeres?56
C6mo la sociedad valora el trabajo y la contribuci6n de uno va al coraz6n
de la cuesti6n de g6nero. Divisiones del g6nero dentro de la fuerza obrera han
jugado un papel importante en la perpetuaci6n del sueldo bajo de las mujeres. 7
Si las mujeres se quedan en empleos de pago bajo, entonces su producci6n,
control y el acceso a otros recursos esta limitada o hasta imposible.
Bern, usa el t6rmino androcentrismo para notar la tendencia de ver la
experiencia masculina como la norma, indica que los patrones tienen la
tendencia de imponer normas parahombres y mujeres basadas en la experiencia
masculina que mientras uno trabaja cada dfa, el hogar y los nifios son cuidados
por otra persona, por lo general una esposa.58
Aunque tenga empleo, ella sigue siendo responsable por el cuidado de los
nifios, de la casa, la cocina, etc. Y aunque tenga ayuda de afuera como nifieras,
criadas, etc6tera, la mujer todavfa permanece como la persona responsable por
los horarios, por contratos los empleados, supervisando los empleados, y por
tomar decisiones como despedir los empleados o hacer arreglos alternativos
cuando no estan disponibles. Ademds, en muchos hogares, hasta cuando ambos
compafieros trabajan, las mujeres hacen y estan supuestas hacer, una parte
desproporcionada de tareas dom6sticas. "
Dos Areas tienen importancia: el primero es la familia individual, el
segundo, la comunidad. Para la familia, un andlisis de economfa nos ayuda a
entender cuales recursos estan disponibles para solucionar la violencia. Tal
55. Vea Judith Buber Agassi, Theories of Gender Inequality: Lesssons from the Israeli Kibbitz
[Teorfas de Desigualdad Sexual: Lecciones del israeli Kibbutz], in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC1rON OF GENDER,
supra nota 25, en 313-334 (Judith Lorber & Susan A. Farrell eds., 1991).
56. Id. en 316-317.
57. Vea Johanna Brenner, Feminization of Poverty and Comparable Worth: Radical Versus
Liberal Approaches, in The Social Construction of Gender, [Feminizaci6n de Pobreza y Valor Comparable:
Aproximaci6nes Radicales Contra Liberales, en LORBER Y FARRELL, supra nota 25, en 205.
58. Lipsrrz B Em, supra nota 22 en 62-65.
59. Id.
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ayuda puede incluir recursos para la terapia, abogados, y gastos de aloj amiento
para un miembro de la familia que este desplazado.
El segundo punto, el conocimiento de la econornfa de una comunidad
asistird en el andlisis de los recursos que la comunidad tiene disponible para sus
residentes, y cuales residentes pueden necesitar recursos adicionales.
IV. UTILIZACON DE TEORfA lINTERNACIONAL PACIFICADORA EN EL DISEl4O
DE SOLUCIONES COMUNITARIAS
Ademds, examinando los principos del desarollo de paz intemacional,
Lederach, indica que cambio requeriri un equilibrio de poder en la relaci6n por
cual todos los comprometidos reconocen el uno al otro de una nueva manera.
Tal reconocimiento aumentard la voz y la participaci6n de los impotentes en
obtener sus necesidades bisicas y vilidara sus preocupaciones.6 ° El tambi6n
indica que cuando los partidos mds d6biles obtenien un entendimiento de si
mismos, asf como un conocimiento de las relaciones y contextos, por lo general
exigirdn cambio.6'
Curle afirma que el movimiento hacia la paz puede ser entendido a travds
de los roles que surgen en una progresi6n tfpica de conflicto que pasa por
cuatro etapas:
1) Una etapa latente u ocultada en la que la conciencia es necesaria;
2) confrontaci6n, en cual el conflicto ya no es ocultado; 3)
negociaci6n, que puede ocurrir cuando niveles de conciencia de
interdependencia han ocurrido entre los partidos; y 4) una
reestructuraci6n, en la que la negociaci6n y mediaci6n pr6spera ha
causado una reestructuraci6n de la relaci6n. Curie refiere a esta etapa
final como "justicia aumentada". 62
Lederach indica que el movimiento a lo largo de esta matriz a veces puede
parar o saltar hacia adelante o hacia atrds. De la misma manera, no todo
conflicto puede ser resuelto de tal manera que fticilmente puede sostener la
paz.63 Sin embargo, como Curie advierte en esta matriz, el conflicto latente no
puede ser resuelto hasta que haya reconocimiento de la existencia del
conflicto. 64
Revisando los aspectos del desarrollo de la paz internacional y la
pacificaci6n, Lederach (1997) usa una pirdiide como medio de describir los
60. LEDERACH, supra nota 3 en 65.
61. Id. en 64.
62. LEDERACH, supra nota 3 en 64-66 (citando Curie).
63. Id. en 66.
64. Id. en 64-66.
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tipos de actores y las aproximaciones que pueden ser vistos. El primer nivel es
el liderazgo, como lideres militares, politicos y 6lites; el enfoque tiende hacia
procesos llevados a cabo por mediadores sumamente visibles, e implican cese
de fuego y negociaciones de alto nivel. El segundo nivel representa a los lideres
que son conocidos en sectores particulares, tal como los intelectuales, lideres
6tnicos y religiosos, organizaciones no gubernamentales y 6lites de media
hilera. El acercamiento tiende hacia equipos enterados y parciales, comisiones
de la paz, talleres y entrenamiento. El tercer nivel contiene a lideres locales, el
liderazgo de rafces comunitarias, especuladores de comunidades y las cabezas
de organizaciones no gubernamentales indigenas. Sus accesos tienden hacia la
reducci6n del trauma de la posguerra, las organizaciones de rafces comunitarias
y entrenamiento local, la reducci6n del prejuicio y los esfuerzos psicosociales.65
Lederach sugiere que cada uno de estos nivelesjuega un papel significante
en el esfuerzo hacia la paz y que entre mis alto el nivel es, mds es el acceso que
uno tiene a la informaci6n y mds grande es el impacto en las decisiones que
uno tiene al conjunto, mientras que, en el mds bajo nivel de mando, uno tendrd
mis experiencia con la gente victimizada y los resultados de decisiones de gran
escala, pero menor serd la capacidad de ver la imdgen mds amplia.66 Usando
esta pirdmide en la seguridad de la comunidad y la intervenci6n de violencia,
uno puede ver que la comunicaci6n entre los niveles es esencial en el
establecimiento de politicas y pricticas en la intervenci6n de mediaci6n de
violencia familiar donde los expertos locales y lfderes tienen mayor oportunidad
de pasar su pericia, y donde lideres de niveles medios y superiores y los que
crean las polfticas pueden considerar esta informaci6n con cuidado. La
seguridad de las victimas puede ser aumentada cuando salvaguardas adicionales
son implementados al nivel local, pero para hacer esto, el apoyo de programas
financieros, las leyes y la politica deben descender de los altos rangos.
V. INTERVENCIONES Y AsOcIAcIONEs COMUNITARIAS
Byrne y Keashley sugieren que en situaciones internacionales hay un arte
de poder identificar problemas especfficos y que esto podrfa resultar en un
anteproyecto de problemas que sefiala soluciones posibles.67 Este concepto
podrfa asistir en la identificaci6n de problemas en el drea de prevenci6n de
violencia y proyectos de intervenci6n y tambi6n permitirfa la evaluaci6n de
problemas. El "paradigma anidado" en el desarrollo de la paz internacional de
Lederach, por ejemplo, indica cuatro etapas, representadas como cfrculos, que
pueden ser itiles para la observaci6n de conflictos en tfrminos de tiempo y la
65. Id. en 74-80.
66. Id.
67. Byme y Keashley, supra nota 2.
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planificaci6n de la paz.6' El enfoque es holfstico y considera el proceso del
desarrollo de la paz por etapas desde acabar con la violencia hasta el
establecimiento de una visi6n a largo plazo, atravezando un perfodo de veinte
alos O mds.
69
El primer cfrculo es la actual "intervenci6n de crisis", que requiere acci6n
inmediata, acci6n a corto plazo, a nivel internacional, a menudo significa el
auxilio de emergencia, y en casos de violencia, el cese de hostilidades y de
fuego. Por lo general, esto ocurre a lo largo de 2-6 meses de tiempo y se
concentra en soluciones inmediatas.70 Cudndo se trata de violencia familiar, el
primer cfrculo representa la respuesta de las agencias jurfdicas a la crisis
inmediata de violencia. Aquella respuesta seria inmediata, aunque tambi6n
pueda pasar repetidamente a trav6s de un periodo de tiempo.
El segundo cfrculo, de "preparaci6n y entrenamiento", se ha vuelto cada
vez mis popular en la resoluci6n de conflictos. Esto implica el entrenamiento
de habilidades y actividades preparatorias para que los conflictos en el futuro
puedan ser mejor dirigidos. Por lo general, esto ocurre a lo largo de 1-2 afios
y se considera como la planificaci6n de corto rango. 71 En una comunidad, la
policia podrfa estar entrenada para entender mejor los conflictos y las reuniones
peri6dicas permitirfan un contexto para cambiar opiniones sobre el rol de
soluci6nes del conflicto y la mediaci6n en la pacificaci6n de la familia, la
comunidad y el desarrollo de la paz.
Tales reuniones tambi~n ayudan a introducir informaci6n en el disefto de
entrenamientos para el futuro. El modelo de entrenamiento anima el empleo de
ideas de los participantes en los objetivos, metas y el diseflo del
entrenamiento.72 Conversaciones con oficiales de la policia antes de disefiar el
entrenamiento resulta en un disefio mds apropiado y puede ser descrito por los
participantes como mis titil.
El tercer circulo, "el disefto de cambio social", correlaciona la experiencia
de crisis con la necesidad para la mej or planificaci6n prospectiva e implica un
plazo de tiempo de 5-10 afios. Esto es visto como "pensamiento de la d6cada",
y es el perfodo de tiempo durante el cual muchos disefios de sistemas de
discusi6n son concebidos.73
La necesidad de una sociedad de comunidad viable y significativa basada
en la planificaci6n de la comunidad estrat6gica hacia la paz, es el coraz6n de
este estudio. Mds bien que el simple responder a epis6dios de violencia familiar
68. LEDERACH, supra nota 3 en 63-80.
69. Id.
70. Id. en 76-80.
71. Id.
72. LEDERACH, supra nota 34 en 55-62.
73. LEDERACH, supra nota 3 en 63-80.
1176
en casas individuales o la tendencia de vecinos y oficiales de observar la
escalaci6n sin tener un programa de comunidad en el lugar, este cfrculo
promueve el rango largo de planificaci6n y disefilo.
Finalmente, el cuarto cfrculo, del "futuro deseado" es para la visi6n de
largo t6rmino, ocurriendo a lo largo de veinte o mis afios. Durante este tiempo,
las generaciones son consideradas en t6rminos de conflicto, prevenci6n de la
violencia y la armonfa.74 Durante este perfodo, Boulding imagin6 un futuro
donde la paz compartida es generada.75 La esperanza es que cuando la paz
comunitaria pueda crearse, puede construirse una sociedad establecida, una
visi6n a largo plazo serfa el resultado natural. Esto es el objetivo iltimo, el
futuro deseado.
Este marco permite que las comunidades comienzen a planear
estratfgicamente y no esperar hasta que los problemas se intensifiquen. Esto
les permitiri identificar problemas previstos y cuestiones que surgen y tambi6n
iniciard el proceso de planificaci6n y asignard los recursos necesarios. Por
consiguiente, disefiadores de sistemas de advertencia temprana deberfan
desarrollar enlaces con otras organizaciones para que los sistemas de
advertencia puedan ser mejorados y puedan formarse grupos de cabecera.
Este concepto podrfa ser empleado en la planificaci6n estrat6gica de
soluciones de largo rango para la violencia familiar que ha demostrado tener
implicaciones de gran alcance en la comunidad. Como ya se estableci6, la
violencia familiar y sus efectos son sentidos mucho mds alhi de las paredes de
la casa. Asf, las comunidades que desean dirigir esta cuesti6n pueden aprender
mucho del uso de conceptos del desarrollo de la paz intemacional y de sfstemas
de advertencia temprana.
Tres ideas me vienen a la mente en la utilizaci6n de los conceptos del
desarrollo de la paz en un modelo para la planificaci6n y estrat6gia de violencia
familiar. Primero, la resistencia contra la acci6n temprana y la intervenci6n
puede ser vencida. Este cambio de paradigma exige prioridad alta sobre los
cambios educativos y sist6micos que causarfan el reconocimiento de la
violencia y su potencial en las familias arriesgadas, asf como en todas las
familias. Las familias en peligro incluyen las de ingreso bajo y las que estan
pasando situaciones de crisis de vida como el divorcio, la relocalizaci6n, etc.
Mirando mds alli de los mitos de violencia, los sistemas de advertencia
temprana pueden ser modificados para que: 1) vfctimas potenciales y sus
familias puedan ser referidas a las agencias apropiadas para buscar ayuda; 2)
las familias recibiendo ayuda de agencias por otras razones pueden ser
supervisadas mds de cerca por abuso; y 3) decisiones de intervenci6n pueden
74. Id.
75. BOULDING, supra nota 4.
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ser hechas, basadas en el nivel de violencia, la cultura y otras consideraciones
contextuales para situaciones donde el abuso ha sido identificado. Esto tambi6n
podria ayudar a fijar una directriz para el empleo de mediaci6n y otros tipos de
intervenci6n.
Segundo, Lederach se di6 cuenta que la planificaci6n y estrat6gia asiste en
el establecimiento de cambios de largo plazo7 6 y Byme y Keashley indicaron
que el enlace con otros grupos era un medio eficaz para dirigir los cambios."
Los estudios y la prictica sugieren que la estrat6gia mds acertada para promover
cambios no es solo una estratfgia, mis bien implica una combinaci6n de
estrategias que mejor encajan a los indivfduos y grupos.78 Esto estarfa apoyado
por la teorfa del desarrollo de la paz internacional, incluyendo la diplomacia de
multi-grados de Diamond y McDonald.79 Asf, si una comunidad se dirige a las
cuestiones de violencia familiar con un ojo hacia el cambio sostenible, debe
ocuparse de un nimero de estrategias y tener servicios de apoyo para el
tratamiento continuado.
Tercero, Byrne recomienda la inclusi6n de todos los accionistas relevantes
en el proceso de paz para que la promoci6n de entendimiento, la tolerancia y el
didlogo pueden causar una verdadera oportunidad para que facilitadores del
tercer partido ayuden a que los interesados cumplan sus objetivos en la
percepci6n de sus necesidades verdaderas.8°
Cuando la violencia familiar es vista mds completamente a trav6s del
Cubismo Social y por la teorfa del desarrollo de la paz internacional, se hace
claro que la mayorfa de los servicios actualmente disponibles en la comunidad
estdn en el primer cfrculo de intervenci6n de crisis, con algunos encontrados en
el segundo. Las vfctimas son anfmadas a marcharse o hacer que el autor sda
expulsado, o tolerar la situaci6n. Por lo general, esta costumbre de aconsejar la
tolerancia de la violencia dentro de casa nace de normas culturales,
psicoculturales, religiosas y morales. Y afin cuando una vfctima se marcha o
hace que el autor s6a expulsado por mandato judicial, expertos dan testimonio
al alto nivel de reconciliaciones en las que sin opciones de servicio en
desarrollo, poca transformaci6n ocurriri y asf habri mantenimiento limitado
para cambio actual. Sin el cambio sostenible, el modelo de violencia es mds
probable de reasumir con el tiempo, continuar y hasta intensificarse.
76. LEDERACH, supra nota 3.
77. Byrne y Keashley, supra nota 2.
78. DIAMOND & MCDONALD, supra nota 5.
79. Id.
80. Sedn Byme. Conflict Regulation or Conflict Resolution: Third Party Intervention in the
Northern Ireland Conflict-Prospects for Peace [Regulaci6n o Resoluci6n de Conflicto: Intervenci6n de
Tercer-Partido en Conflictos de Irlanda del Norte - Perspectivas para la Paz. DIARIO DE TERRORISMO Y
VIOLENCIA POLfTICA] Vol. 7 No. 2 J. OF TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 1-24 (1995).
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Tambifn se ha visto que la necesidad de una respuesta comunitaria y de
sociedades comunitarias viables son vitales en la aplicaci6n de la ley moderna.
Esto es congruente con la teorfa del desarrollo de la paz internacional, que
estimula la colaboraci6n entre varios accionistas en niveles diferentes.
En consideraci6n de lo mencionado, se hace claro que los conceptos
tfpicamente relacionados con el conflicto etnopolftico y el desarollo de la paz
internacional pueden ser ditiles al examinar como y en que manera una
comunidad analiza y responde los asuntos sociales, como la violencia.
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INTRODUCCION
Un aumento en sociedades devastadas y traumatizados por la violencia
masiva se ha visto a fines del siglo veinte. Las sociedades traumatizadas se
desarrollan cuando conflictos severos inter6tnicos causan dristicas p6rdidas
compartidas, la humillaci6n por el enemigo, y la impotencia que impide la
adaptaci6n positiva a la situaci6n'. Vemos los ejemplos del resultado del
genocidio en Rowanda y Bosnia, el militarismo brutal en Haiti, y los choques
entre los Palestinos e Israelfes en el Medio Oriente. Mientras muchas de estas
sociedades no aparentan estar traumatizadas en la superficie, estos
acontecimientos aun pueden afectar procesos sociales 2.
Por mds de 200 afios, Haiti ha sufrido tales traumas. La esclavitud y la
colonizaci6n, una sucesi6n de dictaduras predadoras, sanciones econ6micas y
el aislamiento internacional, siguen atormentando a Haitf. En este escenario Pos
Guerra Fria, el desaffo para los eruditos en la resoluci6n de conflicto y
abogados, los funcionarios del gobierno, y actores no gubernamentales se han
desarrollado unos mecanismos multi-modalos y multidimensionales para
ocuparse de estados fracasados y de sociedades traumatizadas. Este capftulo
examinari la eficacia de cubismo social como un marco analitico para ocuparse
del conflicto multi-fasetico en Haitf.
* Ph.D. Candidate Nova Southeastern University.
** Este articulo fue traducido por Lourdes Sanchez-Barcia.
1. VAMIK VOLKAN, BLOOD LINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDE TO ETHNIC TERRORISM 43 (1998). [Linias
de Sangre: Del orgullo 6tnico al terrorismo Otnicol.
2. Id.
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Segiin Byrne y Crter, los estudios de polftica etnoterrirtorial tipicamente
examinan estructuras polifticas y econ6micas, para acentuar los intereses de
grupos en competencia, o usan un acercamiento psicoanalitico para acentuar
fuerzas psicol6gicas y culturales.3 Byrne y C-irter abogan por la perspectiva del
"cubismo social" acentuando, la interacci6n, de los mecanismos materiales y
psicol6gicos. El cubo social de conflicto tiene seis interrelacionadas facetas o
fuerzas: historia, religi6n, datos demogrificos, instituciones politicas,
economia, y factores socioculturales. 4
El cubismo social evoca las imdgenes del Cubo "Rubic' s" lo cual al torcer
o girar el cubo en cualquier direcci6n, cause un movimiento que cambia la
interacci6n de los varios elementos del juego. Estas seis fuerzas sociales,
cuando combinadas, producen diferentes modelos de comportamiento inter-
grupo o interacci6n. Ninguna fuerza puede ser aislada para explicar su relaci6n
a otras fuerzas, ni puede una sola ser la ijnica raz6n de conflicto. Por ejemplo,
un dilema para fabricantes de polftica internacional es que ellos no tienen una
metodologia cientffica para evaluar los significados culturales, politicos, y
sociales del trauma en las vidas de poblaciones civiles ni como medir cuanto
estas experiencias traumiticas cambian las vidas diarias de los individuos
afectados. Poca investigaci6n empfrica es conducida para valorar los resultados,
por lo que objetivos humanitarios son frecuentemente subordinados a agendas
politicas. Aunque la magnitud de tales problemas se han aclarado, los m6todos
de prevenci6n y la reconstrucci6n de sociedades dafiadas han permanecido
evasivos. Por consiguiente, la enorme carga de sufrimiento humano y p6rdida
de productividad social y econ6mica continua ocultada detrds de un velo de
negligencia, ignorancia, y negaci6n.5
El cubismo social ofrece un marco analftico para evaluar los significados
culturales, politicos, y sociales de trauma. Usar6 las seis fuerzas para examinar
el estado de Haiti hoy. iPuede esta perspectiva verter una nueva luz sobre
esfuerzos para reconstruir una sociedad traumatizada de modo que promuevan
el desarrollo econ6mico, la reconstrucci6n de sociedad civil, la justicia, la
democracia, y derechos humanos, y prevenir una recafda a nuevas crisis y el
caos? Mi contenci6n es que descuidando la interacci6n entre estas seis fuerzas,
asf como la psicologia colectiva de la gente desplazada de sus hogares y de su
pais, con la reconstrucci6n econ6mica y politica de la comunidad, no puede
3. Sein Byrne & Neal Carter, A Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Qu6bec, 3 J. PEACE & CoNFLicT STUDIEs 52,52-66 (1996). [Un Cubismo Social: Seis
Fuerzas Sociales de la Polftica de Ethnoterritorial en el Norte de Irlanda y Qu6bec].
4. Id.
5. Richard Mollica, Trauma and Reconstruction in Kobe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Columbia,
Harvard School of Public Health 1, 1-4, available at http://www.cgp.org/cgplink/vol16/articlesvoll6.html (last
visited Jan. 19 2002). [El trauma y la reconstrucci6n en Kobe, en Bosnia Herzegovina, y en Columbia].
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apoyar una resoluci6n durable. La resoluci6n del conflicto politico continuo en
Haiti requiere no s6lo el restablecimiento politico, sino una curaci6n mds
amplia de la sociedad traumatizada. La transformaci6n de este material y la
anomalfa psicol6gica requieren esfuerzos a corto plazo y a largo plazo por
muchos actores.
Haiti es un pafs de extrema polarizaci6n polftica, divisi6n de clase, una
identidad nacional fracturada y contrastes socioecon6micos muy rfgidos.6 Las
elites quien artificialmente perpetdian los extremos de las tradiciones coloniales
de la naci6n se han probado indispuesto de ha abandonar su estado y riqueza (y
por lo tanto el poder) en la pos independencia Haiti. Estos desacuerdos han
exacerbado grietas culturales en lengua, pricticas religiosas, y las actitudes
hacia el color de la piel - que solo puede impedir la transici6n a la democracia
que el gobierno haitiano ahora intenta efectuar.7
Haiti ha aguantado muchos acontecimientos horrorosos en su breve
historia. Quizds la perpetuaci6n de estos traumas a travds de su historia, sin la
ventaja de la curaci6n como una naci6n, inhibiendo el desarrollo de Haiti hoy.
Volkan describe la transmisi6n transgeneracional de trauma como "cuando una
persona mayor [o grupo] inconscientemente esternaliza su ser traumatizado
sobre la personalidad de un nifio [o un grupo] en desarrollo. El nifio [o el grupo]
se convierte entonces en un dep6sito para las partes no deseadas, y las
dificultades de una generaci6n mayor. Como los mayores [y la comunidad]
tienen influencias sobre los nifios, el nifo absorbe sus deseos y expectativas y
se prepara ha actuar sobre ellos. Se hace la tarea del nifio de lamentarse, voltear
las humillaciones y los sentimientos de impotencia que pertenece al trauma de
sus antecesores. 8
Volkan usa el t6rmino "trauma escogido" para describir la memoria
colectiva de una calamidad que una vez le aconteci6 a los antepasados. Desde
luego, es mds que solo un recuerdo simple; es una representaci6n mental
compartida del acontecimiento, que incluye informaci6n realista, expectativas
fantaseadas, sentimientos intensos, y defensas contra el pensamiento
inaceptable.9 tl mantiene que la palabra "escogido" propiamente refleja un
grupo grande que inconscientemente define su identidad por la transmisi6n
transgeneracional de personalidades heridas infundidas con la memoria del
trauma de los antepasados. Haiti como pais sufre de un trauma de transmisi6n
6. Jennifer L. McCoy, ROBERT ROTBERG, HALTi, Renewed: Political & Economic Prospects 1-26
(Robert 1. Rothberg ed., Brookings Institution Press, 1997) (1997). [Haiti Nenovado: Los Prospectos Politicos
y Economics].
7. IRWINP. STOTSKY, SILENCINGTHEGUNS IN HArri: THEPROM1SEOFDELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY
17(1997). [CALLAR LOS FUSILES EN HAITI: LA DELIBERATIVE PROMESA DE LADEMOCRACIA].
8. VOLKAN, supra nota 1, en 43.
9. Id. en 48.
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trasgeneracional. Usar6 el cubismo social para analizar las varias fuerzas
sociales que se entrelazan para producir la crisis en Haiti hoy.
1I. HAITi: UNA DESCRIPCION DE UNA HISTORIA TURBULENTA
Quizds el elemento sigular mds importante para entender el Haiti
contempordneo es que permanece la dnica naci6n en la historia
fundada por los esclavos quienes derrocaron a sus duefios... Este
aspecto tinico de la historia haitiana es, tanto una ventaja como una
responsabilidad.
-Chetan Kumar
Haiti fue el primer pais Caribeflo en ganar su independencia, cuando los
franceses fueron expulsado en el aflo 1804, y s6lo la segunda reptiblica del
hemisferio despu6s de los Estados Unidos. Haiti, antes conocido como el Saint-
Dominque, comparte aproximadamente un tercio de la isla de Hispafiliola con
la Reptblica Dominicana.' ° La historia haitiana moderna comenz6 en el aio
1492, cuando Crist6bal Colon desembarco en Haiti cerca del Cabo Haitien en
la costa norte de Hispailiola." La isla se hizo una colonia importante y la
morada del gobierno Espafiol en el Mundo Nuevo hasta que Espafia perdi6 el
inter6s por Haiti ya que su obsesi6n por el oro habia agotado los recursos
naturales de la isla.
Durante un periodo cincuenta afios de esclavizar a los habitantes, medio
mill6n de Indios Arawak habia sido exterminado en las minas de oro
espafiolas. 2 Sin embargo, el genocidio de los Indios natales no paso inadvertido
en Espafia. El misionero Bartolom6 de las Casas inicio una campafia contra la
esclavitud India, alcanzando su abolici6n en el afio1542. La medida no solo
llego muy tarde para prevenir la extinci6n de los Arawak, tambi6n caus6 el
principio de esclavitud Africana en el Mundo Nuevo.13 Hacia el afio 1517,
Carlos V autoriz6 la exportaci6n de 15,000 esclavos Africanos a Santo
10. DAVID MALONE, DECISION-MAKING IN THE UN SEcURITY COUNCIL: THE CASE OF HAITI 1990-
1997 40 (1998). [La toma de decisions en el Concilio de la Seguridad de ONU: El Caso de Haiti].
11. Leslie A. Benton, & Glenn T. Ware. Haiti: A Case Study of the International Response and
the Efficacy of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Crisis, at
http://www.law.emory.edu/EILR/volumes/spg98/benton.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002). [Un caso de la
Respuesta Internacional y la Eficacia de Organizaciones de Nongovernmental en la Crisis].
12. James Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers 1 (1987). [Papa Doc, Bebe Doc:
Haiti y los Duvaliers].
13. Id. en2.
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Domingo, y asf el sacerdote y el Rey lanzaron sobre el mundo el comercio de
esclavos Americanos y la esclavitud.14
Despu6s de casi cien afios de lucha por la isla de parte de los Espafioles,
Britdnicos, y el Franceses, Espafia cedi6 a Santo Dominique, ahora Haiti, a los
Franc6s en el afio 1695 segdin el Tratado de Ryswick. 15 Hacia el afio 1789 la
colonia francesa antillana de Santo Domingo suministraba las dos terceras
partes del comercio exterior de Francia y era el mercado europeo individual
mds impresionante para el comercio de esclavos. La esclavitud era una parte
integral de la vida econ6mica de la era en la colonia mds grandiosa del mundo,
el orgullo de Francia era la envidia de todas las otras naciones imperialistas. La
estructura econ6mica descansaba totalmente sobre la labor de medio mill6n de
esclavos. 6 Santo Domingo tambi6n ha sido afamado por ser la colonia mds
represiva que engendro un sistema de castas de dominaci6n francesa y preparo
el escenario para la discordia social y la explotaci6n polftica que permanece
hoy.'
7
La discordia social entre blancos y negros se ensancho, y se extendi6 por
los duefios de esclavos franceses y sus esclavas negras quienes produjeron una
nueva clase, los mulatos, tambi6n conocidos como gen de couleur o affranchis.
El estado social de esta nueva clase era una combinaci6n de los blancos y los
negros. Por lo general los duefios de las plantaciones educaban a su progenie
y a menudo les cedfan titulos de tierras, entonces a pesar de la discriminaci6n
institucional contra ellos, muchos mulatos se hicieron ricos duefios de tierras,
estableci6ndose como una clase viable.'8 La discriminaci6n racial, cruel y
abusiva, fueron el sello de las colonizaciones francesa en esta sociedad de tres
estados el de los blancos, los mulatos, y los negros.
La naci6n modema de Haiti es el producto de una revoluci6n contra la
esclavitud y el colonialismo que comienzo en el afio 1791. Mas o menos en los
cincuenta afios en que se introdujo la revoluci6n esclava de Haiti los negros
comenzaron a reaccionar al trataniento brutal de sus duefios. Las continuas
contiendas raciales impulsadas por la inspiraci6n de la revoluci6n francesa,
contribuy6 al brote de una revoluci6n. Durante este periodo de guerra civil,
Toussaint L'Ouverture surgi6 como el lfder negro dominante de la primera
rebeli6n de esclava a gran escala acertada en las Am6ricas. 9 L'Ouverture
14. C. L. R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS: TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE AND THE SAN DOMINGO
REVOLUTION (Vintage Books 1989) (1963). [Los Jacobinos Negros: TousSAINT L'OUVERTURE Y LAS
REVOLUCION DE SAN DOMINGO].
15. Id.
16. JAMES, supra nota 14, en 6.
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eventualmente gano el control de la isla entera. Sin embargo en el afio 1802, las
fuerzas napole6nicas enviadas para deponer a L'Ouverture lo llevaron a
Francia, donde mds tarde muri6 en la prisi6n. Sin embargo, Napole6n y sus
tropas, agotadas y derrotadas en Europa, finalmente concedieron a la rebeli6n
haitiana.2°
Haiti proclam6 la independencia el primero de enero del afio 1804. Esto
surgi6 como una naci6n bajo el mando sucesivo de dos figuras, Toussaint
D'Ouverture y Jean - Jacques Dessalines. Despu6s de dos siglos de dominio
colonial espahiol y franc6s, y tras la revoluci6n francesa y un nuevo gobierno
basado en los "Derechos del Hombre," la poblaci6n esclava comenz6 a luchar
por derechos polfticos iguales a esos poseidos por islefios blancos y la elite
mulata.2' La primera repfiblica negra libre del mundo por lo tanto ha sido
caracterizada por el odio racial y la corrupci6n. La revoluci6n de los esclavos
pricticamente elimin6 la poblaci6n blanca y se degener6 enreddndose en un
periodo de atrocidades que duro diez afios conocido como la "Guerra de las
Castas. ' 22
Despu6s del gobierno de Dessaline's, la competencia desesperada entre
negros y mulatos se manifest6 en la divisi6n eventual de Haiti: un reino negro
al norte controlado por Henry Christopher (el rey Henry I de Haiti), quien
gobern6 severamente de un palacio en el Cabo Haitiano, y al sur en Port-au-
Prince una reptiblica controlado por el mulato Alexandra Petion debajo de la
p6liza laissez-faire. 23 Despu6s de la muerte de Petion en el afio 1818, el senado
republicano seleccion6 al comandante de la Guardia Presidencial, el General
Jean Pierre Boyer, como el nuevo presidente vitalicio. El presidente Boyer
entonces invadi6 a Santo Domingo despu6s de su declaraci6n de independencia
de Espafia, con la isla entera controlada por Hait hasta el ahio 1844.
Tras la muerte del rey Henry en el afio 1820, Boyer fue capaz de
consolidar Haiti y establecer un gobiemo notable de s6lo relativa estabilidad
por mas de veinticinco afios. Despu6s de d6cadas de aislamiento de la
comunidad internacional, Francia acord6 a reconocer la independencia haitiana
a cambio de una indemnidad financiera de 150 millones de francos. La mayorfa
de las naciones, incluyendo los Estados Unidos, rechazaron a Haiti por casi
cuarenta afios, temeroso que su ejemplo podrfa causar desorden en otros parses
esclavistas. Durante las d6cadas siguientes Haiti se vio obligada a incurrir en
pr6stamos de setenta millones de francos para reembolsar la indemnidad con las
esperanzas de ganar el reconocimiento internacional. Bajo Boyer, la economfa
se estanc6 y la divisi6n entre negros y los mulatos se ensanch6. El gobierno de
20. Id. en 2.
21. CHErAN KuMAR, BUILDING PEACE IN HAITI (1998). [Construyendo la paz en Haiti]
22. STOTSKY, supra nota 7 en 18.
23. Benton & Ware, supra nota 11 en 2.
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Boyer cedi6 dando le el paso a una sucesi6n de veintid6s j efes de Estado, entre
el afio 1843 y el ahio 1915, cuando los Estados Unidos invadi6 a Haiti.24
Desde el comienzo de su independencia, la forma del gobierno de Haiti ha
sido, prdcticamente, una dictadura. El m6todo principal de derrocar a los
dictadores ha sido por golpes de estado, la ejecuci6n o el exilio. En el ahio 1915
los Marinos norte americanos invadieron Haiti con una fuerza media de 2,000
soldados para controlar el pais. Aunque habian motivos legales, los motivos
pricticos de la invasi6n eran proteger intereses estadounidenses de negocio y
mantener lejos a Alemania (la primera guerra mundial habfa comenzado y las
aguas entre Haiti y Cuba son el paso principal del oc6ano del este al Canal de
Panamai).
Despu6s de veinte afios de ocupaci6n, la estabilidad politica, y algunas
mejoras en la infraestructura, los Marinos estadounidense se retiraron. La
ocupaci6n estadounidense tuvo pocos efectos duraderos a parte de reforzar el
racismo entre los negros y mulatos porque los Marines le concedfan a los
mulatos el poder politico sobre haitianos negros.25 En la ausencia de
instituciones establecidas politicas o sociales, los militares permanecieron la
tinica instituci6n cohesiva en el pais, y el instrumento por el cual los gobiernos
futuros gobernarfan. Muchos haitianos consideran la retirada estadounidense
como una segunda independencia.26
Despu6s del fracaso de varias tentativas a finales de los afios 1950 para
moverse hacia un gobierno democrdtico elecciones militarmente controladas le
dieron la victoria a Doctor Frangois Duvalier. El acceso "noiriste" Duvalier,
o Papa Doc" termino con la tradici6n del gobierno de la elite de mulatos
gobernando el pais, pero no hizo nada para mejorar los servicios que el estado
ofreci6 a sus ciudadanos. En 1964, Papd Doc se declar6 presidente vitalicio y
form6 la infama fuerza paramilitar, el "Tontons Macoutes." El r6gimen de
Duvalier ha sido marcado por el terror y la corrupci6n, por las decenas de miles
de haitianos que han sido asesinados o exiliados. El reinado de terror de
Duvalier finalmente se deshizo veintinueve afios mds tarde, en febrero del ailo
1986, cuando su hijo, Jean-Claude, fue escoltado al exilio por los Estados
Unidos.27
En diciembre del aio 1990, Jean Bertrand Aristide, un carismdtico
sacerdote Cat6lico, gan6 el sesenta y siete por ciento del voto en una elecci6n
presidencial la que los observadores internacionales consideraron en gran parte
libre y justas. Aristide tomo posesi6n del cargo en febrero del ahio 1991, pero
24. Malone, supra nota 10.
25. Id.
26. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. & Nancy Gordon HeinI, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian
People, 1492-1995 489 (1996). [Escrito en Sangre: La Historia del Pueblo Haitiana].
27. Ferguson, supra nota 12 en 119.
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fue derrocado por los elementos descontentos del ej6rcito y fue obligado a dejar
el pafs en septiembre del mismo aflo. Se estima que entre 300 y 500 haitianos
fueron asesinados los dfas despu6s el golpe en septiembre, y 3,000 en los
siguientes tres afios. El golpe cre6 un 6xodo en gran escala del pais; de hecho,
los guardacostas estadounidense rescataron un total de 41,342 haitianos, del afio
1991 al afto 1992, mds del total, ntimero de refugiados rescatados en los diez
aiios anteriores.28
El clima politico y los derechos humanos siguieron deteriorindose como
los militares y el gobierno de facto autoriz6 la represi6n, el asesinato, la tortura,
y la violaci6n en abierto desaffo de las condenas de la comunidad internacional.
La intervenci6n militar estadounidense que restaur6 Aristide a su puesto en el
afilo 1994 demostr6 una vez mds que la violencia permanece el elemento
decisivo en la politica haitiana; la violencia representaba el tinico medio viable
de terminar con la dictadura. 29 La intervenci6n, sin embargo, ha tenido
consecuencias contradictorias. Mientras esto resucit6 el proceso dificil de
democratizaci6n y facilit6 la emasculizacion relativa de los 6rganos represivos
del estado, esto tambi6n protegi6 el equilibrio viejo de poder de clase e impuso
pardmetros para la transformaci6n econ6mica. El resultado fue mas bien un
cambio de r6gimen que la creaci6n de un estado nuevo.3" En las elecciones de
noviembre del afio 1995, Ren6 Preval, antes un ministro en la administraci6n
de Aristide, fue elegido en la segunda elecci6n libre en la historia Haitfana. Sin
embargo, las condiciones en el pais, permanecieron voldtiles durante los
siguientes cinco afios.
Aristide gan6 la reelecci6n en noviembre del afio 2000 con el aplastante
noventa y dos por ciento del voto (aunque se estim6 que s6lo el diez por ciento
de la poblaci6n particip6 en la elecci6n). Sin embargo Las elecciones han sido
muy controversiales. Muchos de los principales partidos de oposici6n y seis
candidatos desconocidos (demasiado asustados para participar) boicotearon la
elecci6n.3" Competidores acusaron a Aristide de aparejar las elecciones,
incitando violencia, intimidando a los opositores, y hasta utilizando
bombardeos contra rivales politicos. La comunidad internacional aun no
reconoce las elecciones como legitimas. El aire de conflicto contrast6 con la
28. UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Background Notes: Haiti, March 1998, at
http://www.state.gov/www/background-notes/haiti_0398_bgn.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
29. Robert Fatton, Jr., The Rise, Fall and Resurrection of President Aristide, in HAm RENEWED:
POLIICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1, 136 (Robert I Rothberg ed., 1997). [La Ascensi6n, la Cafda y la
Resurrecci6n de Presidente Aristide, en HAITI RENOVARON: las PERSPECTIVAS POLITICAS Y
ECONOMICAS].
30. Id.
31. David Gonzalez, Final Haitian Vote Tally Shows Aristide Winning 91.69%, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.




euforia piiblica que acompaii6 la victoriosa elecci6n del sacerdote en el aflo
1990, cuando 61 se hizo el primer presidente libremente elegido de Haiti.
El pasado y el presente de Haiti ej emplifica una sociedad traumatizada por
la violencia, la pobreza, y un aparato predador estatal. Si el pafs se va a curar
de su pasado, debe destruir los remanentes del r6gimen predador,
substituydndolo con un gobierno humano, democritico que puede responder a
las necesidades de la naci6n. Pr6ximo, la entrelazada relaci6n de la historia,
datos demogrdficos y la estructura polftica, sern considerados, para entender
mejor el trauma sociocultural de Haiti.
III. DATOS DEMOGRAFICOS: LA DISPOSICION DE LA TIERRA
Lo dinico que ata a Haiti al hemisferio son la latitud y la longitud.
Piense en Haiti como un fragmento de Africa negra, un fragmento
desalojado del continente madre que fue a la deriva a trav6s del
oc6ano Atldntico y se conect6 con las Antillas.
-Heinl y Heinl
Aproximadamente 700 millas sudeste de la Florida, Haiti comparte una
isla Caribefia con la Repdblica Dominicana. Haiti esta localizada entre las islas
de Cuba, Jamaica, y Puerto Rico. La proximidad geogrdfica plantea cuestiones
de seguridad nacional en la regi6n, con Haiti como un parachoques
democrdtico, dejando a Cuba como el i6nico pais en el hemisferio todavia bajo
una dictadura. La proximidad de Haiti a los Estados Unidos ha inducido una
formaci6n de una gran comunidad de expatriados en Am6rica de ciudadanos
haitianos y una afluencia de haitianos que buscan el asilo politico y
econ6mico.32
Factores demogrdficos siguen siendo una cufia entre la gente haitiana
evocadora de Haiti pos-colonial. Aproximadamente el noventa por ciento de
todos los haitianos (noirs) son negros 6bano. El diez por ciento restante tienen
rastros variantes de sangre blanca y se conocen como "juanetes" o "mulatres."
Esta divisi6n racial, lo Haitianos la llaman exactamente asi y hablan de dos
razas- es el aspecto mis importante de la vida en Haiti. Esto domina la
existencia de la naci6n entera. Es tambi6n, en las palabras de uno de los
pensadores mds capaces de Haiti, Alcius Charmant, "... El mal supremo de
nuestra Repiblica, el virus que lo devasta, y el camino a la ruina."33 De verdad,
es basado en ideologias contrarias acerca de la mejor forma de gobierno para
el pas.34
32. McCoy, supra nota 6, en 21; HEINL & HEiNL, supra nota 26.
33. HEINL & HEiNL, supra nota 26 en 5.
34. STOTZKY, supra nota 7 en 22.
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Las dos terceras partes de los 7.5 millones de ciudadanos de Haiti viven
debajo del nivel de la pobreza nacional con un ingreso medio anual de menos
de doscientos cincuenta d6lares, mientras un pequefio grupo de militares y
ciudadanos pertenecientes a la elite continian oprimiendo a la poblaci6n.35 La
seguridad humana en Haiti es peligrosamente d6bil, no s6lo desde un punto de
vista politico, sino mds importante de un punto de vista de salud. El Programa
de Desarrollo de Naciones Unidas (PDNU) informa que la exceptivas de la vida
en el nacimiento es s6lo cincuenta y seis afios, comparados con setenta seis en
Costa Rica y los Estados Unidos.36 Haiti tiene una poblaci6n abrumadamente
rural con s6lo el treinta por ciento de la poblaci6n viviendo en ireas urbanas.
La infraestructura fisica de las ciudades tambi6n se ha debilitado debido
a obligaciones financieras, que se intensificaron entre los afios 1991 y 1994,
aumentos en la poblaci6n, y la degradaci6n ambiental. El Banco Interamericano
de desarrollo informa que menos del cuarenta por ciento de las necesidades de
agua de la capital son cumplidas y que la disposici6n de basura s6lida en Port-
au-Prince y el "Cap Haitien" contribuyen a condiciones sanitarias deplorables.
Los caminos y la infraestructura en Haiti urbano y rural son dafiados por la
erosi6n y una mala administraci6n vertiente.37
Haiti tiene la tasa mas alta de analfabetismo en el hemisferio Occidental
y una de las mas altas en el mundo. Aproximadamente el sesenta y cinco por
ciento de todos los haitianos son analfabetos. El otro treinta y cinco por ciento
--entre quien se encuentra una elite magnfficamente educada con titulos de las
mejores universidades del mundo- pueden leer y escribir.3"
Un Viejo dicho en Haiti es que el 80 por ciento de la poblaci6n es Cat6lico
y el 100 por ciento practica el Vudti. Esto no es literal verdad, pero es dudoso
si mIs del 15 por ciento Haiti de la poblaci6n Haitiana-incluyendo una pequefia
pero vigorosa comunidad Protestante- practica el cristianismo exclusivamente.
Como lo hizo Judaismo en Israel y Shinto en Jap6n, "Vudti" ayudo definir la
nacionalidad haitiana aunque el catolicismo Romano, en su variante francesa,
permaneci6 la religi6n oficial hasta del aflo 1987.39
35. KUMAR, supra nota 21; McCoy, supra nota 6 en 2
36. McCoy, supra nota 6, en 2.
37. Id.
38. HEINL & HEINL, supra nota 26 en 5.
39. Patrick Bellegard-Smith, Resisting Freedom: Cultural Factors in Democracy; the Case of Haiti,
in HAm RENEWED: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1,28 (Robert I. Rothberg ed., Brookings Institution
Press 1997) (1997). [Resistiendose a la Ubertad: los Factores Culturales en la Democracia; el Caso de Haiti,
Haiti Renovo: las PERSPECTIVAS POLiTICAS Y ECONOMICAS].
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IV. EL ESTADO PREDADOR: ESTRUCTURAS POLITICAS EN HAITI
El estado haitiano tradicionalmente ha funcionado como una fuerza
partsita, sacando con sif6n recursos econ6nicos del campesinado por
impuestos draconianos y otros medio, haciendo cumplir su voluntad
por una multiplicidad de controles incluyendo la amenaza y el empleo
de fuerza.
-Donald Schultz
Durante la historia de Haiti de gobernaci6n por cuarenta y dos
emperadores, reyes, presidentes, y otros jefes de Estado, todos excepto tres
acabaron su tdrmino por un sangriento golpe de estado o "coup de 6tat," por
muerte violenta o el exilio.4° En Haiti una cultura profundamente encajada de
depredaci6n ha criado la autocracia y la corrupci6n, la injusticia extrema social,
y el estancamiento econ6mico. Es en este contexto que se habla del estado
contra la sociedad, de los militares que simultdneamente trabajan como brazo
represivo del gobierno y con sus propios intereses.41 Como lo describen Norte
y Rotberg, el estado predador extrae los ingreso de un grupo del electorado sin
preocuparse por el impacto sobre la sociedad en general. Durante la historia de
Haiti independiente, la presidencia a servido como una fuente de ingreso
privado para el gobernante.42 Caracterizado por pocos gastos productivos, el
estado se convirti6, como comenta Mats Lundahi "a la vez demasiado pequefto
y demasiado grande: demasiado pequeflo en el sentido que no ha logrado crear
un ambiente de politica conducente a la productividad y el crecimiento;
demasiado grande si uno toma en consideraci6n el ndimero de empleados de
sector ptiblico quienes han sido tornados en el servicio de kleptocrats para
asistir en la creaci6n de ingresos privados para el gobernante o que han servido
dinicamente como los recipientes de fondos ptiblicos sin cumplir sus deberes y
solo apoyado polfticamente al gobernante.43
En este sentido, proceso Duvalierism no era una aberraci6n, si no la
culminaci6n de un de experiencias hist6ricas, incluyendo algunas provefdas por
la cultura Africana, la esclavitud, una guerra sangrienta de liberaci6n, la
reimposici6n del dominio de la elite y la sumisi6n de masas, los ciclos cr6nicos
40. Elizabeth D. Gibbons, SANCTIONS IN HAITI: HUMAN RIGHTS ANDDEMOCRACY UNDERASSAULT
177 THE WASH. PAPERS 1, 2 (1998). [Las SANCIONES EN HAITI: los DERECHOS Y la DEMOCRACIA
HUMANOS BAJO ASALTO].
41. Donald E. Schultz, Political Culture, Political Change, and the Etiology of Violence, in HAITI
RENEWED: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1, 93 (Robert I. Rothberg ed., 1997). [La Cultura polftica,
el Cambio Polftico, y el Etiology de la Violencia, en RenovadasPerspectivas Politicas y Economicas en Haiti].
42. McCoy, supra nota 6 en 9.
43. Id.
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de tirania, el caos y los efectos de una ocupaci6n prolongada estadounidense.
El resultado ha sido el desarrollo de un sindrome complicado de
comportamiento destructivo y auto destructivo politico marcado por
autoritarismo, paternalismo, personalismo, patrocinio, nepotismo, demagogia,
corrupci6n, cinismo, oportunismo, racismo, incompetencia, parasitismo,
rigidez, intolerancia, rivalidad, desconfianza, inseguridad, venganza, intriga,
superstici6n, volatilidad, violencia, paranoia, xenofobia, explotaci6n, odio de
clase, ilegitimidad institucional, apatia de masas, aversi6n, y sumisi6n."'
La democratizaci6n de Haiti ha sido un proceso lento y arduo. La
degeneraci6n del estado predador comenz6 en el otofio del aflo 1986 con la
cafda de la dictadura de Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvaier. Cinco gobiernos
internacionales diferentes observaron las elecciones en diciembre del afto 1990,
en cual Aristide, el candidato del Frente Nacional por la Convergencia la
Democritica (FNCD) captur6 el sesenta y siete por ciento del voto popular. La
transici6n de autoritarianismo al populismo era una funci6n del ascendiente de
sociedad civil. El golpe del afto 1991 que sigui6, sin embargo, que el equilibrio
viejo de poder de clase, asf como los 6rganos vitales represivos del estado de
Duvalierista, sobrevivieron la salida de Jean-Claude Duvalier e instigaron la
recafda a una dictadura de la sociedad haitiana.45
El golpe represento para la aspiraci6n de haitianos ordinarios debido a un
embargo Americano econ6mico instituido para expulsar el r6gimen dirigente
militar. "Las motivaciones para esta intervenci6n eran en apariencia la
restauraci6n de la democracia y los derechos humanos, pero podrfa haber un
motivo subyacente en que la estabilizaci6n de Haiti era el dinico modo politico
aceptable de evitar una afluencia politicamente inaceptable de refugiados
haitianos a los Estados Unidos."'
"Tanto el regreso de un lider populista como Aristide o la
estabilizaci6n de regla miilitar, era aceptable para el gobiemo
Americano, siempre y cuando el problema de los refugiados fuera
arreglado aun que el arreglo significara la repatriaci6n, el uso de
medios brutales para desalentar la salida, y el restablecimiento en
paises ya sobrecargados en America Central y el Caribe. ' 47
En el centro de la crisis corriente nacional haitiana hay un conflicto
incendiario entre grupos al mando dentro y fuera del gobierno sobre la
direcci6n politica nacional generalmente, y la reforma econ6mica
44. Schultz, supra nota 41 en 95.
45. Gibbons, supra nota 40 en 1.
46. RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRiTIQuE 58-9 (1999).
47. Id. en 59.
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especfficamente. Polfticamente, el mando de Haiti esta rasgado entre los
partidarios del Presidente Aristide y su "Fanmi Lavalas" y los partidarios de la
Organizaci6n Polftica Lavalas (la Organizaci6n Politique Lavalas, OPL)
conducido por Gerardo Pierre Carlos. Ambos partidos politicos salieron del
movimiento populista Lavalas originalmente conducido por Aristide. OPL
ahora es opuesto a la influencia percibida de Aristide sobre la politica haitiana
y lo acusa vagamente de tener tendencias antidemocriticas. El primer paso
hacia la democracia debe ser el desmantelar los controles del antiguo Estado y
los monopolios ptiblicos y privados que formaron la base del estado
depredador.48 Mientras estos mecanismos contintien, la seguridad regional
Caribefia y la colocaci6n de refugiados permaneceri una cuesti6n central.
Detrds de los valores, actitudes, creencia, y el comportamiento que
promueve la violencia politica y el estado depredador en Haiti son necesidades
econ6micas y las relaciones. Mientras las bases militares institucionales de
violencia han sido destruidas, los restos de la subestructura econ6mica
permanecen en gran parte intactos. Las cuestiones criticas aquf, tanto para la
democracia como para la estabilidad polftica, son la pobreza, la desigualdad, el
crecimiento econ6mico, y el conflicto de clase.49
V. ESTRUCTURA ECONOMICA: ZSUMARA ALGUNA VEZ?
La estructura econ6mica de Haiti puede estar cerrada en un equilibrio
de bajo nivel que no ofrece ninguna salida ficil... los Gobiernos hasta
los bien intencionados, con una burocracia purgado y honesta tienen
una tarea Hercdlea en este aspecto.
-Mats Lundahl
Haiti ha sostenido por mucho tiempo la distinci6n dudosa de ser la naci6n
pobre del hemisferio occidental. En una economfa con un crecimiento de s6Lo
0.9 por ciento per cipita anual entre los afios 1965 y 1980, -2.4 por ciento
contribuci6n entre los afios 198 0 y 1992,50 una perdida del treinta por ciento del
PBI entre 1991 a 1994 perfodo militar, y 2.4 por ciento contribuci6n durante el
afto 1999," 1 la necesidad de la reconstrucci6n masiva econ6mica es crudamente
clara. Aproximadamente el ochenta por ciento de la poblaci6n vive en una
pobreza abyecta. Casi el setenta por ciento de todos los haitianos dependen de
48. McCoy, supra nota 6, en 5.
49. Schultz, supra nota 41 en 101.
50. McCoy, supra nota 6, en 6.
51. United States Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook (2000), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
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la agricultura, la cual consiste principalmente de la labranza a pequefia escala
y emplea dos tercios de la fuerza obrera econ6micamente activa.52
Haiti aun no ha recuperado del embargo econ6mico estadounidense que
se lanzo en el aflo 1993 para arrancar a la fuerza el gobierno de Raoul Cedras.
El embargo devast6 la miserable base econ6mica de la naci6n. Durante los tres
anos de gobierno militar, las condiciones en todas las dreas de la vida haitiana
empeoraron perceptiblemente. Enfermedades infecciosas como el c6lera y la
tuberculosis eran desenfrenadas, ya que s6lo el cuarenta por ciento de la
poblaci6n tuvo acceso a la medicina moderna. Escuelas gratis estuvieron
disponibles para s6lo el diez por ciento de los nifios haitianos. La deforestaci6n
y la labranza excesiva severamente erosiono la tierra, y el pafs de 7.5 millones
tenia una de la densidades demogrfficas mis alta en el mundo. La economfa
encogi6 mis del dos por ciento cada aflo durante los afios 1980, luego se
desplomo treinta por ciento durante el gobierno militar. Las calles estaban
Ilenas de criteres, la mayorfa de los prisioneros no tenian ni agua ni
electricidad, y algunos jueces no tenfan ni lIpices ni papel. 3 "El gobiemo
militar era incompetente, corrupto, y violento con 3,000 a 4,000 muertes
atribuidas a la violencia de estado durante este periodo. Cuando la Operaci6n
Restaura la Democracia se inicio en otofio del afio 1994, Haiti era un desastre
econ6mico.54
El embargo era una espada de doble filo. "Mientras que la acci6n
sancionada por la Naciones Unidas indudablemente puso presi6n a la junta
militar que controlaba el pais, los haitianos pobres sufrieron sus peores efectos.
Ademds, las consecuencias negativas del embargo crearon muchos desaffos
nuevos para los que buscaban ayudar a que Haiti se recupera. Las empresas de
asamblea estadounidenses que habian estado en Haiti, y que luego se habian
mudado a petici6n del gobierno estadounidense querfan compensaci6n. La
infraestructura haitiana se deterior6 mucho durante el embargo y costaria
mucho mis reparar la. En resumen el embargo - que fue iitil a corto plazo al
derrotar el r6gimen militar- devasto a Haiti econ6micamente, haciendo el
objetivo estadounidense de largo plazo de restaurar el crecimiento mucho mas
complicado.55
La ayuda externa es esencial al desarrollo futuro econ6mico de Haiti.
Comparaciones de indicadores sociales y econ6micos indican que Haiti se ha
quedado atrds de otros paises en via de desarrollo (particularmente en el
52. Id.
53. DAVID J. ROTHKOPF, THE PRICE OF PEACE: EMERGENCY ECONOMIC INTERVENTION AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 15-6 (1998). [El Precio de la Paz: Intervencion Economica de Emergencia y Poliza
Extranjera Estadounidense].
54. Id. en 16.
55. Id. en 16-17.
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hemisferio) desde los afios 1980. El estancamiento econ6mico de Haiti es
resultado de p6lizas econ6micas realizadas inadecuadamente en el pasado, la
inestabilidad politica, la escasez de buena tierra arable, la deterioraci6n
ambiental, uso continuo de las tecnologfas tradicionales, la subcapitalizaci6n,
la migraci6n las poblaciones hibiles, y una tarifa d6bil nacional de los
ahorros.56 La inversi6n dom6stica y extranj era privada ha sido lenta para volver
a Haiti debido a dudas sobre las condiciones polfticas y la reforma econ6mica,
aunque instituciones financieras intemacionales y las agencias de donante han
prometido sumas sustanciales para asistir a Haiti en la restauraci6n y la
ampliaci6n de su infraestructura fisica. Tasas dom6sticas de intereses altas y
mercados de capitales mal desarrollados internos son otros factores que
refrenan el funcionamiento econ6mico" Hoy, la instituci6n militar no existe,
pero la oligarquia permanece. Las perspectivas para el desarrollo econ6mico
y una mejora sustancial de las condiciones de vida son problemdticas. La
redistribuci6n de poder econ6mico a favor de la mayora pobre no parece
probable. Aunque Mintz haya dicho que casi ningtin cambio politico
beneficioso a largo plazo puede ser logrado sin tal redistribuci6n, esto es una
cuesti6n explosiva.58 Mds que cualquier otro factor individual, la amenaza de
guerra de clase causo el golpe que derroc6 a Aristide en septiembre del afio
1991. Una resurrecci6n de aquel espectro habria polarizado de nuevo Haiti,
amenazo mas violenciay espanto a inversionistas. Lareconstrucci6n econ6mica
es crtica a la continua expansi6n democrdtica en Haiti. Ademis de las
dificultades econ6micas y politicas, sin embargo, un obsticulo mds dificil para
obtener las democracia en Haiti puede ser causada por influencias psicol6gicas
y culturales. La tradici6n de un estado depredador y opresivo ha dejado a los
haitianos profundamente desconfiados del gobiemo y de los extranjeros.
VI. FACTORES SOCIOCULTURALES: CREANDO DE UNA COMUNIDAD
COHESIVA
"Todos estamos en el Mismo Barco, y Este Barco no va a la Florida"
-Jennifer McCoy
La historia de Haiti es una de intereses bruscamente opuestos, visiones
crudamente competitivas de estado y la naci6n, y una estructura de clase rigida.
Si "la mente Haitiana" o la actitud se propone a significar las posiciones
polfticas, econ6micas, y sociales de la mayorfa, los haitianos han sido de una
56. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra nota 28.
57. Id.
58. Schultz, supra nota 41 en 102.
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actitud s6lo dos veces en su historia. Su primera uni6n como un pueblo fue en
el perfodo entre los afios 1791-1804, cuando ellos valientemente se unieron
contra la esclavitud y el colonialismo franc6s. La segunda en el afilo 1990,
cuando una mayorfa de al menos del sesenta y siete por ciento eligieron a Jean-
Bertrand Aristide a la presidencia en las primeras elecciones libres y
democrdticas. Los acontecimientos desde aquella elecci6n, sin embargo,
reflejan los desacuerdos profundos que se desarrollaron en esta sociedad entre
esos dos momentos definidos5 9
El orgullo de sus logros hist6ricos permite que los haitianos piensen en si
mismos como una naci6n a pesar del enorme golfo social que divide los de
debajo de los de arriba, este mismo orgullo crea un foco hacia adentro que
impide a muchos haitianos aprender de otros.6 Todos los haitianos
sinceramente se consideran los miembros de la raza Africana y reclaman lazos
de hermandad con Africanos negros. Sin embargo, los haitianos cultos siempre
han compartido el menosprecio paternalista Europeo de cosas africanas.6" La
cuesti6n fundamental es como crear un sentido entre haitianos que ellos estdn
todos en el mismo barco y que si un grupo o clases va al agua, el barco entero
se hundird.
"El problema es aquellas elites haitianas francamente creen, y han
creido durante un siglo y medio, el que ellos pueden sobrevivir sin la
mayorfa pobre, rural de Haiti. La estructura social, no simplemente el
ingreso, las mareas hist6ricas, ni simplemente el pasado inmediato,
estA en la raiz de la crisis modema de Haiti. De verdad, una
resoluci6n positiva a esta crisis es imposible a no ser que se entiendan
estas cuestiones culturales e hist6ricas.62
La soluci6n, afirma Trouillot, implica un contrato social entre el estado y
la sociedad, que deletrea las obligaciones de cada uno al otro. Para Haiti, como
a la mayorfa de otros paises, el estado precedi6 la naci6n en la independencia.
Pero, a diferencia de otras siguientes democracia, el estado haitiano no alcanz6
un contrato social que podria producir el sentido de la identidad nacional. En
vez la elite haitiana del siglo diecinueve reaccion6 a la subida del campesinado
no con un paquete de las ventajas sociales que hubiera hecho que la mayorfa
creyese que ellos estaban en realidad en el mismo barco que las elites, pero con
una forma de polftica de segregaci6n social. Las elites han crefdo que ellos
59. McCoy, supra nota 6, en 10.
60. See KuMAR, supra nota 21.
61. STOTZKY, supra nota 7 en 23.
62. Id. en 18.
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podrian sobrevivir sin la mayorfa. Asf, un sentido de igualdad y de identidad a
trav6s de las clases sociales nunca se alcanzo en Haiti.
63
Esta divisi6n cultural entre haitianos ha creado una violencia interioridad
en relaci6n con la diversidad 6tnica de la poblaci6n. La variaci6n en el color de
la piel es quizds 61 mas "real" de los agentes en la lucha cultural: en Haiti existe
una tensi6n hist6rica entre la antigua elite mulata y clase media negra. Esto es
una cuesti6n compleja, sin embargo; ningtin aspecto de historia haitiana es mds
confuso que el aspecto fisico de su gente. Se dice, que Haiti esta dividido por
el color, pero esto es una sobre simplificaci6n. Es mds cercano a la verdad decir
que el conocimiento de color varfa entre clases sociales y tambi6n dentro de
cada clase, y que para muchas personas la piel clara es simb6licamente
importante. Pero esta declaraci6n simplemente toca la superficie. El color de
la piel de la gente debe verse como parte de una perspectiva global que incluye
el tipo de pelo, el tipo de nariz, los tipos de labios, el color de los ojos, el
tamafio de los oidos y otros rasgos, como el peso y el pelo facial, y el tipo de
cuerpo.64 Tan importante como el color es para los haitianos, sin embargo no
esta claro que esto determin6 la identificaci6n de una clase dirigente tanto como
hizo la educaci6n, registros militares, y conexiones personales. Mientras el
color es una cuesti6n culturalmente significativa, esto no fue ni al nacimiento
de la naci6n, ni hoy, tan limpiamente un marcador que grupos sociales puedan
ser descritos en t6rminos de color.
Asf mismo la variaci6n en el empleo de lengua es una manifestaci6n de
divisi6n cultural. Todos los haitianos hablan la lengua Criolla haitiano de una
manera u otra; del ocho al diez por ciento de la poblaci6n (las elites) hablan el
frances bastante bien para reclamar la fluidez; sin embargo, s6lo una minorfa
diminuta dentro de la elites es realmente bilingtie en 61 y franc6s y la lengua
Criollo. Mis importante que el bilinguiismo es los mensajes dados a los nifios
del grupo elite que es inaceptable para los miembros de su clase hablar la
lengua Criolla.65 Hasta la restauraci6n de Aristide a la presidencia, el franc6s
era la lengua oficial en las escuelas y en los sistemas tribunales. De este modo,
la lengua es una barrera social eficaz que niega la participaci6n de la mayoria
en cierta instituciones estatales por los que el noventa por ciento de los
haitianos estdn excluidos del poder. Ademds, existen matices sutiles de
significado dentro del Criollo haitiano que ilustran prejuicios culturales y el
cinismo. Por ejemplo, la palabra leta en la lengua Criolla "el estado" y
"rufidn." La gente urbana, por su parte llama a los campesinos rurales "mounn"
que significa "extrafios." '66
63. McCoy, supra nota 6, en 4.
64. STOTZKY, supra nota 7, en 21-22.
65. HELNL & HEINL, supra nota 26 en 5; STOTZKY, supra nota 7 en 21.
66. STOTSKY, supra nota 7 en 21.
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El lenguaje se manifiesta en una divisi6n cultural que es un instrumento
de dominaci6n. Si uno imagina que la hegemonfa es relativamente abierta o
relativamente cerrada, la esencia del concepto no es la manipulaci6n, pero la
legitimaci6n. Las ideas, valores, y ias experiencias de grupos dominantes son
validadas en el discurso pdiblico; y los que pertenecen a grupos subordinados
no son, aunque ellos puedan seguir prosperando mds alli de las fronteras de
opini6n recibida.67
Las cosas mismas que reconciliaron a los haitianos son las cosas mismas
que los mantienen separado. La lengua y la religi6n ayudaron a los campesinos
haitianos a afrontar el d6ficit de poder entre el amo y el esclavo, 61 opresor y el
oprimido, y Europa dominante y Africa subyugada. Tanto en la lengua haitiana
como en la religi6n haitiana, uno encuentra los compromisos necesarios y
subterfugios que emplean los d6biles para sobrevivir.
VII. Religi6n en Haiti: ZVuddi o Catolicismo- Se tiene que escoger?
"A menudo se dice que Vudti mantuvo a Haiti atrasada.
Probablemente los contrario es lo cierto: Vudti prospero porque los
jefes de Haiti negaron a la ciudadanfa multitudinaria la posibilidad de
transformar un vida socialmente y econ6micamente estancada.
-Robert Rotberg
El Vudti esta profundamente arraigado a la cultura haitiana; es una
amalgamaci6n de los cultos de "animista" del Oeste de Africa infundido con el
ritual Cat6lico. Vudii (tambi6n escrito VudAi o Vodoun) juega un papel central
en la vida y la historia de Haiti, 61 desatenderlo es impedir el conocimiento de
esta gente. El Vudfi haitiano es el sistema de creencia dominante, por lo tanto,
una importante caracterfstica nacional. La lucha entre Vudd y la fe principal
cristiana de Haiti (el catolicismo Romano y, tiltimamente, el protestantismo
presentado por misioneros Americanos) ha sido un elemento constante en la
evoluci6n social.68
Convicciones religiosas y sus representaciones dividen a haitianos
culturalmente. La elite proclaman su adhesi6n al cristianismo. Ptiblicamente,
la elite asocia la religi6n del pueblo con el mal, y gobiernos sucesivos haitianos
han perseguido a muchos individuos quien abiertamente practican el Vuddi. Sin
embargo hay extensa evidencia que muchos de la elite constantemente practican
aspectos del Vuddi detrds de puertas cerradas. Ellos asi reclaman para si mismos
un sentido de superioridad cultural basada en adhesi6n al cristianismo y el
rechazo del Vuddi (ellos hasta han aceptado el estimulo y el apoyo de la
67. T.J. Jackson Lears, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, 90 AM.
HIST. REv. 567, 567-93 (1985) [El Concepto de la Hegemonfa Cultural: los Problemas y las Posibilidades]
68. HELNL & HEINL, supra nota 26, en 5.
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jerarquia Cat6lica en la persecuci6n de creyentes Vodoun), mientras siguiendo
la prdctica Vuddi ellos mismos.
69
Un gran ntimero de los campesinos, tambi6n, dicen ser Cristiano Cat6licos
Romanos, ellos lo practican y siguen el ciclo anual de eventos Cat6licos - pero
ellos se refieren a si mismos como "sirvientes de dios" miembros de la mayor
religi6n del pueblo Vodoun, Vudon o Vudti (estos t6rminos se intercambiaran).
En Vudti, el catolicismo es unido con religiones Haitianizadas Africanas para
formar un sistema integrado de creencia y rituales. Como un campesino dijo,
"hay que ser cat6lico para servir el loa (espiritus Vuddi). 7 °
Vuddi es tan politico como religioso. El presidente Aristide estaba
consciente, del simbolo y de la realidad de Vudti cuando 61 tom6 el juramento
de oficio en la lengua Criolla y recibi6 la faja presidencial de un mambo
(sacerdotisa femenina) en febrero del afto 1991, con las formas simb6licas de
saludo que reson6 profundamente dentro de la poblaci6n. Su empleo deliberado
de Criollo indic6 una rotura y la discontinuidad en el modelo cultural que era
de manera extrafia simb6lico de la sfntesis en Vudti, y ataco, a lengua de la elite
(el franc6s) y su religi6n (el catolicismo).7"
Sin embargo, Vudti tiene un lado expectativo. Duvalier ampli6 su control
sobre la poblaci6n empleando el Vudti y el Houngans (sacerdotes masculinos).
Houngans tradicional jugaban un papel importante en la comunidad local y en
el pasado, pero no sistemdticamente, habian sido explotados por los gobiernos
haitianos para alcanzar objetivos politicos sobre todo cuando las elecciones
eran inminentes, mientras despu6s de las elecciones el Vuddi a menudo era
proscrito. 2
Duvalier aprovech6 su conocimiento de Vudii y su influencia sobre las
masas para establecer una relaci6n mis s6lida y duradera con sus lideres.
Rotberg sugiere que porque el Vudfi presenta una forma de gobiemo en las
dreas rurales ya que el pais no hace, Vudid s61o serd substituido por el
desarrollo. Vudi es resistente. Sin Duvalier, como sin Soulouque, sus
conexiones al estado se desollaren. Su base pequefia, segura, parroquial de
poder permaneceri hasta aquel dia distante cuando la modernizaci6n -si es que
alguna vez lleve a las partes mas profundas de Haiti- eroda las fundaciones de
universo protector de seguridad cognoscitiva.73
69. Stotzky, supra nota 7, en 22
70. Fatton, supra nota 29 en 138.
71. Bellegard-Smith, supra nota 39 en 29
72. MATS LUNDAHL, POLITICS OR MARKETS?: ESSAYS ON HAITIAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT 278
(1992). [La Politica o El Mercado: Un Ensayo sobre el Subdesarrollo Haitiano].
73. Robert I. Rotberg, Vudu and the Politics of Haiti, in THE AFRIcAN DIAsPORA 365 (Martin L.
Kilson & Robert I. Rothberg eds., 1976).
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Vudi se hizo tan estrechamente asociado con el r6gimen Duvalier que una
vez que Duvalier escapo, muchos houngans y mambos fueron asesinados en el
levantamiento popular.74
VII. CONCLUSION
La curaci6n del trauma que han experimentado los haitianos durante los
iltimos 200 afios es una tarea titdnica. Mis importante la tarea es entender que
tanto lo material (econ6mico y politico) como dimensiones psicol6gicas
(socioculturales) acttian recfprocamente para mantener o mitigar el conflicto en
una sociedad. El cubismo social permite para la identificaci6n de varios
factores sociales inter relacionados que se entrelazan y sus efectos perjudiciales
sobre Haiti. Estos factores deben ser examinados en luz del uno al otro para
iniciar el entendimiento del conflicto. Aunque los factores, cuando combinados,
puedan producir el modelo diferente de importancia o la urgencia, es importante
no permitir que un factor ensombrezca otros solamente porque este parece mas
importante en el momento. Segdin Byrne y Carter, la naturaleza entrelazada del
cubo indica que enfocando en una sola direcci6n hace improbable un acuerdo,
y ain las mejoras de una sola faceta pueden mejorar otras tambi6n.75
Si circunstancias hist6ricas no perniten que una nueva generaci6n cambie
las tradiciones de ineficacia, la representaci6n mental de la calamidad
compartida continuara vinculando a los miembros del grupo. Pero en vez del
cultivo del amor propio la imagen mental de los acontecimientos unirA a la
gente por un sentido continuado de ineficacia, como si los miembros del grupo
existiesen bajo la vitirizacion.76 Para que los haitianos como una sociedad
salgan de esta etiqueta de victimizaci6n es importante analizar el presente
dilema usando el acercamiento de cubismo social al conflicto de interrumpo
para considerar como mecanismos estructurales y socioculturales acttian
reciprocamente para exacerbar o mejorar el conflicto politico, la lucha
econ6mica y divisiones culturales que enfrenta el pais.
74. Fatton, supra nota 29 en 139.
75. Byme & Carter, supra nota 3 en 66.
76. VOLKAN, supra nota 1, en 76.
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I. INTRODUCCION
El conflicto entre el Sinhalese 6tnico y los Tamiles en Sri Lanka es uno de
los problemas 6tnicos prominentes en el mundo hoy. Sri Lanka es una naci6n
de la isla situada en el oc6ano indio al sur del continente indio.
Aproximadamente, dieciocho millones de su poblaci6n esta compreses la tres
grupos sociales importantes. Segdin el censo del ano 1981, cual es la cuenta
apropiada pasada los emprendido, Sinhalese constituye 74.6 por ciento, y los
Tamiles forman un 18.1 por ciento de la poblaci6n total.' La gran mayorfa de
Sinhalese son religioso, budistas. Por otra parte, los Tamiles son Hindus. Los
musulmanes que constituyen 7.4 por ciento de la poblaci6n total, incluyen
musulmanes que hablan Tamil y Sinhala.2 Sin embargo, como una minorfa
religiosa los musulmanes en Sri Lanka ha desarrollado una identidad distinta del
* Departamento de Ciencia Polftica, Universidad de Colombo, Sri-Lanka.
** Este articulo fue traducido por Migdalia Perez.
1. Para la descripci6n detallada de informaci6n demogrMica, ve SUNiL BASTIAN, DEVOLUTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA (LA TRANSFERENCIA Y EL DESARROLLO EN SHRI-LANKA) (1994).
2. La mayor parte miembros de la poblaci6n Musulmana, el tercer grupo social mAs grande en el
pais, hablan el tamil, pero no se consideran como la parte de la comunidad de tamil. La complejidad del estado
Musulmdn en el pals no estA en el hecho que ello ni pertenece al cingal6s, ni tamil grupos dtnicos con el
ntlmero grande de Musulmanes sobre todo urbanos que abrazan el Sinhals como su lengua y medio de
educaci6n. Desde, sin embargo, los Musulmanes en Sri-Lanka han desarrollado una identidad Musulmana
distinta basada en religi6n, ellos son considerados como un grupo separado social. Te6ricamente, los
Musulmanes permanecen neutros en el conflicto. En la prictica, sin embargo, su posici6n siempre se inclina
hacia el gobiemo de Sri-Lanka.
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los Sinhalese y los Tamiles. 3 Aparte de estos grupos sociales mayors, tambien
hay un pequefio ndmero de gente indfgena y Burgers. El cristianismo es
profesado por los Sinhalese, Tamiles y Burgers es la religi6n de
aproximadamente ocho por ciento de la poblaci6n.
Como dos de los grupos 6tnicos mayores los Sinhalese y los Tamiles estdn
en conflicto sobre reclamos territoriales. Los Tamiles estdn en guerra contra
el estado de Sri Lanka por un estado separado en la provincias noroeste de la
isla, la cual reclaman es su " patria tradicional. ,4 Aunque la confrontaci6n
entre estos grupos se podrfa rastrear a la era hist6rica y pre-colonial, el perfodo
despues de la independencia atestigu6 un intenso conflicto y una guerra. Los
Sinhalese y los Tamiles son dos grupos 6tnicos diferente con caracterfsticas
distintas. Linguifsticamente, el Sinhalese habla Sinhala, que se describe como
lenguaje indo-Aryan. Los Tamiles hablan etnicos Dravidian. Los Tamiles
viven mayoramente en las partes nortefias y este de la isla mientras que los
Sinhalese se concentran en el resto de las provincias, aunque, la guerra 6tnica
ha alterado seriamente los modelos demogrdficos en el pasado.
Sri Lanka fue gobemada por tres poderes coloniales occidentales (El
Portugese, el holand~s, y el Britdnica) por casi cuatro siglos. Al final del
regimen britdnica surgi6 una 61ite cristianizada, educado, y de hablan inglesa,
compuesta por miembros de ambos grupos 6tnicos. Este grupo represent6 no
solamente relaciones 6tnicas cordiales sino tambi6n un exitoso foro para la
reforma constitucional para entonces " Ceildn."5 Las diferencias comenzaron
en los afios 1920 y culminaron al mediado 1980 con una expresi6n violenta y
la lucha por un estado separado para la minorfa, los Tamiles.6
El movimiento del separativo de Tamil, result6 de la demanda por mayor
autonomfa para el Tamil en las provincias nortefias y al este de Sri Lanka. El
descontento Tamil con la polftica nacional de Sri Lanka, entonces liamada
Ceildn fue expresado incluso antes de que la naci6n isla se le concediera
independencia en el ano 1948. El grito por mayor autonomfa, que proporcion6
la fundaci6n para el movimiento separativo, gan6 fuerzas con la aparici6n de
3. Ve generalmente, S.I. Keethaponcalan, Ph. D., Understanding the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka:
A Conflict Resolution Perspective, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTORY
HANDBOOK (Entendimiento del Conflicto ttnico en Sri-Lanka: una Perspectiva de Resoluci6n de Conflicto,
en RESOLUCI6N DE CONFLICTO Y ESTUDIOS DE PAZ: UN MANUAL INTRODUCTORIO) (Colombo: Friedrick Ebert
Stiftung and Center for Policy Research Analysis, 2000).
4. Para mas detalles ve, TULF, Tamil United Liberation Front Towards Devolution of Power in
Sri-Lanka - Main Documents, August 1983 to October 1987(Tamil Uni6 Frente De liberaci6n Hacia
Transferencia de Poder en Sri Lanka - Documentos Principales) (Madras: TULF, 1988).
5. J.A. Wilson, S.J.V. CHELVANAYAKAM AND THE CRISIS OF SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM,
1947-1977: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPi-Y, 107 (S.J.V. CHELVANAYAKAM Y LA CRISIS DE SRI LANKAN TAMIL




S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, considerad por muchos como el padre de la fundaci6n
del nacionalismo Tamil.7 El movimiento de Chelvanayagam por la autonomfa
regional era una lucha fundamental sin violencia, modelada en la manera
Gandhian a del satyagraha. La lucha sin violencia que dur6 por cerca de treinta
afios no solo fall6 en producir algun resultado substancial a favor de la gente de
Tamil pero en afios posteriores forz6 los elementos radicales entre los Tamiles
la vanguardia de la lucha nacional.8 Esta situaci6n fue causada por la creencia
excesiva a la violencia por el estado de Sri Lankan, asf como tambien los
militantes de Tamil en afios posteriores por la resoluci6n del conflicto.
El ciclo vicioso de la violencia fue perpetuado por acciones y reacciones
de los partidos implicados en el conflicto y cormti6 e conflicto en una guerra
intensa. La guerra, que ha reclamado millares de vidas en ambas caras del
espectro, es luchada por las fuerzas armadas de Sri Lankan y los tigres de la
liberaci6n de Tamiles Eelam - la fuerza principal el luchar entre los Tamiles.
Puesto que a ambas partes le falta el poder de imponer una soluci6n militar ante
la otra y la carencia del confianza en medios pacfficos de alcanzar sus metas, la
guerra continia por cerca de 18 afios sin ninguna muestra de solucion pacffica.9
Desde que en Sri Lanka, aparte de sus implicaciones internas, es altamente
peligroso regionalmente, asf como intemacionalmente. Una atenci6n acaddmica
substancial es pagada analizar las causas, las consecuencias, y las maneras de
ocuparse del conflicto. Estos estudios, sin embargo, abarcan un mttodo
descriptivo hist6rico o toman un factor como la causa bisica del conflicto y
enfocan particularmente en ese elemento. Por ejemplo, los factores econ6micos
se analizan mds a menudo como posible causa principal del conflicto.10 Este
estudio, sin embargo, disctite que la psicologfa de la gente fundamental para este
conflicto y el resto de los factores tienen un papel que influencia en formar la
psicologia.
II. CUBISMO SOCIAL
El cubismo social proporciona una herramienta comprensiva para mirar
conflictos 6tnicos y entender las fuerzas mdltiples detrds de ellos. Por lo tanto,
7. Vea generalmente, J.A. Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origin and Development
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (Sri Lankan tamil Nacionalismo: Su Origen y Desarrollo en los
Siglos Diecinueve y Vigdsimos) (2000).
8. Id.
9. Keethaponcalan, supra nota 3.
10. Perera, J., Sri Lanka: History of Ethnic Relations, Formation of the Tamil National Identity and
the Demand for a Separate State, in 9 (2/3) SCANDINAVIAN J. OF DEV. ALTERNATIVES, 67-84. (Sri-Lanka:
Historia de Relaciones tnicas, Formacitn del tamil Identidad Nacional y la Demanda de un Estado
Separado, en 9 (DE 2/3) J ESCANDINAVA. DE DEV. ALTERNATIVAS, 67-84.)
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es un marco dtil para el andlisis del conflicto." Ademis, Byrne y Carter
consideran que "el cubo social del conflicto teniendo seis facetas o fuerzas
correlacionadas: historia, religi6n, demograficos, instituci6n polftica y
comportamiento, economfa, y psychocultural. Estas seis facetas sociales se
combinan para producir modelos del comportamiento de inter-grupo."'' Este
artfculo, por lo tanto, analiza el conflicto de Sri Lankan usando el cubismo
social como el marco. Este capftulo, sin embargo, no abrazan todas las seis
fuerzas en la manera prevista por el marco original del cubismo porque el
conflicto de Sri Lankan requiere un marco levemente modificado para entender
el conflicto.
Una faceta del marco original del cubismo es demografia. En Sri Lanka,
aunque la demograffa desempefia un papel prominente en el origen del conflicto
esti implicada muy de cerca con el interior geogrffico de los factores asf como
fuera de la isla. Por lo tanto, es imprescindible darles igual valor a los factores
geogrdficos tambi6n. Sin embargo, puesto que los factores demogrdficos y
geogrtficos no son dos variables independientes sino son entrelazados, este
articulo substituye la demograffa en el modelo original del cubismo por
"geodemografid." Esto permite al investigador considerar geogrdfico asf como
factores demogrdicos igualmente.
El tdrmino "politica" o "politico" no estd s6lo mucho en la literatura de
estudiante, sino todavia sigue siendo vago como concepto. Byrne y Carter
(1996) aunque no defini6 la "faceta polftica" del cubo, discuten limites y
terrorismo como factores politicos. I3 Este articulo toma (1) las instituciones
politicas, y (2) las constituciones como factores politicos. El marco original de
cubismo es escaso de aplicarse el conflicto de Sri Lankan, pues no proporciona
al espacio para la discusi6n de factores 6tnicos que son una de las facetas
fundamentales en este conflicto. Byrne y Carter (1996) aplican cubismo a los
conflictos de Irlanda del Norte y de Quebec que son sobre todo conflictos
basados religiosos. 4 Por lo tanto, es comprensible que ellos usaron la religi6n
como una faceta en su analisis. Mientras el Sri Lankan el conflicto es
principalmente 6tnico esto lo tiene un Angulo religioso. Por lo tanto, es tambi6n
importante tomar factores religiosos en consideraci6n. Para acomodar estas
facetas diferentes, este artfculo considera la psicologfa como a parte de cultura
e incluye la civilizaci6n para incluir factores 6tnicos, raciales, relgious, y
culturales.
11. Sean Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in Northern
Ireland and Quebec, in 3 PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES 2, 52-71. (Cubismo Social: Las Fuerzas Sociales






Esencialmente, este modelo del cubismo de los artfculos incluye las seis
facetas siguientes: (1) Geodemografia (geograffa y demograffa), (2) historia, (3)
economfa, (4) polftica (constituciones e instituciones), (5) civilizaci6n (6tnico,
racial, religioso y cultural), y (6) psicologfa.
I. GEO-DEMOGRAFIA
He discutido en otro sitio que la causa principal del conflicto entre los
Sinhal6s y los Tamiles en Sri-Lanka es " el miedo de extinci6n " entrelazada
con la sospecha, y complejidades superiores e inferiores. Estos factores serdn
analizados detalladamente bajo el subtitulo "la psicologfa." Sin embargo, los
factores psicol6gicos han sido profundamente bajo la inflluencia de otras facetas
de cubismo social. En aquel sentido la geograffa y la demograffa del pals han
jugado un papel crucial en la intensificaci6n del conflicto entre los
protagonistas.
En lo que la distribuci6n demogrdfica del pals estd preocupada los Sinhal~s
y los Tamiles son los dos grupos mayores social. Sin embargo, hay divisiones
intemas de estos grupos. Los Sinhal6s se divididen (1) Kandyan el Sinhal~s (2)
Sinhal6s de pals bajo seg-in la posici6n geogrdfica de la gente. Los desacuerdos
entre estos grupos estaban obvios y claros en la pre independencia el perfodo.
Sin embargo, despu~s de la independencia estas diferencias en gran parte han
desaparecido.' 5 Los Tamiles, de otra parte, son divididos en dos grupos
sociales. Primero, " los Tamiles de Ceildn "o ahora los " Sri Lankan Tamiles
" quien consideran como los habitantes originales de regiones del Norte y de
Este. Entonces el supuesto "Tierra adentro Tamiles" " o "los Tamiles de origen
reciente, " quien ha sido traldo al pais por la administraci6n Brit6nica colonial
para emplearlos en las plantaciones de t6, y quien se concentra principalmente
en Sri-Lanka central y dreas urbanas como Colombo, la ciudad de Congreso.
A pesar de los pueblos llanos entre el Sri Lankan Tamiles y los Tierra adentro
Tamiles, ellos oficialmente consideren como dos grupos diferentes. El Tierra
adentro Tamil no tiene un papel directo en el conflicto. Por lo tanto, cuando nos
referimos al Tamil en este articulo significo(pienso) el Sri Lankan Tamiles.
Cuando concedieron a Sri-Lanka la independencia por los Britdnico en el
ano 1948, los Tamiles disfrutaron de la mayorfa absoluta en las provincias del
Norte y Orientales del pals, que constituye nueve provincias en total.' 6 LoS
Tamiles no s6lo considerados las provincias del Norte y Orientales como su
patria pero tambi6n la autonomfa insistida mis gran regional para ,reas de
mayorfa de Tamil hasta antes de la independencia, como ellos eran sospechosos
15. Esto no debe sugerir que estas diferencias han desaparecido completamente. En un micro-nivel,
uno todavfa puede notar que la gente deliberadamente se refiere a las diferencias de dentro la sociedad
Sinhalese.
16. Los Tamiles tienen su fuerza demogrAfica en la provincia Oriental actualmente.
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sobre las intenciones de lfderes Sinhala en vfsperas de la independencia. Una
de las circunstancias que crearon mucha reacci6n de la gente de Tamil era, como
ellos prefirieron llamar ello, " el estado el establecimiento patrocinado " de la
gente Sinhala por gobiernos sucesivos en las dreas de Tamil. Los Tamiles
creyeron que los establecimientos han sido apuntados a reducir la mayorfa de
Tamil en estas dos proxvincias que han sido consideradas tan fundamental para
su supervivencia como un grupo 6tnico. Las consecuencias de los esquemas de
establecimiento, los Tamiles temieron, conducirdn al debilitamiento de su
posici6n polfticamente asf como amenazardn a su existencia a largo plazo.
Los Sinhal6s de otra parte fuerte disput6 esta reclamaci6n y discuti6 que
era necesario establecer establecimientos para acomodar la poblaci6n de
crecimiento en el sur. La base del argumento de los Sinhal6s es que es injusto
para un grupo que representa s6lo el doce por ciento de la poblaci6n para
reclamar casi un tercio del paisaje total del pais. Independemente los
argumentos de los grupos que compiten, el efecto neto del estado el
establecimiento patrocinado en las provincias del Norte y Orientales es que esto
con eficacia redujo el predominio de Tamil en la provincia de Este. Tambi6n
esto desconect6 la contigiidad de ireas de mayorfa de Tamil y asi seriamente
desafi6 el concepto de patria y reforz6 la percepci6n de amenaza que los
Tamiles tenfan sobre sus colegas Sinhaleses.
La percepci6n de amenazar no s6lo existen entre los Tamiles, pero el
Sinhal6s tambi6n posey6 un miedo de predominio de Tamil. Los Sinhal~s son,
en cierto modo, una mayorfa con un complejo de minorfa. Aunque los Sinhal6s
sea la comunidad de mayorfa dentro del estado de Sri-Lanka regionalmente ellos
son una minorfa a los Tamiles, como el Estado del Sur Indio al Tamil Nadu
constituye aproximadamente cincuenta y cinco millones de Tamiles. 7 S61o un
agua estrecha llamada Palk el Estrecho divide al Tamil Nadu y del norte la
mayor parte punto de Sri-Lanka. Los Tamiles disfrutan de pueblos llanos
culturales, lingiifsticos, asf como religiosos con sus colegas en el Tamil Nadu.
Interesantemente, el Tamil Nadu era el primer estado alguna vez para
abiertamente exigir la separaci6n de la Repiiblica de India en temprano de los
ahios 1960. Aunque, el movimiento separatista desaparecfo tarde en los afios
1960, el nacionalismo de Tamil permaneci6 fuerte y unos hasta sugirieron que
el deseo de la separaci6n entre los lideres de Tamil Nadu no hicieron totalmente
de moda lejos.
Las relaciones entre los Tamiles en Sri-Lanka y India eran tan fuertes que
el movimiento militante de Tamil en sus tempranos dfas disfrut6 del apoyo
17. Ve generalmente, T.E. ANANDARAJAH, CENTER FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES. No. 18,
THE PROVqNCIAL COUNCIL SYSTEM AND DEVOLUTION OF LAW AND ORDER (CENTRO PARA ESTUDIOS DE




enorme de la gente de Tamil Nadu. Despu6s de que los disturbios 6tnicos de
1983 18 en Sri-Lanka, en la que los Tamiles han sido embrutecidos, los lfderes
polfticos en el Tamil Nadu compitieron entre ellos para apoyar la militancia de
Tamil en Sri-Lanka. Con la matanza del primer ministro anterior de Sr. de la
India Rajiv Gandhi, para el que los Tigres De liberaci6n de Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) han sido culpados a un grado mds gran elimin6 esta base de apoyo. Sin
embargo, la colaboraci6n entre Tamiles en India y Sri-Lanka caus6 una
sospecha en la psique Sinhala, en la que ellos concibieron la colaboraci6n como
una conspiraci6n para formar a un Tami Eelam mis gran, centrado alrededor del
estado separado de Tamil Eelam en Sri-Lanka. Los Sinhal6s bisicamente detuvo
la creaci6n de Tamil Eelam en Sri Lanka como una almohadilla de lanzamiento
para la creaci6n de un estado de Tamil mis gran. Los Sinhal6s le importan el
estado de Tamil mdis gran es una amenaza directa al estado de Sinhala y la raza.
Los Sinhal6s siguen resisti6ndo cualquier sugerencia para la transferencia de
poder, que es el foco de cualquier tentativa en la resoluci6n de conflicto,
demandando que cualquier poder delegado eventualmente conducirfa a la
creaci6n de Tamil separado Eelam y el estado de Tamil mis gran.
IV. HISTORiA
La historia es uno de los factores ms discutidos en este conflicto. Esto ha
sido interpretado por los partidos contrarios segtin sus posiciones y, a un grado
mdis gran, explotado para reforzar aquellas posiciones. El anilisis de la
explotaci6n de Tamil de historia para justificar sus exigencias, Rajanayagam
indica que "mds relaciones entre los dos grupos deterioraron mds historia se
hizo un arma en la batalla para justificar la demanda de Tamil de la autonomfa
y, en principio, la independencia," segtin Nissan y Stirrat. 19
El presente y el pasado en t6rminos de la interacci6n de dos opusieron
entidades, Sinhala y Tamiles, siemprien han sido separados como ellos son hoy.
Segundo, ellos consisten en argumentos sobre los acontecimientos que segin
dice ocurrieron entre el cuarto siglo B.C. y el d6cimo siglo A.C.D. Tercero,
ellos presentan los dos comunidades hist6ricamente y continuamente opusieron
por la guerra, uniendo un pasado antiguo y al presente sin respeto para el hiato
de siglos. Cuarto, las historias son concemidas en "una reclamaci6n nacional de
la gente de su propio territorio. Finalmente cada lado presenta el otro como un
poco mds bdrbaros. Cada lado en el contexto polftico presente sostienen sus
18. Ve generalmente, JANI DE SILVA, CENTRIPETAL PRESSURES AND REGIME CHANGES IN THE POST-
COLONIAL SRI LANKA IN BASTIAN (PRESIONES CENTRfPETAS Y CAMBIOS DE RIGIMEN EN SRI-LANKA POST-
COLONIAL EN BASTIAN) (1994).
19. Dagmar Hellman-Rajanayagam, The Politics of Tamil Past, in SRI LANKA: HISTORY AND THE
ROOTS OF CONFLICr 116 (La Pol(tica de tamil Pasado, en SRI-LANKA: HISTORIA Y LAS RAICES DE CONFLICrO
(Jonathan Spencer eds., 1990).
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Ambos partidos demandan que ellos son la gente original de la isla y los
otros son invasores. Aunque no haya ninguna evidencia para demostrar que los
habitantes originales son o el que los primeros colonos son, un hecho obvio que
surgi6 de las teorfas existentes son aquellos grupos y 6tnicos Ilegaron a la isla
probablemente del subcontinente Indio y partes instaladas diferentes. Parece no
hay ninguna discusi6n sobre el concepto que ambos grupos 6tnicos se instalaron
la isla de India. Sin embargo, algunos eruditos creen que aquellos ambos grupos
ilegaron a la isla aproximadamente el mismo tiempo. Independientemente de la
validez, estas reclamaciones proporcionan una fundaci6n moral para los
sentimientos nacionales de ambos grupos, como hay debates viciosos sobre la
propiedad legftima de la tierra en foros impresos de la literatura asf como
pdblicos.
En el ano 1815, Sri-Lanka ha sido trafda bajo una administraci6n s6lo por
los Britdnico. Antes de la llegada de poderes occidentales coloniales la isla era
en control de varios monarcas regionales. Por ejemplo, cuando el portugu6ses
lleg6 en el ano 1505, la isla constituy6 tres reinos, dos del cual han sido
gobernados por reyes Sinhala y uno era por un rey de Tamil. La existencia de
un reino de Tamil de Jaffna en la historia escrita de la isla proporcion6 el ndcleo
bdsico para el nacionalismo de Tamil y todavfa sirve como la fundaci6n para la
demanda del estado separado de Tamil Eelam. De otra parte, los Sinhal6s cree
que allf existieron un reino prehist6rico Sinhala en Sri Lanka que domin6 la isla
entera. Esto tambi6n ha sido usado para justificar el derecho Sinhala al control
polftico.
Ademds de su contribuci6n para los sentimientos nacionalistas en cada
lados, la historia tambi6n funcion6 como una fuente de psicologfa de miedo y
la persecuci6n en las mentes de cadas 6tnico comunidades. Por ejemplo, la
historia de la isla sugiere que las reglas del Sur Indias del subcontinente Indio,
crefdo para ser a reyes de Tamiles invadieran la isla varias veces. Hay evidencia
que el reino Chola ha sido ampliado para incluir las partes de la isla siglos. 21
Estos argumentos han sido usados para representar a los Tamiles como
invasores asf como demandar que los Sinhal6s eran las vfctimas de invasi6n de
Tamil ajena. En la misma vena, los Tamiles afirman que los Sinhal6s intent6
6tnicamente eliminar a los Tamiles de la isla, hasta de la vez antigua. Por
20. Vea generalmente, Elizabeth Nissan, & R.L. Stirrat, The Generation of Communal Identities,
in Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict 21 (La Generaci6n de Identidades Comunales, en Sri-Lanka:
Historia y las Rafces de Conflicto) (Jonathan Spencer eds., 1990).
21. R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, The People of Lion: The Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and
Historiography, in SRI-LANKA: HISTORY AND THE ROOTS OFCONFLICr45-86 (La Gente de Le6n: la Identidad
Sinhala y Ideologla en Historia y Historiografla, en SRI - LANKA: HISTORA Y LAS RAfCES DE CONFLICTO 45-
86) (Jonathan Spencer, 1990).
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ejemplo, cargando la historia Sinhala como Genocidal, Vanniasingham, un
Tamil 6tnico, escribe en su prefacio:
Segtin cr6nicas Sinhalesas, el Rey Dutta Gemunu emprendi6 una
Guerra Santa contra los Tamiles, con un contingente de quinien
bhikkus en realidad acompahiando el Ej6rcito en su campafia. 1l mat6
los treinta y dos sub-reyes de Tamil quien reconocieron el suzerainty
de Rey Ellalan, y dltima instancia Ellalan tambi6n, y se establecieron
en Anuradhapura. Sin embargo, en los ultimos dfas 61 no tienia
ningtina paz mental: 61 estuvo preocupado que su matanza de
millones de Tamiles lo excluirfan de entrar al Cielo. TJltimalmente,
61 sido consolado por la jerarqufa de budista que los Tamiles quien 61
habfa causado para ser matado no habian abrazado de budismo y
como tal eran equivalente s6lo a bestias; la matanza de ellos no era
ningtin pecado y asi 61 no serfa exclufdo de entrar al Cielo.
Obviamente, "los millones de Tamiles" no se refieren a soldados en
el campo de batalla, pero a civiles inocentes. Asf los registros
Sinhaleses admiten que un ataque de Genocidal sobre los Tanilles en
el segundo siglo ante Cristo continu6 en nombre del Sefior Buda.2
La historia post-independiente del pafs tambi6n tiene el mismo impacto en
la percepci6n de Tamil. Unas leyes y polftica ptiblica formulada por el Sinhala
dominaron gobiernos inmediatamente despuds que la independencia hizo los
Tamiles creer que los Sinhal6s debe ahf reducirlos a segundos ciudadanos de
clase y eventualmente terminar su existencia. Por ejemplo, uno de los primeros
actos emprendidos por el primer gobiemo de independencia postal encabezado
por tardfo D.S Senanayake, debfa privar del derecho al voto "a los Tamiles de
origen reciente Indio," quien tambidn se laman a Tamiles de Estado. Aunque
haya diferencias sociales entre los Sri Lankan Tamiles y los Tamiles Indios ellos
comparten una cultura similar, la misma lengua y la religi6n.
Los Tamiles Indios han sido trafdos a Islandia por los Britnico para
trabajar en la industria de t6 principalmente en la regi6n central del pas.23 La
presencia de los Tamiles Indios quien formaron casi el siete por ciento del
poblaci6n de total m.s tarde represent6 una amenaza para la gente Sinhalesa asf
como el gobernar el Partido Unido Nacional (UNP) el Gobiemo. Mientras la
gente local Sinhalesa sinti6 que los Tamiles Indios asumfan su tierra, el
gobemar UNP, que estd capitalista en el coraz6n los consideraron como
politicamente infavorable porque los Tamiles Indios tienden a votar con los
22. Vanniasingham. S., Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within (Sri-Lanka: El Conflicto de Dentro)(New
Delhi: Lancer Group, 1988) p. ix
23. Vea Perera supra nota 10.
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partidos izquierdistas 4 Por lo tanto, el gobiemo tuvo la intenci6n matar dos
pdjaros con una piedra e introdujo los Actos de Ciudadania de 1948/49, que
esencialmente hizo a los Tamiles Indios como una gente ap~itrida 5
El efecto de este acto sobre las relaciones 6tnicas era que los Tamiles de
Ceildn concibieron esta acci6n como un paso hacia el predominio Sinhala contra
todas las minorias sobre todo los Tamiles de Ceildn. Aunque, el partido de
Tamil predominante en entonces, Todo Congreso de Tamil de Ceildn (ACTC)
encabezado por tardfo G.G. Ponnambalam no lograron oponerse el Acto de
Ciudadanfa, el diputado Chelvanayagam de Ponnambalam hizo.26
Chelvanayagam se hiende del ACTC y se form6 un partido politico nuevo llam6
el Partido Federal (FP), que pronto se hizo la punta de lanza de nacionalismo de
Tamil y la demanda de la autonomfa regional. Cuando el partido Federal
advertfa a la gente de Tamil del movimiento hacia la dominaci6n Sinhala por
gobiernos sucesivos, el Sinhala S61o Acttia ha sido introducido, que reforz6 el
argumento que los Tamiles son hechos ciudadanos de segunda clase en su
propia tierra
Sinhala 1956 S61o Acttia era un resultado directo de la promesa de elecci6n
hecha por el Partido de Libertad de Sri Lanka (SLFP) que ha sido formado por
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, quien desert6 del UNP en temprano de los afios 1950.
Durante la elecci6n 1956 para el parlamento nacional, Bandaranaike prometi6
a la gente Sinhala que si le dieron una posibilidad para formar el gobierno 61
haria Sinhala la tinica lengua oficial del pais y 61 mantuvo su promesa despu6s
de una victoria resonante en la elecci6n. 28 El Sinhala S61o Actia requirieron que
los funcionarios licenciarse en lengua Sinhala si ellos quisieran seguir en sus
posiciones. Este acto, aunque, afect6 toda la oratoria de no Sinhala grupos (de
minorfa), tenfan una repercusi6n seria para los Tamiles quien dominaron el
empleo de sector ptiblico.
Ademis de la aseguraci6n "de la posici6n legftima" de la gente Sinhala en
la vida nacional, el Acto ha sido querido para reducir el predominio de Tamil
en el empleo de sector ptiblico y esto con eficacia realiz6 aquella expectativa.
"Con la puesta en prdctica de Sinhala como la lengua de gobierno," creen Mitra
y Lewis que "el espectro de Tamiles los empleos negados que son en el servicio
24. Id.
25. Kumar Rupesinghe, Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace
Keeping Force, in Journal of Peace Research (Conflictos ttnicos en el Sur Asia: el Caso de Shri-Lanka y la
Paz India que Mantiene Fuerza, en Diario de Investigaci6n De paz) (1988), 25 (4), pp. 337-350.
26. Id.
27. Vea generalmente Loganathan, K., Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities, Past Attempts at Resolving
Ethnic Conflict (Sri-Lanka: Ocasiones Perdidas, Mds alld Tentativas en Resoluci6n de Conflicto ttnico)
(Colombo: Center for Policy Research and Analysis, 1996).
28. Rajanayagam, D.H., Sri Lanka - A Current Perspective, in Asian Affairs (Shri-Lanka - una
Perspectiva corriente, en Asuntos Asidticos) (1991), 12 (3), pp. 314-329.
1210
Keethaponcalan
de goviemo y de Tamiles que pierden su herencia cultural al Sinhal6s
comenzaron a extender en todas partes del Tamil la Comunidad."2 9 Los Tamiles
sintieron que por promulgando el Sinhala S61o Acttan, el gobierno
satisfactoriamente empuj6 la lengua de Tamil a una posici6n inferior en
condiciones de su importancia en los asuntos nacionales.30
Los escritores de Tamil, el mds a menudo que no, citan el estado esquemas
de colonizaci6n patrocinados como uno de los jalones principales en la relaci6n
hostil entre estas dos comunidades. La comunidad de Tamil mir6 los esquemas
de colonizaci6n una conspiraci6n para dividir su posici6n suprema en las
provincias del Norte y Orientales. La colonizaci6n de campesinado Sinhal6s en
las provincias de zona de intento Al norte-centrales y Orientales ha sido lanzada
casi inmediatamente despu6s de la independencia con el primer ministro D.S.
Senanayake administraci6n a la campafia. Ha sido discutido que la colonizaci6n
era imperativa para el desarrollo agrfcola del pafs asf como la acomodaci6n de
la poblaci6n de crecimiento ripido en el sur por gobiemos sucesivos.3' Sin
embargo, un objetivo principal pero ocultado debfa reducir el predominio
demogr.fico de la gente Tamil hablando en las provincias del Norte y
Orientales. Refiri6ndose al impacto de esquemas de colonizaci6n los lfderes mds
mayores de TULF, Sr. S. Sivasithamparam y Sr. A. Amirthalingam demandaron
que "incursiones serias han sido hechos en estas patrias por la polftica de
colonizaci6n planeada con el cingal6s realizado por gobiernos sucesivos Sinhala
desde la independencia. '' 32 La naturaleza contigua de estas provincias era un
hecho en el Tamil demandan que estas provincias eran su patria y esperaron
formar la fundaci6n de la regi6n de Tamil propuesta.
Por complaciendo en los esquemas de colonizaci6n masivos de la gente
Sinhala en una regi6n Ilamada Manallaaru o Welioya, los gobiemos estaban
acertados en la rotura de esta naturaleza contigua. Manallaaru o Welioya
todavfa, como se considera, es sumamente estrat6gico por el gobierno con su
guerra contra el LTTE. Sin embargo, los programas de colonizaci6n reforzaron
la percepci6n de Tamil de un "Sinhala la conspiraci6n" para 6tnicamente limpiar
y hacer a la gente de Tamil extinta, y ocupar su patria.
Por lo tanto, la historia de esta isla s6lo no ha sido usada por partidos al
conflicto segtin sus interpretaciones y a un grado mds gran refuerzan sus
posiciones pero esto tambi6n ha ayudado a reforzar su teme sobre otro grupo
29. Mitra & Lewis, Sub-national Movements in South Asia (Movimientos Sub-nacionales en el Sur
Asia) (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p.44.
30. De Silva, (1994) supra nota 18.
31. Mitra & Lewis supra nota 29.
32. TULF - El tamil Se uni6 el Frente De liberaci6n era el partido prominente democrdtico que
representa a los tamiles en el parlamento en los afios 1960 y los afios 1970. Ve, TULF, supra nota 4 (1988).
p. 19.
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6tnico. El miedo a su turno oblig6 a los partidos a tomar medidas extremas para
asegurar su seguridad y en cierto modo la supervivencia. La decisi6n de Tamil
de conducir a una campafia violenta contra el estado (de Sri Lanka) y mucha
polftica estatal contra las minorfas puede ser explicada en condiciones de la
psicologfa de miedo.
V. ECONOMIA
La economia juega un papel significativo en muchos conflictos modemos
6tnicos y otros arraigados.33 El conflicto de Sri Lankan no es ningun excepci6n
como factores econ6micos contribuidos infinitamente para el origen y el
desarrollo del conflicto asf como la escalada de violencia. La faceta econ6mica
del conflicto puede ser remontada al perfodo colonial sobre todo la regla
Britdnica. Cuando el Britdnico intentado llenar su administraci6n en Sri Lanka
con trabajadores locales blancos, quien eran bastante mds baratos comparados
a sus colegas blancos a la isla, los Tamiles en particular los Tamiles de Jaffna
estaban en una posici6n favorable para ocupar el empleo de sector ptiblico3
Esto era debido a las ventajas educativas los Tamiles tenfan sobre sus colegas
Sinhala. Los Tamiles de Jaffna benefited enormemente de actividades de
misionero Americanas centradas en Jaffna durante el perfodo colonial. 35 En la
etapa inicial, los Sinhal6s no era entusidstico sobre la educaci6n inglesa en parte
para motivos religiosos. Por lo tanto, sobre el curso de tiempo, los Sinhal6s no
fueron capaz de competir con los Tamiles por el empleo de sector ptiblico. Los
comentaristas indican que:
En el momento de la independencia el servicio civil tenfa un nimero
desproporcionado de Tamiles en ello, sobre todo en sus filas mis
altas. Los Tamiles comprendieron aproximadamente el treinta por
ciento de los niveles superiores del servicio civil comprendiendo s6lo
el 22.7 por cientos de la poblaci6n en el censo 1946. Los Sinhalds
comprendi6 el 69.4 por cientos de la poblaci6n y el 57.6 por cientos
de los niveles superiores del servicio civil. 36
33. Byrne, S. & Irvin, S., Reconcilable Differences: Turning Points in Ethnopolitical Conflicts
(Diferencias Reconciliables: Puntos decisivos en Conflictos de Ethnopolitical) (West Hertford: Connecticut:
Kumarian Press, 2000).
34. Vea generalmenta Hewavitharana, B., Economic Consequences of the Devolution Package and
an Evaluation of Decentralization (Las consecuencias Econ6micas del Paquete de Transferencia y una
Evaluaci~n de Descentralizaci6n) (Colombo: Sinhala Weera Vidahana, 1997).
35. Vea generalmente Little, D., Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (Sri-Lanka: la Invenci6n de
Enemistad) (Washington, D.C: United States Institute for Peace Studies Press, 1994).
36. Mitra & Lewis (1996) supra nota 29 en 148.
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Los Sinhal6s, sin embargo, concibi6 este estado de asunto como el
favoritismo Brit6nico la minorfa sobre la mayorfa. Esto ha sido entendido en
condiciones de la polftica Britdnica de dividen la regla y la colaboraci6n de
Tamil con colonialistas. Naturalmente esta percepci6n abasteci6 de combustible
la animosidad Sinhala con los Tamiles. Sin embargo, los Tamiles siguieron
dominando el empleo de sector ptiblico hasta despu6s de la independencia.
Segdn Rajanayagam:
...los Tamiles habfan encontrado su vida principalmente en el servicio
de goviemo y las profesiones, y la educaci6n, como se decfa, era "la
industria" principal de la Jaffna. El suelo alli es rido y puede ser
hecho f6rtil s6lo con mucho trabajo dificil. Hasta entonces esto no
apoya la poblaci6n y por consiguiente la juventud estd dependiente
sobre empleos de servicio civiles y las profesiones de profesi6n. Bajo
la regla Britdnica esto de verdad habfa conducido a cierto
overrepresentation de Tamiles en estos sectores, en particular ya que
los Sinhalds se resisti6 a la educaci6n basada por misi6n mils de los
Tamiles y ha sido implicados en comercio y el comercio a un grado
nrs gran.37
Sin embargo, los Sinhal6s concibi6 el predominio de Tamil de empleo de
sector pdiblico como "una injusticia hist6rica" comprometido contra su raza por
los maestros coloniales con la ayuda de las minorfas de Tamil.38 Con la
independencia literalmente que transfiere el poder estatal de los Britdnico a los
lideres Sinhaleses politicos, los Sinhal6s estaba en una posici6n c6moda para
compensarse para "la injusticia" pasada.39 Las medidas han sido introducidas
para asegurar los intereses de la comunidad Sinhalesa dentro del marco
legislativo del estado asf como bajo capa de la polftica ptiblica.
Lamentablemente, estas medidas han sido demostradas para ser perjudiciales a
las aspiraciones de las comunidades de minorfa.
La polftica de lengua era del extremo de importancia en cuanto a esto.
Sinhala 1956 S61o Acttia estaba, entre otras cosas, un golpe principal para la
supervivencia econ6mica de los Tamiles de Jaffna como esto requiri6 que
empleados de sector ptiblico licenciarse en Lengua Sinhala dentro de un perfodo
estipulado. Las decenas de miles de Tamiles perdieron su empleo por
consiguiente. Sinhala mds lejos ha sido mejorado para ser la lengua de los
tribunales pronto despu6s. 4
37. Rajanayagam supra nota 28 en 316.
38. Hewavitharana B. supra nota 34.
39. Keethaponcalam, supra nota 3.
40. De Silva, supra nota 18.
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Lo que la Sri Lankan gobierno se llam6 "la estandarizaci6n" ha sido
introducida en 1972 como una polftica de educaci6n para ayudar a estudiantes
Sinhala obtener la mayor parte de las admisiones a las universidades.
Esencialmente, la estandarizaci6n "significado que los estudiantes de la
corriente de Tamil tuvieron que tener sefiales de examen de entrada
desproporcionadamente mis altas que los que la corriente Sinhalesa para
conseguir un lugar en la universidad. Esto abiertamente ha sido disefiado para
reducir el segtin se dice sobre-representaci6n de Tamiles en las universidades."4
Ademds, Raj anayagam tambi6n indica que esto era la polftica de estandarizaci6n
que "golpean a la juventud (de Tamil) hardest, y se puede decir que esto
provoc6 el conflicto subsecuente violento, porque esto prdcticamente ejecut6 su
futuro."42
La polftica "de nacionalizaci6n", que ha sido caracterizada como
"Sinhalesaci6n" por los Tamiles tambi6n tenfa el mismo efecto sobre la
supervivencia econ6mica de la poblaci6n de Tamil. El S.W.R.D. el gobierno de
Bandaranaike introdujo el proceso de nacionalizaci6n y el mimero grande de
instituciones que incluyen establecimientos comerciales asf como
organizaciones educativas han sido trafdas en patrocinio del gobiemo. Segfin
Rupesinghe:
Con la victoria electoral del SLFP en 1956, proporcionaron la
bdsqueda de hegemonfa Sinhalesa con el poder polftico. Esto ha sido
usado para introducir la legislaci6n contra intereses coloniales
econ6micos, y crear las condiciones para el Sinhalesaci6n del estado.
Esta polftica es reflejada en particular en la polftica de lengua por el
Sinhala S61o Actdian, pero tambi6n en otras esferas como la
educaci6n, el empleo, y la colonizaci6n de tierra.43
Esta polftica pone a los Tamiles en una posici6n fuerte desheredada en
competiciones para el empleo en aquellas instituciones. No s6lo los
establecimientos de negocio y educativos pero tambidn los 6rganos estatales
estaban radicalmente "Sinhalesized" durante Bandaranaike la era y despu~s.
Por ejemplo, las fuerzas armado del estado estuvieron llenas de los miembros
de la comunidad Sinhala. "Del afio 1970 no habfa pricticamente ningfin
reclutamiento de Tamil en las fuerzas armado " (Rupesinghe, 1988, p.343).'
41. Rajanayagam, nota 18 en 316.
42. Id.




Hasta hoy estas instituciones permanecen muchisimo Sinhala establecimientos
(Manor y Segal, 1985)."5
La carencia de pasar de ocasiones econ6micas no s6lo frustradas la
comunidad de Tamil, en particular lajuventud, pero tambidn forzado ellos para
pensar en alternativas que asegurarfan su poder y desarrollo. En aquel punto de
tiempo un estado separado pareci6 una altemativa viable y los Tamiles tambi6n
realizaron, probablemente de la experiencia pasada, esto s6lo una campafia
violenta podrfa ayudar crear tal estado. La decisi6n de subir armas ha sido hecha
en la altura de la frustraci6n entre la juventud de Tamil. La frustraci6n conduce
a la agresi6n.46 Esto ha sido demostrado para estar verdadero en el Sri Lankan
Tamil caso.
VI. FACETA POLITICA
La faceta polftica de cubismo social incluye factores constitucionales asf
como institucionales que incluyen la polftica de partido en la contribuci6n a la
evoluci6n de conflictos 6tnicos. En Sri Lanka todos estos factores han sido
implicados en descontento creciente de los Tamiles hacia el Sri Lankan el
Estado asf como la enemistad entre los dos grupos contrarios.
La Constituci6n 1946 Soulbury proporcion6 la fundaci6n para la
independencia del pais en 1948. Aunque preocupaciones locales hayan sido
tenidas en cuenta que la constituci6n Soulbury esencialmente ha sido disefiada
por los Britdnico y estuvo vigente hasta 1972.47 En 1972 la Primera
Constituci6n nueva Republicana substituy6 esta constituci6n. La constituci6n
Soulbury proporcion6 algunos salvaguardas constitucionales para las minorfas
porque los Tamiles tenfan ya comenzaron a levantar su voz contra el predominio
Sinhala en la polftica de cuerpo del pafs. Por ejemplo, Todo Congreso de Tamil
de Ceil6.n (ACTC), que era el partido polftico principal que representa a la gente
de Tamil propone una oferta corrientemente sabida como 50:50 (cincuenta y
cincuenta). Esta oferta abog6 por un arreglo constitucional que asegurarfa la
mitad de los asientos parlamentarios para ir a todas las minorfas.B Primero, esto
no se conform6 a principios liberales democrdticos. De otra parte los Sinhal6s
de mayorfa inmediatamente lo rechaz6. Por lo tanto, esta oferta no disfrut6 de
ningiin apoyo principal en entonces.
45. Manor y Segal, Causes of Conflict: Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean Strategy, in Asia Survey, (Las
causas de Conflicto: Sri-Lanka y Oc6ano Indico Estrategia, enAsia Revisi6n) (1985), 25 (12), pp. 1165-1185.
46. Gurr, T.R., Why Men Rebel (Por qud Hombres Son Rebelan) (Princeton, NJ; Princeton
University Press, 19
47. Boss, S., States, Nations, Sovereignity: Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Eelam Movement
(Estados, Naciones, Sovereignity: Sri-Lanka, India y el Movimiento de tamil Eelam) (New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1994).
48. Perera, (1990) supra nota 10.
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Sin embargo, como mencionado en otro sitio, la constituci6n Soulbury
ntimero proporcionado de salvaguardas a las minorfas contra predominio de
mayorfa. Por ejemplo, Pacte 29 "la autoridad expresamente negada al
Parlamento para hacer leyes discriminatorias contra o a favor de cualquier
comunidad particular. El Consejo Privado observ6 que esto era una cl~usula
firmemente enraizada en la que esto no era dentro del poder del Parlamento para
enmendar o abrogar dicha cliusula."'49 Mientras tanto, una Segunda Cdnara (el
Senado) tambi6n ha sido creada en el parlamento para, entre otros objetivos,
acomodar opiniones de minorfa.50 Tambi6n la constituci6n asegur6 que el estado
permanecerfa secular porque esto es una comunidad multi-religiosa. La eficacia
de estas disposiciones era un sujeto de discusi6n como los principios han sido
violados sobre varios casos. Por ejemplo, Sinhala 1956 S61o Acttia ha sido
pasado en el parlamento a pesar de que la constituci6n no permiti6 ningin
legislaci6n que favoreci6 s6lo una comunidad racial o religiosa (Para pactar
29).i
La Primera Constituci6n Republicana de 1972 no incluy6 de Artfculo 29,
y tambi6n suprimi6 la segunda cnara en el parlamento. Esta constituci6n hizo
el pais un estado unitario 2 Constitucionalmente dieron al budismo el lugar
principal y colocaron la responsabilidad sobre el estado "para proteger y criar
el budismo. ' 53 Sinhala ha sido conservado como la tinica lengua oficial del
estado. Estos rasgos de la constituci6n nueva reforzaron la opini6n de Tamil que
ellos han sido hechos ciudadanos de segunda clase dentro del pafs. La
constituci6n 1978 no hizo ningtin cambios principales a estos rasgos pol6micos
excepto la polftica de lengua. El Tamil ha sido reconocido como una de las
lenguas nacionales en esta constituci6n (Wamapala, 19 80 ). Refiri6ndose al
arreglo sobre el budismo, Warnapala (1980) reclamaciones que "el Capftulo 11,
que se ocupa del budismo, estd mds o menos el mismo como en la Constituci6n
1972 pero la palabra 'Sasana' - la dispensaci6n de budista - es inclufda. El
empleo de esta descripci6n tradicional (Sinhala) hace el capftulo sobre el
budismo mis eficaz" (p.917).5
Una caracterstica importante de estas constituciones republicanas es que
ellos centralizaron el poder del estado con un grado mds gran ambos
49. Vanniasingham, (1988), p. 19.
50. Gunewardena, V. & Wesumperuma, D., Constitutional Structure and Devolution of Power
(Estructura Constitucional y Transferencia de Poder ) (Colombo: Sri Lanka Foundation Institute, 1987).
51. Bose, (1994).
52. Warnapala, W.A.W., Sri Lanka's New Constitution, in Asian Survey, (La constituci6n Nueva
de la Sri-Lanka, en Revisidn Asidtica) (1980), 20 (9), pp. 114-130.
53. Perera, (1990).
54. Wamapala, (1980).
55. Id. en 917.
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administrativamente asi como polifticamente. Manor y Segal indican esto " ...
aunque Sri-Lanka tenfa un sistema abierto, representativo politico basado en el
sufragio universal parte posterior tan lejana como 1931, el poder era todavia
extremamente sobrecentralizado. Ningunas instituciones representativas
existieron en cualquier nivel intermedio entre el parlamento en Colombo y el
nivel local.""s
Ambiente tan politico abandon6 a los Tamiles sin el poder sobre asuntos
o sea nacionales o sea sus cuestiones regionales porque la fabricaci6n de polftica
era y ha sido controlada de Colombo. Despu6s la lucha sin violente emprendida
por el Partido Federal conducido por S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, dos pactos han
sido firmados.57  Primero, entre primer ministro Bandaranayake y
Chelvanayagam en 1957 y luego entre primer ministro Dudley Senanayake y
Chelvanayagam en 1965. El Banda -Chelva el pacto como lo laman asegurado
la transferencia de poder sobre la base de Consejos Regionales y el Dudley -
Chelva el pacto tambi6n convino que las Administraciones de distrito serfan el
principio se un para la transferencia. Lamentablemente ambos estos acuerdos
unilateralmente han sido desechados por los gobiernos respectivos que obligan
a los Tamiles a perder cualquier fe ellos tenfan en acuerdos que alcanzan con los
gobiernos de Sri-Lanka.58
La naturaleza de polftica de partido en el pafs tambi6n ayud6 a intensificar
la tensi6n entre estas comunidades. Dos partidos principales a saber el Partido
Unido Nacional (UNP) y el Partido de Libertad de Sri Lanka (SLFP)
representan la mayoria gente Sinhale. Ambos partidos pueden ser etiquetados
como "Sinhala partidos" a pesar del apoyo pobre del que ellos disfrutan entre
el Tamil y poblaciones Musulmanas porque su base de apoyo es predominately
Sinhala.59 Los Sri Lankan Tamiles ha sido representado primero por Todo
Congreso de Tamil de Ceildn (ACTC) y luego por el Partido Federal (FP). El
Tamil Se uni6 el Frente de Liberaci6n (TULF) ha sido formado en temprano de
1970 como una fuerza combinada de la gente de Tamil y disfrutado abrumando
el apoyo de los Tamiles en provincias del Norte y Orientales. ° Mientras la gente
Musulmana tiende a votar con los partidos supuestos nacionales, el UNP Y EL
SLFP, el Congreso de Musulm.n de Sri-Lanka (SLMC) los representa desde el
56. Manor & Segal, (1985), pp. 1169
57. Willson, (2000).
58. Loganathan, (1996).
59. Leitan, T. G.R., Political Integration Through Decentralization and Devolution of Power: The
Sri Lankan Experience (Integraci6n Politica Por Descentralizaci6n y Transferencia de Poder: el Sri Lankan
Experiencia (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Department of History and Political Science, University of Colombo,
1990).
60. Siriweera, W.I., Recent Developments in Sinhala - Tamil Relations, in Asian Survey,
(Acontecimientos Recientes en Sinhala - tamil Relaciones, en Revisidn Asidtica ) 20 (9), pp. 903-913.
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medio los afios 1980. Los Tamiles Indios predominantemente apoyaron el
Congreso de Trabaj adores de Ceildn (CWC) y su base de apoyo ha sido limitada
a estados de t6 en Sri Lanka central asi como Areas donde la gente de origen
Indio vive densamente. Como uno puede concebir, la politica de partido en Sri
Lanka bruscamente ha sido dividida a lo largo de la lealtad 6tnica asi como
religiosa.6"
Esta tendencia indudablemente anim6 los partidos politicos y sus
candidatos a extensivamente emplear lemas 6tnicos y religiosos para ganar el
juego de ntimero, que es una parte esencial de democracia liberal. El mds a
menudo, lemas 6tnicos y religiosos girados contra "otras" comunidades "y el
otros" han sido representados como enemigos. En hechos los partidos politicos
competfan para ofrecer la medida posible fuerte contra otras comunidades si
ellos fueran elegidos para impulsar. Sinhala 1956 S61o Acttia, por ejemplo, era
al principio una promesa de elecci6n hecha por el SLFP.62 Cuando el UNP
tambi6n endos6 una politica de lengua, el lider SLFP prometi6 a la gente
Sinhala "Sinhala s6lo dentro de veinte cuatro horas." Como segtin
Vanniasingham
"Bandaranaike encontraron que 'Sinhala s6lo dentro de veinte cuatro
horas' serfan el colector de fuego seguro-voto."63
Partidos de Tamil tambi6n, lemas comprensivamente manipulados raciales
contra la gente Sinhala asi como el estado en particular en reas de mayorfa de
Tamil. Asi, la resoluci6n para un estado separado de Tamil Eelam entr6 en vigor
como una promesa de elecci6n. Siriweera indica que "segdin el manifiesto de
elecci6n del TULF's (de 1976)" la pregunta para ser resuelta era si los Tamiles
quisieron su libertad o siguieron la servidumbre al Sinhala - el gobierno
Dominado. ''64 Este tipo de miope "la visi6n" de partidos politicos en este pafs
ayud6 s6lo a distanciarse el vacfo entre las comunidades contrarias.
VII. CiVLizAcION
Al menos, en sus mentes los Sinhalds y los Tamiles son dos grupos
diferentes de la gente originada de civilizaciones diferentes. La creencia
convencional es que los Sinhal6s es los descendientes de una raza al norte India
aria y los Tamiles son Dravidians, la cuya base geogrifica estd en el Sur India.
Es imperativo notar que alli existe un discurso de acad6mico interesante, que
avanza unas teorfas en cuanto al origen y las interrelaciones de estos grupos. Por
61. Leitan, T.G.R., (1990).
62. Misra, S.S., Ethnic Conflict and Security Crisis in Sri Lanka (Conflicto tnico y Seguridad
Crisis en Sri-Lanka) (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1995). Also See Rupesinghe (1988).
63. Vanniasingham, (1988), p. 13.
64. Siriweera, (1980), p. 903.
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ejemplo, algunos eruditos sugieren que los cingal6s y los Tamiles sean los
descendientes de misma acci6n racial, probablemente Dravidian y otros
mantienen que los Sinhal6s es de hecho los descendientes de la gente aborigen
Ilamada Veddas quien todavfa vive en las dreas de montafia remotas de Sri
Lanka en un pequefio ntimero. Atn, estos debates acad6micos en realidad no
hacen ningtin cambios sustanciales de las percepciones un grupo sostiene sobre
el otro, que es fundamentalmente negativo.
Ademis, hay diferencias obvias entre estos grupos. Los Sinhal6s habla
Sinhala y la mayor parte de ellos son el budista. Los Tamiles, de otra parte,
hablan el Tamil, y son predominantemente hindties Hay una comunidad
cristiana que incluye ambo Sinhal6s asf como Tamil. El factor comiin de
cristianismo no logr6 hacer cualquier impacto en el acortamiento del hueco
entre los antagonistas 6tnicamente diferentes porque Christian Sinhala y el
Tamil Christian sienten la proximidad emocional al budismo y el hinduismo
respectivamente. Este accesorio emocional ha sido basado en su lealtad 6tnica
asf como la apreciaci6n cultural de aquellas religiones. Esta tendencia hasta ha
influfdo en algtin Tamil Christian y Christian Sinhala para declarar que ellos son
culturalmente hindties y budistas respectivamente.
Sin embargo, el aspecto religioso del conflicto es algo complicado. Es sano
y salvo asumir que este conflicto es esencialmente 6tnico mts bien que religioso
si bien los grupos enredados sean con religiosidad diferentes y factores hasta
cierto punto religiosos son implicados. La lengua de Tamil y el hinduismo no
son entrelazados tanto como Sinhala la lengua y el budismo son. Para la
comunidad Sinhalesa, su lengua y religi6n son mismas. En otras palabras, uno
no puede sobrevivir sin el otro. Rupesinghe indica que "el renacimiento de
budista ha sido asociado con el concepto del Sinhal6s como una raza 'aria', y
que el budismo y el Sinhal6s eran sin6nimos del uno al otro.'' 65 Sinhala el
budismo estd la fundaci6n de supervivencia Sinhalesa y bien ser y esto es una
parte incorporada de su identidad. Los Sinhal6s cree que Buda 61 mismo escogi6
la isla de Sri Lanka como un lugar donde su ensefianza prosperarna.66 Por lo
tanto, esto es el deber inviolable de la gente Sinhalesa para proteger el budismo
en tierra. Ademds, los Sinhal6s tambi6n discute que el "Sinhala el budismo"
s6lo podrfa ser protegido en Sri Lanka unitaria. Este argumento es basado en
presunci6n que cualquier forma de transferencia de poder eventualmente
conducird a la separaci6n del pais y causai la destrucci6n de budismo Sinhala.67
65. Rupesinghe (1988), p. 342.
66. Brow, J., Nationalist Rhetoric and Local Practice: The Fate of the Village Community in
Kukulewa, in Spencer, (Ret6rica Nacionalista y Pr~ctica Local: el Destino de la Comunidad de Pueblo en
Kukulewa, en Spencer) (1990), p. 128.
67. Hewavitharana, (1997).
2002] 1219
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1201
El nacionalismo de Tamil, de otra parte, no representa asociaci6n fuerte
con el hinduismo. Esto puede ser una raz6n del apoyo aplastante los extractos
separatistas de guerra de la masa en particular Cat6lica de Christian en la zona
de guerra. El Tamil en que la Iglesia cat6lica es sumamente critica del Sri
Lankan el gobierno para la manera el que la gente de Tamil era y es tratado en
las provincias del Norte y Orientales. Para su parte los duros Sinhala en el sur
acusan al Tamil la Iglesia cat6lica para asistir al LTTE.
VInI. PSICOLOGIA
En el andlisis final que es importante es la psicologfa de la gente que es
implicado en conflicto sumamente intenso violento 6tnico. "El miedo de
extinci6n" juega un papel principal en el empujar a la gente a la violencia
extrema en muchos conflictos modernos 6tnicos. Reiterer cree que este "el
miedo de extinci6n" es abastecido de combustible a menudo por las memorias
de matanzas del siglo-viejas y otros acontecimientos horribles en la historia de
relaciones mutuas.68 Los grupos tienen "un trauma escogido" que asiste en la
movilizaci6n de sus componentes. 69 Esto es verdadero para el Sri Lankan la
situaci6n tambi6n.
Hay un miedo de extinci6n total, y en Tamil y psiques Sinhalesas, los que
correctamente laman "la crisis de confianza" por los estudiantes de Sri Lankan
la polftica.7° Ambos grupos perdieron la fe que ellos plcidamente puedan
coexistir dentro de un sistema o hasta al lado. Este miedo es la raz6n
fundamental del deseo Sinhal6s de mantener el control apretado de la gente de
Tamil y sus asuntos. Cualquier esfuerzo de delegar poderes a unidades
regionales o el poder de parte con sus colegas de Tamil es opuesto sobre la
premisa que tal situaci6n conduzca a la creaci6n de Tamil separado Eelam y
eventualmente causar, la destrucci6n de raza de budista Sinhala. La creencia
que hay una conspiraci6n de Tamil para establecer a un Tamil mds gran Eelam
permanece muy fuerte en la psique Sinhala.
De otra parte, los Tamiles creen que aquel Sinhal6s ha reducido a los
Tamiles a una ciudadania de segunda clase principalmente que usa el poder
politico y la polftica hegem6nica sobre asuntos de Tamil. Los ejemplos de tales
tendencias a menudo son ubicados de las versiones deformadas de historia de
68. Reiterer, A.F., Reducing Ethnic Conflicts: Contemporary Approaches to Conflict Resolution
in Western Europe, in Klink, A., Renn, 0., & Lehner, J.P. (Conflictos Itnicos que Reducen: Accesos
Contempor/neos de Estar en desacuerdo Resoluci6n en Europa Occidental) (eds) Ethnic Conflicts and Civil
Societies: Proposals for a New Era in Eastern Europe (Conflictos tnicos y Sociedades Civiles: Propuestas
para de una Era Nueva en Europa Oriental) (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997).
69. Volkan, V., Bllodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1997).
70. Gunewardena, & Wesumperuma, (1987).
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Tamil y la cultura en manuales de la escuela a lo que esti el t6rmino como la
ocupaci6n militar de fuerzas armado Sinhala en el Al norte y el Este. Ven la
legislaci6n y la polftica ptiblica que afecta al Tamil como instrumentos reducir
su presencia en la polftica establecida. El Tamil es convencido de que todo los
que la polftica opresiva eventualmente conducird a la extinci6n de su identidad
y gente como un grupo 6tnico. Para ellos el iinico modo de evitar tal lio es de
tener el derecho a la autodeterminaci6n o el control al menos total de sus
propios asuntos. Varias opciones que incluyen la creaci6n de un estado separado
y la introducci6n de una estructura federal han sido propuestas sobre esta
suposici6n.7'
Por lo tanto, las posiciones finales de estos grupos naturalmente
diametralmente son opuesto al uno al otro. Fundamentalmente, el Sinhal~s
quiere mantener el estado existente unitario del estado, que asegura el control
del gobierno central de poder sobre todas las unidades y niveles. Los Tamiles
quieren crear una unidad que asegurarfa su supervivencia y bien ser, serfan ello
dentro de un estado separado o una estructura federal. Esto es donde ambos los
grupos son pegados y son incapaces de moverse hacia una soluci6n pacffica.
Los diecinueve afios la larga guerra ha demostrado que ambos partidos carecen
del poder de imponer una soluci6n militar sobre el otro.72 Por lo tanto, un final
a la guerra debe ser alcanzado por el didlogo politico. Sin embargo la situaci6n
de tierra en el pais no proporciona ningtin causa para la esperanza, al menos en
el t6rmino de clase. Parece que un cambio hacia una resoluci6n pacffica al
conflicto no es posible sin un cambio sorprendentemente principal del entorno
politico del ajuste de conflicto.
IX. CONCLUSION
Como en muchos otros conflictos 6tnicos, el Sri Lankan estd en desacuerdo
demasiado desarrollado de exigencias suaves polfticas en un todos de la guerra.
La guerra civil hasta ahora ha reclamado mds de sesenta mil vidas adems del
dafiador a la cantidad enorme de recursos econ6micos. Instituciones sociales y
polfticas no eran inmunes de la destrucci6n tampoco. Un establecimiento
negociado politico tiene importancia extrema para asegurar una resoluci6n
pacffica con la justicia a todos los grupos complicados. Una solamente soluci6n
no puede ser alcanzada sin un entendimiento apropiado de la dindmica mdiltiple
del conflicto. El conflicto Sri Lankan, aunque esencialmente ftnico, esto sea
multidimensional.
Ya hemos hablado en el gran detalle los varios factores complicados en el
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como los factores hist6ricos han influfdo en psicologfa de los partidos, y como
la psicologfa tenfa un impacto sobre la fabricaci6n de polftica en condiciones de
la economfa, polftica, asf como la decisi6n de usar la violencia para alcanzar
objetivos. El Cubismo Social de conflicto nos permite examinar las facetas
variadas de un conflicto por proporcionando un marco multidimensional. En
este sentido esto es un marco dltil para el anilisis de conflicto y puede ser
aplicado a cualesquiera conflictos arraigados 6tnicos.
LA ECONOMIA POLITICA DE VIOLENCIA E
INSEGURIDAD EN LAS FRONTERAS DE KENIA
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I. EXTRACTO
Desde los afios ochenta, los conflictos y la violencia que implican
comunidades pastorales en las fronteras de Kenia del Norte se han hecho
end6micos. La violencia, particularmente, ha tomado la forma de robo de
ganado y vandalismo. La aparici6n dejefes militares de ganado entre los grupos
* Joshia Osamba es Profesor de Historia en la Universidad Egerton, Kenia. ti ensefia cursos de
historia militar, la gobernaci6n, constitucionalismo, Derecho Humanitario Internacional, y la resoluci6n de
conflicto. Sobre todo, 6l ha enfocado sus investigaci6nes en el sindicalismo, el conflicto 6tnico, la
gobernaci6n, y los m6todos africanos indigenos de resoluci6n de conflicto. Su estudio Bandolerismo y El
Robo de Ganado En Kenia Del Norte, ha sido publicado en ACCORD AFRICAN JOURNAL ON CONFLICT
RESOLUTION [EL DIARIO AFRICANO "ACCORD" SOBRE LA RESOLUCI6N DE CONFLICTO] (2000). Joshia ha
presentado estudios en conferencias internacionales en Senegal, Sudfrica, Etiopfa, y los Estados Unidos.
Presentemente 61 es un candidato doctoral en la resoluci6n de conflicto y un Erudito Subalterno Fulbright en
el Departamento de Resoluci6n e Andlisis de Conflicto en la Universidad Nova Southeastern, Fort Lauderdale,
Estados Unidos.
** Este articulo fue traducido por Manuel Perez-Leiva.
ILSA Journal of Intemationfal & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1223
pastorales ha contribufdo a la internacionalizaci6n y la comercializaci6n del
robo de ganado. Los actos de bandolerismo y el robo de ganado han conducido
a la p6rdida de vidas humanas y el desplazamiento de poblaciones. En esa forma
la violencia y la inseguridad se han hecho la orden del dfa en la regi6n. Este
capftulo analiza la violencia y la inseguridad en las fronteras de Kenia del Norte
usando la perspectiva del Cubismo Social para demostrar como los terminos en
un conflicto a menudo son relacionados y entrelazados entre ellas. El capftulo
tambi6n examina las estrategias posibles para la intervenci6n de parte de
terceras personas entre el conflicto para controlar o disminuir la violencia.
II. INTRODUCCION
Desde los afios noventa, los conflictos comunales se han hecho end6micos
en todo el mundo. Existen eventos y tendencias, tanto internos y extemos, que
han contribuido a la aparici6n de estos conflictos.' En Africa, por ejemplo, el
conflicto y la violencia parecen asumir dimensiones diferentes, desde las guerras
civiles en Somalia, Liberia, la Reptiblica Democrdtica de Congo y Sierra Leone
hasta al genocidio en Rwanda y Burundi. Tales conflictos han minado
severamente la cohesi6n social de los estados Africanos.
En los tiltimos veinte afilos se ha presenciado un aumento de violencia e
inseguridad en la forma del bandolerismo y del robo de ganado (incursiones) en
las fronteras de Kenia del Norte. Por lo general, el robo de ganado entre los
grupos pastorales no esti limitado por las lineas comunales y las fronteras
nacionales. La frase 'las fronteras de Kenia del Norte' se usa en este escrito para
referirse a la regi6n bordada por las fronteras de Kenia, Uganda, el Sudan, el
Etiope, y Somalia. El drea es mencionada a menudo como 'la zona del bandido'
o 'el cintur6n del bandido' debido a las armas de fuego ilegales en las manos de
los grupos pastorales quienes los usan para crear estragos en la forma del robo
de ganado y del bandolerismo.3 El t6rmino 'pastoralista' estd aplicado en este
1. TED ROBERT GURR Y BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN WORLD POLITICS [CONFLITOS
ITNICOS EN LA POLITICA MUNDIAL] (1994); RODERICK VON LIPSEY, BREAKING THE CYCLE: A FRAMEWORK
FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION [ROMPIENDO EL CICLO: UNA ARMAZON PARA LA INTERVENCION DE
CONFLICTO] (1997); WILLIAM 1. ZARTMAN, COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION OF LEGITIMATE
AUTHORITY [ESTADOS DERRUMBADOS: LA DESINTEGRACION DE AUTORIDAD LEGITIMA) (1995).
2. John Mbaria, Suguta Valley of Death [Suguta Valle de la Muerte] THE EAST AFRICAN, Octubre
9, 2000, p. 12, Disponible en http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/current/Featurres/
Featuresl.html; Makumi Mwagiru, Borders, Frontiers and Conflict in the Horn ofArica: Some Preliminary
Hypotheses [Bordes, Fronteras y Conflicto en el Cuerno de Africa: Algunas Hipdteses Preliminares] (2000)
(estudio no-publicado: Universidad de Nairobi).
3. Alex Mwangangi, Kenya's PastoralAreas: An Arch of Conflict? [Las Areas Pastorales de Kenia
- un Arco de Conflicto?], THE EAST AFRICAN, Septiembre 15-21: disponible en
http://www.nationaudio.comNews/EastAfrican/130999/. ../opinion2.html; Ferocious Tribal Warfare [Guerra
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estudio para denotar a la gente cuyo modo principal de producci6n es el
apifiamiento de ganaderfa como el ganado, camellos, cabras, y asnos sobre bases
extensas o en combinaci6n con alguna forma de actividades agrfcolas.4 En
Africa Oriental, tales comunidades incluyen los Turkanas, los Pokots, los
Samburus, los Somalfs, y los Boranas de Kenia, los Toposas y los Meriles de
Etiopfa y Suddn, y los Karamojongs y los Jies de Uganda.
De este modo, un estudio de la economfa polftica de violencia e
inseguridad entre los desaffos de la globalizaci6n y el nuevo orden Mundial es
central a nuestra comprensi6n del conflicto etno-polftico y comunal en Africa
Oriental. Queremos en este capftulo dirigir las siguientes preguntas pertinentes
en relaci6n a la violencia y la inseguridad en las fronteras: LCudles son las
causas principales de la violencia y la inseguridad en Kenia del Norte? ZEsti el
conflicto basado en los recursos o en la identidad? ZC6mo nos podemos dirigir
al conflicto y la violencia? ,Cual es el nivel de intervenci6n de resoluci6n de
conflicto necesaria en la regi6n?
Asf este capftulo examina y analiza la economfa politica de violencia e
inseguridad en las fronteras de Kenia del Norte con el 6nfasis particular sobre
el fen6meno del bandolerismo y el robo de ganado. La primera parte del
capftulo proporciona un fondo contextual de la economfa pastoral en relacion
con el conflicto sobre los recursos, sobre todo en los treinta afilos pasados. La
segunda parte proporciona un an,disis del conflicto que usa el modelo del
Cubismo Social. La tercera parte discute qu6 tipo de intervenci6n de terceras
personas puede ser ditil en la facilitaci6n de la resoluci6n de conflicto. En la
conclusi6n, el capftulo proporciona una discusi6n comprimida de las ideas
claves en la aplicaci6n.
m1. EL BANDOLERISMO Y EL ROBo DE GANADO EN LA ECONOMA
PASTORAL: UN FONDO CONTEXTUAL
La mayor parte de Kenia del Norte es semi-drida y el drea es s6lo
conveniente para un modo de producci6n pastoral. La evidencia disponible
demuestra que los pastoralistas han sido capaces de ganar a duras penas una
existencia frugal del dspero ambiente climdtico de la frontera durante siglos.5 En
Feroz Tribal], THE WEEKLY REVIEW, Marzo 12, 1999: disponible en http://wwww.africaonline
.co.ke/weeklyreview/990312/kenya3.html.
4. M. Mahmud Khan, Market-Based Early Warning Indicators of Famine for the Pastoral
Households of the Sahel [Los Tempranos Indicadores de Aviso de Hambre Basado en el Mercado Para las
Casas Pastorales del Saheln, 22 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 2 (1994), p. 198.
.5. Vera Mohammed Ali Salih, Agro - Pastoralismo: An underestimated Regional FoodProduction
System [Agro-Patoralismo: Un Sistema subestimado de Producci6n Regional De Alimentos], EASTERN
AFRICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH REVIEW, Vol. IX, No 1 (1993), p. 23; R.M.A. VAN ZWANENBERG &
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todas partes de su historia la ganaderfa ha sido su salvavida econ6mico y social.
Algunos de los pastoralistas como los Turkanas y los Pokots, sin embargo,
practican la transhumaci6n, una forma de pastoralismo por el cual s6lo los
animales son movidos en la btisqueda de pasto y agua mientras las familias se
colocan 'permanentemente' en locales dados.
Hist6ricamente, las armas de fuego parecen no haber jugado un papel
prominente en la temprana organizaci6n militar de las comunidades pastorales
y semi-pastorales de Africa del Este. S61o fu6 en la ultima parte del siglo
d6cimo que los pionero comerciantes costeros de Africa del Este, los Arabes-
Swahili y los 'Khatoumers', se aventuraron dentro de las fronteras de Africa
Oriental y la cabecera del Nilo, introduciendo asf las armas de fuego como un
articulo comercial.6 Indudablemente, hoy en dfa los pastoralistas en la frontera
afrontan desaffos sin precedentes en su larga historia lo que a menudo conduce
a luchas serias y violentas para la supervivencia. En los dltimos veinticinco
afilos, por ejemplo, los cataclismos ecol6gicos, las sequfas, la carestia asf como
la competencia para los recursos han contribufdo al conflicto y la violencia entre
comunidades pastorales.7 Por lo tanto, la mayorfa de las sociedades pastorales
en las fronteras se han militarizado y cada vez mds confian en las armas de
fuego.
Sin embargo, Odegi-Awuondo afirma que las causas originales de los
problemas socio-econ6micos corrientes en dreas pastorales pueden remontarse
a la polftica del gobiemo britdnico colonial.8 Por ejemplo, en su tentativa de
pacificar estas comunidades, el Gobiemo colonial adopt6 una polftica dspera
que contribuy6 a la marginaci6n econ6mica y polftica de estas comunidades.
Por ejemplo, el Gobiemo favoreci6 el establecimiento de agricultura de
plantaci6n de los colonos blancos en Kenia a cargo de la economfa de
campesino. Para hacer la tierra mds f6rtil disponible para la enajenaci6n por la
comunidad blanca, el Gobiemo colonial demarc6 pequefias reservas 'tribales'
ANNE KING, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF KENYA AND UGANDA, 1800-1970 [UNA HISTORIA ECONOMICA DE
KENIA Y UGANDA 1800-19701 (1975); WARFARE AMONG EAST AFRICAN HERDERS [GUERRA ENTRE LOS
PASTORES AFRICANOS DEL ESTE] (Katsuyhoshi Fukui & David Turton, eds., 1979).
6. Ver las obras siguientes, BETHUEL A. OGOT, ECONOMIC ADAPTATION AND CHANGE AMONG THE
JI-SPEAKING PEOPLES OF EAST AFRICA [ADAPTACION ECONOMICA Y CAMBIO ENTRE LOS PUEBLOS JII-
HABLANDO DE AFRICA ORIENTAL] (1996); ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA [IDENTIDAD
tTNICA Y CONFLICTO EN EL CUERNO DE AFRICA] (Katsuyhoshi Fukui & John Markakis, eds., 1994); 23
INTERNATIONAL STUD. IN SOCIOLOGY & SOC. ANTHROPOLOGY [ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES EN SOCIOLOGIA
Y ANTROPOLOGIA SOCIAL] (Ali Mazrui, ed., 1977).
7. Fukui Y Markakis, supra, nota 6, p. 147.
8. CASPER ODEGI-AWUONDO, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY OF TURKANA
NOMADS [LA VIDA EN EL EQUILIBRIO: LA SOCIOLOGiA ECOL6GICA DE LOS N6MADAS TURKANA], p. 44
(1992).
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para poblaciones Africanas.9 La mayor parte de las comunidades pastorales
consecuentemente han sido empujadas de la tierra mis f6rtil en las partes de
aparato de secado del pafs. Ademds, los funcionarios coloniales consideraron
el pastoralismo como un modo primitivo de producci6n y por lo tanto se han
hecho esfuerzos para desalentarlo. Por ejemplo, el primer Gobernador colonial
de Kenia, Sefior Carlos Eliot declar6 que el pastoralismo no tenfa ning-in futuro
en Kenia.'0 Tambi6n los antrop6logos coloniales propagaron mitos sobre el
estado bajo el pastoralismo en la evoluci6n humana social y econ6mica.
De esta forma, las comunidades pastorales desde los tiempos coloniales
han afrontado el hostigamiento y la represi6n estatales." Por ejemplo, durante
el perfodo colonial, Kenia del Norte era un distrito cerrado y fu6 administrada
por oficiales militares. El movimiento libre de la gente y los animales dentro y
fuera del distrito fu6 restringido. Esta polftica fu6 dirigida para la supervisi6n
de las actividades de los grupos pastorales. Los britdnicos se referfan a los
grupos pastorales como los Turkanas y los Pokots como 'belicosos', violentos
y como comunidades recalcitrantes. Esta creaci6n de los estereotipos era una
manera de crear una imagen del enemigo y la justificaci6n para la contra-
agresi6n. 2 Por ejemplo, el Gobiemo a menudo enviaba expediciones militares
punitivas contra los pastoralistas. Tales expediciones a menudo conducfan a la
matanza de la gente y la confiscaci6n de ganaderfa.
El Gobierno Keniano de la post-independencia parece haber adoptado la
misma estrategia en relaci6n con las actividades frecuentes del robo de ganado
en las fronteras. 3 Sin embargo, a pesar del empleo de fuerza, el Estado no ha
alcanzado sus objetivos. Mis bien, esto ha exacerbado el problema. Por
ejemplo, los bandidos y asaltantes de ganado a menudo poseen armas mis
sofisticadas que los de las fuerzas de seguridad del Gobierno. Por lo tanto, los
bandidos parecen no tener rival en las fronteras. Consecuentemente, las
incursiones se desarrollaron casi a la escala de una operaci6n militar como el
medio de obtener algunos pocos animales y mejorar la capacidad para la lucha. 14
No s6lo los hombres j6venes han sido matados, sino que las mujeres y nifios han
9. R.M.A.vAN ZWANENBERG, COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND LABOUR IN KENYA 1919-1939 [EL
CAPITALISMO COLONIAL Y EL TRABAjO EN KENIA 1919-1939] (1975); M.P.K. SORRENSON, ORIGINS OF
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN KENYA [Los ORIGENES DE ESTABLECIMIENTO EUROPEO EN KENIA] (1968).
10. David M. Anderson, Cow Power: Livestock and the Pastoralistas in Africa [El Poder de Vaca:
Ganadera y los Pastoralistas en Africa], AFRICAN AFFAIRS: Vol.92, No.366 (1993), p. 121.
11. WILLIAM R. OCHIENG, AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF THE RIFT VALLEY [UNA HISTORIA ESBOZADA
DEL VALLE 'RIFt'] (1980).
12. Fukui Y Markakis, supra nota 6, p. 193.
13. ODEGI-AWUONDO, supra nota 8.
14. MWANGANGI, supra nota 3.
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sido asesinados tambi6n. Las chozas, tiendas, y cosechas han sido quemadas y
saqueadas.
La confusi6n polftica en los paises vecinos en los afios 80 proporcion6 una
oportunidad para los pastoralistas para adquirir ficilmente armas de fuego
mortales.' 5 Adem.s, algunos gobiernos africanos han tendido a proporcionar
armas a un grupo para luchar contra otro, mis bien que la resoluci6n de los
conflictos 6tnicos de muchos afilos. Por ejemplo, la guerra civil en curso en
Suddn del Sur ha demostrado ser un auge para el comercio de arma de fuego en
las fronteras. 6 Por ejemplo, el gobiemo Sudands tanto como los guerrilleros del
Ej&cito de Liberaci6n de Los Pueblos Sudaneses (SPLA) proporcionan armas
a sus colaboradores en la regi6n.
Desde los dltimos afios de la d6cada de los setentas, la siguiente
combinaci6n de factores ha contribufdo a la destituci6n evidente de los
pastoralistas en Kenia del Norte. 7 Primero, las enfermedades de ganado
borraron la mayor parte de la ganaderfa. En segundo lugar, las sequfas perennes
conducfan al hambre. En tercer lugar, habfa un aumento de incursiones sobre los
ganados y ataques militares por asaltantes Karamajong y Turkana fuertemente
armados, en conjunto ilamados Ngorokos (bandidos). Ademds, entre el ario
1984 y el afio 1986, el gobierno Keniano envi6 una operaci6n militar punitiva
hasta el distrito pastoral de Pokot, en apariencia para recoger armas de fuego
ilegales. Aquella mayor operaci6n de seguridad se conoce en el Pokot como el
'Lotiriri' segun el ruido de los helic6pteros usados en el ataque del gobierno
contra ellos y sus animales.l" Durante las operaciones, las fuerzas de seguridad
confiscaron miles de cabezas de ganado Pokot, mientras otros murieron debido
a la sequfa o la carencia de atenci6n adecuada mientras estaban en manos de las
fuerzas de seguridad. Tales medidas obviamente no alcanzaron los resultados
15. Fukui & Markakis, supra nota 6; THE WEEKLY REVIEW, supra nora 3.
16. Stop These Merchants of Terror [Pare a Estos Comerciantes de Terror], THE WEEKLY REVIEW,
Febrero. 25, 1999. Disponible en http://www.africaonline.co.ke/weeklr review/990312/editorial.html ; Marc-
Antoine P. de Motclos, The Proliferation of Light Weapons in Pastoral Northern Kenya [La Proliferaci6n
de Armas Ligeras en la Kenia del Note Pastoral], en MONOGRAFIA, No.30, CONTROLLING SMALL ARMS
PROLIFERATION AND REVERSING CULTURES OF VIOLENCE IN AFRICA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN [CONTROLANDO
LA PROLIFERACION DE ARMAS PORTATILES E INVIRTIENDO LAS CULTURAS DE VIOLENCIA EN AFRICA Y EL
OCPANO NDICO], Sept. 1998, Cape Town Institute of Strategic Studies [Instituto de Estudios Estratdgicos de
Cape Town], p. 8, Disponible en http:lwww.iss.co.za/Pubs/MonographslNo3O/CONTENTS.html.
17. IN SEARCH OF COOL GROUND: WAR, FLIGHT AND HOMECOMING IN NORTH-EAST AFRICA [EN
BOSQUEDA DE TIERRA FRESCA: GUERRA, VUELO Y REGRESO EN AFRICA NORDESTE] (Tim Allen, ed., 1996);
Eboe Hutchful, Demilitarizing the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic Issues [Desmilitarizando el
Proceso Politico en Africa: AIgunas Cuestiones Bdsicas], 6 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 2, p. 1 (1997);
ODEGI-AWUONDO, supra nota 8.
18. Ferocious Tribal Warfare, supra nota 3.
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esperados ya que ellos parecieron no enfocarce bien en las causas del orfgen del
robo de ganado.
Ademis, desde el final de los afilos setenta las operaciones de robo de
ganado tomaron una dimensi6n nueva que ha sido basada tinicamente sobre
intereses individualistas m~is bien que sociales. Por ejemplo, mientras las
incursiones tradicionales dependieron de intereses comunales y han sido
supervisados por la comunidad por normas sociales establecidas, estas
incursiones nuevas se basan completamente sobre intereses privados y son
controlados por lideres armados del pueblo.I9 Esta tendencia ha conducido a la
aparici6n dejefes militares de ganado. El jefe-militar de ganado es un fen6meno
que surgi6 entre el Pokot y el Turkana en los afios ochenta. El fen6meno entr6
en foco cuando varias personas carismdticas, influyentes y ricas surgieron en
estas comunidades prometiendo la prosperidad y la seguridad del pueblo. Estos
jefes militares de ganado incluyen a los antiguos jefes, antiguos militares,
hombres de negocios y expertos de rituales. Ellos han creado milicias armadas
privadas que, aparte de proporcionar la seguridad local, tambi6n siguen en las
incursiones sobre el ganado contra comunidades cercanas y a travds de la
frontera en Uganda, Etiopfa, y Suddn. El jefe-militarismo asf al parecer se ha
convertido en empresa provechosa para ambos jefes militares y sus
subaltemos20 Por ejemplo, ellos han mantenido una red comercial fuerte con
parses cercanos. Los jefes militares a menudo organizan operaciones conjuntas
de robo de ganado, implicando a miles de subaltemos en Uganda, Suddin, y
Etiopfa. Asf los Jefes Militares de ganado parecen ser los empresarios nuevos
de la violencia. Segfin Reno, un jefe militar es tfpicamente un civil quien arma
a los civiles con armas rudimentarias para servir sus intereses polfticos,
econ6micos y sociales.21 Ir6nicamente algunos funcionarios del Estado, sobre
todo las fuerzas de seguridad y ex-militares, tambi6n segdin se informa son
contratados en las actividades del robo de ganado, una ocupaci6n que se ha
hecho una empresa lucrativa para ellos.
Tradicionalmente, el robo de ganado entre los pastoralistas era una prictica
cultural y ha sido considerado como simplemente una especie de 'deporte
peligroso'.22 Bajo el sistema tradicional de gobierno, los mayores tenfan el poder
de controlar o sancionar incursiones. Las incursiones sobre el ganado asf han
19. Charles M. Ocan, Pastoral Crisis in North-Eastern Uganda: The Changing Significance of
Raids [Crisis Pastoral en Uganda del Noreste: La Importancia Variante de Incursiones], WORKING PAPER
(ESTUDIO EN PROGRESO), No 2., Center for Basic Research Publishers (1992).
20. THE WEEKLY REVIEW, supra nota 3.
21. Ver generalmente, WILLIAM S. RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES [LA POLiTICA
DEL JEFE MILrrAR Y Los ESTADOS AFRICANOS] (1998).
22. Mabiria, supra nota 2; ver tambidn a Macharia Gaitho, Arming the Pokot was Folly: Now
Disarm Them [Armar del Pokot era Locura: Ahora Desdrmelos], THE DAILY NATION, Marzo 26, 2001, p. 6.
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sido consideradas como una respuesta comunal aceptable a las calamidades
naturales y como el medio para rellenar las reservas perdidas. Lajuventudjuega
un papel prominente en el sistema del jefe-militarismo. Ellos ofrecen sus
servicios uniendose a los grupos militares gentuzos del jefe militar. La violencia
y la inseguridad en las fronteras por lo tanto se han hecho asuntos serios
regionales y no simplemente un problema local. La mayoria de las fronteras, por
lo tanto, son abandonadas; a menudo obligan a la mayor parte de las familias a
escapar de sus casas para los campamentos de refugiados y los pequefios centros
de comercio en Kenia y Uganda.23
El bandolerismo y las actividades del robo de ganado en Kenia del Norte
han afectado millones de personas, desde los limites del Turkana en el norte,
hasta el Samburu y el Pokot en el centro, y el Keiyo, el Marakwet y el Tugen en
el sur de el drea de estudio. Las actividades del robo de ganado sin embargo, son
mds intensas entre el Pokot y las comunidades Turkana. Por ejemplo, cada
grupo pastoral intenta inclinar la escala militar a su favor. Esto sigue cambiando
sobre todo entre el Pokot y el Turkana.24 Esta rivalidad evidente conduce a un
ciclo infinito de incursiones vengativas y contra-incursiones entre las dos
comunidades. Las comunidades pastorales asi son implicadas en carrera de
armamentos de su propia invenci6n. Los bandidos y los jefes militares de
ganado parecen prosperar en este ambiente de anarquia. La capacidad de los
jefes militares para organizar y armar sus fuerzas son una indicaci6n clara que
el Estado ha perdido el monopolio sobre el empleo de la fuerza Esto merece
notar que los grupos pastorales a menudo viven en los pueblos dispersados
haciendole dificil para el Estado controlarlos con eficacia. A causa del estado
de anarqufa y la falta de ley en las fronteras de Kenia del Norte, es muy diffcil
poner en prictica cualquier proyecto de desarrollo. Los pocos oficiales del
gobierno y las NGO's (Organizaciones No Gubernamentales) basados en el drea
viven con el miedo constante de los bandidos.
IV. UNA PERSPECTIVA DEL CUBISMO SOCIAL
El capftulo ahora analiza la din~mica de la violencia y la inseguridad en las
fronteras de Kenia del Norte que usa el marco del Cubismo Social.26 El modelo
23. Ocan, supra nota 19.
24. THE WEEKLY REVIEW, supra nota 3; Mwangangi, supra nota 3.
25. Id.
26. Sean J. Byme & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Conflict in
Northern Ireland and Quebec [Cubismo Social: Seis Fuerzas Sociales del Conflicto Etnoterritorial en Irlanda
del Norte y Quebec], en JOURNAL OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 3 (2), Deciembre 1996, p. 52; ver
tambidn a Neal Carter y Sean J. Byrne, The Dynamics of Social Cubism: A View from Northern Ireland and
Quebec [La Dindmica del Cubismo Social: Una Vista desde Irlanda del Norte y Quebec], RECONCILABLE
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del Cubismo Social toma el conocimiento de factores potenciales intemos para
aclarar las complejidades del conflicto. El marco muestra como en los conflictos
etno-polfticos, el conflicto lleva a su fin en las dimensiones diversas de la vida
social como en las Areas polfticas, econ6micas y sociales. Es posible usar el
modelo para demostrar la conexi6n de relaciones entre los factores econ6micos,
politicos, psico-culturales, demogrdficos, religiosos e hist6ricos. Esta dindimica
de conflicto en los varios lugares sociales se relaciona mutuamente el uno al
otro para atrincherar el conflicto y hacerlo resistente a la resoluci6n.
El marco de Cubismo Social es dtil en el andlisis del conflicto porque
muestra la necesidad de los intervinientes de resoluci6n de conflicto para
analizar el conflicto por todos los Angulos y perspectivas. En otras palabras,
exactamente como un cubo que tiene seis lados, las cuestiones en cualquier
conflicto dado a menudo son relacionadas y entrelazadas la una a la otra.
Consecuentemente, para comprender un conflicto tenemos que identificar y
dirigir todos los factores que lo afectan de una forma u otra.
V. FACTORES HIST6RIcos
Hist6ricamente, las comunidades pastorales han habitado las fronteras de
Kenia del Norte desde tiempos inmemoriales.27 Es importante notar que Kenia,
como otros parses Africanos (excepto Etiopfa), es una creaci6n colonial o una
'expresi6n geogrdfica'. Antes del colonialismo, cada grupo pastoral era una
naci6n separada viviendo bajo sus propias instituciones sociales y politicas. Las
fronteras coloniales, sin embargo, incorporaron los grupos diversos de la gente
que no tenfan ningunos eslabones culturales o politicos, o quienes eran
enemigos tradicionales, en la misma entidad polftica en nombre de Kenia.
Muchas comunidades pastorales, por ejemplo, no se ven como Kenianos
debido a su larga distancia desde el centro de la administraci6n polftica.28 Por
ejemplo, ellos se refieren a cualquier persona que viaja hacia el sur mIs alld de
sus distritos como 'yendo a Kenia'. De modo bastante interesante, el modo de
vivir econ6mico de las comunidades pastorales es bastante diferente de la
mayorfa de otros grupos Kenianos. Al parecer, los pastoralistas parecen sentir
que ellos tienen muy poco acceso a los recursos econ6micos del estado. Las
comunidades pastorales en Kenia del Norte, por lo tanto, generalmente yen al
gobiemo como si representara una especie de colonialismo intemo. Por ejemplo,
en los ahios sesenta, los Somali de Kenia del Norte emprendieron una
prolongada, aun fracasada, guerra contra Kenia en una tentativa de separarse y
DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFIC [DIFERENCIAS RECONCILIABLES: LOS PUNTOS
DECISIVOS EN EL CONFLICTO ETNO-POLITICO], (Sean J. Byrne & Cynthia L. Irvin, eds., 2000).
27. VAN ZWANENBERG & KING, supra nota 5, en capftulo 1.
28. Mwagiru, supra nota 2.
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unirse a la Repdblica de Somalia. Menos los misioneros y las NGOs, la
participaci6n estatal en el desarrollo econ6mico y la provisi6n de servicios
sociales a los grupos pastorales en Kenia del Norte es minima.29
Consecuentemente, los lfderes pastorales influyentes, por lo tanto, a menudo
inculcan 'una mentalidad de sitio' en su gente para hacerlos sentir que ellos han
sido empujados contra la pared y que deben reaccionar en una forma u otra para
reafirmarse, salvar sus intereses y hacer que el gobiemo acceda a sus varias
exigencias. Por ejemplo, Jay Rothman claramente sefiala que los conflictos en
Africa a menudo son "profundamente arraigados en las cuestiones existenciales
como las expresiones culturales y la misma supervivencia". °
VI. FACTORES PSICOLOGICOS
Los factores psicol6gicos incluyen la identidad, el amor propio, el miedo
y la c6lera, entre otros. Los pastoralistas tradicionalmente se consideran gente
intr6pida y endurecida.3 Este sentimiento es probablemente debido a su
ambiente ispero. Por ejemplo, ellos tienen un alto respeto por su prictica
cultural de asaltar al ganado. Ademis, ellos sienten que, a no ser que ellos
mantengan a sus enemigos en la bahfa, ellos pueden ser abrumados y derrotados
militarmente. De ahf viene la tendencia de organizar incursiones contra sus
vecinos. Ellos tambi6n tienen un afecto fuerte por su cultura, el cual ellos
sienten ha pasado la prueba del tiempo.32 Los grupos pastorales han
permanecido homogeneos en los valores y los intereses. Tal uniformidad a
menudo conduce a lo que Von Lipsey describe como: "el inter6s en la
conservaci6n de s6lo aquellas cosas que son percibidas como valiosas para el
grupo o que son capaces de aumentar el poder del grupo en relaci6n a otros
dentro de la sociedad. Aquella preservaci6n de los intereses estrechamente
definidos trabajan al detrimento de las afiliaciones mds amplias requeridas para
la estabilidad dentro de la sociedad y el estado.33
29. David Western, Drought: Kenyans Have Not Seen Anything Yet [La Sequia: Los Kenianos no
Han Visto Nada Alin], THE NATION, Junio 29, del ano 2000, disponible en
http://www.climateark.org/articles/2000/2nd/drkehano.html; ver tambi6n a Mukisha Kituyi, Becoming
Kenyans: Maasai Pastoralism [Hacidndose Kenianos: El Pastoralismo MaasaiJ, African Center for
Technology 1992; ODEGI-AWUONDO, supra nota 8.
30. Ver generalmente, JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY-BASED CONLICT IN NATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITIES [RESOLVIENDO EL CONFLICrO BASADO EN IDENTIDAD EN LAS
NACIONEs, ORGANIZACIONES Y COMUNIDADES] (1997).
31. KANA ROBA DUBA, ET. AL., HONEY AND HEIFER, GRASSES, MILK AND WATER: A HERITAGE OF
DIVERSITY IN RECONCILIATION [LA MIEL Y LA NOVILLA, HIERBAS, LA LECHE Y EL AGUA: UNA HERENCIA
DE DIVERSIDAD EN RECONCILIACION] (1997); ver tambin a Mbaria, supra nota 22.
32. Id. en 32.
33. VON LIPSEY, supra nota 1.
1232
Durante afios ha habido la erosi6n sistemdtica del valor de la ideologfa y
los modos de vivir de los pastoralistas. Sin embargo, las ganaderfas todavfa
permanecen como la piedra angular de su economa. 4 Por ejemplo, el ganado
tiene muchos valores sociales y rituales para la mayor parte de los grupos
pastorales. El ganado es usado en muchas formas de relaciones recfprocas como
el edificio de alianzas sociales, intercambios en los eventos de matrimonio, el
pagar multas, los sacrificios y los pr6stamos a amigos y parientes. Los
pastoralistas yen sus valores culturales como superiores y sin mezcla de la
influencia 'exterior'. Asf, entre las comunidades pastorales, la matanza de los
miembros de grupos-de-auera (sobre todo los guerreros) y el robo de su
ganaderia son prdcticas culturalmentes y socialmentes aceptables y un signo de
valor.35 Por ejemplo, entre el Turkana y el Jie (de Uganda), el asalto de ganado
era una actividad tan importante que se esperaba que cada uno participara en
ella. Como Juan Lampear observa: "Cualquiera, hasta el no iniciado, podria ir
y fajar... Que comerfan los hombres no iniciados si ellos solamente
permanecieran en casa? LEs que el est6mago distingue entre hombres?".36 Tal
actitud 'de alarde' anim6 la militancia entre la juventud quien quizo demostrar
su virilidad y su valor militar participando en las incursiones. Asf,
tradicionalmente, el asalto de ganado por las comunidades pastorales era tanto
una respuesta natural a los desastres como la sequfa, y tambien una tentativa de
aumentar los nimeros de su ganaderfa como un seguro contra desastres.
Tambi6n, esto era una prdctica cultural para demostrar el merecer de su
comunidad.37
Los gobiernos Kenianos desde la era colonial han intentado controlar
actividades pastorales. Durante el perfodo colonial, por ejemplo, el objetivo
ostensiblemente era pacificar los pastoralistas y hacer cumplir el orden
pdblico.38 Asf, durante un largo rato la polftica oficial estatal tendi6 a ver el robo
de ganado como un mero problema cultural de los pastoralistas y no una
cuesti6n seria de seguridad estatal. Ain, el robo de ganado ahora ha resultado
ser una amenaza para la seguridad del estado.
34. DUBA, ET. AL., supra nota 31.
35. Francis Deng, Reaching Out: A Dinka Principle of Conlict Management [Extendiendo la Mano:
Un Principio Dinka de la Direccidn del Conflicto], p. 95, TRADITIONAL CURES FOR MODERN AFRICAN
CONLICTS: AFRICAN CONFLICT "MEDICINE" [CURAS TRADICIONALES PARA LOS CONFLICTOS AFRICANOS
MODERNOS: "MEDICINA" PARA EL CONFLICTO AFRICANO] (I. William Zartman, ed., 2000); DUBA, ET. AL.,
supra nota 31.
36. Fukui & Markakis, supra nota 6, p. 63.
37. Deng, supra nota 35.
38. OCHIENG, supra nota 11.
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VII. FACTORES EcONOMIcos
Los factores econ6micos tambi6n son importantes en nuestra comprensi6n
de la violencia y la situaci6n de inseguridad en las fronteras. Por ejemplo, Ali
Said indica que los grupos pastorales tenfan economfas independientes que
alcanzaban a la mayor parte de sus necesidades bdsicas.39 Tambi6n, las redes de
cambio entre los pastoralistas y los cultivadores siempre han existfdo.
Relaciones tan recfprocas pudieron permitir a los pastoralistas ganar el acceso
a los cereales, la sal y el pasto, entre otros artfculos, cuando eran requeridos.
Sin embargo, actualmente debido a la fuerte competici6n sobre los recursos y
el conflicto en la regi6n, la dicotomfa de granjero-pastor se ha hecho bastante
patente.4°
Bisicamente, la existencia hist6rica de la economfa pastoral ha sido minada
por tres factores principales, particularmente: la aparici6n de estados-naciones,
la penetraci6n de la economfa del mercado, los cambios climdticos y los
cataclismos ecol6gicos. La incorporaci6n de la economfa pastoral en la
economfa global del mercado en cierta medida tambi6n ha hecho un impacto
negativo contra la estructura social, asf como contra las fundaciones 6ticas y
morales." La predisposici6n evidente del gobierno contra la agricultura es una
indicaci6n clara del poco respeto que tienen asf al pastoralismo en los cfrculos
estatales. Por ejemplo, la economfa intemacional pone la demanda para mis
cosechas enajenando efectivamente las tierras pastorales para el establecimiento
de plantaciones agricolas grandes. La mayoria de las tierras pastorales
tradicionales han llegado a ser propiedad privada de otra gente bajo el principio,
san cionado por el estado, del 'vendedor dispuesto-comprador dispuesto'. Como
Juan Maria correctamente lo suma: "La simbiosis vieja entre los pastoralistas
y el granjero sedentario se ha estropeado, la sospecha y el conflicto de vez en
cuando sangriento han tomado su lugar, alentados por politicos con una agenda
de auto-engrandecimiento".42
39. Ali Said, Resource Use Conflict Between Pastoralism and Irrigation Development in the Middle
Awash Valley of Ethiopia [El conflicto del Empleo de los Recursos entre el Pastoralismo y el Desarrollo de
Irrigaci6n en el Medio Valle Awash de Etiopia], EASTERN AFRICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH REVIEW, Vol.
1, No 2., p. 21 y 29 (1994).
40. Gudrun Dahl & A. Hjort, Pastoral Change and the Role of Drought [El Cambio Pastoral y el
Papel de la Sequta], SAREC Report R. 2, Stockholm: Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with
Developing Countries [Estocolmo: Agencia Sueca para la Cooperaci6n de Investigaci6n con Paises en vfa del
Desarrollo] (1979); ver tambidn a Mohammed Babiker, East African Dryland Pastoralism: Some
Methodological Anxieties [El Pastoralismo de Tierras Secas de la Africa Oriental: Algunas Preocupaci6nes
Metodol6gicas], Estudio de Seminario In6dito, Khartoum: Universidad de Khartoum (1999).
41. Ali Said, supra nota 39.
42. Mbaria, supra nota 22.
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Indudablemente, el sistema de producci6n pastoral requiere un espacio de
tierra extenso para movimientos de ganaderia en respuesta al cambio de los
modelos meteorol6gicos y climiticos. Los grupos pastorales dependen en gran
parte de los productos de su ganaderfa. Asf para seguir con su prdctica hist6rica
pastoral ellos tienen que asaltar otras comunidades para abastecer la reserva
perdida. De ahf, ellos sufren las incursiones 'dando y dando'. Ademis, los
distritos pastorales de Kenia del Norte son en gran parte subdesarrollados en
t6rninos de infraestructuras, asignaciones de recurso, y la disponibilidad de
servicios sociales y econ6micos.
VIn. FACTORES RELIGIOSOS
La religi6n parece no jugar un papel prominente en la violencia y la
inseguridad de los grupos pastorales en las fronteras. Esto merece notar que la
mayor parte de los miembros de las comunidades pastorales todavfa practican
la religi6n tradicional aunque un ntimero significativo de la gente se han
convertido al cristianismo.43 Los expertos tradicionales y rituales (Emuron)
tenfan mucha influencia en las sociedades pastorales. En caso de conflicto estos
lfderes religiosos en tdndem con los mayores podrian buscar una soluci6n
amistosa aceptable a todos los partidos envueltos. Los expertos en rituales han
sido considerados como divinamente inspirado y nadie podrfa desafiar sus
decisiones. Ademis, en el sftio pastoral tradicional, los mayores eran los
funcionarios con el poder de decisi6nes judiciales y polfticos.
Los mayores manejaron en varios niveles todos los conflictos principales
en la sociedad. 4 Por ejemplo, siempre que habfa un conflicto serio entre grupos
vecinos, los mayores de ambos lados llamaban una reuni6n de paz para intentar
resolver la discusi6n. Tambi6n era permitido asistir y participar en la ceremonia
de paz a los miembros del ptiblico. La reuni6n podrfa ser Ilevada a cabo en una
atm6sfera de carnaval marcada por historias, canciones, bailes y proverbios. El
nombre de Dios y de los espiritus podrfan ser invocados durante la reuni6n. Un
toro serfa matado y su sangre rociada en el aire como una manera de atar los
disputantes y a los miembros de las dos comunidades del convenio. Como un
gesto de reconciliaci6n, el grupo entero comerfa la came juntos. La sociedad
entera podrfa ser parte del acuerdo y quien lo violara podrfa sufrir alguna
calamidad. En general, la negociaci6n, la reconciliaci6n o la fabricaci6n de paz
se vefan como el reestablecimiento de la relaci6n entre la gente, Dios y los
espiritus, los cuales se vefan como testigos y participantes activos. Los
acuerdos se establecfan solemnemente por la toma de juramentos y la
43. DUBA, ET. AL., supra nota 31.
44. Id.
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participaci6n en los rituales que se consideraban obligatorios y sagrados. El
castigo, la restituci6n y la reconciliaci6n se basaban en las normas y los valores
de la sociedad. Asi, el 6nfasis se colocaba sobre la reparaci6n de relaciones
dafiadas, mis bien que la venganza.45
Sin embargo, las sociedades pastorales actualmente se estan transformando
debido a la influencia occidental y cristiana.4 Asf los poderes de los mayores
y de los expertos rituales han disminufdo mientras que la juventud-guerrera y
la elite educada adquieren mds prominencia en la sociedad. Tradicionalmente,
antes de cualquier expedici6n de asalto, los mayores o los dirigentes espirituales
tuvieron que bendecir a los asaltantes. Hoy dia, sin embargo, tales bendiciones
son raras ya que los mismos jefes militares de ganado tienden a organizar la
mayor parte de las incursiones sin consultar el mando tradicional politico. Sin
embargo, hay todavfa unos grupos de expertos rituales que bendicen a los
guerreros antes de las incursiones, para ganancias econ6micas. Por ejemplo, en
abril del afio 2001, el Presidente Moi de Kenia, como se relata, ha emitido una
advertencia a tales expertos rituales diciendoles que abandonen la prictica o
confrontar la detenci6n por la policfa.47 Es mi contenci6n que estos expertos
rituales probablemente no van a hacer caso a tales amenazas, pues, en realidad
el estado ya no tiene mds el control eficaz de Kenia del Norte. En este sentido
hay buenas razones para creer que las maneras indfgenas de resolver el conflicto
podria ayudar a resolver algunos de los conflictos en las fronteras.
IX. FACTORES POLITICOS
La polftica es un factor principal que contribuye a la inseguridad corriente
y a la violencia en las fronteras. La reacci6n del gobierno a su frustraci6n e
inhabilidad de controlar los actos de anarqufa ha sido principalmente enviar
fuerzas de seguridad, quienes mds a menudo no optan por acosar la poblaci6n
paisana, segoin se dice, la colaboraci6n con bandidos y ladrones de ganado en
vez del revestimiento al enemigo.48 Actos tan inhumanos tienden a hacer al
estado impopular y a la gente indispuesta de cooperar con las fuerzas de
45. Ver generalmente, JANNIE MALAN, CONFLICT RESOLUTION WISDOM FROM AFRICA [SABIDURIA
DESDE AFRICA DE LA RESOLUCION DEL CONFLICTO], ACCORD (1997); DAVID W. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT
MEDIATION ACROSS CULTURES: PATHWAYS AND PATTERNS [MEDIACION DEL CONFLICTO A TRAv]s DE LAS
CULTURAS: SENDEROS Y MODELOS] (1992).
46. DUBA, et. al., supra nora 31.
47. DAILY NATION, Abril 15, 2001, disponible en http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/
15042001/News/News72.html.
48. THE WEEKLY REVIEW, supra nota 3 y 16; ver tambin d Joshia Osamba, The Sociology of
Insecurity: Banditry and Cattle Rustling in NorthWestern Kenya [La Sociologia de la Inseguridad: El
Bandolerismo y el Robo de Ganado en Kenia Del Noroeste], ACCORD AFRICAN JOURNAL ON CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, Vol. 1, Ndmero 2, p. 1 (2000).
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seguridad. Por ejemplo, siempre que las fuerzas de seguridad fallan en sus
operaciones contra los bandidos, ellos a menudo expresan su c6lera sobre la
poblaci6n paisana. Ellos son aterrorizados tanto por el gobiemo como por los
bandidos. De ahf, la tendencia de los pueblos de coffer lejos y la fuga del
alcance de ambos. La pregunta que uno puede hacerse es LCuales son las
opciones dejadas a los pastoralistas?
Las comunidades pastorales se sienten privados del derecho al voto por el
sistema politico Keniano.49 Por ejemplo, los lfderes de las comunidades
pastorales a menudo expresan el sentimiento de exclusi6n del centro de poder
nacional y la marginalizaci6n en todos los aspectos de vida. Por ejemplo, el
gobiemo Keniano parece haber adoptado sistemas econ6micos y politicos que
tienden a perpetuar la marginalizaci6n de las comunidades pastorales. Este
hecho estd evidente en la distribuci6n de recursos econ6micos y politicos. El
gobiemo aparece reconocer la importancia de estas sociedades s6lo cuando esto
requiere su apoyo politico, como durante el tiempo de elecci6nes. Como tal, los
lideres pastorales a menudo usaban la pobreza y el subdesarrollo en sus dreas
como evidencia de la marginalizaci6n Estatal. ° Algunos lideres politicos locales
tienden a animar a su gente a seguir con la prdctica hist6rica y cultural del robo
de ganado. Estos politicos parecen temer que una denuncia de la prictica del
robo de ganado pueda ser polfticamente suicida. Tales lideres reclaman ser los
defensores de su gente cuando de hecho su objetivo es salvaguardar sus propios
intereses o prevenir la aparici6n de algoin desafio potencial a su autoridad. Es
importante notar que aunque estos lideres piden a su gente permanecer firmes
en su modo cultural de vivir, estos mismos lfderes envian sus nifios a colegios
locales y en el extranjero para la ensefianza superior." Esto tiende a crear una
forma de diferenciaci6n de clase en la sociedad en la que unas familias cultas
pastorales siguen poseyendo el poder politico a cargo de la mayoria pastoral-
campesina pobre.
Ademds, la elite local polftica inculca en su gente 'una mentalidad de sitio'
de manera que demandan que a no ser que ellos actiien con decisi6n para
defenderse ellos serfan borrados por sus enemigos tradicionales5 2 Por ejemplo,
los lideres Pokot han rechazado una solicitud por el Presidente de Kenia, Daniel
arap Moi que ellos rinden todas las armas ilegales al gobierno. Ellos declararon
que el rendimiento de sus armas harfa a su gente vulnerable a ataques por los
49. Id.
50. DAILY NATION, Febrero 21, 2000, disponible en http://www.nationaudio.com/News/
DailyNation/21022001/index.html; Mbaria, supra nota 22.
51. Babiker, supra nota 40.
52. Mbaria, supra nota 22; ver tambidn al DAILY NATION, Abril 22, 2001, disponible en
http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/22042001/News/News58.html.
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Karamonjong militarizados de Uganda. El Pokot asf vuelve a su historia para
apoyar las incursiones y otros actos de violencia contra comunidades
vecindarias. Por ejemplo, en marzo 2001, un hombre Ilamado Samuel Moroto
fu6 elegido como el nuevo Pokot Miembro de Parlamento para Kapenguria para
sustituir por uno de los presuntos Pokot Jefes Militares, y el Ministro anterior,
el difunto Francis Lotodo. Unos dfas despu6s de que 61 oficialmente tomo
juramento como el Miembro de Parlamento, Moroto dirigi6 una reuni6n grande
en su distrito electoral, y 61 declar6 que el Pokot iba a usar la violencia para
reclamar toda la tierra, que hist6ricamente les perteneci6.53 Algunas de esas
tierras han sido incorporadas a los distritos vecindarios de Turkana y Trans
Nzoia durante el perfodo colonial. Los comentarios de Moroto fueron vistos
como una declaraci6n simb6lica de 'guerra' contra los no-Pokot.
El Pokot asf usa la historia para justificar sus acciones y acentuar la
cohesi6n territorial y comunal. Ellos se sienten justificados en el desahucio del
no-Pokot quien ha asumido su tierra hereditaria. Como notan Carter y Byrne:
"Las elites polfticas a menudo intentan inculcar el sentido del destino comtin y
la solidaridad del grupo acentuando las semejanzas del en-grupo y las
diferencias del ex-grupo, representando a los miembros del grupo como
permutable y personalizando el conflicto inter-grupo".54 Carter y Byrne al
mismo tiempo indican que los grupos tienden a enfocar su cuento para que ellos
quepan en su situaci6n, percepci6n, y visi6n del mundo corriente
Hay evidencia clara de prejuicio y discriminaci6n contra los pastoralistas
en Kenia. Por ejemplo, ellos a menudo son referidos como 'primitivos',
'incultos', y una gente que sufre de una mentalidad de 'acomplejado de
ganado'. 56Adema's, pocos miembros de las comunidades pastorales, empleados
con salario, realizan mas que nada las tareas de sirvientes como guardias de
seguridad en la noche y colectores de basura en las ciudades. Esto estd previsto
al hecho que la educaci6n occidental ain no es arraigada entre estas
comunidades pastorales.57
53. MP Warns Over Land in Pokot, DAILY NATION, Marzo 23, del ano 2001, disponible en
http://www.nationaudio.con/News/DailyNation/25032001/News/News26.html; DAILY NATION, supra nota
52.
54. Carter & Byrne, supra nota 26.
55. Id. en 45.
56. Mbaria, supra nota 22; Western, supra nota 29.
57. Eric Both, Education, Training and Household Labour among the Rendile Palstoralists of
Northern Kenya [La Educacidn, Entrenamiento y el Trabajo De Casa entre los Pastoralistas Rendile de Kenia
del Norte], INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES BULLETIN [EL BOLErfN DEL INSTITUTO DEL ESTUDIO DEL
DESARROLLO], ]a Universidad de Nairobi, Vol.22, No.4, p. 136 (1991); ver tambign a MICHAEL A. LITTLE,
THE ILLUSIVE GRANARY: HERDER, FARMER AND STATE IN NORTHERN KENYA [EL GRANERO ILUSORIO: EL
PASTOR, EL GRANJERO Y EL ESTADO EN KENIA DEL NORTE] (1992).
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En realidad, los funcionarios del estado a menudo amenazan a los jefes
locales con consecuencias horribles por faltar de identificar a los bandidos y los
ladrones de ganado quienes pueden estar funcionando en sus localidades. Por
ejemplo, estos funcionarios a menudo aplican 'el castigo colectivo' sobre los
clanes sospechados, cuyos miembros podrfan participar en incursi6n de ganado
contra comunidades vecindarias. Tales actos tienden a enajenar a la gente mis
lejos del gobiemo, quienes ellos ven como una fuerza exterior que interfiere con
su modo de vivir. Aparentemente, tal castigo y coacci6n a menudo abren 'una
caja de Pandora' y a menudo exacerban el conflicto. Como Juan Burton postula
"si las relaciones sociales cooperativas y no-violentas son buscadas por las
sociedades, las normas sociales y las instituciones deben ser adaptadas a las
1p8aspiraciones humanas y no a lo contrario".
El gobiemo ha tendido que condenar el robo de ganado entre las
comunidades pastorales basado en gran parte en la falsa asunci6n que tales
incursiones son un factor primitivo que se relaciona con la vida n6mada.59 Asf,
el Estado no ve las incursiones como un resultado en parte debido a la intrusi6n
econ6mica moderna que afecta el ajuste sociocultural de los pastoralistas. En
gran parte, el cambio de las relaciones sociales y econ6micas ha compuesto las
actividades del robo de ganado. 6° Parte de la raz6n es que la comercializaci6n
y la intemacionalizaci6n del robo de ganado parecen unidas al mercado global
extendido de la ganaderfa, los productos de ganaderfa, y la proliferaci6n de
armas, todos durante los afilos.
Claramente, la pobreza, el hambre y la destituci6n se han hecho parte de
la ejecuci6n agresiva y predadora de los objetivos politicos. En tal gui6n, el
estado se hace un irritante inconsecuente.61 Corrientemente, la politica de las
comunidades pastorales parecen ser dominadas por eljefe-militarismo. El estado
de inseguridad, la anarquia en las fronteras y el derrumbamiento de las
estructuras sociales y econ6micas han creado una categorfa de pastores-
campesinos pobres quienes para sobrevivir a menudo recurren a los actos de
robo de ganado y bandolerismo.62
58. JOHN W. BURTON, VIOLENCE EXPLAINED: THE SOURCES OFCONLICr, VIOLENCE ANDCRIMEAND
THEIR PREVENTION [LA VIOLENCIA EXPLICADA: LAS FUENTES DEL CONFLICTO, LA VIOLENCIA Y EL CRIMEN
Y Su PREVENC1ON], p. 26 (1997).
59. Ocan, supra nota 19, p. 12.
60. Babiker, supra nota 40, p. 8.
61. Salih, supra nota 5.
62. Osamba, supra nora 48.
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X. FACTORES DEMOGRAFICOS
En las dos d6cadas pasadas, hubo alguna mejoraci6n significativa de
servicios m6dicos, sobre todo por los misioneros cristianos y las NGOs en las
fronteras.63 Tales servicios han conducido a una subida estable de la poblaci6n
de la gente pastoral. Ademds, los nimeros de su ganaderfa han aumentado.
Estos factores crean presiones demogrdficas que causan mds conflicto sobre el
pasto de tierras y el agua. Al mismo tiempo, muchas personas de las
comunidades no pastorales han adquirido tierra en las Areas pastorales. Tal
p6rdida de tierra inevitablemente reduce la capacidad de los pastoralistas para
mantener las manadas grandes de ganaderfa. Los terratenientes nuevos han
adquirido hechos de tftulo (certificados) que les dan derechos legales sobre tal
tierra. Sin embargo, los grupos pastorales tradicionalmente no reconocen la
propiedad de tierra individual ya que su modo de producci6n requiere el
territorio expansivo y el dominio comunal de los pastos de tierra y otros
recursos.64 Asf, las tentativas de las sociedades pastorales para ignorar el
dominio individual de la tierra y de las fronteras tienden a exacerbar relaciones
tensas entre las comunidades pastorales y las agrfcolas. Consecuentemente, hay
a menudo un choque de culturas entre los sistemas occidentales y los legales
tradicionales de hacienda.
Debido a la inseguridad en las fronteras, los grupos pastorales han
abandonado mis del cuarenta por ciento de sus tierras de pasto y han
comprimido entre reas mis pequefias.65 Este estado de asuntos afecta la
economfa pastoral, asf contribuyendo a la degradaci6n de la tierra, que a su
turno exacerba el conflicto.
XI. LA POSIBLE LINTERVENCION DEL TERCERO EN EL CONFLICTO
La violencia y la inseguridad que ha sido creada por el bandolerismo y las
actividades del robo de ganado en Kenia del Norte se pueden tratar a niveles
diferentes de la intervenci6n. Aparece que durante un largo rato el estado
Keniano ha tenido que adoptar ufi acercamiento de arriba-hacia abajo o basado
en federal tratar la cuesti6n. Como ya mencionado, tal m6todo ha fallado
miserablemente. Consecuentemente, sugerimos que hay una necesidad de que
los funcionarios del estado, los pastoralistas, y otros partidos afectados debfan
63. Gufa Oba & Walter J. Lusigi, An Overview of Droughts Strategies and Land Use in Arican
Pastoral Systems [Una Descripci6n de las Estrategias de las Sequias y el Empleo de la Tierra en los Sistemas
Africanos Pastorales] (1998) (investigaci6n inedita, Kenya Aridlands Research Station).
64. DUBA, et. al., supra nota 31.
65. Oba & Lusigi, supra nota 63.
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venir juntos y dirigirse al problema de un punto de vista en comiin.' Tal
proceso de intervenci6n implicarfa el empleo de un acercamierito de "naiz" o de
abajo hacia arriba, un acercamiento que a menudo es mencionado como
'pacificaci6n por debajo'. Al mismo tiempo el conflicto podrfa serse dirigido
por un acercamiento basado en intereses. 6 Esto es un acercamiento que podrfa
ayudar a los intervinientes asistir a los partidos a identificar sus preocupaciones
y necesidades, y por lo tanto posiblemente estar en una mejor posici6n para
desarrollar intereses comunes sobre el cual construir algfin acuerdo general. En
otras palabras, una transformaci6n de la actitud y la visi6n del mundo de los
pueblos es vital en cualquier intervenci6n de conflicto en las fronteras.
Por ejemplo, el sistema pastoral debe ser reconocido como un componente
importante de la econornfa Keniana mis bien que una prictica arcaica que tiene
que ser desechada. En este sentido, el estado Keniano y los pastoralistas deben
comenzar a reconocer que cada uno tiene el derecho de existir. Al parecer,
aparece que los pastoralistas atin no participan totalmente en la toma de
decisiones afectando sus vidas sociales y su desarrollo econ6mico. Asf es
correcto decir que muchas intervenciones de desarrollo pasadas en las ireas
pastorales se han hecho un cosechero debido a la neutralidad de los pastoralistas
en sus planificaci6nes e implementaci6n. 8 Los intervinientes de la resoluci6n
de conflicto, por lo tanto, deben intentar dirigirse a las causas subyacentes del
conflicto ms bien que simplemente tratar los sfntomas. De modo bastante
interesante, mds a menudo que no son 'los forasteros' quienes deciden lo que
ellos perciben como los problemas que afligen los pastoralistas y sugieren sus
resoluciones sin implicar los mismos habitantes del lugar. En otras palabras, la
politica parece ser que los pastoralistas deben ser 'visto y no ser enterado'. En
aquel respeto, estos intervinientes tienden a hechar la culpa a los pastoralistas
o por 'el abastecimiento excesivo y el sobre pasto' mis bien que dirigirse a las
causas subyacentes de sus problemas. 69
66. Ver generalmente, WILLIAM L. URY, ET. AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING
SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT [CONSIGUIENDO QUE SE RESULVAN LAS DISCUSIONES: DIsERANDO
SISTEMAS PARA REDUCIR LOS GAsTos DEL CONFLICTO] (1993).
67. Ver generalmente, JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION
IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES [CONSTRUYENDO LA PAZ: LA RECONCILIACION SOSTENIBLE EN LAS SOCIEDADES
DIVIDIDAS] (1995); ver tambin a DUBA, et. al., supra nota 31.
68. Ver generalmente, GUDRUN DAHL, SUFFERRING GRASS: SUBSISTENCE AND SOCIETY OF WASO
BORANA [LA HIERBA SUFRIENDO: LA SUBSISTENCIA Y LA SOCIEDAD DE WASO BORANA] (1979).
69. John Helland, Some Aspects of and Implementaion of the Development of the Grazing Blocks
in North Eastern Province [Algdinos Aspectos y la Puesta en Prdctica del Desarrollo de los Bloques de Pasto
en la Provincia del Norte-Oriental] (1980) (investigaci6n inddita, Nairobi International Livestock Centre for
Africa [El Centro de Ganaderia Internacional de Nairobi para Africa]).
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Un punto importante para recordar es que muchos eruditos y practicantes
de la resoluci6n de conflicto est6.n de acuerdo que es casi imposible transformar
una sociedad a no ser que las necesidades subyacentes de los partidos
intrincados en el conflicto sean suficientemente identificadas, reconocidas, y
tomadas en cuenta.7° Asi, cualquieras soluciones recomendadas por los
intervinientes deberfan tomar el conocimiento del hecho que las comunidades
pastorales han logrado sobrevivir en su ambiente ispero durante miles de afios.
De ahi, serfa irrazonable esperar que ellos cambiaran fundamentalmente su
modo de vivir asf a un futuro inprobado. Asf el cambio debe ser gradual y no
deberfa ser impuesto por encima. Debido a las sospechas y las experiencias
negativas pasadas, tanto el Gobierno como los pastoralistas estdn a menudo
embarcados en su capullo, inseguros de las intenciones verdaderas del otro."
jTendrd el pastoralismo un futuro en Kenia del Norte? iSobreviviri el
modo de producci6n pastoral contra los varios ataques recorridos contra 61?
Ambos Aronson y Dyson-Hudsons afirman que el pastoralismo confronta un
futuro incierto.71 De otra parte, Mustafa Babiker73 indica que los pastoralistas
no estan estdticos y en todas partes de su historia ellos se han adaptado a las
condiciones nuevas socioecon6micas y ffsicas cuando era necesario. Al mismo
tiempo, Babiker no esta divertido por las reclamaciones del derrumbamiento
inminente del pastoralismo. Ademds, Babiker afirma que el foco de los estudios
de los sistemas pastorales deberfa cambiarse del modelo de 'las crisis de
supervivencia' a favor del marco de 'la supervivencia en las crisis'. Ademis,
Babiker opina que los forasteros bajo la capa de 'expertos' tienden a ofrecer
soluciones a los problemas que ellos nunca han experimentados. Algunas de sus
recomendaciones son incompletas y no pueden resistir el paso del tiempo. Estos
expertos en la resoluci6n de conflicto y del desarrollo raras veces buscan las
70. Ver a BURTON, supra nota 58; LEDERACH, supra nota 67; URY, et. al., supra nota 66; ROTHMAN
supra nota 30.
71. Maurice Lokong, Dialogue Education-A Tool for the Equitable Incorporation of Nomadic
Pastoral Communities in National Development with Special Reference to the Turkana of North West Kenya
[Educaci6n Didlogica-Un Instrumento para la Incorporaci6n Equitativa de las Comunidades N6madas
Pastorales en el Desarrollo Nacional con Referencia Especial a los Turkana de Kenia Norte Oestel, , p.7
(1987) (tesis de diploma inddita, Universidad de Readings); ver tambidn a Both, supra nota 57.
72. David R. Aronson, Must Nomads Settle? Some Notes Toward Policy on the Future of
Pastoralism [6Debian Colocarse los N6madas? Algunos Apuntes Hacia la Politica sobre el Futuro del
Pastoralismo] en WHEN NOMADS SETTLE: PROCESSES OF SEDENTARIZATION AS ADAPTATION AND RESPONSE
[CUANDO LOS N6MADAS SE COLOCAN: Los PROCESOS DE SEDENTARIZACION COMO ADAPTACION Y
RESPUESTA], p. 173 (Philip C. Salzman, ed., 1980); ver tambidn a Neville Dyson-Hudson & Rada Dyson-
Hudson, The Structure of East African Herds and the Future of the East Arican Herder [La Estructura de las
Manadas de Africa del Este y el Futuro del Pastor Africano del Este], DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Vol. 13,
1985, p. 213.
73. Babiker, supra nota 40, p. 1.
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opiniones de los habitantes del lugar cuando deciden los proyectos de desarrollo
apuntados a mejorar sus condiciones.
Es importante notar que la mayor parte de las fronteras Africanas son
porosas e impugnadas.74 Los bandidos y los ladrones de ganado asf lo
encuentran fdcil de oscilar entre los estados vecinos, cruzando fronteras
internacionales a voluntad.75 El hecho que los parses vecinos han desarrollado
diferentes estrat~gias del manejo de conflicto y regulaciones a menudo les hace
diffcil de manejar con eficacia los conflictos de las frontera enfadados. Por
ejemplo, en Uganda los grupos pastorales son a menudo permitidos por el
estado poseer armas de fuego afin en Kenia el gobiemo ha prohibido la posesi6n
de armas por los pastoralistas.76
Nuestro argumento es que para que la coexistencia pacffica sa alcanzada,
las comunidades pastorales deben aceptar la realidad que cada uno es parte de
la entidad mis amplia geopolftica y econ6mica. Sugerimos que para la paz
duradera en las fronteras, los mdtodos indfgenas de la resoluci6n del conflicto
y los valores culturales sean incorporados en los mecanismos modernos de la
resoluci6n de conflicto. Esto, con esperanza, enormemente podrfa contribuir a
la restauraci6n de la paz, la seguridad, la estabilidad y las relaciones cordiales
entre las comunidades pastorales en las fronteras. Ambos Aronson y David
Western, entre otros eruditos del pastoralismo, han conmovedoramente
discutido que la vida social en las dreas pastorales no se ha mejorado. 7 Por
ejemplo, los pastoralistas todavia conffan en la naturaleza para su supervivencia.
Segtin John Burton, para cualquier intervenci6n eficaz de la resoluci6n de
conflicto, los intervinientes de tercero deben evitar las opiniones parciales y
preconcebidas sobre la situaci6n local.78 Asf, para dirigir un conflicto
suficientemente hay la necesidad de algtin cambio de las instituciones y las
estructuras de la sociedad. Asf, afirmnamos que para prevenir o reducir el
conflicto del inter-grupo en las fronteras es necesario dirigirse a las necesidades
bdsicas humanas de la gente, como la seguridad, el reconocimiento, la identidad,
el amor propio y la aceptaci6n. La violencia estructural 9 esti evidente en la
74. BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES [DISCUSIONES FRONTERIZAS Y TERRITORIALES] (Andrew
J. Day, ed., 1987).
75. Mwagiru, supra nota 2.
76. SUNDAY NATION, Abril 22, del ano 2000, p. 3.
77. Aronson, supra nota 72; Western, supra nota 29.
78. Ver generalmente, JOHN W. BURTON, RESOLVING DEEP-ROOTED CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK
[RESOLVIENDO EL CONFLIcTO ARRAIGADO: UN MANUAL] (1987); ver tambign a CONFLICT: HUMAN NEEDS
THEORY [CONFLICTO: LA TEORfA DE NECESIDADES HUMANAS] (John W. Burton, ed., 1990).
79. JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND
CIVILIZATION [LA PAZ POR MEDIOS PACiFICOS: LA PAZ Y EL CONFLICTO, EL DESARROLLO Y LA
CIVILIZACION] (1996); Burton, supra nota 86, p. 32.
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manera en que el estado Keniano ha manej ado el problema de la gente pastoral
desde los tiempos coloniales. La polftica del gobierno ha impactado
negativamente a la producci6n econ6mica pastoral. Esto deberfa ser notado de
una perspectiva psicol6gica, los sentimientos de enajenaci6n podrfan ser
peligrosos, tanto al individuo como al grupo.
Nuestra contenci6n es que para que los conflictos en las fronteras sean
reducidos, es necesario identificar las causas de los origenes subyacentes del
problema en vez de culpar a los partidos implicados o simplemente dirigiendose
a los sfntomas del conflicto. Esto le conviene a los intervinientes de la
resoluci6n de conflicto de identificar y analizar la interacci6n de los varios
factores y sus dindmicas intemas y externas cuando se dirigen a la cuesti6n de
la violencia y la inseguridad en las fronteras. Byrne y Carter nos sefialan la
direcci6n correcta.
De modo bastante interesante, Von Lipsey ha desarrollado un modelo de
la resoluci6n de conflicto que 61 llama 'el ciclo de la intervenci6n' .80 Este
marco incorpora 'la relaci6n entre la prevenci6n, la mitigaci6n y la resoluci6n'.
Las medidas de resoluci6n de conflicto duraderas a menudo requieren un
cambio del status quo y un compromiso fuerte de parte de los partidos
implicados para jugar segtin 'las reglas del juego', mds bien que la coacci6n o
el consentimiento de parte de uno de los partidos. En otras palabras, los
componentes bisicos de la paz deben ser puestos sobre una tierra firme. Jay
Rothman, Edward Azar, y Louis Kriesberg sostienen opiniones similares. 81 Por
ejemplo, segiin Rothman, algunos conflictos profundamente arraigados a
menudo no pueden ser resueltos porque los conflictos son "maldiagnosticados
y manejados mal". 82 Rothman ha propuesto el marco ARIA (el Antagonismo,
la Resonancia, la Invenci6n, y la Acci6n) del manejo del conflicto que puede
ayudar a los partidos del conflicto moverse del cambio adversarial al
cooperativo. Rothman acenttia la importancia del diflogo positivo entre los
partidos para crear un ambiente conducente a la soluci6n de los problema y el
entendimiento. Como Azar correctamente indica, los conflictos basados en la
identidad son atados para repetirse a no ser que las causas subyacentes hayan
sido suficientemente identificadas y tratadas a la satisfacci6n de todos los
partidos.83
80. VON LIPSEY, supra nota 1, p. 6.
81. Ver a ROTHiMAN, supra nota 30; Edward Azar, Protracted Social Conflict: Ten Propositions [El
Conflicto Social Prolongado: Diez Propociciones] en INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE [LA RESOLUCION DEL CONFLICTO INTERNACIONAL: TEORIA Y PRACTICA] (John W .Burton &
Edward Azar, eds., 1996); KRIESBERG, LOUIS KRIESBERG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS: FROM ESCALATION TO
RESOLUTION [Los CONFLICTOS CONSTRUCTIVOS: DESDE LA ESCALADA HASTA LA RESOLUCI6N] (1998).
82. ROTHMAN, supra nota 30, p. 6.
83. Azar, supra nota 81.
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Este papel por lo tanto sugiere que esta conexi6n entre las necesidades
humanas y el conflicto deberia ser claramente comprendida por los lfderes
polfticos locales, la administraci6n provincial y el estado Keniano. En aquel
respeto, los fabricantes de la polftica del gobierno Keniano deben tomar el
conocimiento de estos hechos para identificar como la amenaza ambientalmente
(ecol6gicamente) relacionada a la paz puede ser contenida, o resuelta. En el
hecho real, el pastoralismo simplemente no puede ser despedido como una
prdctica pasada de moda. Como Doonrboss correctamente exprime, los
pastoralistas, "...han demostrado perspicacia econ6mica y social en la
explotaci6n de sus patrias dridas. Aquellas tierras son demasiadas ridas para
nada mas que un pastoralismo n6mado, o a lo mds, transhumante. La finica otra
opci6n es emigrar y dejar el arbusto a la caza". 4
Es necesario conceder a los pastoralistas la oportunidad de determinar su
futuro. En aquel respeto afirmamos que los 'forasteros' no deberfan imponer
decisiones y polftica importantes que afectan el modo pastoral de existencia sin
su participaci6n activa desde las etapas iniciales hasta el proceso de puesta en
prdctica. 85 Esto es el hecho innegable que en gran parte han sido principalmente
las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales y los misioneros de iglesia que han
intentado aliviar la situaci6n grave de las comunidades pastorales con la
provisi6n de escuelas, perforaciones, centros m6dicos y otras instalaciones.86
Como ya declarado, el gobierno Keniano por lo tanto deberfa cambiar la
tendencia de no hacer caso al descuido del bienestar de los pastoralistas en
t6rminos del desarrollo y la distribuci6n de recursos polfticos y econ6micos.
Probablemente, el Gobierno deberia adoptar alguna acci6n afirmativa para hacer
a los pastoralistas subir en t6rminos de la provisi6n de los servicios de
desarrollo, sociales, educativos, y econ6micos patrocinados por el gobierno.
En general, la intervenci6n de tercero deberfa ayudar a los partidos
disputativos adoptar un acercamiento de 'dar y tomar' al tratar a su conflicto.
El empleo de medidas coactivas para modificar un comportamiento o resolver
el conflicto puede ser contraproductivo. Esto esti evidente en el fracaso del
gobierno en las campafias de despastoralizaci6n en las fronteras. En el hecho,
los pastoralistas consideran las medidas estatales como la provisi6n de alivio de
alimentos durante sequfas como una medida a corto plazo substitutiva temporal
84. Fukui & Markakis, supra nota 6, p. 87.
85. Western, supra nota 29; Osamba, supra nota 48.
86. Gufu Oba, Perception of Environment among Kenyan Pastoralists: Implications for
Developement [La Percepci6n del Ambiente entre los Pastoralistas Kenianos: Las Implicaciones para el
Desarrollo], p. 33, NOMADIC PEOPLES, No. 19, 1985.
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mientras ellos esperan ocasiones de volver al pastoralismo, o sea por incursiones
sobre el ganado o sea otros mftodos de reconstruir su reserva.87
La dicotomfa "nosotros-ellos" es un futuro comtin en la interacci6n
humana.88 Asf, las generalizaciones, las percepciones y la proyecci6n de
atributos negativos sobre los otros siempre son manifestadas en los conflictos.
Sin embargo, el empleo de los t6rminos negativos y peyorativo como 'malo',
'primitivo', 'asesinos insensibles', 'bandidos' deberfan ser evitados por los
partidos contrarios mientras ellos intentan resolver el problema de la violencia
y la inseguridad en las fronteras. Tales t~rminos tienden a crear un ambiente de
desconfianza, venganza y 'el echar el muerto'.
XII. CONCLUSIONES
El capftulo ha intentado analizar la economfa polftica de violencia y la
inseguridad en las fronteras de Kenia del Norte usando el modelo del cubismo
social. Esto ha indicado que los fen6menos del bandolerismo y el robo de
ganado enormemente han contribufdo a la aparici6n de un ambiente de violencia
e inseguridad en esta regi6n. El robo de ganado aparece haber sufrido una
transformaci6n fundamental de una prdctica cultural a una empresa comercial
internacional aparentemente debajo del control de Jefes Militares de ganado. En
general, el cambio del empleo de la tierra, las presiones demogrificas, las
condiciones polfticas y econ6micas han contribufdo al aumento corriente del
conflicto y la violencia en las fronteras. La institucionalizaci6n de la violencia
y la inseguridad resultante ha contribufdo a los problemas sociales, polfticos y
econ6micos extendidos entre los pastoralistas.
El gobiemo parece no haber adoptado la polftica y los mecanismos
necesarios que podrfan ayudar a prevenir y dirigirse a las causas subyacentes de
la inseguridad y la violencia en la regi6n. Consecuentemente, la situaci6n se ha
hecho insuperable. La flojedad del gobierno ha, por lo tanto, de algtin modo
contribufdo a la aparici6n de jefes militares, quienes han surgido como los
maestros incontestados de la regi6n.
Para hacer cualquier intervenci6n significativa en el conflicto, hay una
necesidad de tranquilizar a los pastoralistas que su modo hist6rico de vivir serd
reconocido. En aquella conexi6n, serfa apropiado reforzar las capacidades
institucionales pastorales con la referencia especffica a las normas, las reglas y
las regulaciones tradicionales de la resoluci6n de conflicto. En general, la
87. Richard Hogg, Pastoralism and Improverishment: The Case of the Isiolo Boran o Northern
Kenya [El Pastoralismo y el Empobrecimiento: El Caso del Isiolo Boran de Kenia del Norte], DISASTERS,
Vol.4, No.3, 1980, p. 299.
88. VAMIK VOLKAN, BLOODLINES: FROM ETHNIC PRIDETO ETHNIC TERRORISM [LINEAS DE SANGRE:
DESDE EL ORGULLO ETNICO HASTA AL TERRORISMO tTNICO] (1997).
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intervenci6n de tercero en el conflicto debe tomar nota de los intereses, las
necesidades y las aspiraciones subyacentes de la poblaci6n local al desarrollar
un marco de resoluci6n de conflicto para la regi6n. El estado, por lo tanto, debe
intentar cultivar relaciones buenas que trabajan entre las fuerzas de seguridad
y los habitantes del lugar para la ventaja mutua del estado y los habitantes
locales. El estudio concluye que un esfuerzo concertado por todos los tenedores
de apuestas es giratorio en cualquiera resoluci6n significativa del conflicto en
Kenia del norte.
XIII. RECONOCIMIENTOS
Una versi6n mds temprana de este capftulo ha sido publicada en el
ACCORD AFRICAN JOURNAL ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION (EL
DIARIO DEL ACUERDO AFRICANO SOBRE LA RESOLUCION DE
CONFLICTO), Volumen 1, Ntimero 2,2000. Deseo expresar mi gratitud a Sean
Byrne de la Universidad Nova Southeastern por los comentarios y sugerencias
valorosos que 61 hizo sobre los esbozos mis tempranos de mi artfculo.
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I. COMPLEJIDAD COMO UN AMORTIGUADOR: EL CUBO SOCIAL BELGA
En toda su historia, B61gica ha sido una entidad compleja politicamente y
socialmente. Al Rey de los Belgas en un informe oficial le dijeron "no hay
Belgas". El pals ha cambiado rdpidamente de una estructura unitaria a una
estructura federal, con diferentes racionamientos y responsabilidades para sus
regiones y comunidades. Los cambios demogrdficos son algo dificiles de trazar
en un mapa debido a las restricciones que se presentan al hacer las preguntas
durante los censos. La combinaci6n de los mdltiples niveles de las instituciones
polfticas, el conflicto de grupo, la disparidad econ6mica, el simbolismo politico,
y los factores psicol6gicos demuestran la utilidad del uso del Cubismo Social
para estudiar este conflicto que es relativamente pacffico. l Este documento
discute que mucha de la complejidad de las instituciones polfticas de B61gica es
* Profesor Ayudante de ]a Ciencia Polftica, El departarnento de la Ciencia Polftica, St.
Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, New York.
** Este articulo fue traducido por Lucia Santos
I. Sehn Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, 3(2) J. PEACE AND CONFLICT STUD. 52, 52-71 (1996). NEAL CARTER & SEAN
BYRNE, A View From Northern Ireland and Quebec, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN
ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICT (S. Byrne & C. Irvin eds. 2000).
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el resultado de los atentados a mitigar el conflicto y a posponer unos
desacuerdos significativos.
Un entendimiento de los conflictos de identidad no se completa sin el
exdmen de la interacci6n estrat6gica y de las varias facetas del conflicto. Por
consiguiente, este capitulo presenta una breve discusi6n de los modelos de la
interacci6n estrat6gica, acentuando el modelo de cambio estructural. Mientras
este modelo es titil para sefialar la relaci6n entre estructuras y acciones, este es
muy general. Por eso combino este modelo con el Cubismo Social para mostrar
la interacci6n y la interrelaci6n de las diferentes facetas del Cubo Social. En el
caso de B61gica se ilustra claramente la utilidad de este estudio para examinar
el conflicto que varia continuamente.
I. INTERACCI6N ESTRATtGICA
Los modelos de las acci6nes estrat6gicas usadas para explicar las
coacciones a las que se enfrentan los lfderes proporciona una invaluable
comprensi6n a la naturaleza dindmica de la acci6n politica. Estos presentan
sucintamente la interacci6n del contexto, los objetivos, las acciones y los
resultados en situaciones complejas. Dibujando los estudios dejuegos fijos y los
procesos del conflicto, discuto que las acciones de los lideres politicos son
mej or entendidas dentro de un marco que es sensible a las multiples coacciones
a las que ellos se enfrentan.
Tsebelis ha usado juegos fijos para modelar las decisiones complejas
hechas por lideres politicos. tl discuti6 que los politicos tienen relaciones con
otros lideres y con sus electores, y que las acciones con un grupo afectardn la
relaci6n con el otro.2 Asimismo Panebianco indic6 que lideres politicos se
implican simultfneamente en al menos dos tipos de interacciones, que pueden
ser caracterizadas como juegos. En el primer juego, las relaciones 'verticales',
los lideres buscan el apoyo de sus electores intentando representar y realzar los
intereses de ellos, y al mismo tiempo tambi6n ayudando para formar esos
intereses. En el segundo juego, las relaciones 'horizontales', los lideres
compiten entre ellos por el poder.3 Como las relaciones son 'fijas', el
movimiento de un lider en un juego afecta su posici6n en el otro juego de
relaciones. Los lfderes que negocean situaciones entre uno de los grupos
(horizontales) se enfrentan a un limite impuesto por las obligaciones que les
deben a las estructuras del poder verticales (las de lider-elector). 4 En otras
palabras, los lfderes deben tener confianza que sus decisiones seran aceptadas
por todos. Ellos pueden usar este limite a su ventaja durante negociaciones. En
2. GEORGE TSEBELIS, NESTED GAMES: RATIONAL CHOICE IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1990).
3. ANGELO PANEBIANCO, POLITICAL PARTIES: ORGANIZATION AND POWER (M. Silver trans. 1988).
4. Id; Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
(3) INT'L ORG. 427, 427-460; TSEBELIS, supra nota 2.
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general, el apoyo fuerte por un politico en el juego vertical aumenta su poder de
influir en otros lfderes en el juego horizontal.
La figura ntimero uno representa dos tipos de los juegos que se combinan
en negociaciones politicas y se invocan para explicar la politica en B61gica. En
la politica consocial, los lideres (representados en la figura por mimerales)
acttian reciprocamente con sus electores (que se identifican en la figura con el
subndice X) y con otros lideres. Consocialisaci6n implica el colocar a los
lideres dentro de diferentes niveles separados y aislados de la sociedad.5
Originalmente, concebido como el medio para regular el conflicto ideol6gico,
esta teorfa ha sido ampliada para explicar las hendiduras tnicas y culturales.'
El juego de coalici6n, implica un modelo mis complejo en la interacci6n de los
lideres, ya que este implica la necesidad de la competencia entre ellos
(representado por los nimeros) y a la vez tienen que actuar recfprocamente para
resolver sus diferencias dentro de la coalici6n (representada por los nimeros
dentro del mismo elipse) para asi enfrentarse contra otra coalici6n. Esto
requiere que se consideren las interacciones dentro de y entre las diferentes
coaliciones. Las coaliciones son esenciales a la politica Belga.7 La combinaci6n
de los dos modelos proporciona una representaci6n mds exacta de las relaciones
que afectan las decisiones de los politicos, como es indicado en el diagrama
"combinado". Esto muestra que hay tres juegos: las relaciones entre electores'
y lfderes; las relaciones de lideres dentro de una coalici6n; y las relaciones entre
los lfderes de una coalici6n con los lideres de diferentes coaliciones. Como estos
juegos son fijos, cada juego es afectado por el movimiento dentro de cada una
de las otras relaciones. Los lideres tambi6n compiten por los electores y se
enfrentan a desafios dentro de sus partidos, pero esta figura nos ensefia estas
interacciones para el modelo. Las interacciones pueden ser vistas como un
juego interactivo, los lideres persiguen las estrat6gias que refuerzan su posici6n
total.8 Rudolph pinta un cuadro donde el debate constitucional Belga se
ejemplifica en la manera en la que estos juegos actfian recfprocamente: "el
movimiento (horizontal) de cada partido, en el proceso para reformar la
5. AREND LLJPHART, The Power-Sharing Approach, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN
MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES (J.V. Montville, ed. 1991).
6. Sue Halpern, The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy, 9 W. EUR. POL. 181, 181-
197 (1996).
7. Las coaliciones en Bdlgica se complican por los efectos del lenguaje y de la ideologfa. Las
ideol6gicas "familias espirituales" oficialmente son separadas entre partidos de habla francesa y los de habla
Holandes. Sin embargo, en muchas cuestiones constitucionales, los partidos negocean dentro de su comunidad
para asi determinar una estrategia comin con la cual pueden enfrentarse a sus compatriotas del otro lado de
la frontera lingiifstica. Jacques Brassinne, Le Dialgue de Communautde Communautd: Avril-juillet 1992 [The
Dialog of Communication and Communication: April-July 1992], in COURRIER HEBDOMODAIRE DU CRISP
[CRISP Bulletin] (Centre de Recherch et d'Information Socio-Politiques, Brussels 1992).
8. JON ELsTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979).
2002] Carter 1251
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1249
constituci6n tiende a incluir un cdlculo individual en el cual las ventajas 6 la
oposici6n de los electores (vertical) se refleja."9 Muchas variaciones se pueden
encontrar sobre este tema, ya que las relaciones horizontales y las verticales
actfian recfprocamente y cada acci6n obliga la estrat6gia subsecuente. Rudolph
tambi6n not6 que las estrategias que producen el 6xito al principio en la
evoluci6n de un partido pueden ser que necesiten cambiarse para afrontar los
nuevos desaffos a la cohesi6n producida por este 6xito.
El tamafho y la cohesi6n de los movimientos son centrales a los calculos de
los lideres, pues estos movimientos afectan el poder que ellos tienen para
imponer su voluntad 6 alcanzar el ajuste aceptable con los otros. l° Aunque
parece que una fraccionalizaci6n interna afecta, en realidad es posible que la
posici6n horizontal negociadora de un lfder pueda mejorar; tambi6n es posible
que el uso de la relaci6n del lider con sus electores s6a usada para exigir favores
en cuestiones importantes. Los lderes pueden declarar que los desaffos internos
de su posici6n reducen el espacio para la maniobra y el compromiso y a la
misma vez estos aumentan la necesidad de producir un acuerdo favorable para
los electores. Sin embargo, para que la negociaci6n tenga 6xito los lderes
tambi6n tienen que convencer a otros lfderes que ellos razonablemente pueden
llegar a un accuerdo con sus electores. "
Burton not6 los peligros de estas relaciones cuando estudi6 las ideas
tradicionales sobre el conflicto. 12 El conflicto generalmente es considerado
como una competencia por bienes materiales en vez de la competencia por
bienes sociales, que no son escasos, bienes tales como la identidad, el
reconocimiento, y la participaci6n. Por lo tanto los lfderes deben de aceptar
varias restricciones importantes. Ya que los recursos parecen ser limitados, el
beneficio para un lado es considerado una p6rdida para el otro. Esta idea
conduce a que los lderes busquen un acuerdo en el cual las ganancias y las
p6rdidas se reparten proporcionalmente, en vez de una resoluci6n a las
necesidades y a los intereses de cada uno. Es m.s, como cada uno busca un
acuerdo a su favor, cada uno presenta una imigen bien poderosa para debilitar
9. JOSEPH R. RUDOLPH, JR., Belgium: Variations on the Theme of Territorial Accomodation, in
ETHNOTERRrrORIAL POLMCS, POLICY AND THE WESTERN WORLD 99 (J. Joseph R. Rudolph & R.J. Thompson
eds. 1989).
10. Asimismo Rudolph declara, "[el mando de] un partido electoral pequefio.. .TendrA relativamente
poco problema en el mantenimiento de un frente unido al articular la demanda del partido contra los lderes
tradicionales del estado. Pero una vez que el partido comienza a alcanzar el 6xito en las urnas de elecci6n,,
el partido se enfrenta con los juegos nuevos de desafios y sus lfderes deben ocuparse de la nueva tensi6n."
Id. en 105.
11. Para un argumento de los efectos mdltiples de juegos de dos niveles en la negociaci6n, visto
Putnam, supra nota 4.
12. John W. Burton, About Winning, 12(1) INT'L ORG. 71, 71-91 (1985).
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la resoluci6n del opositor. Claro, ambos lados saben esto y pueden descontar la
evidente resoluci6n de sus opositores.
Dada esta percepci6n al conflicto, todos los partidos se enfrentan con "este
problema a la entrada, " ya que los lfderes tienen aversi6n a ponerse en un
marco institucional que compromete sus posici6n para negociar o que atra6
cargos de apaciguaci6n dentro del partido. Cuando el conflicto se intensifica, los
partidos generalmente restringen su interacci6n. Si los partidos establecen
marcos institucionales para un acuerdo, estos deben ser lo mis fuertes posible
cuando representan los intereses de sus electores. Los partidos usan las
instituciones mds como un mediador que como una instituci6n para tomar
decisiones probablemente van a exigir un resultado y van a querer tener control
sobre este. 13
Una vez alcanzado el acuerdo, los lideres se enfrentan con "un problema
de reingreso. " Si los lfderes ganan una nueva apreciaci6n por los intereses del
otro partido durante estas negociaciones y al Uegar al acuerdo, ellos pueden
tener dificultad en informar a sus propios electores que no es necesario ganarle
al otro partido. Los electores son movilizados y los grupos son polarizados
cuando el conflicto se intensifica antes de las negociaciones que conducen a un
acuerdo. Los electores probablemente van a seguir viendo la situaci6n como una
de triunfo 6 de perdida y consideran cualquier reconocimiento del inter6s del
otro partido como un signo de debilidad. Los lideres pueden afrontarse con
desaffos de otros que trataran de obligar al rechazo de un acuerdo. Burton
defiende un modo diferente para manejar este desacuerdo, 61 piensa que la
direcci6n a seguir es una en que los partidos opuestos puedan resolver los
problemas al encontrarse en una clase que es facilitada como una opci6n para
encontrar una solucion que a lo mejor podrfa reducir los peligros del problema
de reingreso."4
Cuando el conflicto se desarrolla, los lfderes cambian sus estrat6gias para
adaptarlas a los cambios y a las combinaciones de estas relaciones fij as.' 5 Elster
discute que el desarrollo de modelos especfficos que explican situaciones
racionales son mds complejos, porque es posible que lo que parece ser irracional
o sub-6ptimo al final puede tener repercusiones que producen un resultado que
es 6ptimo duradero."6 Estas consideraciones limitan la oportunidad de
desarrollar un cdlculo especffico para la toma de decisiones. La idea de estos
juegos fijos sin embargo, proporciona una metAfora titil para las coacciones
complejas dentro de las que los lfderes actdan. Los lideres son conscientes de
13. Id. en 78-80.
14. Id. en 84-85.
15. Anthony Mughan, Accommodation or Defusion in the Management of Linguistic Conflict in
Belgium, 31 POL. STUD. 434,434-451 (1983).
16. ELSTER, supra nota 8.
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varios factores contextuales y por lo general han desarrollado razones por las
cuales escogen esa tictica. El Modelo de Cambio Estructural representa la
naturaleza dinimica de las relaciones descritas por juegos fijos.
El Modelo del conflicto debe de incorporar cambios que son probables
para la estructura de tales conflictos. El Modelo de Cambio Estructural esta
basado en las escrituras de Burton, Coleman y Schumpeter, 7 e incluyen la
noci6n que la interacci6n del conflicto produce tres tipos de cambio estructural:
1) cambios a los estados sicol6gicos de los participantes debido a los resultados
de la interacci6n, 2) cambios de la estructura o la funci6n de grupos debido a la
movilizaci6n, y 3) las alteraciones a las complejas relaciones sociales de los
partidos que a lo largo afectan el modo de ser de la comunidad entera. Durante
la subida, los estados psicol6gicos son marcados por objetivos cada vez m~is
hostfles y competitivos, actitudes negativas y las percepciones de otros grupos
y de la interacci6n interna del grupo. Este proceso eventualmente puede
desarrollarse en una desindividualizaci6n y en un deshumanizmo, en la que los
participantes se ven asi mismos y ven a otros estrictamente como los miembros
del grupo y no como individuos. La subida puede producir una necesidad mayor
para la coherencia del grupo interno y aumenta el efecto de las normas del
grupo que pueden conducir a la polarizaci6n y esto permite que las facciones
militantes ganen mis influencia, que despu6s afecta la estructura y la forma del
grupo. Ademds, los conflictos a menido cuando se intensifican tienden a incluir
a mis participantes, y cada lado intenta de sostener su posici6n movilizando a
sus aliados.'
8
La Figura nimero dos (2) presenta el Modelo de Cambio Estructural. Este
modelo combina la noci6n del aumento del conflicto como espirales
(representado por las flechas s6lidas) con la confimaci6n regenerada
(representado por lineas partidas). En la figura las palabras Partido y Otro
representan los participantes en el conflicto. El Partido es el participante cuyo
punto de vista es considerado el m~s completo. Yo opino como Rubin y sus
colegas' 9 en la prdctica de poner la diferencia que se percibe del inter6s en la
parte superior a la izquierda. Esta diferencia de inter6s, se asume, da comienzo
al conflicto y conduce la acci6n. Como Rubin y sus colegas, ellos notaron que
este factor tambien puede actuar sobre otras partes del modelo. Yo he cambiado
su modelo pues rechazo la idea de que solo las ticticas pesadas pueden restringir
el alcance, ya que yo creo que las tfcticas ligeras tambi6n afectan el
mecanismo.2°
17. JOHN W. BURTON, PEACE THEORY (1962); JAMES SAMUEL COLEMAN, COMMUNITY CONFLICT
(1957); J. SCHUMPETER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM (1955).
18. JEFFREY Z. RUBIN ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT (2d
ed. 1994).
19. Id.
20. "[L]a tdcticas livinas son definidas como aquellas consecuencias que son favorable o neutrales
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El Modelo de Cambio Estructural muestra las interrelaciones entre las
acciones y las estructuras dentro de un conflicto. Este contiene unas vueltas que
se regeneran, y su naturaleza circular indica que el conflicto debe ser visto en
t~rminos de interacciones interactivas. Cambios estructurales pueden afectar los
estados sicol6gicos, la estructura y las funciones del grupos, y\o la naturaleza
de la comunidad entera. Las flechas [A] y la [C] indican que las acciones de un
partido en el conflicto pueden producir cambios estructurales que afectan al otro
partido. Por ejemplo, un ataque afectarfa el estado sicol6gico del opositor y es
muy probable que la confianza se disminuya y que la hostilidad aumente. Las
flechas [B] y la [D] indican que la tictica que se escoje tambien es afectada por
condiciones estructurales. El aumento de hostilidad y la disminucion de la
confianza podrfan producir tdcticas mds desconcertantes y tambi~n pueden
reducir la voluntad para negociar. Las flechas [M] y la [N] indican que la
elecci6n de la tdictica tambi6n pueden causar cambios estructurales que afectan
el partido que escogi6 esa acci6n. La acci6n de un partido puede cambiar el
contexto, por ejemplo, el partido racionaliza que un ataque sorpresivo es mejor
pues ellos deshumanizan el hecho del ataque declarando que este era una forma
preventiva para prevenir un ataque inminente del otro partido. Estas
racionalizaciones refuerzan la necesidad de escoger la tdctica. A si mismo, los
mecanismos que alzan la confianza tambi~n pueden ser reforzados por este
m6todo pues se justifican con la percepci6n de que hay una posibilidad de
negociaci6n fructuosa. Las flechas [0] y la [P] indican que las condiciones
estructurales a menudo producen mecanismos de auto-refuerzo, como la
realizaci6n de profecias 6 la percepci6n selectiva.
El Modelo de Cambio Estructural proporciona un modelo bdsico para
ensefilar las diferentes causas de cambio en los conflictos pero permanece
bastante general sobre los varios tipos de cambio que pueden ocurrir. Ademds
de los cambios estructurales enumerados por Rubin y sus colegas, los partidos
tambi~n pueden actuar para cambiar el marco institucional en el que conducen
sus relaciones. Esto es particularmente importante en los conflictos sobre el
marco constitucional de los paises como B61gica. Estos paises que estan en
conflicto son conscientes que los cambios constitucionales tendrdn efectos
multiples y duraderos sobre su poder. Sus sesiones de negociaciones
probablemente producen residuos que afectan las negociaciones futuras. Los
lideres consideran la politica de reforma constitucional como un interactivo
proceso de aprendizaje.
La explicaci6n que nos presenta el modelo aumenta con la incorporaci6n
de la perspectiva que presenta el Cubismo Social. Cambios estructurales pueden
ocurrir en las varias facetas del conflicto: la historia, los datos demogrificos, la
para otros. la tdctica fuerte por el contrario imponen o amenazan con imponer, consecuencias infavorables
para los otro." Id. en 48.
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religi6n, la actividad politica, la economfa y en los factores sicoculturales. Por
eso si se entiende la naturaleza del cambio y las interconexiones es posible que
se encuentren mej ores soluciones para la regulaci6n del conflicto.
III. IDENTIDAD POLTICA Y LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL
El conflicto 6tnico territorial plant6a una amenaza significativa a la
seguridad intemacional en la era despu6s de la Guerra Frfa, provocando guerras
civiles en algunos parses y provocando cambios estructurales significativos en
otros. Para el estudio del conflicto 6tnico territorial hay que considerar como
claves las estructuras institucionales que regulan la interacci6n del grupo y las
exigencias que demandan los lideres del grupo. El entendimiento de la
interacci6n de estas consideraciones puede proporcionar una advertencia del
conflicto candente y puede ayudamos a entender la naturaleza din.imica que
tiene la interacci6n entre la identidad, la cultura y la polftica.
Las Constituciones proporcionan una versi6n idealizada de como la
interacci6n entre grupos deberfa de ser regulada. Por eso, las constituciones
hacen legftimas algunas instituciones y agrupaciones sociales. En sociedades
multiculturales, varios grupos pueden exigir cambios constitucionales que
afectan las interacciones futuras entre los grupos. La polftica constitucional es
interactiva, es un proceso conducido por las confirmaciones y las
representaciones del grupo, la movilizaci6n del grupo, la interacci6n del grupo,
y los cambios estructurales del contexto. 21 Tenemos que emplear el modelo
conceptual para tener un mejor entendimiento de los procesos dininicos del
conflicto. Esta secci6n analiza la interacci6n entre identificaciones de grupo y
la polftica constitucional en B61gica, enfocando el andlisis en Wallonia. Este
an6.lisis indica que cada acci6n de los grupos puede cambiar la estructura de
interacci6n del grupo, formando asf el conflicto y este cambio estructural
tambi6n afecta las opciones disponibles a los grupos. Esto ilustra la gran
importancia de entender el contexto en el que el conflicto ocurre.
La cuarta reforma (desde 1970) de la constituci6n Belga que ocurri6 en
1993 y marc6 la revisi6n completa de los fundamentos que construyeron el
estado. De mds importancia es que B61gica oficialmente se transform6 de un
sistema de gobierno unitario a uno federal. Algunos de los politicos de las
mayores comunidades son partidiarios de la transferencia. Con las reformas
constitucionales en la agenda del parlamento es indicativo que este debate
seguiri. El caso Belga plant6a la pregunta de por qu6 es que el conflicto 6tnico
territorial es tan intenso y persistente y a la vez tambi6n pacffico e
institucionalizado. El uso del modelo de cambio estructural y el Cubismo Social
demuestra importancia del debate constitucional en la regulaci6n del conflicto
6tnico territorial.
21. TSEBELIs, supra nota 2.
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Despu6s de un repaso de las relaciones entre los dos grupos 6tnicos que
dominan en cada pais, yo examin6 la relaci6n dinimica entre la polftica
constitucional y la importancia polftica de la identidad 6tnica. En la discusi6n
que sigue, las letras maydsculas entre par6ntesis se refieren a las trayectorias
representadas en el Modelo de Cambio Estructural (ver la Figura mimero 2) y
las letras mindsculas indican la faceta del cubo social.22
IV. LA CREACION GRADUAL DEL CONFLICTO tTNICO
En B61gica, la evoluci6n de identidades 6tnico territoriales han conducido
la conducta de la polftica. El cambio gradual de la identidad localizada a una
comunidad 6tnico territorial debilit6 la eficacia del estado unitario y el de las
provincias existentes. Los politicos cambiaron la constituci6n para crear
instituciones que dirigieran las exigencias regionales y culturales un poco mej or.
Nacionalistas Franc6fonos Walloon, o Wallingants, hicieron reclamos como
respuesta a las exigencias de los Flamingants que hablan Holand6s.23 Los
Walones casi uniformemente se separan entre los que se identifican
primordialmente como Belgas y los que se identifican como Valones.24 La
situaci6n actual en B61gica se debe de ver dentro del contexto del desarrollo
hist6rico de las relaciones entre los Fleming y los Valones.
A pesar que el nombre "Belga" se deriva de los Celtas quienes poblaron el
drea alrededor de 650 AC, politicos e investigadores a menudo afirman que una
identidad comtin Belga es considerada artificial.25 Julio Csar conquist6 el irea
en 58-57 AC.26 La llegada de los Francos a principio de los 800s promovi6 la
divisi6n lingtifstica pues la poblaci6n Gallo-Romana se habfa colocado
densamente en el sur para asimilar a los Francos, pero no en el norte.27 Durante
siglos, varias ciudades, estados, provincias e imperios lucharon por el territorio.
No habfa polftica o identidad cultural que pudiera unir a la gente que ocupaba
22. Las letras mindsculas son representadas como: c= factores sicoculturales; d= demografia; e=
economfa; h= historia; p= actividad political; r= religion.
23. Wallingants muy raras veces se consideran como nacionalistas. Ellos tienden a acentuar la
importancia de diferencias geogrdficas. Su marca indica la naturaleza defensiva, como derivada del
movimiento Flamingant y los Flamingantes usan los problemas de la cultura, la identidad dtnica y la lengua.
A pesar de estas diferencias, ambos se refieren a los movimientos 6tnico territoriales.
24. Michel Vandekeere et al., Les Declinaisons de l'identitd en Wallonie: Couplages et divorces
entre dlectorats, appartenances et prises de position en matidre communautaire et institutionnelle, in IN
ELECTIONS LE FILURE? ENQUtE SUR LE COMPORTEMENT tLECTORAL DES WALLONS ET DES FRANCOPHONES
(A.-P. Frognier and A.-M. Aish-VanVaerenbergh, eds., 1994).
25. BOULANGt Y CAVENAILE, LA BELGIQUE DES ORIGINES A L'TAT FIDIRAL (1990).
26. JOHN FITZMAURICE, THE POLITICS OF BELGIUM: CRISIS AND COMPROMISE IN A PLURAL SOCIETY
(1983).
27. BOULANG9 & CAVENAILE, supra nota en 23.
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el drea. Las identidades locales que se desarrollaron primero todavfa impiden la
identidad nacional.
En 1792, Francia ocupaba el drea, e impuso la centralizaci6n y el
predominio cultural. Con la caida de Napo'le6n en 1815, el territorio se uni6 con
los parses bajos [C, p]. Los Belgas se resintieron por las diferencias religiosas
[P, r] y el Holandesismo de la administraci6n [P, c]. Los Belgas declararon su
independencia de los Parses Bajos en 1830 [A D y p]. B61gica adopt6 el franc6s
como la lengua oficial, aunque la gente podia hablar otras lenguas (Artficulo 23)
[P,p y c] 28 El voto que se basaba estrictamente en las propiedades asegur6 a la
burguesfa Franc6fona una mayorfa politica aunque la mayor parte de los Belgas
hablaban dialectos holand6ses. En su independencia, B61gica no tenfa una
lengua estfndar podia ser holand6s 6 franc6s.
Hasta a mediados de los afios 1900, el poder politico, econ6mico y social
se encontraba principalmente con los Franc6fonos, hasta en el Area del norte que
ahora es la regi6n Flemish. 29 El desarrollo econ6mico realz6 el poder de la
regi6n del sur conocida hoy como Wallonia [P, y e]. Algunas partes de la regi6n
del sur se beneficiaron de la revoluci6n industrial, y desarrollaron industrias
pesadas [P, y e]. El estado social y politico de la lengua francesa promovi6 una
presencia fuerte Franc6fona en Bruselas [P, p & d]. 30 El movimiento Flemish,
apoyado por lfderes religiosos y por funcionarios, comenz6 una campafia
cultural para reforzar la cultura Flemish y su lengua casi inmediatamente
despu6s de la independencia [N, c & r & pl. La mayor parte de los Belgas,
independientemente de su lengua, eran Cat6licos, pero un debate sobre la
relaci6n entre la iglesia y el estado aument6 las tensiones 6tnicas [A, r & p, C,
r & p]. La mayor parte de los Franc6fonos favorecfan el seculismo, sobre todo
con respeto a la educaci6n pdblica pagada por el estado. Muchos lfderes
religiosos consideraron que los Franc6fonos eran anti-eclesiasticos, y por lo
tanto procuraron proteger el empleo de la lengua Flemish [B, r & p].3' Ademds,
muchos Holandeses que habfan sido funcionarios durante el regimiento
holandes, procuraron mantener su estado exigiendo que el Flemish fuera una de
las lenguas oficiales [B, c &p; D, c & pl. En 1847 el Manifiesto del movimiento
Flemish present6 varias exigencias. [B & C, p & c]. En 1898, Flemish se hizo
una de las lenguas oficiales [0, p & c]. Este reconocimiento transform6 las
relaciones inter6tnicas y esto reforz6 que B61gica se viera como una sociedad
28. La reforma constitucional de 1993 incluy6 una revisi6n completa y la renumeraci6n de los
artfculos en la constituci6n. Para la simplicidad yo uso la enumeraci6n vieja al referirme a los cambios
anteriores.
29. RUDOLPH, supra nota 9 en 92.
30. Martine de Ridder and Luis Ricardo Fraga, The Brussels Issue in Belgian Politics, 9 W. EUR.
POL. 376,376-392 (1986).
31. BOULANGt & CAVENAILE, supra nota 25 en 100.
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bicultural [0 & P, p & c]. 32 Franc6fonos reaccionaron defensivamente contra la
presi6n de los Flemish [C-M]. En 1912, el Congreso Val6n apoy6 la separaci6n
administrativa entre Flandes y Wallonia [A, p; m, p]. En 1912, el Viceministro
del estado Jules Destr~e en una carta al Rey le declar6" Sefior, no hay Belgas".
Hay s6 1o Flemish y Valones, diciendo que por 80 afios se habfa tratado de
construir una naci6n y no se habfa logrado producir una base dominante de
identificaci6n, mientras los grupos ethnoterritoriales habfan ganado y
sobresalido.33
Con la extensi6n gradual del sufragio los Fleming eventualmente
transformaron su mayorfa demogrdfica en poder politico [0, p&d; P,p&d] .34 En
1893 se concedi6 el sufrigio Universal a los hombres pero mtltiples votos
permitieron que los Franc6fonos conservaran la mayorfa de los votos [P,d&p;
O,d&p].35 Esta situaci6n signific6 que el dominio de la mayorfa serfa por una
minorfa demogr.fica. Cada reforma cambi6 el cima politico y cultural para
alentar mds cambios, pero tambi6n mitig6 los niveles de hostilidad que podrfan
haber estallado en un conflicto violento si los Franc6fonos hubieran rechazado
a aumentar la participaci6n Holandesa en el gobierno. Duffy y la aserci6n de
Frensley que los lideres preferirfan el conflicto institucional sobre cualquier
ganancia que hubiera surgido por el fervor del conflicto durante este peri6do.36
La evoluci6n de las relaciones 6tnicas fue interrumpida por la pimera
guerra mundial. La primera guerra mundial exacerb6 las tensas relaciones
6tnicas dentro del ej~rcito, porque los oficiales Franc6fonos ordenaban a las
tropas Flemish. El Flemish Frontpartij exigi6 la creaci6n de unidades separadas
para los militares Franc6fonos y para los Holandeses [Cp&c; Np&c]. Los
Alemanes usaron la estrat6gia de " dividir y conquistar " para ocupar B61gica,
y promovieron el nacionalismo Flemish [Cp&c]. En 1916, abrieron una
universidad Flemish en Ghente [Cp&c]. La Proclamaci6n del 22 de Diciembre
32. See Raymond Breton, The Production and Allocation of Symbolic Resources: An Analysis of
the Linguistic and Ethnocultural Fields in Canada, 21(2) CANADIAN REV. OF SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 123,
123-144 (1984). Bret6n discute que la importancia simb6lica del estado relativo de grupos es clave en la
legitimidad de un estado. Aunque basado en un caso canadiense, su argumento es relevante aquf. El
aumentado de una minorfa polftica o social probablemente produce una reacci6n defensiva en los que ven su
estado como amenazado. Esto es sobre todo importante si factores demogrficos producen un fen6meno
similar.
33. Frank Delmartino, A Regional State or a Federal State in the Making?, in FEDERALISM AND
FEDERATION IN W.E. 38 (M. Burgess ed. 1986).
34. ALEXANDER B. MURPHY, THE REGIONAL DYNAMICS OF LANGUAGE DIFFERENTIATION IN
BELGIUM: A STUDY IN CULTURAL-POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY (RESEARCH PAPERS 227) (1988).
35. KENNETH DOUGLAS MCRAE, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES:
BELGIUM 35 (1986).
36. Gavan Duffy and Nathalie J. Frensley, Community Conflict Processes: Mobilization and
Demobilization in Northern Ireland, in INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: MAJOR CONFLICTS
IN THE 1980s (J.W. Lamare, ed., 1991).
12592002] Carter
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:1249
de 1917 afirm6 la autonomfa del Flandes sin 6xito [C&N, p&c].37 Los lfderes
Flemish unieron el sfmbolo del poder y de la lengua franc6sa, representando a
los Flemish como vfctimas quien no podfan comprender a sus opresores
Franc6fonos [C&N, h&c].
Durante el perfodo de guerra interna los nacionalistas Flemish exigieron
la igualdad completa lingiifstica [C&N,c&p]. 1919 marc6 la primera elecci6n
en la cual se us6 la f6rmula "un hombre; un voto" N-O,p; C-P, p]. En 1928, la
administraci6n nacional habfa sido reformada para acomodar las exigencias de
los Flemish para la paridad lingifstica [C&N, c&p]. 38 Los Flemish, notando un
aumento en la presencia de Franc6fonos en el norte, exigieron el
establecimiento del principio territorial como una base para la legislaci6n sobre
la lengua [O-B,d&c&p]. Franc6fonos sin embargo discutieron que el uso de una
lengua deberfa ser a la opci6n del individuo [A-D,d&c&p].39 Una lengua se
estableci6 en 1930 para la ensefianza en la primaria y en la secundaria, con
Flemish se ensei6 en el norte y franc6s en el sur. La Universidad de Gante se
convirti6 en una instituci6n monolingiie Flemish ese mismo afro [C&N,c&p].
En 1932, la administraci6n adapt6 la noci6n de dos regiones monolingies. Estos
esfuerzos aunque dirigidos a cuestiones lingifsticas, reforzaron la noci6n de un
estado biregional y bicultural. Estos aumentaron la saliente de la hendidura
lingiifstica haci6ndola una hendidura territorial [O&P,c&d&p].
La pregunta al Rey reforz6 estas tensiones. Durante la segunda Guerra
Mundial, el Rey Leopold II se rindi6 a pesar de la presi6n que tuvo por su
gobierno para formar un gobiemo en exflio. Al final de la guerra, el Partido
Cat6lico se moviliz6 para de nuevo poner en el poder al Rey, pero los
Socialistas protestaron.4° Esto caus6 disturbios en Liege y Hainaut [D, p & d
& c]. Un refer6ndum se produjo, la mayorfa estaba a favor del Rey, pero la
disparidad regional era notable [M & A, p & d & c]. Los Fleming votaron
abrumadoramente a favor de su restablecimiento [N & C ,p]. Una pequefia
mayorfa de Valones se opuso al plan aunque algunas provincias produjeron una
mayorfa leve a favor [A & M, pl. El Rey abdic6 debido a la oposici6n Valona,
y el trono le pas6 a su hijo [P & 0, p].41
Despufs de la guerra, los Belgas establecieron el Centro de Investigaci6n
para la Soluci6n Nacional de Problemas Sociales, Politicos y Jurfdicos en las
37. MURPHY, supra nota 34 en 105-6.
38. Robert Senelle, Constitutional Reform in Belgium: From Unitarianism Towards Federalism,
in FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM 55 (M. Forsyth, ed., 1989).
39. Por una evaluaci6n de las diferencias entre los principios de territorialismo y la personalidad,
vista Kenneth D. McRae, The Principle of Territoriality and the Principle of Personality in Multilingual
States, 158 LINGUISITICS: INT'L REV 33 (1975)
40. En ese tiempo, el Partido Cat61ico era fuerte en Flandes, mientras que el Partido Socialista era
fuerte en Wallonia. Sin embargo ambos partidos tenfan electores en todo el pais.
41. MCRAE, supra nota 35 en 111.
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regiones Val6nes y Flemish. El Centro inform6 que los Flemish, aunque eran
una mayorfa demogrdficamente, eran una minorfa en la milicia, en los cfrculos
politicos, diplomiticos, de negocio y culturales [0, d & e & p & c]. El centro
not6 una extensi6n de franc6s en las dreas Flemish alrededor de Bruselas y am
lo largo de la frontera lingifstica [la 0, la d].42 Estos informes proporcionaron
incentivos adicionales para la movilizaci6n a lo largo de las lIfneas 6tnico
territoriales [0 & P, c & d & p]. Los Flemish exigieron que el gobierno reparara
las diferencias [C&N,p]. Los Valones se contra-movilizaron encontra de la
amenaza a su posici6n que fue planteada por la mayoria Flemish [A&M,p].
Los desacuerdos politicos y econ6micos se hicieron mds profundos en la
reconstrucci6n inmediata que vino despu6s de la guerra. En Flandes, la
industrializaci6n procedi6 ripidamente [ 0, e], mientras las industrias viejas en
Wallonia regularmente decafan [P, la e] y la porci6n de la poblaci6n Valona en
B61gica se disminufa [P, d]. En los afios 1950, estos cambios, combinados con
el debate con respecto a las reglas de la educaci6n, animaron la creaci6n de los
partidos regionales [A&M,p; C&N,p].43 Un partido Flemish federalista,
Volksunie, fu6 fundado en 1954 [N, p]." Las ganancias econ6micas y
demogrdficas [O,d&e] obligaron al gobierno Belga a reconocer la paridad del
franc6s y del holand6s con una administraci6n separada para las comunidades
culturales [O&P,p&c]. Mientras tanto, el Rassemblement Val6n y el frente
D~mocratique des Franc6fonos fu6 formado para dedicarse a los intereses
regionales de los Val6nes y los Bruxellois [P,p&c].'
A pesar del surgimiento de partidos regionales, los tres partidos politicos
principales (el Liberal, el Cat6lico, el Socialista) mantuvieron su predominio en
la polftica Belga. El Partido Flemish Cat6lico sostuvo la posici6n mds fuerte,
mientras los Socialistas fueron los mis poderosos en Wallonia. A finales de los
afios 1950, las medidas de austeridad y la disinuci6n econ6mica en Wallonia
amenazaron con desestabilizar el gobierno [P,e&p]. En el inviemo de 1960
lideres polfticos llamaron una huelga general nacional contra las medidas de
austeridad del gobierno, pero la participaci6n fu6 sumamente d6bil en el norte
Flemish. Andr6 Renard, un lider de las huelgas, fund6 el Mouvement populaire
Vallon para dedicarse a la reforma econ6mica y social dentro de Wallonia y
para evitar contar con la cooperaci6n Flemish [P,c&p]. Esto reforz6 la noci6n
que las dos regiones principales buscaron diferentes instituciones sociales y
siguieron ideologfas politicas diferentes [O&P,c&p].
42. BOULANG9 & CAVENAILE, supra nota 25 en 103.
43. Els Witte, Belgian Federalism: Towards Complexity and Asymmetry, 15(4) W. EUR. POL. 95,
95-117 (1992).
44. Murphy, supra nota 34 en 201.
45. El Franc6fonos en Bruselas y Wallonia no siempre se unen en sus opiniones polfticas. La
dimensi6n regional, territorial a menudo interfiere con la capacidad de cooperar.
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El gobierno Belga permanentemente fij6 la frontera linguifstica en 1962 [0
& P, p & c]. Antes de este cambio, el gobiemo habfa tenido que ajustar el lfmite
de vez en cuando para reflejar los cambios del empleo de lengua indicado por
el censo decenal [0 & P, p & c & d]. Reaccionando al aumento dramitico de
Franc6fonos en Flandes que se informo en el primer censo despu6s de que la
segunda Guerra Mundial [0 & B, c & d], los Flamingants reclamaron que el uso
de una pregunta del censo para determinar la frontera era injusto ya que esto era
una indicaci6n de la popularidad de las lenguas, en vez de su empleo real [N &
C, p & c] .46 La protesta oblig6 que el gobiemo quitara preguntas lingifsticas del
censo [C & N, p & c & d], asf quitando el empleo de las lenguas como el medio
de determinar la lengua [0 & P, c & d & p].4' El gobiemo cre6 una frontera
linguifstica para limitar las regiones lingiifsticas territorialmente. La lfnea no ha
sido dibujada claramente; 25 comunas fueron transferidas de la regi6n Flemish
a Wallonia y 24 fueron pasadas en la direcci6n opuesta [O&P,p&c]. Segtin
Dustin, el gobierno inici6 la transferencia parcialmente debido a la fuerza de
partido en esas Areas [N&C,p&d; M&A,p&d].48 Mds importante eran seis
comunas que fueron transferidas de Liege (Wallonia) a Limburg (Flandes).49 En
un refer6ndum en estas comunas, el 93 % se opuso a la transferencia, pero el
gobierno rechaz6 y no respet6 el voto [O&P,p&d&c]. 5' La mayorfa de los
Franc6fonos en el Parlamento tambi6n se opusieron a esta ley [A&M,p]. La
transferencia fu6 un ejemplo de legislaci6n importante que pas6 a pesar de los
agudos desacuerdos lingtifsticos [O&P,h&c] .5  Los Franc6fonos sigufan
desafiando la legitimidad de esta ley, sobre todo en Voeren/Fourons donde la
Vuelta a la lista de Liege habfa alcanzado 6xito considerable en las elecciones
municipales [P&D,c&h]. El Flemish Taal Aktie Komitie (el Comit6 de Acci6n
de Lengua) y el Vlaamse Militanten Orde (Del Orden Militar Flemish) condujo
una campafia de intimidaci6n [C&N,p&c] como respuesta a la Acci6n
Franc6fona fouronnaise que fu6 un activismo dirigido a devolver a Fourons a
Liege [A&M,c&p]. El lfder franc6fono Jos6 Happart rechaz6 una oferta de
46. Aunque algunos miembros de ambos lados colaboraran con los alemanes los Flemish fueron
vistos como los colaboradores mds entusi.smados y por lo tanto fueron sujetos a un tratamiento dspero
despu6s de la guerra. Es probable que que ellos hubieran negado que hablaban Flemish [O&P,h&c].
47. MCRAE, supra nota 35 en 35.
48. Interview with Femand-Daniel Dustin, PSC Archivist (1995).
49. Estas comunas a menudo eran referidas como les Fourons en francds, y Voeren en Flemish.
50. MCRAE, supra nota 35 en 153.
51. Xavier Mabille, Le ddbat politique d'avril 1990 sur la sanction et la promulation de la loi,
COURRIER HEBDOMODAIRE DU CRISP [CRISP Bulletin] (Centre de Recherch et d'Information Socio-
Politiques, Brussels 1990).
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ayuda para el sostenimiento de una campafia terrorista, quizis esto previno un
serio aumento del conflicto [A&M,h].52
Los politicos se enfrentaron con otro problema con esta construcci6n de la
frontera linguifstica. Ellos no podian ignorar que Bruselas, que se localizaba en
el lado Flemish del lfmite lingfifstico, tenfa un cuarto de todos los Franc6fonos
en el pafs, y tenfan s6lo una pequefia minorfa de altavoces Flemish [O&P,c&d].
Para poder mantener que esta "mancha del aceite"53 no se extendiera, los
Flemish insistieron, y en 1963 lograron que Bruselas fuera designado como un
territorio limitado bilingie [0-B-N & C, c & p].
Para 1969, los Flemish encontaron otro problema. Aunque el territorio de
Bruselas hubiera sido puesto, "la mancha del aceite" de los Franc6fonos en
Flandes crecia hacia la Universidad de Louvain/Leuven, que estd al este de
Bruselas en Flemish Brabant [0 & P, c & d]. Los altavoces Flemish en la
universidad pidieron por el retiro de la Universidad de los Franc6fonos [0-B-
C&N, p & c & d]. La divisi6n de la universidad y con la creaci6n de Louvain -
La - Neuve, simbolizaron los grandes desacuerdos dentro del pafs [A & M, c &
d & p; C & N, c & d & p]. Estos cambios reducieron el apoyo por el estado
unitario porque la noci6n de una identidad comin Belga perdi6 la credibilidad
[0 & P, c & h].54
Cambios estructurales se acumularon con tiempo, formando un modelo de
comportamiento y de las percepciones de los grupos. Las interacciones espirales
del conflicto con estructuras que mutuamente afectan el uno al otro debilitaron
el apoyo para una identidad comdn y aumentaron la demanda por la autonomfa
ethno regional. La constituci6n serfa el campo de batalla politico.
V. REFORMA CONSTrrUCIONAL BELGA
Hacia el final de los afios 1960, B61gica requiri6 una gran revisi6n a la
constituci6n. La constituci6n Belga ha sido considerablemente modificada
cuatro veces desde 1970. Cada cambio constitucional implic6 reformas
institucionales para reducir la necesidad de un acuerdo a trav6s de la frontera
lingifstica. Cada vez mis, los lideres tenfan m~is independencia para tomar
decisiones dentro de cada comunidad o regi6n linguistica.55 B61gica ha
52. Jost HAPPART, Au NOM DE LA LIBERTt [IN THE NAME OF LIBERTY] (1984). Jost HAPART AND
MARIE-PPAULE ESKENAZI, Jost HAPPART: PORTRAIT D'UN REBELLE TRANQUILLE [JoSt HAPPART: PORTRAIT
OF A QUIET REBEL] (1987). Jost HAPPART AND VINCENT VAGMAN, HAPPART DE A A Z: ENTRETIENS AVEC
VINCENT VAGMAN [HAPPART FROM A TO Z: CONVERSATIONS WITH VINCENT VAGMAN] (1989).
53. Los Flamingants usaron este t6rmino para simbolizar la concentraci6n de Francophones en la
regi6n Flemish. Esto indic6 que los Francophones estropearon la regi6n Flemish, que ellos eran diffciles de
mover y que ellos podrian extender y causar ms dafilo a los Flemish.
54. Murphy, supra nota 34.
55. La diferencia de la mayor parte federaciones, leyes federales no invalidan regional o decretos
de comunidad dentro de su jurisdicci6n. Hay unas excepciones a esto, como las preguntas de polftica
educativa.
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abandonado su estructura unitaria a favor de una federaci6n compleja
compuesta de comunidades y regiones, las cuales tienen un translapo de
fronteras. Esta secci6n sefiala las principales dimensiones polfticas de estos
cuatro cambios a la constituci6n1
6
A. La Reforma de 1970
De 1967-71 se produjo una reforma principal a la constituci6n Belga. La
reforma instituy6 varios cambios estructurales que considerablemente cambi6
la tictica usada por los partidos. Los politicos institucionalizaron la naturaleza
binaria de B61gica, estableciendo" las Comunidades Culturales" (el Articulo
59bis).57 Cada una de las tres comunidades - el de habla Flemish, el de habla
Franc6s, y el de habla Alemdn recibieron su propio Consejo y el poder para
promulgar decretos acerca de asuntos culturales y a un cierto grado limitado,
para la educaci6n y para el empleo de lengua [0 & P, p]. 58 Los lideres Flemish
habfan conducido el paso el establecimiento de las Comunidades [C & N, p &
c], pero los Franc6fonos favorecian la regionalizaci6n [A & M, c & p]. Los
Valones exigieron la descentralizaci6n de asuntos sociales y econ6micos para
dirigir la crisis econ6mica de su regi6n [D-A & M, c & e & p].59 La constituci6n
renovada reconoci6 tres regiones, pero no logr6 definir las responsabilidades
administrativas de cada regi6n [O&P, c&p]. Los detalles fueron pospuestos, "
beige A la," para futuras asambleas de los electores. Los Franc6fonos exigieron
el reconocimiento de Bruselas como una regi6n iguala a Flandes y Wallonia
[A&M, c&p]. Los lfderes Flemish se opusieron a darle a Bruselas el estado
regional, temiendo que tal reconocimiento condujera a un cambio a la paridad
dando una ventaja dos por una, para los Franc6fonos [C&N, c&p]. El
compromiso fu6 s6lo una victoria parcial para cada lado, ya que ellos crearon
regiones, pero dejaron a el estado de Bruselas en una ambiguedad.
Otras revisiones constitucionales importantes incluyeron la paridad
lingfiistica obligatoria en el Gabinete, con la excepci6n del Primer Ministro (el
Artfculo 86bis). Las carteras principales gubernamentales fueron divididas
56. La enmienda constitucional en Bdlgica es conducida dentro del Parlamento Belga. El gobierno
debe producir una lista de articulos los que esto desea repasar para la enmienda. El parlamento entonces es
disuelto, y la elecci6n de una Asamnblea constituyente sigue. La formaci6n de coalici6n despuds de la elecci6n
incluye la negociaci6n de inter-partido sobre las cuestiones. Una mayorfa de dos terceras partes es requerida
para cualquier enmienda.
57. Los ndmeros de articulo citados aquf se refieren a su enumeraci6n original. La reforma del aio
1993 incluy6 una renumeraci6n completa de los artfculos en la constituci6n.
58. Mientras dieron a la comunidad de habla alemana poderes, esta tiene una muy pequefia
poblaci6n (menos del un por ciento de la poblaci6n total), y no juega papel clave en la polftica nacional.
59. ANDR9 ALEN AND RUSEN ERGEC, BRUSSELS: MINISTRY OFFOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXTERNALTRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 15 (1993).
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igualmente entre Franc6fonos y De Habla Nederlandosa [O&P, p]. Esta
exigencia no incluy6 a los Secretarios de Estado (carteras de sub-gabinete), que
puede ser usado para reflejar la fuerza relativa de los compafieros de la coalici6n
y por lo general favorece a el Flemish.6 Ademis, la revisi6n 1970 inici6 "una
alarma despertadora " en el proceso, porque en un movimiento de inter6s
firmado por tres cuartos de los miembros del parlamento de cualquier grupo
linguistico podrfa devolver una ley al poder ejecutivo para reconsideraci6n
[O&P, c&p].61 Este proceso puede ser usado en el parlamento Belga (el Artfculo
38bis) y en el Consejo de Bruselas (el Artfculo 108ter, la secci6n 3). La
naturaleza simb6lica de la alarma despertadora aument6 la confianza de que la
mayorfa iba a actuar con el respeto para la minorfa [O&P, c].
B. La Reforma de 1980
Los politicos Belgas de nuevo modificaron la constituci6n en 1980 para
adaptar mejor la nueva divisi6n de poderes. Esta revisi6n ampli6 el poder de las
Comunidades Culturales para incluir unos "servicios personalizados " tales
como la protecci6n de menores de edad y la politica de la salud, pero esto
cambi6 el nombre a "Comunidades" [O&P, c&p].62 El gobiemo otra vez
temporalmente ignor6 la pregunta de Bruselas con el fin de alcanzar este
acuerdo ["lab de o", p; P-D, p]. Una legislaci6n especial parcialmente clarific6
el papel del Val6n y de las regiones Flemish y por eso el futuro de las regiones
permaneci6 en cuesti6n.
La revisi6n en 1980 present6 el Tribunal de Arbitraje (el Artfculo 107ter)
para poner en orden las discusiones entre Comunidades, Regiones y el Gobiemo
Nacional [O&P, p]. Sus primeras decisiones aumentaron la confianza en la
imparcialidad del Tribunal [O&P, c], y la reforma de 1988 aument6 la
jurisdicci6n que fu6 una de s6lo resolver discusiones para los gobiernos a la
juridicci6n de resolver para "cualquier persona que demostrara un inter6s ,63
C. La Reforma de 1988
Se le acredita al "affair de Happart" extensamente con la causa de la crisis
que condujo a la cafda del gobiemo y la elecci6n de una asamblea de electores
en 1987. Happart era un miembro del Parlamento europeo y el Bourgmestre
60. MCRAE, supra nota 35 en 185.
61. MAUREEN COVELL, Belgium, The Variability of Ethnic Relation, in THE POL. OF ETHNIC
CONFLICT REG.: CASE STUDIES OF PROTRACTED ETHNIC CONFLICTS 289 (J. McGarry & B. O'Leary eds.
1993); MCRAE, supra nora 35 en 183.
62. ALEN, supra nota 59 en 15; COVELL, supra nota 61 en 290.
63. ALEN, supra nota 59 en 21-22.
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(alcalde) de Fourons.6 Fourons se transfiri6 en 1962 de la provincia Valona de
Li~ge a la provincia Flemish de Limburg como parte de un compromiso que
condujo a la delineaci6n "permanente" del imite lingiifstico [O&P, c & h&p].65
La transferencia habia sido promulgada a pesar de un referendum local en el que
la mayor parte de los Fouronnais se opusieron a la transferencia y a pesar de
votos contrarios por la mayorfa de los Franc6fonos en el Parlamento. Happart
y sus aliados de "Happartiste" siguieron la lucha, diciendo que la transferencia
era ilegftima [A&M, c&p]. Ellos crearon varias organizaciones para luchar
contra lo que ellos consideraron que era un plan Flemish para dominar el pafs
[A&M, c&p]. En 1987, la situaci6n en Fourons de nuevo alcanz6 un punto de
ebullici6n. Notando ambigiiedades legales, Happart no se rindi6 a las pruebas
lingiufsticas requeridas para los alcaldes en Flandes, y esto produjo una
contradicci6n legal en la que Happart tenfa un mandato y a la vez le era
prohibido realizar sus obligaciones de alcalde [A & M, c & p].' El gobemador
de Limburg pospuso la reelecci6n de Happart como Bourgmestre, sobre la cual
el gobierno municipal local se disolvi6 para obligar una nueva elecci6n [B-N &
B-C, p]. Happart gan6 otra vez. Un caso similar surgi6 en Bruselas. Varias
vueltas de este "carrusel", como se le llam6 comunmente, provoc6 un
descontento en ambos lados de la frontera lingiifstica [A-0, c & p; M-P, c & p].
En 1987-88, lideres politicos empezaron nuevas negociaciones constitucionales.
El debate sobre esta reforma muestra la complejidad de desacuerdos dentro
de la comunidad Franc6fona y la importancia del modelo dindrtico del
conflicto. La controversia original acerca de la capacidad de Happart para
realizar sus obligaciones del alcalde se intensificaron al punto que el gobiemo
se derrumb6 y los partidos politicos de Bdlgica pasaron aproximadamente seis
meses negociando un acuerdo que iba mis alld de la situaci6n especifica de
Happart. Todos los politicos tenfan objetivos mfiltiples. Los lideres franc6fonos
tenfan que defenderse de la critica Happartiste [P-D, p]. El lider Social Cristiano
Franc6fono, G6rard Deprez tuvo que defender sus acciones contra acusaciones
64. Tcnicamente, Happart era Jchevin primerfaisantfonction, esto es, interpretando Bourgmestre.
El gobierno provincial de Limburg podria prohibirlo de designar Bourgmestre, pero no delegir como un
concejal (6chevin). Pacte 107 de la ley Comunal declararon que el Primer Concejal (dchevin primer) se harfa
el alcalde interpretador si el Bourgmestre fuera incapaz de realizar sus (deberes). El Fouronnais asf eligi6 a
Happart como chevin primer, pero la oficina de Bourgmestre ha sido (dejada) vacfa despu6s de octubre del
ario 1986 como consecuencia de una decisi6n por la cAmara Flemish del Consejo de Estado. Esto caus6 "el
carrusel" en el que el gobiemo provincial rechazarfa la elecci6n, pero elecciones nuevas producirfan los
mismos resultados. Esta crisis asi indica la importancia de las conexiones entre instituciones y el conflicto.
Vea Jost HAPPART, LETrRES QUESTIONS AU MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR MONSIEUR JOSEPH MICHEL [LETTERS
AND QUESTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR JOSEPH MICHAEL] (1987).
65. Aunque el limite pueda ser cambiado segOn un acto de ley, tal acto requerirfa una mayorfa
especial que incluirfa la mayorfa de representantes de ambos se especializan grupos lingiifsticos-un
acontecimiento improbable.
66. HAPPART, supra nota 64.
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de que 61 acord6 el plan simplemente a cambiar la coalici6n de los partidos y
que 61 habfa "'vendido" a los Flemish [el M, p]. Dentro del Partido Franc6fono
Socialista, los que apoyaron la polftica regionalista de Jos6 Happart protestaron
que el Presidente de partido Guy Spitaels habia perdido una oportunidad tinica
de reestablecer a Fourons como una parte de Liege [M, c & p]. En los ojos de
ellos, Spitaels se habia rendido a las exigencias interminables y cada vez
mayores de los Flemish.67 Spitaels, sin embargo, discuti6 que 61 habia escogido
la estrat6gia mejor para B6lgica, la que conduce hacia un sistema federal [A &
M, p]. l dijo que 61 nunca habia prometido que Fourons volverfa a Liege.68
Muchos Socialistas temieron que los Happartistes iban a ignorar la plataforma
Socialista, o que iban a cambiarla para hacerla un privilegio regional en vez de
una clase de conflicto [P, c & p].
Como parte del acuerdo, el Derecho Especial del 9 de agosto del afio 1988
cambi6 las regulaciones para las elecciones comunales, por consiguiente
impidiendo la reelecci6n de Happart como Bourgmestre [M & C-P-D, p] .69 El
gobiemo estableci6 un plan de tres fases para cambiar la estructura fundamental
del estado unitario. La primera fase requiri6 el reconocimiento legal de los
derechos Franc6fonos en la periferia de Bruselas, la creaci6n de una Regi6n en
Bruselas con poderes iguales a las otras dos regiones y la extensi6n de la
jurisdicci6n del Tribunal del Arbitraje [P&O, p]. La segunda fase ampli6 el
poder de la Comunidad de habla alemana para que ellos pudieran crear
relaciones intemacionales (el Articulo 59) e incluy6 leyes especiales que
clarifican los poderes de las Comunidades y Regiones [O&P, p]. La tercera fase
establece las elecciones establecidas para las Regiones y para las Comunidades
[O&P, p]. La reforma de 1988 tambi6n incluy6 un nuevo sistema de
financiamiento para las comunidades y regiones [O&P, p].7o Las comunidades
ganaron prdcticamente el completo control de la educaci6n (el Artfculo 59)
[O&P, p].
El compromiso alcanzado por los partidos en esta tercera reforma
constitucional no present6 nuevas o innovadoras instituciones ni complet6 el
proceso de federalizaci6n. Pero sf ampli6 el poder de las regiones y reconoci6
que Bruselas fu6 aprobada como una regi6n en sf misma marcando un punto
67. Jean-Maurice Dehousse (1995). Entrevista con el autor.
68. Dider Caudron,. Guy Spitaels :oui d lafin du carrouselfouronnais mais pas en capitulant, LE
PEUPLE, May 18, 1987; Guy Daloze et al, Guy Spitaels: pas touche a la sicuriti social, LA UBRE BELGIQUE,
Jan. 16, 1989 en 4.
69. Jos6 Happart. Entrevista con el autor (1995). Happart dice que esto sigue causlindole el gran
dolor, pero 61 permanece activo en el PS. Como un miembro socialista del Parlamento Europeo, Happart luch6
por la regionalizaci6n y ahora aboga por un estado biregional para el Fourons/Voeren. El permanece un
politico pol6mico, pero popular, Val6n. Es actualmente el Ministro de Agricultura en Wallonia.
70. ANDRP ALEN AND RUSEN ERGEC, FEDERAL BELGIUM AFTER THE FOURTH STATE REFORM OF
1993 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, External Trade and Development Cooperation, Brussles, 1994).
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principal en las relaciones inter6tnicas. Esto cre6 cambios estructurales que
aumentaron el paso hacia el federalismo.
D. La Reforma de 1993
Las reformas de 1988-89 dejaron varias cuestiones sin contestar. En medio
de atin otra crisis en 1991, el poder ejecutivo declar6 que cada artfculo de la
constituci6n estaba sujeto a revisi6n y disolvi6 el parlamento asf requiriendo
nuevas elecciones. Los partidos cristianos y socialistas formaron una coalici6n
nueva basada en un acuerdo que era menos exacto que el construfdo en del aio
1988. El acuerdo concret6 la federalizaci6n oficial del pais, incluyendo
elecciones directas para los gobiernos de las unidades constituyentes. Esta
reforma implic6 una completa revisi6n a la constituci6n y firmemente estableci6
los derechos sociales y polfticos. El sistema de numeraci6n de los artfculos
fueron cambiados. M~s considerablemente, el artfculo 1 ahora lee," B61gica es
un estado federal con Comunidades y Regiones " [O&P, p] El artfculo 138
autoriza la Comunidad Francesa y le concede autoridad sobre la Regi6n Valona
y tambi6n establece el grupo lingiifstico franc6s en la Capital Bruselas [P, p]. La
cuarta reforma tambi6n ampli6 el poder internacional de las regiones y de las
comunidades para el comercio y para los asuntos culturales, pero sus acciones
deben de ser compatibles con la politica nacional [0 & P, p]. El gobierno
federal mantuvo el derecho de requerir una conferencia intergubernamental
sobre cualquier tratado propuesto, el Rey puede suspender un tratado si ciertos
criterios especificos se encuentran. La mayor parte de las diferencias entre los
gobiernos siguen siendo tratadas por el Tribunal de Arbitraje.
Como consecuencia de estos cambios, tres regiones (Flandes, Vallonia, y
Bruselas) y tres comunidades (la Flemish, la de habla franc6s, y la de habla
alemana) componen el Estado. La comunidad de habla alemana
geogr6ficamente estA localizada dentro de la regi6n Valona que es dominada por
los Franc6fonos. La comunidad Franc6fona estd localizada en la regi6n Valona,
con excepci6n del territorio ocupado por la regi6n de habla alemana y de la
Regi6n de la capital-Bruselas. La comunidad Flemish estm localizada en la
Regi6n Flemish, y en la Regi6n de la capital-Bruselas. La nueva constituci6n
Belga sefiala las responsabilidades de las comunidades y de las regiones
(Artfculos 115-140). Las regiones tienen lajurisdicci6n sobre cuestiones como
el ambiente, el desarrollo, la vivienda, la politica econ6mica, la politica de
energfa, la polftica de empleo, y la cooperaci6n internacional. Distinto a la
autoridad regional, las instituciones de la comunidad tienen la capacidad de
mando acerca de la educaci6n y de los asuntos culturales como la polftica de la
lengua, las bellas artes, la herencia cultural, las bibliotecas, la radiodifusi6n, y
la polftica sobre la juventud. Las comunidades tambi6n tienen la jurisdicci6n
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sobre los "asuntos personalizados" que son por ejemplo la politica de la salud,
y de la ayuda a indivfduos.7"
VI. CONCLUSIONES
Con estos cambios estructurales, los Belgas se han adaptado al aumento de
las exigencias que vienen con esta transferencia. La transformaci6n del estado
ha sido hecha por etapas para dirigir las preocupaciones etnoterritoriales
dejando varias cuestiones de lado hasta que un acuerdo pueda ser alcanzado. La
confianza de que las cuestiones sern tratadas es importante para que los
participantes sientan que han sido tratados justamente y para el 6xito de
negociaciones7 Sin embargo, las reformas han reforzado la divisi6n lingiifstica
y regional y han reducido el incentivo para la cooperaci6n. Con los politicos
preocupandose de los int6reses etnoterritoriales, la revisi6n institucional es una
posibilidad constante.
Debido a que no hay tiempo ni espacio, he decidido no discutir sobre la
influencia de la sociedad en la Uni6n Europea. Sin embargo, la sociedad en la
Uni6n Europea cambia algunas de las implicaciones politicas y econ6micas de
las varias opciones de polftica. Es posible que la sociedad con la Uni6n Europea
reduciria los gastos de la desintegraci6n de B61gica en dos o tres estados. Sin
embargo, el estado de Bruselas todavfa sigue siendo una fuente de contenci6n,
ya que es predominantemente Franc6fono, pero esta localizada dentro de
Brabant que es Flemish. Las diferencias econ6micas regionales siguen
fastidiando y sumando a la tensi6n de B61gica. Los Belgas seguirdn afrontando
significantes desaffos al seguir intentando regular el conflicto ethnoterritorial.
Este articulo ha mostrado las significantes interacciones entre las seis
facetas del cubo social. Datos demogrificos, la historia, la religi6n, la economfa,
la polftica y los factores sicoculturales todos juegan un papel importante en las
estrat6gias adoptadas por los varios politicos. La religi6n acentu6 las
diferencias, aunque el pais entero es predominantemente Cat61ico, los Fleming
han sido vistos como los Cat6licos mds leales. Aunque la historia no fu6 usada
con frecuencia para la codificaci6n, la pasada historia que se relatada aquf
comprime las altemativas que pueden ser consideradas en la politica
contempordnea. Las consideraciones demogrificas pueden cambiar la fuerza
relativa de los grupos; por eso, el gobierno ha hecho la colecci6n de la
informaci6n demogrdfica acerca del uso de la lengua sumamente diffcil y no
permitirdn este tipo de preguntas en las revisiones oficiales o el censo. La
imigraci6n, sobre todo en Bruselas, puede cambiar consideraciones politicas en
un futuro pr6ximo. El poder econ6mico ha canbiado de Wallonia a Flandes
durante los ahios. Ademds, las instituciones polfticas han cambiado dando mils
71. Id.
72. Marc Uyttendael (1995). Entrevista con el autor.
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poder a los Fleming y descentralizando la toma de decisiones. Estas
consideraciones son influenciadas tambi6n por los factores sicoculturales como
la identificaci6n de los grupo y las percepciones de los grupos de afuera y sus
motivaciones. Estos factores son compuestos por el hecho que la minoria
Franc6fona por mucho tiempo sostuvo ventajas polfticas, econ6micas, y
sociales, conduciendo a que los Fleming se vieran como una mayorfa con un
complejo de minorfa." La creciente complejidad de instituciones
gubemamentales en B61gica es una indicativa de los varios caminos que pueden
ser tomados para regular el conflicto y pueden interpretarse como un
amortiguador que obliga al ptiblico a confiar en que los politicos y en que los
abogados van a revisar todas las implicaciones de los cambios futuros.
Al analizar el conflicto, es importante recordar que un solo modo de
amilisis es improbable para completamente explicar el problema. Sin embargo
varios esfuerzos para reducir el conflicto, incluyendo medidas simb6licas,
institucionales y econ6micas pueden promover la des-intensificaci6n. Estos
accesos creardn el cambio estructural adicional que influird la opci6n para la
tdctica de los partidos. Un aumento en el entendimiento del cambio estructural
es promovido por la sensibilidad a las interconecciones de los varios lados del
cubo social.




A. Figura 1: Modelo de Juegos Anidadosl
X1 X2 3
Poitka Consociltionalismo
X, X2 X3 X4
Combindo
Fumcm Tsebf (1990,59) presenm el Modelo de coaici6ny el Consociationalism. He producido el
modelo combinado.
B. Figura 2: Modelo de Cambio Estructural2
Digenmcia PeMibida
De inters ,
Fuente: Rubin et al. (1994, 1983). Hecambladsu laticapesadaa lafkct'
127120021
